Is Israel Winning the War in Gaza? (with Andrew Fox)
What this covers
Andrew Fox, a British Army major and lecturer at Sandhurst, spent a week embedded with the Israel Defense Forces, including a day in Gaza. In this conversation with Russ Roberts, Fox traces a line from tactical operations to strategic outcome, arguing that Israel is succeeding militarily while failing catastrophically in the court of public opinion. His core claim: Israel has adopted humanitarian measures—including a Civilian Harm Mitigation Cell that tracks population movement hourly across over a hundred zones—that reduce civilian casualties but lengthen the war, whereas Hamas has deliberately won the Information Warfare campaign that Israel has largely ceded.
Fox defends Israel's conduct against several critical framings. He contends that the physical destruction, while severe, is not historically anomalous—comparable to Raqqa, Homs, or Warsaw in 1944—but differs fundamentally in civilian death toll. He argues that critics cannot simultaneously demand civilian protection and condemn the war's duration, since safeguarding noncombatants necessarily extends conflict. He addresses lawfare, the ICC, and the Principle of Anticipatory Self-Defense as applied to potential Iranian strikes. On the central tension of the war—dismantling Hamas while securing hostage release—Fox identifies it as an unsolvable choice that demands political compromise.
The conversation spans military doctrine, just war theory, the distinction between Hamas and Iranian proxies, rules of engagement in contested zones, and why Western perception of the conflict has shifted so sharply. Fox offers a diagnosis: Western audiences, unfamiliar with urban warfare and emotionally responsive to atrocity imagery, lack the frame to weigh military necessity against civilian harm. He singles out Information Warfare as Israel's critical failure—not strategy, not tactics, but the battle over narrative itself.
Fox argues that Israel is succeeding in Gaza by tracing a coherent line from soldier to strategy, conducting the war with unusual humanitarian restraint that prolongs it, while its critical failure is ceding the information war to Hamas.
- Israel's humanitarian measures have lowered civilian casualties but extended the conflict's duration
- The destruction is comparable to historical urban warfare but with far fewer civilian deaths
- Hamas is deliberately and successfully fighting an information war Israel has abandoned
Israel deploys advanced civilian protection systems and targeting procedures that match or exceed international practice.
- Israel's Civilian Harm Mitigation Cell, which combines AI, open-source intelligence, and Arabic-speaking analysts to divide Gaza into over a hundred cells tracking normal versus current population hourly for every headquarters planning strikes, is a method of civilian protection that no other army has.
“the Civilian Harm Mitigation Cell is like nothing I've ever seen. It's a combination of kind of AI and open source intelligence and Arabic speakers and analysts.”
- Israel's targeting process collates intelligence and AI-derived datasets but then runs many steps—examining the area, building, munition selection, collateral damage, and civilian presence—and has canceled one in every two airstrikes since the war began for failing at one of those stages, a process indistinguishable from British or American practice.
“they've canceled one in every two airstrikes since the start of the war because it's failed at any one of those stages. And it's absolutely recognizable to me, from my own experience of targeting and calling for airstrikes.”
- The massive strike on Mohammed Deif using two or three 2,000-pounders and a bunker buster was proportional under the law of armed conflict because he was the second-in-command of the enemy's army, and you cannot judge the success of a military strike by its human-impact end state but must dispassionately measure the rationale against the legal standard.
“that is not excessive to kill the second-in-command of the enemy's army. That is proportional under the law of armed conflict, to use that force when you can identify someone that critical to the war effort.”
- Criticism of Israel using 2,000-pound dumb bombs misses that a dumb bomb is still accurate to within 30 meters when delivered by a smart aircraft and pilot, and Israel uses much smaller munitions like the 250-pound GBU-39 and even non-explosive kinetic weapons where possible.
“a dumb bomb is still accurate to within 30 meters when it's fired by a smart aircraft and a smart pilot. So, there's not just one brain in this chain.”
- Israel's rules of engagement establishing kill zones—where anyone moving in the zone can be targeted—go beyond even the loosest rule (429 Alpha) used sparingly in Afghanistan, which only permitted shooting perceived threats; this is concerning, though it is partly mitigated by the fact that civilians were evacuated leaving largely ghost towns where remaining persons may plausibly be Hamas.
“We had something called 429 Alpha, which was the most loose rule of engagement we would be given... that was that anyone who was perceived as a potential threat could be shot. Which is very different to anyone moving around in this zone can be shot.”
Destruction in Gaza stems from Hamas embedding military infrastructure inseparably within civilian areas, making large-scale damage unavoidable.
- Dismantling Hamas as a functioning organization requires destroying its power base of tunnels, co-opted buildings, and universities, but because that power base is integral to civilian municipal infrastructure and cannot be separated from it, large-scale destruction is unavoidable.
“that power base is integral to the civilian municipal infrastructure, and you can't separate them. So, it's going to see destruction.”
- The shocking level of destruction in Gaza is not malicious or for sport but results from the fact that roughly every other house contains a tunnel or booby trap that the IDF must neutralize, which cannot all be handled by combat engineers without halting progress entirely.
“There is very clear evidence that every other house has a tunnel or a booby trap and the IDF have to do something about those and they can't just send in the combat engineers every time they find one, or they'd never get anywhere.”
- Two of three water supplies into Gaza from Israel and the electricity lines were damaged by Hamas rocket fire on October 7th in the very areas where the IDF was fighting Hamas, and infrastructure repairs could not be undertaken in an active combat zone where Israel had just been invaded.
“two out of three water supplies into Gaza from Israel were damaged. Who were they damaged by? Hamas fire. The electricity lines were cut or damaged by rocket fire on October the 7th. Who fired those rockets? Again, that was Hamas.”
- The IDF has such complete freedom of movement and domination over the Philadelphi Corridor area that they can bring foreign retired officers in with confidence nothing bad will happen, indicating military control of that territory.
“the first thing that really struck me was the freedom of movement that the IDF have in that area: that they completely dominate it, to the point where they can take in a load of retired army officers from another country and be entirely confident that nothing bad is going to happen.”
Israel faces existential threats from Hamas and Iran requiring military action and preemptive strikes to force negotiations.
- Following Clausewitz, war is an extension of politics by other means, so Israel must flex its military muscle to achieve policy gains—forcing Hamas and Hezbollah to the negotiating table to back down or be killed—because there is no easy or quick solution to these situations.
“that's why we have war as an extension of politics by the admixture of other means--as good old Clausewitz said. You have to flex your military muscle to achieve policy gains somehow.”
- The Caroline Affair established the Principle of Anticipatory Self-Defense, justifying preemptive action where the necessity is instant, overwhelming, and leaves no choice or moment for deliberation; with Iran threatening hundreds of rockets and drones, Fox argues that threshold is now met and Israel should strike Iranian installations and military capability hard and immediately.
“the Caroline Affair that established the Principle of Anticipatory Self-Defense... anticipatory self-defense is justified in cases where there is a necessity of self-defense that is instant, overwhelming, leaving no other choice and no moment for deliberation. And, I think we're there.”
- Israel did not want to invade Gaza, commit hundreds of thousands of young people to a year-plus war, or absorb the economic impact of mobilizing a reservist army and disrupting supply chains, but had no choice but to act against Hamas—taking the least-worst option, just as it now faces with Iran.
“The IDF didn't want to have to go into Gaza. They didn't want to have to dismantle Hamas... But they've had no choice but to go into Gaza and do something about Hamas.”
- Israel has no choice but to be powerful and maintain a relatively aggressive foreign policy because it is surrounded by entities—Hamas, Iran—whose stated objective is its extermination, creating an unsolvable perception tension between necessary military power and images of bombs falling on homes.
“you have no choice, as Israel, to be powerful. You have to be. You're surrounded by countries that are committed to your extermination... Which leaves Israel with no choice but to have a powerful military and a relatively aggressive foreign policy. That's very, very hard to square with images of F-16s dropping bombs on people's homes.”
- Each time Israel has invaded Southern Lebanon the defending forces have been better dug in and armed, and since the 2006 invasion did not succeed, it is hard to make the case that an obvious military solution exists in 2024; the answer instead lies in striking Iran directly while degrading Hezbollah slowly through airstrikes.
“On each occasion they've gone in, the defending forces have been better and better dug in, and better and better armed. And, if it didn't succeed in 2006, I think it's hard to make the case that there's an obvious military solution in 2024.”
- Hamas is not a proxy of Iran but an ally—and only a sometime ally—working toward the same goal but not directed from Tehran, whereas Hezbollah genuinely is an Iranian proxy directed from Tehran.
“Hamas is not a proxy of Iran. They're an ally, and only a sometime ally as well. They're working to the same goal, but they're not directed from Tehran in the way that Hezbollah are.”
Israel is held to a different international standard than other armies, and criticism conflates political rhetoric with actual policy.
- The ICC has not properly applied the principle of complementarity in seeking arrest warrants against Gallant and Netanyahu, because Israel has legal procedures and peer accountability mechanisms equivalent to other democratic armies and should be given the chance to investigate its own alleged war crimes before an international court intervenes.
“complementarity has not been applied properly by the ICC [International Criminal Court] in applying for these warrants, because Israel should be given the chance to investigate their own war crimes before an international court jumps in.”
- The lawfare against Israel, including the ICJ genocide case brought by South Africa, relies heavily on inflammatory statements by politicians like Ben Gvir and Smotrich rather than Netanyahu or Gallant, who Fox believes have been misrepresented—as if these politicians are trying to lose the cases single-handedly.
“a lot of what they've used to try and prove genocidal intent is the stupid stuff some politicians have been saying back in October... Ben Gvir and Smotrich and their fellow travelers, it's almost as if they're trying to lose these cases single-handedly.”
- Israel is held to a different standard internationally than other armies, where even a single transgression brings international outrage down upon it—an atmosphere other armies do not have to operate in.
“Israel seems to be held to a different standard internationally for the behavior of its soldiers, where even one transgression will bring international outrage down upon their heads. And, that's not an atmosphere that other armies have to operate in.”
- Israel's moral authority to conduct the war derives from Hamas being the perpetrators of the October 7th atrocities, but if abuse such as the Sde Teiman allegations is proven to occur on a large scale, Israel loses that moral legitimacy, which is why accountability through the justice system is critical.
“What gives Israel the moral authority to conduct this war is the fact that Hamas are monsters and committed, the 7th of October, atrocities. If... this stuff happens on a much bigger scale, then you lose that moral legitimacy to go to war and that's incredibly damaging.”
Western populations lack awareness of actual warfare and judge civilian casualties as inherent evidence of wrongdoing rather than military necessity.
- People in the West have a complete lack of awareness of what war actually looks like, possibly due to Hollywood, video games, or the fact that the West has not fought a war of necessity for 20-30 years, which distorts public perception of civilian casualties as inherently evidence of wrongdoing.
“we seem to be very inoculated against that in the West. And, I don't know if it's by Hollywood or if it's by computer games or if it's by the fact that we haven't fought a war other than a war of selective choice for the last 20 to 30 years.”
- Sympathy for Israel dissipated quickly after October 7th because the horrors were so atrocious that people cannot conceptualize them without seeing them firsthand; studying war in concept does not move a person the way physically witnessing sites with human remains and blood stains does, which is why Israel's restraint in not exploiting those sites limits public understanding.
“one of the reasons that sympathy for Israel dissipated so quickly after 7th of October is that the horrors were so atrocious that people simply can't conceptualize them unless they've seen them themselves.”
- Atrocity imagery such as photos of dead children adds nothing to debate because it is designed to emotionally stimulate; physiologically it suppresses the prefrontal cortex (the critical thinking space) and activates the amygdala, leading viewers to false conclusions by thinking with emotion rather than rationality, and viewers cannot verify context.
“if we look at the physiology of that stimulation, it actively suppresses the prefrontal cortex, which is your critical thinking space. It activates your amygdala and it leads you to false conclusions because you're thinking with emotion rather than rationality.”
Civilian protection measures Israel adopted have prolonged the war, creating an impossible choice between critics' demands for both civilian safety and quick victory.
- Israel has taken a hit on operational success to protect civilians, and the humanitarian measures it adopted—the same ones critics demanded—have prolonged the war considerably; critics cannot simultaneously demand civilian protection and condemn Israel for failing to win quickly, because protecting civilians means Hamas fighters move and hide among them.
“one of the things that's holding them back is the humanitarian measures they've put in, which are the same humanitarian measures that people demanded they adhere to. So, you can't have it both ways.”
- If you train young men and women to be aggressive, arm them, and send them into the terror of combat, some will inevitably cross the line and commit transgressions; this happens in every army including the British SAS and Australian Special Forces in Afghanistan, which is why war crimes legislation exists to hold perpetrators accountable.
“if you train young men and women to be aggressive, and if you arm them--if you send them into the terror of combat--some of them will cross the line. It's inevitable, and it happens in every single army”
Israel's information war disadvantage allows Hamas disinformation and lawfare to succeed, particularly among young Western audiences.
- Israel has vacated the battlefield of the information war, which differs from past conflicts because it is now a specific strategic aim of Hamas to degrade Israel's viability and legitimacy on the international stage, and Hamas has been incredibly successful—evidenced by Ireland, Spain, and Norway recognizing Palestinian statehood—while Israel's abandonment of the information space has enabled lawfare efforts.
“Israel has vacated the battlefield on the information war for this conflict... it's a very specific strategic aim of Hamas in this conflict to damage Israel on the international scale--on the international stage--to degrade Israel's viability and legitimacy as a country in the eyes of large parts of the world. And it has been incredibly successful in doing that.”
- Since 70% of young people get their news from social media, Israel's reliance on an older uniformed spokesman with a thick Hebrew accent fails to connect with the West, and Israel has completely vacated the space of memes and TikTok videos where young people actually consume news.
“where are the memes? Where are the TikTok videos? Where are the things that young people are using to get their news? 70% of young people get their news from social media; and Israel has completely vacated that space.”
- Polling suggests the demographic in the West that has most turned against Israel is young women, who are motivated by disinformation and appeals to emotion in Hamas's information campaign; this is a logical deduction because young women tend to score very high on empathy and respond strongly to images of dead children.
“the people in the West who've most turned against Israel are young women who are motivated by the disinformation and the appeals to emotion that we see from Hamas's information campaign. And, you can make a fairly logical deduction. That's because young women tend to be very high on empathy.”
- Many protesters do not actually protest the real Israel—evidenced by their not knowing which river and which sea 'from the river to the sea' refers to—but have turned Israel into a conceptual cipher onto which they project all their rage at the world's injustices, so they are protesting something other than Israel itself.
“There's almost a conceptual Israel versus an Israel in reality. They have turned Israel conceptually into a sort of cipher for all their anger at the world's injustices, and they've projected all their rage at the unfairness in the world onto Israel as some kind of totem”
Success should be measured by achieving strategic objectives rather than speed, and Hamas must accept Israeli terms through military pressure.
- Framing the Gaza war as win-or-lose is not useful; success should be measured by whether the strategic outcomes articulated at the start—dismantling Hamas, securing the border, returning hostages—are achieved, and ultimately by forcing Hamas to accept terms Israel sets rather than terms Hamas sets.
“I don't like 'win-or-lose.' I don't think it's useful. I think the way we measure success here is in terms of what strategic outcomes were articulated at the start of the war and what strategic objectives are achieved at the end of it.”
- The central paradox of the conflict is that it will be very difficult to remove Hamas entirely while simultaneously securing a deal to return the hostages, so there must be compromise, since writing off the hostages would be a utilitarian measure no prime minister could politically survive.
“that's the real paradox at the center of this conflict, is that it's going to be very difficult to remove Hamas entirely and come to a deal to return the hostages at the same time. So, there's going to have to be some compromise here”
- Fox observed no bloodthirstiness or murderous rage in IDF planning; instead there was a repeated, painfully felt acknowledgment of failure across all levels and an icy, methodical, precise approach to operations rather than revenge-driven leveling of city blocks.
“there was a drumbeat throughout the week of IDF officers saying, explicitly, 'We failed.' And I heard that phrase, it must be 50 times.”
Casualty estimates, humanitarian metrics, and early conflict conditions contradict claims of deliberate siege or famine in Gaza.
- Fox estimates civilian casualties in Gaza at roughly 10,000 to 15,000—still a huge number but vastly lower than Hamas claims and the figures cited by the international community.
“The civilian casualty rates, I mean, I would estimate it's 10- to 15,000 civilians. As you say, it's still a huge number, but it's vastly lower than Hamas claim”
- More calories are now going into Gaza daily than before the war—roughly 3,600 calories per person versus the 2,100 a human needs—so any famine is blatantly the result of distribution issues within Gaza, compounded by it being a war zone and by UNRWA and the UN being unfit for purpose.
“their estimates are, it's about 3,600 calories per person going into Gaza, when the average human just needs 2,100 to keep alive for a day. So, any starvation or any famine is blatantly the results of distribution issues within Gaza itself.”
- The early-war allegation of an Israeli siege on Gaza is nonsense because Israel lacked the capability to impose one—Egypt controlled the Rafah crossing and could have opened it during the early stages, so any siege would implicate Egypt as complicit.
“Israel didn't have the capability to impose a siege on Gaza at the start of the war, because Israel controlled--sorry--Egypt controlled the Rafah crossing. If there was a siege, then that means Egypt is complicit in this because they could have quite easily opened that up during the early stages of the war.”
- The destruction in Gaza is not worse than that of Raqqa, Homs, Caen in 1944, or Warsaw in 1944, but the critical difference is that Israel has killed far fewer civilians than those conflicts did when leveling cities.
“it's not worse destruction than Raqa, or Homs, or Brosni, or Caen in 1944 in Northern France, or Warsaw in 1944. The difference being, of course, that Israel have killed far fewer civilians than people in those conflicts when they leveled those cities.”
- The scale of destruction means substantial reconstruction investment will be required after the war to prevent Gaza from becoming a festering sore on Israel's southwestern border, but there is no clear answer yet as to who will provide it.
“it's going to need a lot of investment from somebody, and I don't think there's a clear answer as to who that is going to be yet or what it's going to look like.”