From the Second Intifada to October 7th (with Daniel Gordis)
What this covers
Daniel Gordis, author and resident of Israel for 25 years, discusses with Russ Roberts why the October 7th attack represents a fundamental break from earlier cycles of Israeli-Palestinian violence. Gordis frames the distinction through a threshold concept: the Second Intifada was a period of genuine suffering—suicide bombings, constant fear—but never threatened Israel's existence as a state, whereas October 7th triggered the displacement of 150,000 to 200,000 Israeli citizens and rendered entire regions uninhabitable. The conversation traces how Hamas evolved from a designated terrorist organization into a trained military force capable of a coordinated land, sea, and air invasion, and examines why Israelis now demand a categorically different response than they have mounted before.
The discussion moves across several distinct territories. Gordis argues that this war has exposed the unfulfilled core promise of Zionism—Jewish safety—and traces historical parallels to pogroms and massacres where Jews faced abandonment without external aid. He connects Israeli strategic miscalculation to the pre-1973 war Conceptia, explores the durability of the Oslo Accords and Yasser Arafat's role in orchestrating the Second Intifada through newly discovered documents, and examines why every Israeli territorial withdrawal has been interpreted as weakness rather than concession. The conversation reaches toward broader geopolitics, positioning Israel as a proxy battlefield between the West and an axis including China, Russia, and Iran. Gordis also grapples with whether Israel can sustain occupation, what postwar governance might resemble, and how this existential war will reshape Jewish consciousness and Israeli national identity.
Gordis argues that October 7th differs categorically from prior conflicts like the Second Intifada because it is an existential war—Hamas operates as an army not a terror cell, has rendered swaths of Israel uninhabitable, and has revealed that Zionism's core promise of Jewish safety remains unfulfilled, forcing Israel toward occupation and a renewed national self-understanding.
- The Second Intifada made Israel miserable but never threatened its existence; October 7th has displaced 150,000-200,000 citizens and made regions uninhabitable
- Hamas in Gaza evolved from a terrorist organization into a trained army capable of a coordinated land/sea/air invasion
- Every Israeli territorial withdrawal has been interpreted as weakness and produced greater aggression
October 7th was a coordinated military assault revealing Israel's strategic failure and shattering the false promise of Zionist security.
- On October 7th, approximately 3,000 trained Hamas soldiers—not mere terrorists—invaded Israel by land, sea (in inflatable dinghies), and air (by hang gliders) with equipment and training, killing 1,400 Israelis, committing mass rape and mutilation, and actually capturing and holding parts of Israel for days, requiring the army to recapture its own bases.
“somewhere around 3,000, some of them fairly well-trained--not terrorists--soldiers: they're terrorists, but they were soldiers. They were trained. They had equipment. They came by land, by sea, and by air.”
- Israel's strategic 'Conceptia' (Conception)—the assumption that Hamas could be contained and periodically battered while allowing foreign money to flow through Qatar, believing Palestinian leadership ultimately just wanted a better life—was entirely wrong, mirroring the disastrous pre-1973 overconfidence, and Israel failed to recognize that Hamas had become an army rather than a terrorist organization.
“That was what we call now the Conceptia--the Conception. And that's a word that became very central in Israeli life after 1973.”
- The Jew of October 7th was no different from the European Jew during the pogroms of the 1880s-1890s or Kishinev in 1903—butchered with no one coming to their aid—which is the existential wake-up call, because it reveals that Zionism's central promise to create a new, safe reality for the Jew was not fulfilled.
“How was the Jew of October 7th different than the European Jew in pogroms in the late 1880s and the 1890s and 1903 in Kishinev? The answer, not at all. Nobody came to their aid.”
- Israel deceived itself into believing it had relocated from the Middle East to Western Europe—building high-tech startups, fancy cafes, and a Tel Aviv lifestyle resembling life along the Seine or Thames—but October 7th reminded Israelis they live in 'the villa in the jungle,' and survival requires acting like one lives in the jungle rather than in Western Europe.
“we're in the villa that's in the jungle. And Israelis are recognizing tragically: if you want to survive in the jungle, you've got to act like you live in the jungle. You can't act like you live along the Seine”
- Anwar Sadat did not seek to destroy Israel in 1973 but to batter it badly enough to break Israel's complacent 'Conceptia' and force negotiation; though he lost territory and thousands of soldiers, he won strategically because the war led Israel to negotiate, ultimately returning the Sinai to Egypt by 1979 in a peace that has held for nearly half a century.
“Anwar Sadat, who was the President of Egypt back then, was not looking to destroy Israel in 1973. He was looking to batter Israel badly enough that the Israelis would wake up from this Conceptia... And in that regard, he won the war.”
The current conflict is existential because Hamas can render Israeli territory uninhabitable and economically paralyzed without conventional ground presence.
- A demilitarized buffer zone along the Gaza border, while it could prevent another mass ground incursion, does nothing to stop rockets, meaning Israeli children would still grow up with bomb shelters as a part of life—which contradicts the foundational goal of Zionism, namely to change the existential condition of the Jew so as to no longer be afraid.
“the buffer zone, of course, does nothing about rockets. That's the problem... Israeli children would still grow up with bomb shelters as part of their life. And that's not what Zionism was about. Zionism was about changing the existential condition of the Jew not to be afraid anymore.”
- It is not clear that Israel can win this war; if it cannot, displaced citizens will not return to the Gaza or northern borders, and the press is beginning to report that army briefings are concealing military failures rather than offering honest assessments.
“If we cannot win this war--and I'm going to say something a little controversial: It's not clear that we can. It's just not clear that we can.”
- The current war is existential because 150,000-200,000 Israelis have been evacuated from the north and south to distant parts of the country, and they refuse to return until the threat is destroyed—meaning Hamas and Hezbollah can render large, economically vital swaths of Israel uninhabitable without any boots on the ground, effectively capturing territory while having no presence on Israel's side of the border.
“they can still have captured territory. They can have nobody on our side of the border and still make huge swaths of Israel with important agricultural, technological, and tourist areas, all included, uninhabitable.”
- Hamas has reduced Israelis to what one observer called 'caveman morality'—an either/or condition in which either Israel destroys Hamas whatever the cost or it cannot continue to live there—which creates an unbridgeable disconnect with Western leaders like Biden and Harris who insist Israel can both destroy Hamas and avoid civilian casualties, when it may genuinely be a binary choice.
“they have forced us into is caveman morality. It's us or them, and that's just it. Either we're going to destroy Hamas whatever the cost, or we can't live here.”
Pre-October 7th Israeli governance was immoral and incompetent; Palestinian Authority cannot govern Gaza; international institutions ignore Israeli suffering.
- The pre-October 7th Netanyahu government was not only immoral and right-wing but also incompetent, having proven unable to manage citizens' medical, financial, and employment needs even apart from the war, and Netanyahu is now in a bad position having articulated two goals—destroying Hamas and returning all hostages—that he may well achieve neither of.
“it was also incompetent, which we're now seeing; and not because of the war part, but it's been unable to take care of people's medical, financial, employment needs.”
- Jewish life in Western democracies—France, Spain, the United States—is becoming dangerous and potentially untenable, evidenced by European public officials openly questioning whether Jews can continue living in their cities and by Bret Stephens warning that the U.S. is at '1922' heading toward '1932' and '1939,' such that Jewish students must now hide their identity on American campuses that were once openly welcoming.
“the Mayor of Paris came out and said, 'Hard for me to see Jews living in Paris and France in the next few years.'”
- International women's organizations have been entirely silent about the sexual violence—rape, gang rape, mutilation—committed against Israeli women on October 7th, a silence that would not have occurred had such violence been committed against any other population in the world.
“international women's organizations have been entirely silent about the sexual violence that was committed against Israeli women--which, of course, would not be the case had that been committed against any other population anywhere in the world.”
- Support for Hamas in Gaza is more widespread than people want to acknowledge, though it is genuinely unknowable—like trying to survey opinion in North Korea, where people will not reveal their true views about the Supreme Leader, rendering statistics meaningless.
“Support for Hamas in Gaza is much more widespread than people want to acknowledge. But we don't really know. It's like trying to do a survey in North Korea.”
- The 1979 peace between Egypt and Israel, achieved when Sadat went to Jerusalem and traded the Sinai for peace, has held for almost half a century, with Egypt playing a critically important role in helping Israel contain Hamas in Gaza in both the current and previous wars.
“that peace, by the way, has held. It's been a very long time since 1979... Egypt has played a critically important role helping Israel contain Hamas on the Gaza Strip”
- The Second Intifada (2000-2004), while a terrible time of suicide bombings on buses and in cafes that made Israel miserable and angry, was never an existential threat—nobody believed that blowing up enough buses could bring down the country, only damage its day-to-day happiness.
“It was not an existential war on Israel's part. Nobody ever said: 'You blow up enough buses and you destroy enough cafes, you can bring down a country.' You can make a country miserable. You can make a country angry.”
- The international community's proposed solution of having the Palestinian Authority take over Gaza is a non-starter, because the PA is not moderate (Abbas is a Holocaust denier who denies the Second Temple existed), is very weak, and only holds power in the West Bank because Israel props it up to prevent a Hamas takeover—meaning there is more Israeli appetite for occupying Gaza than for handing it to the PA.
“they're not moderate. Second of all, they're very weak, and they're only in power in the West Bank because Israel props them up. And Israel props them up because without the Palestinian Authority, it's going to be Hamas.”
- The Second Intifada ended in 2004 because Israel destroyed the Palestinian terrorist infrastructure and built the separation barrier; there is a direct, measurable correlation showing that the more kilometers of wall completed, the fewer terrorist attacks occurred—simple math, because if attackers cannot get in, they cannot detonate bombs.
“you can go online and see: The more kilometers of the wall that were completed, the less terrorist attacks there were. It's just very simple math. If they can't get in, they can't detonate bombs.”
Israeli territorial withdrawals are consistently misinterpreted as weakness, triggering renewed aggression rather than achieving peace or security.
- Despite 'Intifada' meaning spontaneous popular uprising, the Second Intifada was deliberately choreographed by Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority, as proven by document caches uncovered by Israeli forces in Jenin and Ramallah, and was a planned attempt to end Oslo and create a new Middle East reality.
“It was very clearly choreographed by Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority. When Israeli troops went into Jenin and other places--Ramallah eventually--they were able to uncover troves of documents that proved beyond the shadow of a doubt that those was orchestrated to look a bit like a popular spontaneous uprising”
- Israel pulled out of Gaza in 2005 under Ariel Sharon because soldiers were coming back in body bags daily and the settlements could not be protected, but the withdrawal ironically made the situation far worse than anyone could have imagined at the time.
“We pulled out of Gaza because our soldiers are coming back in body bags daily. It was a disaster, and that's why Ariel Sharon pulled out. The irony is, is that pulling out ended up making things much, much, much worse”
- Every Israeli territorial pullback—from Lebanon in 2000, from Gaza in 2005—is consistently interpreted by adversaries as weakness rather than goodwill, and therefore results in renewed Palestinian aggression rather than peace.
“What we didn't understand then was that every Israeli pullback, whether it's from Gaza in 2005, whether it's from Lebanon in 2000, wherever, it's always interpreted as weakness.”
- According to Bogie Ya'alon's book, Yitzhak Rabin had given indication before his 1995 assassination that he was already preparing to pull out of the Oslo Accords because he considered it a disaster and a mistake, given that Palestinian terror had escalated out of control in response to the peace process.
“Bogie writes in his book, A Long Short Road that he had an indication that Rabin was actually already preparing before he was killed to pull out of Oslo because he thought it was such a disaster and he himself had made a mistake”
Historical crises have sparked Jewish renewal; this war will strengthen Jewish sovereignty and self-consciousness despite severe human costs.
- Throughout Jewish history, the darkest periods have consistently led to revival and resurgence—the Holocaust led to the State of Israel, the destruction of the Temple led to the birth of Rabbinic Judaism—and this war will likewise spark a renewed devotion to the project of Jewish sovereignty and a deeper Jewish self-consciousness, even if the path is not pretty.
“our darkest periods have always led to periods of revival and resurgence. The Holocaust led to the state of Israel. Destruction of the Temple led to the birth of what we call Rabbinic Judaism.”
- The Israeli Left and the leaders of the anti-Netanyahu judicial-reform protest movement—including reserve pilots who had refused to report for training to protest the government—returned to active duty within two and a half hours of the October 7th attack and are now flying combat missions, demonstrating that internal political division did not undermine national defense.
“The people who were the head of the protest movement are the pilots who said they weren't going to fly who are now flying 24/7. They went right back to work, right away.”
This war is fundamentally a Western struggle against an Iran-led axis using Israel as a proxy and testing liberal democracy's resolve.
- At the deepest level, this is not a battle between Israel and the Palestinians but between the West and an axis of China, Russia, and Iran; Israel is effectively fighting Iran through its proxies (Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas), and the war is a test of whether the West has the will to defend liberal democracy—making Israel the 'canary in the coal mine' for the future of freedom.
“This is a battle between the West and in the axis of China, Russia, Iran. We're just fighting Iran. It just doesn't look like we're fighting Iran.”