Should Israel Depend on the US? (with Michael Oren)
What this covers
Michael Oren, historian and former Israeli Ambassador to the United States, argues that Israel should phase out American military aid and pursue strategic independence. The conversation with Russ Roberts examines why the aid, now worth roughly $4 billion annually—about 16 percent of Israel's defense budget—has become a liability rather than an asset. Oren contends that the aid arrives as restricted vouchers that limit Israeli procurement and cede sovereignty over foreign policy decisions, exemplified by the presence of the US Secretary of State in Israel's War Cabinet. He traces this argument through decades of Israeli-American relations, showing how compliance with American pressure to avoid military action has historically cost Israel respect and strategic advantage, while defiance of such counsel has ultimately deepened American respect.
The discussion ranges across Israel's current military capabilities and economic strength, the structure of aid agreements from the Obama era onward, the strategic messaging embedded in dependency, and the specific constraints on munitions procurement and independent weapons development. Oren addresses the Gaza War directly, presenting Israel's casualty ratios in urban combat and examining how American criticism of Palestinian deaths inadvertently strengthens Hamas's negotiating position through perverse incentives. He also tackles public diplomacy failures, arguing Israel faces a different standard than other nations—one shaped by cultural shifts in 1967 and overlaid with antisemitic tropes. On the path forward, Oren outlines conditions for a post-war Gaza and explains why support for a two-state solution has collapsed among Israelis across the political spectrum, while expressing confidence in Israeli society's resilience and technological trajectory.
Michael Oren argues that Israel, now an affluent and militarily capable nation, should phase out US military aid to achieve strategic independence, because the aid's strings concede sovereignty and project weakness, while history shows Israel earns American respect precisely when it defends itself against US advice.
- US military aid comes as restricted in-kind vouchers that cede control over Israeli foreign policy and procurement
- Historically, every time the US told Israel not to go to war and Israel complied, Israel paid a price and lost American respect
- Israel is now wealthy and capable enough that the strategic 'message' of US aid no longer holds, making dependency a liability
US aid dependency surrenders Israeli sovereignty; Israel must develop domestic munitions and military capabilities to escape American leverage over policy.
- US aid to Israel of about $4 billion a year comes to roughly $1 per month per American and now represents only about 16% of Israel's defense budget, down from 50% forty years ago, and $4 billion only buys half of one Zumwalt-class destroyer—so the monetary value no longer justifies the strings attached.
“the aid is about $4 billion a year. And, you know what $4 billion buys you today in military terms? It buys you half of one Zumwalt-class destroyer.”
- A central post-Gaza-War goal for Israel should be to achieve strategic independence from the United States—ending dependency on US aid while maintaining America as its principal ally through a relationship of genuine partnership in fields like cyber, laser/directed-energy technology, computer science, and joint maneuvers, rather than a giver-receiver dynamic.
“one of the great goals of Israel, post-Gaza War, will be to achieve strategic independence from the United States of America.”
- The Obama-era Memorandum of Understanding was worse than the Bush package because it eliminated Off-Shore Procurement (the prior 26% of aid Israel could spend domestically to build capabilities the US doesn't need and to create tens of thousands of Israeli jobs), forced all aid to be spent in the US, and attached strings limiting Israel's ability to seek congressional plus-ups for systems like Iron Dome and David's Sling.
“The Obama MOU eliminated the 26%. So, all of the aid has to be spent in the United States.”
- Dependence on American munitions gives the US leverage to deny Israel critical supplies, as when President Obama in 2014 denied Israel the keys to pre-positioned US ammunition warehouses for certain munitions on the grounds that Israel was killing too many Palestinians; the remedy, demonstrated by Israel developing its own cluster bombs after the Second Lebanon War, is domestic production of key munitions like 105mm, 155mm, and JDAMs.
“in 2014, during an earlier war with Hamas, President Obama denied us the keys for certain forms of ammunition because, quote-unquote, "We were killing too many Palestinians."”
- The biggest problem with US aid is the control it gives Washington over Israeli foreign policy—a concession of sovereignty seen poignantly in the US Secretary of State sitting in Israel's War Cabinet—because the dependency means Israel cannot tell American forces it has the situation under control and must accept strings on its decision-making.
“the biggest issue now is the control it gives over our foreign policy. It is a concession of sovereignty and the decision-making.”
American pressure on civilian casualties sends Hamas a strategic message to hold longer, while ceasefire demands and ICC condemnations embolden further pressure on Israel.
- American criticism that Israel is killing too many Palestinians sends a strategic message to Hamas leaders that they should hold on longer to provoke more civilian deaths, because mounting deaths will eventually rupture US support and force a ceasefire—and a ceasefire is precisely what Hamas needs to win the war.
“if you're a leader of Hamas and you're dug in a tunnel and you hear the Secretary of State say this, what you would conclude is: I've got to dig in my heels and hold on for a little while longer, get Israel to kill more civilians.”
- UN Security Council ceasefire demands and International Court of Justice condemnations matter to Israel for one reason: they can serve as a legal basis for boycotts and sanctions and put further pressure on the Biden Administration to cease the two policies essential to Israel's security.
“For one reason, and one reason only. They can serve as a basis for boycotts and sanctions. They could put further pressure on the Biden Administration to cease applying those two policies that are essential for our security.”
- The US Secretary of State's shift from endorsing Israel's goal of 'destroying Hamas' to merely seeking to 'prevent the recurrence of October 7th' signals, in diplomatic terms, that the Administration no longer supports destroying Hamas and may instead back a Palestinian unity government that includes Hamas elements.
“In his recent press conference here in Israel he said, 'Our goal is to prevent the recurrence of the events of October 7th.' And, being an old diplomat, I said, 'Whoa, that's a huge difference.'”
Lopsided hostage-for-prisoner swaps teach terrorists that taking hostages yields enormous bargaining power and killing Jews carries little cost.
- Lopsided prisoner-for-hostage exchanges create perverse incentives: the Gilad Shalit deal freed 1,027 terrorists to recover one soldier, most returned to terror (including Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar), teaching every terrorist organization that taking hostages yields enormous bargaining power and that killing a Jew carries little lasting cost—so in the long run such deals cost more lives than they save.
“we paid for it with the freeing of 1,027 terrorists from our jail. Among those terrorists, almost all of them went back to committing acts of terror. And, one of them was Yahya Sinwar, the head of Hamas.”
- Israel was founded on a covenant to defend the state and its people and, if soldiers fall captive, to do everything to get them back; October 7th broke both halves of that defense identity, presenting the irreconcilable dilemma that destroying Hamas (e.g., flooding or torching tunnels) and redeeming the hostages are largely mutually exclusive goals.
“they are largely mutually exclusive and irreconcilable goals. Because, the easiest thing for the IDF to do... was to go into Gaza, filled up all the tunnels either with saltwater or with flammable material and thrown in a match, and it's over. But, we can't do that because of the hostages.”
Two-state solutions are now impossible because Palestinian states would collapse into Hamas rule, placing Israeli cities in rifle rather than rocket range.
- The day-after plan for Gaza requires demilitarization, internationalization of the problem with a large Arab component, a cordon sanitaire (security buffer) around Gaza, international supervision of reconstruction, and—hardest of all—finding a homegrown indigenous Palestinian leadership that cares more about its children than about killing Israelis, rather than importing leaders from the West Bank or Tunis.
“The hardest stage is finding the Palestinian leadership--not necessarily importing one from the West Bank and one from the West Bank that was in turn was imported from Tunis... It really needs someone who is homegrown.”
- Support for a two-state solution among Israelis, even those left of center, has waned to virtually zero because of facts on the ground, since a Palestinian state in the West Bank could collapse into a Hamas state within days and put central Israeli cities like Jaffa within rifle range rather than just rocket range—making it a life-and-death rather than political question.
“If you say to them today, two states, Palestine, they'll tell you, 'You are crazy. Are you off your rocker?' For us, it's not politics. For us, it's life and death.”
Israel's civilian casualty ratio in Gaza ranks among the world's best in urban combat; mortality figures sourced from Hamas conflate terrorists and own misfires.
- Israel's ratio of civilian to combatant deaths in Gaza is roughly two to one—about half the ratio the US incurred in Iraq and Afghanistan and half NATO's rate in Kosovo—which constitutes a world record for intense urban combat against an enemy embedded in and shielded by its civilian population.
“a ratio of about two to one, civilian to soldier. Soldier to combatant deaths: that is roughly half the ratio of United States and Iraq and Afghanistan, half the rate of NATO and Kosovo--something of a world record”
- The widely cited figure of 23,000 Gazans killed is an inflated number sourced from Hamas that lumps together killed terrorists and Palestinians killed by their own misfired rockets, yet it is reported repeatedly and routinely accompanied by the unverified claim 'mostly women and children,' which echoes antisemitic tropes about Jews killing innocents.
“the source of that statistic is Hamas. How many times have you seen that cited multiple times a day? And then, they'll always add, 'Mostly women and children.' Is that verifiable?”
- Israel's effort to minimize Palestinian casualties is not only moral but strategic, because killing too many Palestinians could threaten the US supply of ammunition that the IDF needs—so the domestic Israeli criticism is actually that Israel takes excessive risks with its own soldiers' lives to curry international favor.
“we need that favor in order to gain time and space for the IDF to get ammunition, for example, from the United States. If we killed too many Palestinians, that supply of ammunition might be threatened.”
Israel's societal resilience, technological achievement, and willingness to defy US advice when defending itself justify long-term optimism despite current despair.
- A key lesson of this crisis is that Israeli society is, without competition, the strongest and most resilient society on the planet, which combined with Israel's historical transformation from a lower-middle-class orange-juice exporter to a technological powerhouse with global ties justifies optimism about the country's future even amid despair.
“we've learned that Israeli society, I think, without competition, is the strongest, most resilient society on the planet. And, what an asset that is.”
- In nearly every Israeli war from 1948 to the present, the United States told Israel not to go to war; every time Israel defied that advice and defended itself, the Americans were angry but later respected Israel and deepened the alliance, whereas every time Israel complied (1973, 1991) it paid a price and received pressure and contempt rather than respect—because America admires a country that stands up for itself.
“in almost every case, the United States said to us, 'Don't go to war.' Every case... And, every time we said, 'Thank you, but we have to defend ourselves,' the Americans got angry and later they respected us for it.”
- Being Israel's Ambassador to the US is a 24/7 role serving as the nexus among hundreds of US and Israeli officials, security and intelligence agencies, and diverse communities, with a punishing social and time-zone schedule that leaves the ambassador constantly sleep-deprived.
“you can't really talk about a day because it's 24/7... you are the nexus between 435 members of Congress, 120 members of Knesset”
Western culture's valorization of victimhood over victory and Israel's public diplomacy failures reflect antisemitic double standards and classic tropes.
- The year 1967 was an inflection point in the West where it became culturally 'cool to be a victim' and 'uncool to be a victor'—reversing the prior valorization of heroism—and Israel, having won decisively, came out slightly too late and on the wrong side of that shift, visible even in Hollywood's switch from heroic cowboys to sympathetic Indians.
“In 1967 was an inflection point in the West generally, where the people who had been victims before were looked down upon. And, all of a sudden it became, in 1967, cool to be a victim. And it became uncool to be a victor.”
- Because Oren was not a close protégé of the Prime Minister—the usual source of an ambassador's plenipotentiary strength—he built influence and access by relentlessly appearing in the press and on television, a strategy that worked because the media-sensitive Obama Administration was itself composed of many former media figures.
“I had to get influence and achieve influence and access by constantly being in the press, constantly being on TV. And, the Obama Administration was an administration that was very sensitive to the media because it was actually composed of a lot of people from the media.”
- Israel's public diplomacy fails fundamentally not for technical reasons but because it is the Jewish State, judged by a completely different set of criteria and held under a microscope no other country faces, with much criticism echoing classic antisemitic tropes such as the Massacre of the Innocents, blood libel, and deicide.
“the basic reason our public diplomacy--I would call it--is so bad is because we are the Jewish State... e judged by a completely different set of criteria. Held under that microscope of a power that no other country is examined.”
- The Biden Administration's Middle East policy lacks any clear line and is characterized by dramatic reversals, such as cold-shouldering Netanyahu and the Saudis for years before suddenly bear-hugging both to broker an Israel-Saudi peace deal.
“If I'd been asked to define President Biden's Administration's policy in the Middle East--this is going back to the inception of his Administration till today--I can't. There's no clear line. There's a tremendous amount of zigzagging.”
- The barbarism of October 7th, though shocking to Israelis, was par for the course in Middle Eastern warfare—matching what Arab peoples have done to one another in events like the massacres at Damour and Sabra and Shatila and the Syrian regime's treatment of its own population—because this brutality is 'the Middle East way of war.'
“the events of October 7th--we talked about barbarism and evil and the satanic nature of them--were pretty much par for the course for the Middle East. This is what Arab peoples have done to one another.”
Israel can militarily degrade Hamas but cannot destroy its ideology without education, as occurred when Nazi Germany and ISIS were eliminated.
- Israel can militarily degrade Hamas so it cannot threaten Israel as much, but cannot destroy the idea of Hamas—the same caliphate-restoring ideology as ISIS, Al-Qaeda, and Hezbollah—with bombs and bullets; only education can kill the idea, just as neo-Nazis and ISIS cells became far less threatening once Nazi Germany and the Islamic State were eliminated.
“You can't kill that idea with bombs and bullets. You can kill it with education. Let's see if anybody's going to do that.”
- Israel's recurring military operations are not merely tactics in search of a strategy; the tactics ARE the strategy—every few years enemies try to destroy Israel and Israel reminds them it is not a good idea, buying years during which Israel builds a successful society, and over time some adversaries (Egypt, Jordan, Abraham Accords states) conclude 'enough is enough.'
“'Jeff, you don't understand. The tactics are the strategy. Since coming into being in 1948, every couple of years, they're going to try to destroy us again. And, every couple of years we're going to have to remind them that it's not a good idea. And, that buys us a certain number of years.'”