Niall Ferguson on Free Speech and Kissinger's Role in the Middle East
What this covers
Niall Ferguson of the Hoover Institution sits down with Russ Roberts to argue that campus censorship is a governance problem, not an inevitable cultural shift, and that the Middle East today offers a darker mirror of 1973. Ferguson contends that institutions can be redesigned around free-speech enforcement—pointing to the University of Austin as a model with actual judicial mechanisms—rather than relying on unenforceable norms. The conversation then pivots to comparing Henry Kissinger's 1973 diplomacy during the Yom Kippur War with the present moment in Israel, drawing out lessons in deterrence and strategic restraint that Ferguson argues the current US administration has failed to replicate.
The first half diagnoses why even institutions with strong stated commitments—Ferguson notes that the University of Chicago's famous Chicago principles are honored mostly in the breach—fail to protect speech. He traces campus self-censorship to misaligned incentives rather than immutable ideology, and flags the paradox of tolerance as a real constraint: how should a university balance open debate with protection against movements hostile to free speech itself. Ferguson and Roberts also spar over whether institutional capture through tenure and ideological hiring can be reversed, and whether the distinction between politics as a vocation and scholarship remains recoverable. The second half compares Kissinger's success in 1973—reading Anwar Sadat's intentions, using a DEFCON 3 bluff to deter Soviet intervention, and restraining Israel from total victory to preserve negotiation—against present failures with Iran. Ferguson suggests the current US-Israel position is weaker because the administration has not credibly signaled deterrence, while Iran has learned it can achieve its aims through backlash without direct escalation. He closes with a forecast that Saudi Arabia will eventually resume the Abraham Accords process once regional passion subsides.
Ferguson argues that the collapse of free speech on American campuses is a fixable problem of institutional incentives and governance—not immutable culture—and that the same realist, deterrence-based thinking Kissinger applied in 1973 reveals how the current US-Israel moment is weaker and more perilous than its historical analogue.
- Campus self-censorship stems from incentives that can be redesigned, as shown by new institutions like the University of Austin with judicial enforcement mechanisms
- Kissinger's 1973 diplomacy succeeded through credible deterrence (DEFCON 3 bluff) and recognizing Sadat's aims, which the current Biden Administration fails to replicate against Iran
- Universities lack a judicial branch to uphold free-speech principles, which explains why even Chicago's principles aren't honored in practice
Universities lack judicial enforcement and have been captured by ideologically aligned faculty with tenure who hire only sympathizers.
- Following Max Weber, there should be a clear distinction between politics as a vocation and science or academic life as a vocation; activist professors blurring the line between politics and the academy and using the academy for explicitly political purposes is a profound violation of the fundamental norms without which a university cannot function.
“Max Weber said this really well over a century ago: There should be a clear distinction between politics as a vocation and science or academic life as a vocation.”
- Once a department is taken over by people who see politics as their true vocation, it is extremely hard to recover because those people have tenure, will hire only the ideologically aligned, and pursue their goals ruthlessly—a pattern of control of the institutions that makes the damage extremely difficult to undo.
“once a department has been taken over by people who see politics as their true vocation, good luck getting it back because those people are extremely hard to dislodge. They have tenure, they will hire only people that they're ideologically aligned with”
- Almost all universities share an institutional defect: they have an executive branch (president, provost, bureaucracy) and something like a legislative branch (trustees and tenured faculty), but no judicial branch—so even where clear principles like the Chicago principles exist, there is no court to uphold them, which is why the University of Austin's constitution includes a Supreme-Court-like adjudicative panel and a Bill of Rights.
“What they don't have is a judicial branch. I haven't been able to find a college anywhere that really has a judicial branch. And, if one looks at the U.S. Constitution as a model, that's a problem.”
- After 12 years at Harvard and 7 at Stanford, Ferguson concluded that existing elite institutions are not really reformable—certainly not within his lifetime—which motivated creating a new University of Austin to start over and rethink the operating system of academic governance itself.
“I finally came to the conclusion that the existing institutions were not really reformable, certainly not in my lifetime; and that was one of the motivations for creating a new University at Austin”
- The academy has become politically monochrome because liberals have hired illiberals: people who call themselves progressives are in fact profoundly illiberal and regard themselves as entitled to engage in political activism and discrimination, including against students who do not take the right political line in class.
“there's a fundamental problem of political skew that's made worse by the fact that liberals have hired illiberals. People who call themselves progressives are in fact profoundly illiberal”
The Left deliberately blurs the distinction between speech and violence to suppress legitimate dissent across the political spectrum.
- The Progressive Left has deliberately blurred rules by using phrases like 'silence is violence' or 'words are violence,' but violence is violence: peaceful protest of any cause is tolerable, while physical aggression—even mere pushing and shoving—is clear grounds for disciplinary action including expulsion.
“the Progressive Left has very deliberately made it difficult to communicate those rules by using phrases like, 'Silence is violence,' or, 'Words are violence.' Violence is violence.”
- It would be a great mistake if conservatives, after years of complaining about hate-speech rules being used by the Left to censor the Right, now adopted the same tactic and began censoring the Left in turn.
“it would in fact be a great mistake if conservatives, after years of complaining about hate speech rules being used by the Left to censor the Right, now said, 'Well, it's our turn. We're going to start censoring you.'”
- Taking an Enlightenment position, free speech applies especially to things people say that one dislikes and might be tempted to silence; in a free country everyone, including undergraduates, has the right to express obnoxious views as the price of true freedom, with limits only at explicit threats of violence against individuals.
“I take the Enlightenment position that free speech applies especially to the things people say that I dislike and might be tempted to silence. We just have to accept that in a free country, everyone, including undergraduates, has the right to express obnoxious views.”
- Drawing on Hayek's Constitution of Liberty and a Popperian argument, showing tolerance of intolerance—such as giving tenure to a communist who would eliminate free speech—amounts to digging a grave for one's own free society, or at least handing a shovel to the gravedigger.
“if you show a tolerance of intolerance--this is a kind of Karl Popper type argument, too--then you are really digging a grave for your own free society, or at least you are handing a shovel to the grave digger.”
- Universities exhibit a double standard: no Stanford administrator would tolerate a Ku Klux Klan march, yet they tolerated pro-Palestinian demonstrations including pro-Hamas signs; a university must choose to either let students say odious things on both Left and Right or clamp down on organizations whose views are incompatible with a liberal society.
“I'm sure there isn't an administrator at Stanford who would tolerate a Ku Klux Klan march through the campus, but they've tolerated pro-Palestinian demonstrations which included pro-Hamas signs. That seems like an inconsistent position.”
Widespread student self-censorship stems from fear of peer denunciation rather than administrative punishment and institutional culture.
- The aftermath of October 7th worked in two stages to reveal long-standing campus dysfunction: first alumni were shocked by large pro-Hamas protests, and second they were shocked even more by university presidents publishing evasive 'word salad' statements that said as little as possible.
“Step Two was that the university authorities--the Presidents and Provosts--then published lame word salads trying their best to say as little as possible. And, I think that shocked the alumni even more.”
- Although the University of Chicago is held up as a paragon with impressive free-speech principles, those principles are not actually upheld: students at Chicago, when asked whether they can speak freely in class, give much the same self-censoring answer as students at Harvard and Stanford, showing the principles are honored only in the breach without enforcement mechanisms.
“if you ask the question, 'Can you speak freely in class?' to people at Chicago, they give much the same answer that people do at Harvard and at Stanford. There aren't huge differences.”
- More than 60% of US students surveyed by Heterodox Academy report self-censoring in class, and when asked why, they say it is because they fear being denounced or condemned by their classmates rather than by their professors.
“more than 60% across the country say no, they self-censor. And, when they're asked why they self-censor, they say because they're afraid of being denounced or condemned by their classmates”
- When students are freed from the fear of being denounced—knowing the institution will discipline anyone who acts as an informer—they enthusiastically embrace uninhibited discussion, as demonstrated by University of Austin summer-school 'forbidden courses,' such that culture changes very quickly like prisoners released into fresh air.
“if you give them a sense that those dangers don't exist, that they really aren't going to be denounced, that the institution will in fact discipline anybody who tries to be an informer, they really love it.”
- Cultural norms can change quickly because humans are much less prisoners of culture than they think and much more prisoners of incentives; setting different institutional frameworks with different incentives—as demonstrated by postwar Germany and Korea diverging under different systems—rapidly reshapes behavior, so removing the incentive to self-censor will make the same smart students behave very differently.
“We're much less the prisoners of cultural norms than we think. We are the prisoners of incentives.”
Universities as corporate entities should not issue political statements and must protect associational freedom from administrative interference.
- The freedom of associations is as important as freedom of speech; students should be able to form societies without being treated as children, requiring a clear institutional separation between the university and students' associational life—as at Oxford, where the Oxford Union invites speakers in its own name, not the university's.
“The freedom of associations is as important as the freedom of speech, and students should be able to form societies without being treated as children by presidents and professors.”
- A university as a corporate entity should not take political positions; presidents issuing statements about political events (a practice that escalated after the 2020 killing of George Floyd) trapped them into looking absurd when they failed to say equally forceful things after October 7th—because universities are not newspapers and exist to pursue truth, captured in Harvard's motto Veritas.
“The reality is that college presidents shouldn't be making statements of that sort because universities are not newspapers. They shouldn't have an opinion page. Universities are there to pursue truth.”
Kissinger's 1973 Middle East diplomacy achieved restraint and Arab dignity that enabled subsequent peace and deterred Soviet intervention.
- Kissinger restrained Israel from destroying the surrounded Egyptian Third Army, reasoning that showing restraint would yield far more than a total victory; by preserving symbolic Arab dignity, the limited outcome of 1973 created the conditions for Sadat to make peace, a peace path well established by the end of the Ford Administration and completed under Carter.
“Egyptian defeat could have been much more crushing had it not been for Kissinger essentially saying, 'Wait, we can make much more of this if we show restraint than if you wipe them out.'”
- When the Soviets threatened to intervene on the Arab side in 1973, Kissinger—with Nixon incapacitated by Watergate—decided to go to DEFCON 3 as a signal to deter Moscow; this was really a bluff that worked because the Soviets had too much to lose from détente to risk war over the Arabs, and it marked the reduction of Soviet influence in the Arab world for a generation.
“Kissinger makes the decision, with a small number of other officials, to go to DEFCON 3 [Defense Readiness Condition]: to raise the level of military preparedness, a signal that is sent to tell the Soviets, 'Don't you dare.' And it worked.”
- Kissinger had initially underestimated Sadat and paid too little attention to his signals before October 1973, but once the war broke out he grasped with a flash of insight that Sadat was using the war to reset the diplomatic table by establishing symbolic respect and dignity for the Arab cause as a prelude to a more productive negotiation.
“Sadat was using the war as a way to reset the diplomatic table by establishing some symbolic respect and dignity for the Arab cause as a prelude to a negotiation that would be far more likely to yield results”
- What Kissinger got wrong was underestimating the effect of an oil embargo on the global economy; the embargo quadrupled oil prices and hit the United States and world economy extremely hard, reflecting a non-meeting of minds with the Saudi regime in contrast to his strong relationship with Sadat.
“What Kissinger gets wrong was he underestimated, was the effect of an oil embargo on the global economy... the oil embargo, which quadrupled oil prices and of course hit the United States economy and the economy of the whole world extremely hard.”
A dangerous ideology of diversity, equity, and inclusion has established hierarchies of victimhood that justify discriminatory treatment by identity.
- Over the past 20 years a dangerous ideology cloaked in the language of diversity, equity, inclusion, intersectionality and minority rights has permeated academia, deliberately creating confusion by establishing a hierarchy of victimhood—in which Jews rank very low—and implying that different identity groups should receive different treatment.
“this ideology deliberately creates confusion by establishing a hierarchy of victimhood--which, Jews are very low down--and implying that the different identity groups in the hierarchy should be subject to different treatment.”
Israel faces military and diplomatic weakness; Iran strategically uses Palestinian backlash while restraint from Hezbollah remains prudent.
- It is easier to stop a short war than one that has lasted longer; the 1973 Yom Kippur War stopped after just 19 days, whereas the prolonged war in Ukraine has become very hard to stop precisely because it has gone on so long.
“the most important thing about that is that it's easier to stop a short war than one that's lasted longer. Memo to all those dealing with the problem in Ukraine: that war has gone on so long that it's really hard to stop.”
- The Biden Administration is really bad at deterrence: it failed to deter the Taliban during the Afghanistan withdrawal, failed in 2021 to deter Russia from invading Ukraine, failed to deter Iran in 2023, and the next thing it will fail to do is deter China—possibly producing one more crisis over Taiwan before the administration leaves office.
“the problem the Biden Administration has is that it's really bad at deterrence. It failed to deter the Taliban... It failed to deter Russia--entirely failed in 2021 to deter Russia--from invading Ukraine the following February, and it's failed to deter Iran in 2023.”
- Israel is showing great and clever restraint with respect to Hezbollah and should not fire the first shot or launch the attack against it, which would be an error; despite hostile press and pleas for ceasefires, the IDF is doing an effective job crushing Hamas in Gaza and has come together as a society to fight cleverly.
“I don't think Israel should fire the first shot, should launch the attack against Hezbollah. I think that would be an error.”
- Iran may have concluded it does not need to unleash Hezbollah because it is already achieving its aims through the backlash against Israel: Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad's attack forced Israel into a Gaza intervention bound to generate a backlash among Western younger voters wooed to the Palestinian cause, so Iran has reactivated the Arab street and put Israel in extreme international vulnerability—why risk sympathy switching back by unleashing Hezbollah.
“one possibility, Russ, is that Iran has concluded it doesn't need to unleash Hezbollah because it's already achieving so much with the backlash against Israel that there has been in the past five weeks.”
- Israel is in a weaker position today than in 1973—both in military capability and international legitimacy—and the United States seems much less capable of using its power to deter the real threats to Israel, which are not terrorist organizations but Iran and to some extent Russia, all part of an axis of ill will including Beijing and Pyongyang coordinating efforts in Ukraine and the Middle East.
“Israel's position seems weaker today than it was then just in terms of military capability, but also in terms of international legitimacy. And, the United States seems much less capable of using its power to deter the real threats to Israel”
- The sense of drowning in vast amounts of material and feeling overwhelmed is actually a necessary part of the process of historical imagination: a historian has to feel really confused and overwhelmed before finally figuring out what happened.
“that sense that you're drowning in material is actually a necessary part of the process of historical imagination. You have to feel really confused and overwhelmed before you finally figure out what happened.”
Trump administration Middle East policy was successful; Biden abandoned it for a failed Iran nuclear deal approach that weakened deterrence.
- Donald Trump looks increasingly likely to be the Republican nominee with roughly a 50% or better chance of being President in January 2025; while a second Trump term would be bad news for Ukraine and uncertain for Taiwan, it would significantly improve Israel's position by ending any resuscitation of the Iran nuclear deal and forcing Iran to reckon with uncertainty, potentially restarting the Abraham Accords process.
“from the vantage point of Israel... a second Trump term would be by no means bad... there would be no more resuscitation of the Iran nuclear deal. There would be no more making nice with Tehran. The Iranians would then have to reckon with all kinds of uncertainty which Trump brings with him.”
- The process that produced the Abraham Accords is not dead: the Saudis are going through the motions for show because they cannot defy the mood of the moment, but the underlying preference is to resume normalizing relations with Israel when the time is right, because the Gulf States have turned away from both the Palestinian cause and the Islamists, and Saudi Arabia needs a better strategic future leveraging Israel as the region's one highly dynamic technological state.
“I actually don't think the process that produced the Abraham Accords is dead. I think the Saudis are going through the motions because there's a limit to how far they can defy the mood of the moment.”
- The Biden Administration puzzlingly continued and ramped up Trump's China policy but entirely broke with Trump's successful Middle East approach—abandoning the trajectory of the Abraham Accords, reconciliation between Israel and Arab states, marginalizing the Palestinians, and isolating a crumbling Iranian economy—by trying to revive the Iran nuclear deal and easing economic pressure on a regime acting in bad faith.
“the Trump Administration was quite successful in the Middle East. The Abraham Accords were a great outcome, and the direction of travel was clear towards further reconciliation between Israel and the Arab states, marginalizing of the Palestinians, and then isolation of Iran. Iran's economy was crumbling.”