What this covers
Journalist Nicholas Wapshott joins Russ Roberts to discuss his book Samuelson Friedman, examining two twentieth-century economists whose intellectual competition shaped modern economics yet produced starkly different legacies. Milton Friedman and Paul Samuelson held opposing views of John Maynard Keynes's work, clashed in their Newsweek columns, and offered competing visions for economic policy. The conversation traces how Friedman revolutionized thinking about monetarism and the role of central banking, while Samuelson's mathematical framework became the institutional bedrock of academic economics. The two also represent contrasting philosophies: Friedman as a classical liberal skeptical of government intervention, Samuelson as the Keynesian establishment figure.
Wapshott and Roberts explore the peculiar irony at the heart of their legacies. Friedman won the theoretical argument—his work with Anna Jacobson Schwartz established that inflation is fundamentally a monetary phenomenon, reshaping how central bankers think—yet his preferred policy solutions largely failed. His fixed-money-growth rule never took root; government expanded steadily even under Republican administrations; and his broader libertarian agenda, from rent control to drug legalization to NAFTA skepticism, struggled for adoption. Samuelson, by contrast, left no detailed policy roadmap, but his Foundations of Economic Analysis, written before age 21, mathematized economics in a way that made his conceptual framework the default language of the profession. The discussion touches on stagflation in the 1970s, the Phillips Curve breakdown, the role of Bretton Woods, and why real-world examples sometimes persuade where theory cannot. A recurring thread examines Unintended Consequences—how Friedman grasped that well-intentioned programs often backfire, a principle Samuelson's framework struggled to accommodate.
Wapshott and Roberts argue that Samuelson and Friedman were intellectual twins-turned-rivals whose lasting legacies diverged: Samuelson's institutionalized academic dominance endures while Friedman won the monetary-theory argument but largely failed to reshape actual policy or the size of government.
- Friedman revolutionized central banking and the view that inflation is a monetary phenomenon, even though his preferred fixed-money-growth rule was never adopted
- Friedman's libertarian policy prescriptions mostly failed; government grew steadily even under Republican presidents
- Samuelson's Keynesian framework became the entrenched establishment default, giving him a more durable institutional legacy
Friedman deliberately built a populist political movement that made libertarian ideas mainstream, unlike Samuelson's academic isolation.
- Unlike Samuelson, who lived entirely within economics, Friedman deliberately broadened his appeal to become popular and turn his ideas into a political movement, which is why his libertarian ideas became more mainstream after his death.
“Milton started off in economics, but he worked out that in order to tell the tale that he wanted to tell he needed to broaden out his appeal. He needed to become popular, and he also needed to make it a political movement more than an economic movement.”
- Wapshott connects Friedman to the election of Donald Trump via the Tea Party movement, arguing Trump supporters came from the Tea Party, which was populist in a way Friedman himself was populist, waving the flag and saying 'This way, lads.'
“Trump actually came out of--if anything, he came out to the Tea Party movement. I think that the Trump supporters were Tea Party supporters in the first place...it's become a populist party in a way that Friedman, I think, was a populist in many respects.”
- Through Friedman's influence, the Republican Party has become every bit as much a libertarian party as a conservative one, with his once-fringe libertarian ideas now more mainstream.
“say the Republican Party is now every bit as much a libertarian party as it is a conservative party”
- Friedman contributed to the Thatcher Revolution in Britain, which reversed the wholesale cradle-to-grave socialism of the 1945 government, demonstrating that ownership is not the key (Marx and Lenin were wrong) and that removing state constraints freed both the economy and individuals.
“Milton contributed towards the Thatcher Revolution, which came to the conclusion in the early 1970s onwards, that actually this was not the way to do it...ownership is not the key. Karl Marx was wrong. Lenin was wrong.”
Friedman overturned Keynesian orthodoxy by restoring money's centrality to economic theory and central bank discretion.
- Until Friedman, the ruling Keynesians held that money didn't matter, and he overturned this by asserting that money matters most of all, transforming how central banks manipulated the economy by restoring their discretion after the rigid Bretton Woods fixed-rate structure.
“until Milton, all Keynesians who ruled the ruled the roost, said that money didn't matter. And, he said, 'Excuse me, it matters most of all.'”
- Friedman's profound problem was that, however right he was about the Quantity Theory of Money, he could not give practical central bankers like Volcker a persuasive method because economists could not agree on which monetary aggregate (M0, M1, M3, M4) to measure.
“however right he was about the Quantity Theory of Money, he didn't find a persuasive way of telling practical people like Paul Volcker, this is how you do it. Because, they couldn't even agree on what bit of money you measured?”
- Friedman and Anna Schwartz's data analysis showed the Great Depression should have been countered by pumping more money into the system rather than restricting it, contradicting Friedman's later popular association with restrictive monetarism.
“what he said that the American economy should have done was: get the faucets open, get some money in that system. The banks won't go bust. Everybody would be--more people would be in jobs and it'll cure itself.”
Friedman valued individual liberty and self-expression against state constraint, viewing regulation's unintended consequences as inherent.
- Friedman was a fierce partisan who played for the conservative team but was not a conservative; like Hayek he valued the relationship between individual and state, believing the individual should have maximum self-expression and disliking anything that curtailed it.
“His notion of the relationship between an individual and the state was very important to him. And, he thought that the individual should be allowed as much self-expression as was possible. And, he didn't like anything that curtailed it at any stage.”
- Friedman believed all drugs should be legal because people will use them anyway, and that the arbitrary justice of prohibition is a far more serious injustice than allowing drug use, a view society has increasingly adopted with widespread marijuana legalization.
“Don't waste your time trying to stop people smoking a joint, because they do it anyway...arbitrary justice is a far more serious, and an injustice than it is the fact that the 16 year old might get a joint from this direction, rather than that direction.”
- Friedman was right that whatever a regulation intends to do, it always has unintended consequences, as do all laws.
“whatever you intended to do, it always has unintended consequences. Always. I mean, all laws have that actually.”
- Friedman understood the disconnect between progressive intentions and reality: the war on poverty ended up paying people to stay home and institutionalized poverty, and public broadcasting super-serves the narrow band of well-off people who would consume that content anyway, illustrating that claiming to cure a problem does not mean you have done so.
“Milton Friedman was always aware of the disconnect between what people said they hoped to achieve by progressive acts...you set out with a war on poverty, but you end up...institutionalizing property, and locking it down”
Friedman's influence wanes because he created no enduring academic school and his oversimplified popularization alienated mainstream economists.
- Although the Quantity Theory of Money is self-evidently true, Friedman's drive to be popular led him to oversimplify it to the point that it failed to persuade mainstream economists, constituting an academic failure.
“There's no doubt that the truth about the Quantity Theory of Money is self-evidently true. I think that what he then did with it, which was to was to turn it--and a lot of it to do with being popular--was to simplify it, oversimplify it”
- Friedman's influence has thinned because he did not leave behind a clump of like-minded academic disciples who could serve as proxies after his death, unlike Keynes's Cambridge Circus or Samuelson, whose framework is so entrenched that all established economists effectively represent his thinking without having to fight for it.
“Milton didn't leave a clump of academics who've thought along similar lines who could be proxies for him...Samuelson is so well entrenched and so established that all established people represent what Samuelson thinks”
- Most towering public figures are forgotten about 15 years after their death, as was true of Churchill, Roosevelt, Updike, and Norman Mailer; only rare figures like Jane Austen are read century after century, suggesting Friedman's fading is a normal pattern of transience rather than a verdict on his ideas.
“all people in the public sphere, 15 years after their death, have been forgotten. It was probably true of Churchill. Probably true Franklin Roosevelt...These huge figures in their day...it's all transient”
Friedman was intellectually honest and personally likable while remaining an effective partisan who shaped policy through real-world influence.
- Friedman combined two seemingly contradictory essential traits: he didn't care what people thought about him, yet he was likable, making him a gadfly people enjoyed having around even when disagreeing with him.
“he combined two things which were essential. First of all, he didn't care what people thought about him. And, he was likable. Which is an apparent contradiction.”
- Both Samuelson and Friedman were intellectually honest and not pushed around by politicians, pursuing a larger aim based on finding the truth, which is the key thing for an academic.
“They had a much larger aim, which was based upon finding The Truth--which for an academic is really the key thing.”
- Friedman's advocacy for floating exchange rates has been a great liberating force for dynamic economies because in a fast-moving world of technological and business change, greater flexibility allows economies to accommodate change better than fixed-rate systems.
“the floating of exchange rates, I think has been a great liberating force for any dynamic economy...the more flexibility you have in an economy, the better”
- Jimmy Carter deserves credit for appointing Volcker to fix hyperinflation and then leaving him to do it without political pressure, even though central bankers are usually under enormous pressure from political masters to do something before elections.
“Jimmy Carter appointed Volcker to fix hyperinflation; and left him to it. He got no pressure.”
- Nixon cynically imposed wage and price controls despite knowing they were an impossible task that people would circumvent and that would make only marginal temporary differences, because the public wants a government that looks as if it is trying to address these problems.
“Nixon knew that you could not fix prices and wages. It's an impossible task...And, yet knowing this fact, he said, 'I'll do it anyway, because the public wants a government that looks as if it's trying to address these things.'”
Samuelson's persistent attacks on Friedman after his death paradoxically confirmed Friedman's ideas remained culturally and intellectually potent.
- Samuelson's repeated posthumous attacks on Friedman, including the 2008 claim that the financial crisis disproved the notion that markets self-regulate, paradoxically reveal that Friedman's ideas were still alive and threatening, as Samuelson felt he had to keep kicking the corpse to make sure it stayed dead.
“this admitting is that: 'He's dead. I still have to keep kicking him to make sure he is dead,' because his ideas are coming back any minute, you know.”
- Despite nearly identical backgrounds (similar ages, both Jewish but non-practicing, same university and class year), Samuelson and Friedman developed sharply opposing worldviews, with one turning left and one turning right.
“it was as if they were twins separated at birth. They were within a couple of years of each other. They both had very similar backgrounds. They were both Jewish but neither of them practiced Judaism in a serious way”
- Weekly columns are not the first draft of history because a week is not enough time to understand what was happening; much of the eighteen years of Samuelson and Friedman columns is irrelevant today.
“A weekly column is not enough time, really. They're not writing the first draft of history. They're just shoveling the stuff out the door.”
- Because Samuelson was Jewish and the Harvard economics department head was antisemitic, he was not offered a full lectureship and went to MIT, which he transformed from an engineering school into a top-five economics department.
“Because he was Jewish and because there was an antisemitic Head of the Economics Department, he wasn't offered a full lectureship, which is why he walked across the Charles River and became the key star at MIT”
- Galbraith has been washed up by history and is no longer read, partly because he never engaged in the jargon-and-equation game of his colleagues, earning the disdain of the economics profession.
“in terms of permanent influence, Galbraith is gone. Nobody reads Galbraith today.”