What this covers
Paul Bloom and Russ Roberts examine whether AI simulations of the dead represent a form of solace or a fundamental violation of what makes us human. The conversation begins with a practical observation: modern grief psychology shows that bereaved people routinely maintain connections with the deceased—hearing their voices, speaking to them, preserving their things—outside any framework of denial or pathology. An AI avatar might simply extend this natural process. But the two speakers quickly move beyond the therapeutic question to the philosophical one: even if such simulations ease loneliness and pain, do they undermine something essential about the human condition? Roberts and Bloom weigh this tension throughout, acknowledging genuine hardship—the elderly parent calling not for information but for contact, the desperately lonely with no realistic prospect of companionship—against the risk that frictionless artificial relationships could make real human friction seem intolerable by comparison.
The discussion draws on Robert Nozick's Experience Machine as its central philosophical anchor: a thought experiment in which pleasant but disconnected simulation is pitted against reality, no matter how flawed. Bloom articulates the threat through junk food analogy—engineered to exploit our preferences perfectly, leaving real people unable to compete. Roberts introduces Nietzsche's amor fati, the notion that meaning derives from embracing genuine fate rather than curated alternatives. The conversation also draws on Jewish mourning practice, specifically Shiva, as an example of how structured, graduated grief produces catharsis rather than evasion. What emerges is not a simple prohibition but a distinction: AI companions might genuinely benefit those on the periphery of human connection, while those positioned to live full lives should resist the substitution. The speakers disagree on where that line falls, and on whether the choice itself changes who we become.
Bloom and Roberts argue that AI simulations of dead or absent loved ones are simultaneously a blessing and an abomination: they can relieve grief and loneliness, but because they give us frictionless, idealized companionship, they threaten to substitute for the difficult, flawed, real human connection that gives life meaning.
- AI companions are engineered to satisfy our preferences perfectly, like junk food, which makes real people seem unsatisfying by comparison
- Immersing oneself in artificial relationships resembles Nozick's Experience Machine: pleasant but ultimately disconnected from reality
- Grief, suffering, and the imperfections of real people are valuable parts of being human that these substitutes erode
AI companions let us escape real relationships by substituting for human connection rather than strengthening it.
- Once AI substitutes for friendship and companionship exist, they lessen the moral obligation we feel to reach out to lonely people in need—for example, a relative one is reluctant to visit can be offloaded onto a charming avatar—even though the substitute may still leave that person lonely when no one real is around.
“once there are substitutes for friendship, for companionship, it lessens the moral obligation we would have to reach out to people in need.”
- An always-available avatar of a deceased spouse could delay or prevent a bereaved person from re-engaging with life and grief, and could persist into a new marriage as an ongoing relationship a new partner might resent or encourage, mirroring how divorced people stay 'friends' with exes.
“if God forbid someone lost a spouse fairly young or certainly at midlife, and you had that avatar... would that delay you from entering out and dealing with your grief?”
- When elderly parents call with a question they could easily Google, they are not calling to get the answer but to talk to the actual person—they want you, not an avatar—which is why a button-box substitute labeled with your name would not satisfy them.
“they're not calling to get the answer. They're calling to talk to me, and they don't want the avatar. They want me.”
- As AI companions compete with real people, only the most extraordinary and charismatic people may retain real friends, while the less attractive and less charismatic are driven into a fully online existence.
“only the most extraordinary, perhaps--maybe only the most extraordinary people--will have real friends. And, the less attractive, less charismatic people will be driven to a fully online existence.”
Creating or inhabiting perfectly tailored digital simulations is abominable because it replaces genuine reality with controlled, consequence-free fantasy.
- What makes AI simulations an 'abomination' rather than merely creepy is twofold: first, tweaking the simulation to produce the version you want rather than the reality that was, and second, living in that frictionless digital world full-time as a retreat from flesh-and-blood human existence.
“The weird part, I think, is twofold. It's the tweaking to produce what you want as opposed to the reality that was. And then, the second part is living in that world full time.”
- Nozick's Experience Machine—where you live a feeling of accomplishment while actually achieving nothing—would have horrified most people when written in the 1970s, but many more people in the modern world now say they would plug in, reflecting a shift toward valuing felt experience over real accomplishment.
“when Nozick wrote that Experience Machine example, which was back in the 1970s, I think most people would have been horrified by it... in the modern world, meaning now, many more people are willing to live that, do that.”
- Not everyone would tweak a simulation toward perfection; many people would want an imperfect or more demanding partner—one who is more critical or less attentive—because they see benefit in having a spouse they live up to rather than exploit.
“There are many people who would want an imperfect one, I assume, and would want those tweaks to go the other direction: 'Make it harder for me. I want to suffer.'”
- The Nietzschean idea of amor fati—loving one's fate by embracing everything that has happened, good and bad—stands opposed to the Experience Machine and to AI companions, because in a world where you can hang out only with people who love and praise you, the fate you 'love' is curated and controlled rather than genuinely beyond your control.
“loving one's fate means you embrace everything that's happened to you, the good and the bad. And, of course, that's a different way of saying that the Experience Machine is not the right way to go.”
Secular worldviews stripped of religious frameworks for meaning make digital immortality and AI companionship appealing as substitutes for confronting mortality and suffering.
- Human finitude and mortality are unbearable, so humans long for immortality and pursue it in many ways—through children, books, and the memories of the living—while religion once provided more effective solace through the idea of an afterlife and reunion.
“as human beings, our finitude, our mortality is unbearable. And, religion provides, or used to... some solace for that with the idea of an afterlife, or reuniting.”
- As the religious worldview—belief in a divine soul and an afterlife—has diminished in the West, it becomes harder to defend anything beyond utilitarian physical pleasure, making digital alternatives like AI companions more appealing to secular people who see life simply as something to be enjoyed.
“as religion diminishes, I think it's harder and harder to reclaim anything other than utilitarian physical pleasure.”
- Suffering is at the core of the Judeo-Christian tradition—not sought out, but treated as an essential part of being human from which one grows—illustrated by the parable that the heart, like a stone, must be broken before it can be carried up and elevated.
“a religious person is into suffering... it is part of the experience of being a human being, is to suffer and to be sad, and to deal with that, and to learn how to grow from that.”
Real human conversation is rare and precious partly because we lack attention discipline, not opportunity, yet this scarcity is what makes it valuable.
- The optimistic possibility is that interacting with infinitely charming, intelligent simulations could make people compete harder and 'up their game,' raising the quality and preciousness of real human conversation—so that interacting with inhuman things ultimately makes us more human.
“I like to think that if we had these online options... this would make our human interactions so much more intense, and so much more precious”
- Deep conversation is rare partly because it is hard to pay attention—we are distracted by thinking about lunch, the next meeting, or a small personal success—so we miss chances for real connection not for lack of opportunity but for lack of the skill to focus on the person in front of us.
“I find my failed conversations with the people around me because I'm thinking about what I'm going to have for lunch or what I'm going to do next at the meeting at 2:00... I feel like a lot of the times we miss those chances because we don't have... the skill to focus the way we could”
- Black Mirror, nominally science fiction, no longer feels futuristic because we are very close to living in the world it depicts rather than merely imagining it.
“We're very close to living in a science fiction world, rather than imagining it or reading it.”
- Current attempts to simulate dead figures by uploading their podcast transcripts or writing produce disappointing, uninteresting conversations, but the technology will steadily improve.
“I can have a conversation with Adam Smith based on his books that are online. And, it's disappointing. It's not very interesting. But it will get better.”
- There will be a large age gap in what is considered abominable versus a blessing, with younger people who are more accustomed to technological comfort, and especially secular young people, finding older people's unease about digital companionship baffling or silly.
“I think there would be a big age gap in what is considered abominable and what is considered a blessing.”
- Roberts missed his father less than expected after his death because the man who died at 89 was not the same person as the funny, wise 40-to-58-year-old father he was actually close to; he grieved the earlier version, not the diminished one at the end.
“when he died, he wasn't the same person he was when he was younger. I didn't miss the man who passed away at 89 years old. I missed the man who was the 50-year-old--or even better, the 40-year-old father of me as a young boy”