What this covers

Matti Friedman examines how Leonard Cohen and Israel collided at a hinge moment in 1973, each at a breaking point that the other's crisis would transform. The podcast features Friedman and host Russ Roberts discussing Friedman's book Who by Fire, which reconstructs Cohen's arrival in Israel without a guitar or plan during the Yom Kippur War—a personal escape from depression and creative despair that led to improvised performances for frontline soldiers. The central argument moves on two tracks: Cohen's journey from artistic dead-end through wartime performances that restored his faith, releasing a major album months later; and Israel's transformation from a founding kibbutz-led euphoria to a fractured nation that experienced military victory as spiritual defeat, losing its communal orientation and shifting toward individualism.

The discussion ranges across Israel's military architecture—how reserves composed of middle-aged professionals absorbed catastrophic early losses while waiting to mobilize—and the war's lingering trauma that resurfaces annually. Friedman traces how the kibbutz-based Labor leadership's discrediting accelerated a broader cultural drift from "we" to "I," paralleling the global 1970s turn away from communal ideals. Particular weight falls on Cohen's internal conflict: his experience of tribal relief upon learning casualties were Egyptian, followed by revulsion at his own sectarian instinct, which mirrors the tension between universal artistic identity and tribal allegiance that the war exposed. Friedman also addresses how Cohen's mixed motives—escape from personal crisis alongside genuine Jewish ethical obligation—reveal altruism as rarely pure, and how the purity of wartime performances uncorrupted by the music industry proved restorative in ways commercial success never had.

Sharpest takeaway

Friedman argues that the 1973 Yom Kippur War simultaneously rescued Leonard Cohen from a personal and creative dead-end and shattered Israel's collective, optimistic founding ethos, marking a turning point that pushed both the artist and the nation in new directions.

  • Cohen arrived in Israel without a plan or guitar at a moment of personal crisis and left with restored faith in his art, releasing a major album months later
  • Israel won the war militarily but experienced it as a trauma that discredited the founding kibbutz/Labor leadership and accelerated a shift from communal to individualistic culture
  • Cohen's wrestling between tribal allegiance and universal artistic identity mirrors the larger tension the war exposed

The argument · threads6 threads · 27 claims
0.68

The war ended Israel's 1960s communal idealism, initiating a shift toward individualism that accelerated with capitalism, economic inequality, and the global Me Generation.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Because cultural trends reached Israel late, the communal feeling and music of the 1960s were still ongoing there in 1973—the Summer of Love being a distant memory in America but not yet arrived in Israel—so that for Israel the 1960s ended, in a metaphysical sense, with the Yom Kippur War.

    “in Israel, the 1960s really end with the Yom Kippur War in a kind of metaphysical way. October 6th, 1973 is really a turning point for Israel in many ways.”

  • Israel's post-1973 turn toward individualism was reinforced by a worldwide shift in which the communal ideals of communism and the 1960s gave way in the 1970s to the 'Me Generation,' as people worried less about the collective and more about themselves and the ideal of communal sacrifice took a blow, perhaps with Vietnam.

    “the communal ideals of communism--or, even the 1960s had a communal feel to them--and that ends in the 1970s. And, even in America, they talk about the Me Generation”

  • Over the past 20-30 years Israel abandoned its government-heavy, socialist-leaning economy and went capitalist—turning out to be very good at it—which produced greater prosperity but also greater inequality and less social solidarity, all happening at the same time.

    “Israel really goes capitalist. And, Israelis turn out to be really good at capitalism... You start seeing greater inequality, less social solidarity, much greater prosperity. And, all of those things kind of happen at the same time.”

  • The Yom Kippur War discredited the founding kibbutz/Labor leadership—who were shown to be blind and misguided—leading the Labor Party to lose power for the first time four years later to Begin's Likud, and more profoundly ending the optimistic, communal, utopian kibbutz culture and ushering in a more introspective country concerned with 'I' rather than 'we': the beginning of today's successful but less communal Israel.

    “it's not just the Labor Party that loses power. It's really the culture of the founding generation, that kind of optimistic kibbutz culture.”

0.57

Cohen experienced the war's moral complexity, felt tribal relief at Egyptian deaths, then rejected taking sides as his artistic duty was to universal truths beyond any war.

9 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Although Israel won the war militarily—ending with its army across the Suez Canal encircling Egypt's Third Army and ultimately leading to peace with Egypt—it felt more like a defeat than perhaps any war, because once the army won, recriminations erupted over the intelligence and leadership failures, and 2,600 fatalities in a country of three million was an incredible blow that demanded someone pay the price.

    “as soon as the army has fended off the enemy and won the war, that's when the recriminations really start.”

  • Friedman feels he belongs in Israel because, though he thought of himself as an adult arriving at 17, he actually came as a kid and underwent an intense 'Israelization' through three years in an infantry unit—speaking Hebrew, doing guerrilla work in South Lebanon, doing what everyone else had to do—so that by the end he was local and could meet anyone's eyes as an equal contributor, while retaining an outsider's eye useful to journalism.

    “had that very intense, I guess, Israelization process of the military--of three years spent in an infantry unit, speaking Hebrew, doing what everyone else had to do... And, by the time I came out, I was local.”

  • Because the Israeli military had no unit in charge of artists and the country operated chaotically even in wartime, there is no list of concerts or official record of Cohen's tour in the IDF archive; it had to be reconstructed as 'underground history' by tracking down aging soldiers and searching their photo albums for memories of performances that officially never happened.

    “this tour officially never happened. There's no record of it in the military archive. So, there's no official record of it. It has to be reconstituted by putting together the pieces.”

  • A breaking point came when, watching medics unload badly wounded and dead soldiers from a helicopter, Cohen felt relief upon being told 'these are Egyptians'—and then caught himself, declaring 'I hate this relief. This is blood on your hands'—experiencing his own tribal relief as a betrayal of his most deeply felt universal beliefs, after which he began pulling back from the war.

    “someone came up to him and said, 'Don't worry, Mr. Cohen, these are Egyptians.' And, he's relieved... and then he catches himself. And, he says, 'This relief--this relief that I just felt--I hate this relief. This is blood on your hands.'”

  • The Jewish ethic that one must not stand idly by while a brother's blood is spilled is part of what drew Cohen to the war—the idea that this terrible thing would happen and he would not be there seemed unbearable to him, driving him to insert himself into the catastrophe.

    “there's this idea in Judaism that you don't stand by your brother's blood”

  • American political terminology fails to transplant onto Israel: the entire Israeli Right, if moved to the U.S., would sit in the Democratic Party on the issues Americans care about—abortion is uncontroversial, gun control is far tighter than American advocates dream of, gay rights are not very controversial, and state single-payer healthcare is taken for granted as the only conceivable option.

    “almost the entire Israeli Right, were it transplanted to the United States, would be in the Democratic Party--in terms of all the issues that Americans care about... Abortion is not controversial in Israel. Gun control is very, very tight in Israel”

  • For a large part of Israel the trauma of the Yom Kippur War has never ended; it persists to this day and resurfaces every autumn before Yom Kippur with new articles and books, such that for many Israelis October 6th, 1973 is in a real sense still going on.

    “the trauma of the Yom Kippur War persists in the country to this day and it pops up every year before Yom Kippur in the fall when more and more articles are published about the war”

  • After the war Cohen became uncomfortable having taken a side: he wrote and then literally crossed out the line 'I went down to the desert to help my brothers fight' from 'Lover Lover Lover,' later claiming he wrote the song 'for the Egyptians and the Israelis'—in that order—obscuring the war context, because as a poet his job was to address the universal human condition and be seen as bigger than any particular war.

    “He says, I went down to the desert to help my brothers fight. He writes that line, but then erases that line; and you really see him erasing it in the notebook.”

  • Cohen's music endures and his fame has grown since his death—unlike most artists who fade—because of his honesty, his facility with language, and his addressing of deep universal truths, which give his songs a long shelf life: work written honestly by a 30-year-old in the 1960s still rings true decades later.

    “it's Cohen's music that endures. And his fame has only grown in a strange way since his death, which isn't what happens to most musicians. And, it's because of his honesty”

0.55

Cohen arrived depressed and artistically lost, found redemption through wartime performances that were pure, uncorrupted artistic transmission restoring faith in his craft.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The wartime concerts—where no one charged tickets, sold records, recorded, or exchanged money—were a 'pure artistic transmission' uncorrupted by the music business Cohen hated, and this restored his faith in his art so that within months he was singing again and released one of the best albums of his career, New Skin for the Old Ceremony.

    “this is pure art. It's a pure artistic transmission... it's not being sullied by any of the usual aspects of the music business that Cohen hated. So it's--in some way, it restores his faith in his art. And, when he comes back, he's singing again.”

  • In 1973 Leonard Cohen was a 39-year-old star in deep personal and professional crisis—depressed, feeling trapped in domestic life, having announced his retirement and lost faith in his art—and the Israeli war caught him precisely at this low point, offering an escape from his own crisis.

    “the Leonard Cohen of 1973, the Leonard Cohen of this story, is quite a young man. He's 39, deeply unhappy, feels like he's at a creative dead end. He's actually announced that he's retiring.”

  • Contrary to the assumption that Cohen came to play for soldiers, evidence shows he arrived in Israel without a guitar and without a plan—having lost faith in his art and stated he wanted to 'shut up'—initially intending to volunteer on a kibbutz, and only began performing after a chance meeting with Israeli musicians at a Tel Aviv cafe.

    “He came without a guitar, as you mentioned. He had announced his retirement from the music business, and he'd been very explicit about having kind of lost faith in his art. He told an interviewer that he just wants to shut up”

  • Cohen's journey to the war had complex, mixed motivations—not pure ideology or altruism but also a personal motive: feeling stuck in his own crisis, he spied an escape, and the regional catastrophe took his mind off his personal one, illustrating that decisions we like to think of as altruistic are often only partly so, with something else going on, which is simply human.

    “Israel's crisis offers a way out of his more immediate crisis; and that's part of what's going on... it's not all pure ideology or a desire to help. The other, I think, is he has a personal motive here, which is that he feels stuck and he spies an escape.”

0.51

Cohen's front-line concerts held extraordinary power because soldiers faced imminent death, making the performances matter of life and death with universal human significance.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Cohen claimed war is in some ways 'people at their best'—a unique state where every gesture has meaning, no one is goofing off, and everyone is focused on what needs to be done, making life feel meaningful—while simultaneously being people at their absolute worst; this potent mix of the noblest and cruelest human behaviors is what made the war so emotionally powerful for a sensitive artist.

    “he says, 'In a war, every gesture has meaning and no one is goofing off and everyone is focused on doing what needs to be done.' And, in some ways, it's people at their best”

  • Cohen's wartime performances were not concerts in any conventional sense but improvised gatherings of roughly 8 to 30 filthy, scared soldiers, staged on crates of ammunition with a Jeep's headlights as spotlights and usually no amplifier—a radical contrast to the Isle of Wight festival of half a million he had played years before.

    “they would kind of put together an ad hoc stage made of crates of ammunition. And they would use the Jeep's headlights as spotlights. And, there wasn't an amp most of the time.”

  • The power and 'electricity' of Cohen's front-line concerts derived from the fact that they were a matter of life and death—he was playing for soldiers who might be dead within hours, for whom his song might be the last thing they ever heard—so the war itself is what lends weight to the performances, making the soldiers as much the stars as Cohen.

    “Cohen is playing for people who might be dead within a few hours. His song might be the last thing that they hear. And he knows that, and that makes the concert so potent.”

0.48

The 1967 victory bred overconfidence that left Israel unprepared when Egypt attacked in 1973, exposing catastrophic military losses that shattered the founding leadership's credibility.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Israel's decisive victory over three Arab armies in the 1967 Six-Day War produced a period of national euphoria and overconfidence, leading to the assumption that the defeated Egyptian army would never dare attack again and that Israel would have forewarning of any attack—an overconfidence that left its borders defended by skeleton crews and caused it to be caught flat-footed in 1973.

    “Israel becomes overconfident. And, this all comes crashing down on October 6th, 1973 when the Yom Kippur War begins.”

  • In the first week of the Yom Kippur War the Israeli losses were so catastrophic—on both the Suez Canal and Golan Heights fronts—that they were hidden from the public, and the army came close to losing the war before the reserves could mobilize and reach the fronts.

    “the losses are so high that they're hidden from the public. And, many Israelis only realized later that in the first week of the war, the army almost lost the Yom Kippur War.”

0.20

Israel's reserve-heavy military structure meant skeleton border forces absorbed massive early attacks before mobilization, while Israelis abroad desperately returned to fight.

2 pointscentrality 2/5
  • While outsiders would flee a war, hundreds of Israelis abroad camped out at airports in New York, Paris, and London desperate to get back to fight, and the army's prioritized boarding lists—first tank crews and hospital staff, then infantry officers, then infantry—served as an index of how the war was going, revealing where casualties and shortages were greatest.

    “from the lists, you could understand how the war was going, because at first, the people who they were letting on the airplanes back to Israel were tank crews and hospital staff. That's who they needed.”

  • Because the bulk of Israel's military force is composed of reserves—accountants, taxi drivers, schoolteachers, and managers in their 30s and 40s rather than 18-19 year old infantry—an emergency call-up ('order eight'/tzav shmoneh) mobilizes the entire male population, and the time required for reserves to reach the front meant the scant standing army on the borders had to absorb massive attacks while being 'shredded.'

    “the guys being called up weren't 18- or 19-year-old infantry men. They were 30-year-old schoolteachers and 40-year-old managers. And, the country's male population was basically mobilized and that takes time.”