What this covers

Noah Smith and Russ Roberts examine whether historical plunder, colonialism, and slavery enriched nations, arguing the opposite: that wealth came from productivity growth and industrialization rather than resource extraction. The conversation moves through economic history, contemporary geopolitics, and future risks to global progress, anchored by the distinction between stocks versus flows—plunder transfers existing resources at a point in time, but genuine wealth requires continuous improvements in how goods are produced.

The episode ranges widely across evidence and counterargument. Smith observes that almost all human enrichment occurred after 1870, despite centuries of prior plunder, and that countries without colonial empires (Germany, South Korea, Sweden) grew wealthy while colonial powers (Spain, Portugal) often remained poor. The conversation tests competing hypotheses: whether slavery enriched America (Smith argues enslaved people's inability to develop human capital created massive economic distortion), whether cheap colonial inputs sparked the Industrial Revolution (evidence is inconclusive), and whether modern conquest remains rational (Smith contends it does not, since contemporary leaders seek honor and identity rather than economic gain). The two also discuss capital-labor substitution, the role of market liberalization in China and India's growth, the risks of great power war to trade and innovation, and how technology advances and foreign direct investment may reshape global prosperity. Throughout, the discussion distinguishes between necessary and sufficient conditions for enrichment, contests specific historical claims (including Ed Baptist's thesis on slave torture and cotton production), and weighs whether current stagnation in Japan, Italy, and Britain signals limits to growth itself.

Sharpest takeaway

Smith argues that nations do not become rich through plunder, colonialism, or slavery but through industrialization and productivity growth, because wealth is created by transforming how things are produced rather than transferring existing stocks of resources.

  • Almost all enrichment happened after ~1870 despite centuries of prior plunder, showing plunder produced poverty not wealth
  • Countries with no colonial empires (Germany, South Korea, Sweden) got rich while colonial powers (Spain, Portugal) often stayed poor
  • Wealth requires growth (flows) through productivity and machines, not one-time transfers (stocks) of plundered resources

The argument · threads6 threads · 29 claims
0.85

Colonial plunder and slavery enriched individuals but did not create national wealth or justify modern territorial conquest.

6 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Almost all of human enrichment has happened in the last 150 years since roughly 1870; before that, even nations that had plundered extensively for centuries were still incredibly poor by modern standards, meaning all that pre-1870 plunder was essentially one poor person taking another poor person's small amount of money.

    “When you look at when nations got really rich, pretty much all of the enrichment has happened in the last 150 years, since maybe 1870 or so.”

  • One serious hypothesis holds that Britain industrialized because cheap resources extracted from colonies made capital cheap relative to expensive labor, prompting businesses to substitute machines for workers and triggering a virtuous cycle of investment in better technology; under this view, colonial extraction may have been the spark that started the Industrial Revolution and saved humanity from perpetual poverty, though the evidence is highly inconclusive.

    “a key part of that argument is the idea that cheap resources from extraction from colonies made capital cheap and prompted business people in Britain to use machines instead of workers”

  • Slavery did not enrich the American nation but made slaveholding regions poorer, because enslaved people could not develop human capital and a large share of the population was prevented from realizing its full productive potential, creating massive efficiency wedges and economic distortions even as it enriched individual slave owners at others' expense.

    “they theorize and show evidence consistent with the idea that slavery made regions poorer. When you extracted wealth from people by enslaving them, you distorted your economy in all sorts of ways.”

  • Colonial-style plunder—sending armed forces to seize resources and extract labor through enslavement or coerced low-wage work—has been a common practice for many empires for thousands of years, with Spain's silver mining via the encomienda system being roughly typical rather than exceptional.

    “this has actually been kind of a common thing for a lot of empires for thousands of years--you saw this kind of plunder. And Spain didn't do it too differently.”

  • Ed Baptist's claim that American slave owners discovered new methods of horrific torture to dramatically increase cotton output is unsupported, because no such torture system was ever specified or evidenced, and the actual increases in cotton production came from the introduction of better, identifiable cotton varieties at known dates.

    “There's no evidence for such a torture system at all. No one knows what it was. He just made up the idea that some sort of thing like that must have existed.”

  • Modern would-be conquerors do not actually believe conquest will make them rich—China cannot capture a functioning TSMC because the plants would be wiped and destroyed, Russia cannot get rich from Ukrainian wheat fields—so contemporary territorial aggression is driven by honor, ethnic identity, historical revenge, and bloodlust rather than rational economic gain.

    “China doesn't want Taiwan because they think they can capture TSMC and make some nice semiconductors. They can't. TSMC will wipe the servers, blow up the plants, and just leave.”

0.75

Market liberalization and private enterprise drive sustained economic growth more than state control or resource extraction.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Having a colonial empire was neither necessary nor sufficient for getting rich: countries like Germany, Sweden, Switzerland, Denmark, South Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan got rich without significant colonial empires, while empires like Spain and Portugal extracted vast resources yet stayed poor because they squandered the wealth on wars and monuments rather than investing in industrialization.

    “we know that countries got rich without having their own colonial empires. We know that countries that had their own colonial empires often did not get rich. So, it was neither necessary nor sufficient to have a colonial empire nor industrialize.”

  • China was made strong by Deng Xiaoping and his handpicked successors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao through liberalization and privatization, while Xi Jinping appropriated their success and has been eroding the system's fundamental strengths by growing state-owned enterprises at the expense of private enterprise; Xi is skilled at internal domination but ineffective at using it to help China economically, as shown by the Belt and Road flop, the reversed IT crackdown, and the real estate disaster.

    “China was made strong by the efforts of Deng Xiaoping and his handpicked successors, Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. They're the ones who made China strong. Xi Jinping then came and basically appropriated their success”

  • China and India experienced big growth spurts when they liberalized their economies: China through Deng's market reforms in the 1980s and later privatizations of state-owned enterprises under Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao, plus low-tax Special Economic Zones, while India dismantled the License Raj of business red tape primarily in the 1990s; this market liberalization, not central control, was the biggest driver of their growth.

    “China and India experienced big spurts of growth when they liberalized their economies. China in the 1980s, and then later with a big wave of privatizations in the 1990s and 2000s. And India, primarily in the 1990s”

  • Smith is optimistic about future economic wellbeing for two main reasons: technology is advancing strongly (dramatic declines in solar and battery costs, biotech advances like cancer vaccines and antibodies, and AI), and a huge new wave of globalization is coming as foreign investment redirects from China to South and Southeast Asia's roughly 2 billion people, transferring technology and improving institutions as those countries reform to attract business.

    “I think there's a huge wave of globalization coming, and it's South- and Southeast-Asia. It is 2 billion people, which is bigger than China.”

0.56

Global trade and institutional reform, enabled by foreign investment and open seas, transfer technology and improve governance.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The decoupling and de-risking of supply chains away from China is being driven so far primarily by private initiatives rather than government policy, because companies and countries are realizing the real risks of doing business in China and are getting out, redirecting investment toward South and Southeast Asia.

    “decoupling and de-risking are all private initiatives so far, because countries are realizing the real risks of doing business in China. Companies are realizing the real risks of doing business in China.”

  • Tariffs and protectionism are a smaller threat to trade than commonly believed because exchange rates appreciate and depreciate to cancel out much of a tariff's effect; the far bigger threat to global trade is the breakdown of global order and freedom of the seas, since most trade moves cheaply by sea under protection of the US and allied navies, and chokepoints can be interdicted by actors like the Houthis or claimed by China in the South China Sea.

    “If you put tariffs on a country, exchange rates will just appreciate and depreciate until it cancels out much of the tariff you put.”

  • Foreign direct investment does more than transfer technology; it catalyzes institutional improvement because recipient countries realize they will make more money by reforming their institutions to be favorable to foreign businesses, as demonstrated by Poland and Malaysia, which were vaulted into the ranks of developed nations and saw their institutions improve—Poland now having effectively Western European institutions.

    “it is going to influence the progress of institutions in those countries, because those countries are going to realize, 'Hey, if we change our institutions in this, and this, and that way to be favorable to these foreign businesses, then we'll make more money.'”

0.51

Technological innovation in energy, biology, and computing will solve major challenges and sustain economic progress.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Adam Smith in 1776, in The Wealth of Nations, correctly anticipated that productivity improvements could exist and recognized through the pin factory example that substituting machinery for human labor enables innovation, which was remarkable because there was little actual innovation in his time and he did not understand industrial labs or machinery.

    “It's kind of amazing that Adam Smith got this right before it happened.”

  • Climate doomerism is not warranted by the evidence; while there will be negative environmental impacts from climate change, the same innovation driving cheap solar, batteries, and other technology will save us from the worst impacts, so climate is not going to derail continued economic progress.

    “I think that there's a lot of people who are doomers about climate, and if you look at the evidence, that's not warranted. The doomerism is just absolutely not warranted.”

0.51

Great power conflict and loss of American hegemony pose the greatest risks to continued global prosperity and development.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The biggest risk to continued global economic progress is great power war, especially nuclear war—a war between China and the United States would be the most catastrophic, and Russia cannot be counted out—because such war would disrupt global trade and investment and redirect technological progress toward weapons rather than civilian benefit, unlike the favorable post-WWII outcome that is not guaranteed to repeat.

    “The thing I worry about is war. The thing I worry about is great power war, especially nuclear war. War between China and the United States would be the absolute most catastrophic.”

  • America's longstanding global hegemony has ended—not primarily because America got weaker, but because other countries, especially China, grew more powerful, and because technological changes let small militias like the Houthis wield outsized power; this loss of hegemony is causing the post-WWII quasi-enforcement of national borders to break down and territorial conflicts to reappear.

    “It's not because we got worse or weaker. We got weaker in some ways. But mostly it is because countries like China grew.”

0.39

Income and migration patterns, tax policy, and stagnation in some wealthy nations complicate universal narratives of growth.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Cheap inputs are not automatically an economic advantage: prices should equal marginal costs, and when prices are pushed below marginal cost it introduces a distortion that causes resources to be over-allocated to that activity and diverted away from more valuable uses.

    “Prices should equal marginal costs. If prices are below marginal costs, it's not an advantage.”

  • China has been a notoriously low-tax country for over a thousand years and lacks property taxes, funding local government services through real estate land sales instead; now that real estate prices are falling and no one wants to buy land from local governments, this model has come back to bite them and contributes to China's current economic slowdown.

    “real estate sales were used in lieu of taxes to fund government services. And, now that real estate is going down in price and no one wants to buy the land from the local government, they can't fund their stuff.”

  • Out-migration pressure follows a hump-shaped relationship with income: in very poor countries people cannot afford to move, in rich countries people do not want to move, but in middle-income countries (peaking around $10,000 per capita) people both want to and can move, so current high migration is driven mainly by rising incomes giving people the ability to move, not by climate refugees as many predicted.

    “you'll see a hump-shaped pattern where, in a poor country, people can't move. In a rich country people don't want to move. But in a middle income country, they both want to and can move.”

  • The long upward trend in living standards is not universal: Japan's living standards have stagnated, Italy's have stagnated, and Britain's are starting to stagnate, showing that growth is not an automatic or universal tendency.

    “I think Japan's living standards have stagnated. Italy's have stagnated. Britain's are starting to stagnate as well. So, I do not think that this is a universal tendency.”

  • The belief that one can get rich by conquering a neighbor and seizing their resources persists today, as shown by Venezuela proposing to invade oil-rich Guyana, though geographic constraints (Brazil refusing passage through its difficult terrain) will likely prevent it.

    “You see Venezuela proposing to invade and conquer part of Guyana over this oil-rich territory that lies between them.”