What this covers

Ran Abramitzky and Leah Boustan sit down with Russ Roberts to discuss their book Streets of Gold, arguing that immigration success unfolds across generations rather than within a single lifetime. Using full-count census records linked across decades—a feat made possible only recently by digitization projects—they construct a dataset of millions of Americans to test whether immigrants and their children follow similar patterns in the 1880–1920 wave and today. The central claim rests on Immigration as a Novel Not a Short Story: first-generation immigrants themselves rarely close the income gap with native-born Americans, but their children show exceptional relative mobility, outpacing children of equally poor U.S.-born households by a significant margin. This holds across eras and origin groups, from Scandinavians a century ago to Mexicans today.

The conversation covers multiple mechanisms behind this pattern. Immigrants' footloose status—having already crossed an ocean—allows them to settle in high-opportunity locations where native-born populations remain rooted by family ties. Underplacement and Regression to Potential plays a major role: a skilled parent working below their ability as a taxi driver has a child who converges toward the parent's true skill level rather than their observed job. On assimilation, the researchers find something counterintuitive: name assimilation, intermarriage, English acquisition, and neighborhood integration proceed at nearly identical pace today as a century ago, contradicting nostalgia about a more cohesive Ellis Island era. Instead, their machine learning analysis of Congressional speeches reveals anti-immigrant rhetoric was actually far more uniformly hostile during the European immigration period, and the novel feature of today is a partisan gap—some voices actively defending immigration—that barely existed then. Roberts raises a methodological objection about Absolute vs Relative Mobility, suggesting earlier mobility pessimism may understate how many children actually out-earn their parents.

Sharpest takeaway

Abramitzky and Boustan argue that immigration is 'a novel, not a short story': immigrants themselves don't experience rags-to-riches mobility in their own lifetime, but their children show exceptional upward mobility—and these patterns, plus assimilation rates and anti-immigrant sentiment, are strikingly similar between the 1880-1920 wave and today.

  • Children of immigrants are more upwardly mobile than children of U.S.-born from equally poor households, both past and present
  • Immigrants achieve mobility largely by settling in high-opportunity locations the native-born are too rooted to leave, plus 'underplacement' of skilled parents whose children realize fuller potential
  • Assimilation pace and anti-immigrant rhetoric are remarkably constant across a century, contradicting nostalgic myths

The argument · threads4 threads · 28 claims
0.85

Immigrant children achieve remarkable upward mobility that equals or exceeds native-born mobility across generations and eras.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Immigrant parents are often 'underplaced'—a Russian scientist working as a taxi driver—because limited English and networks suppress them below their true ability; their children converge toward the parent's underlying potential (the scientist) rather than the observed occupation (taxi driver), and the upward mobility is concentrated among children of immigrants who arrived as adults rather than as young teens.

    “his child is converging more towards the scientist-father rather than towards the taxi-driver-father. So, immigrants are underplaced when they come to the United States and their children reach to the full potential when they grow up.”

  • Children of immigrants are remarkably upwardly mobile both past and present—more so than children of the U.S.-born—and even when raised poor they fully catch up to children of the native-born; this held for Danes and Swedes a century ago and holds for Mexican immigrants today.

    “by the second generation, the children of immigrants are doing remarkably well... They are, in fact, more upwardly mobile than the children of U.S.-born; and even when they start poor, they completely catch up”

  • Immigration should be judged over generations rather than years: short-term snapshots of how immigrants do on arrival understate their success, but viewed across a generation or a century—as with Norwegian fishermen who looked unimpressive on arrival but thriving 100 years later—the American dream is just as real for today's immigrants as for the Ellis Island generation.

    “by the second generation, the children of immigrants are doing remarkably well... They are, in fact, more upwardly mobile than the children of U.S.-born; and even when they start poor, they completely catch up”

  • A major, mundane driver of immigrant upward mobility is location: immigrants are 'footloose' (having already crossed an ocean) and settle in places offering high mobility for everyone—historically avoiding the low-mobility U.S. South—whereas the native-born are rooted in place by family and networks and don't simply relocate to where returns are highest.

    “immigrants tend to move to those areas that offer higher economic mobility for everyone”

0.64

Assimilation fears directed at each new immigrant group are recurring, baseless cycles driven by prejudice rather than reality.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Across roughly 5,000 presidential speeches, Presidents tend to speak more positively about immigration than Congress does, with one notable modern exception.

    “Presidents tend to be more positive than Congress when they speak about immigration”

  • The fear that immigrants and even their children won't assimilate is a very old, recurring idea—targeted in sequence at the Irish, then Italians, then later groups, then by descendants of those very groups at Mexicans and Muslims—with the same concerns merely redirected at successive immigrant waves.

    “Over and over again in this book, we see that you kind of hear the exact same concerns, only they are targeted at different immigrant groups.”

  • Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, an architect of the 1920s immigration restrictions, characterized immigrants as coming from 'the lowest races and lowest classes' with lower IQ, exemplifying the era's elite anti-immigrant rhetoric.

    “Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, who was one of the architects of the immigration restrictions that were put in the 1920s, said, 'Immigrants are from the lowest races and lowest classes and they have lower levels of IQ'”

0.64

The rags-to-riches immigration narrative is historically false on both arrival conditions and catch-up speed.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The nostalgic rags-to-riches myth is wrong on both ends: first-generation immigrants neither started uniformly in rags (some out-earned the U.S.-born on arrival) nor experienced rapid catch-up—those who started below the native-born often failed to close the gap even 30 years later, both historically and today.

    “we don't find evidence for the rags-to-riches myth. So, we find that both parts of, in fact, of the rags-to-riches story is wrong. They didn't start in rags.”

  • The names immigrants give their children serve as a repeated, financially cost-free (but socially costly) measure of assimilation: parents shift toward more American-sounding names the longer they stay, and the most-criticized groups—Italians, Portuguese, Russians historically, Mexicans today—name-assimilate the fastest, reflecting a trade-off between retaining original identity and the benefits of assimilation.

    “immigrants tend to give their children more American-sounding names when they spend more years in the United States, and to a remarkable similar degree in the past and present”

  • Having a more foreign-sounding name was associated with less schooling, lower income, and higher unemployment, which can rationally motivate immigrant parents to give later children more American-sounding names to avoid discrimination.

    “Having, for example, a more foreign-sounding name was associated with less schooling, lower income, higher unemployment, and so on.”

0.36

Measurement methods profoundly shape what immigration research can reveal or discover.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Census-to-census linking systematically misses roughly half the population—women—because they typically change surnames at marriage, though newer methods using marriage and birth records are beginning to recover them.

    “We do miss out kind of half the population by this procedure because women, they tend to change their last name when they marry. So, we couldn't systematically link them across censuses”

  • Linking algorithms face a tradeoff: very conservative rules (link only a uniquely-matched name with no near-birthdate competitor) yield small samples with few false positives, while looser rules yield larger samples with more false positives; the book reports only results robust across all these linking algorithms.

    “you can be very, very conservative... then for sure you will link the right Ran Abramitzky. But you will have a relatively smaller sample. Or, you can say... I'll call it a link. And then you will have a larger sample, but with higher chance of false positives.”

  • This research could not have been done 20 years ago: it required Ancestry.com and FamilySearch (digitized largely by Mormon Church volunteers) to convert microfilm census records into searchable digital form, making it feasible to look up and link millions of individuals across decades.

    “20 years ago, nobody could have done it because we needed Ancestry.com to digitize at least the name so that we can start on this process of looking people up”