What this covers

Russ Roberts interviews Jenny Schuetz of the Brookings Institution on how local land-use rules restrict housing supply and drive up rents. The conversation traces a chain of economic and political logic: discretionary zoning and approval processes impose costs and delays that only large developers can absorb, existing homeowners dominate local politics while renters and potential residents have no voice, and outright bans on multifamily housing and small units foreclose cheap shelter. Schuetz argues that the solution requires shifting decision-making power upward to state government and realigning financial incentives so that localities benefit from housing growth rather than blocking it.

The episode moves through specific mechanisms and their history. Path dependence emerges as central: community review processes, born from legitimate 1960s opposition to urban renewal and highway bulldozing, hardened into a norm where existing residents can veto neighbors' construction. Schuetz details how zoning codes once serving explicit racial exclusion persist as income-based exclusion through minimum lot sizes and bans on boarding houses and SROs. The bootlegger and baptist pattern shows how self-interested homeowner opposition gains cover from legitimate concerns about aesthetics and environment. On remedies, Schuetz and Roberts consider state-level leverage through funding conditions, compare Paris's mid-rise density to San Francisco's low-density abundance, and examine Judge Glock's proposal to redirect developer fees to residents—each with political and design complications. The conversation assumes supply and demand drives rents, rejects landlord greed as explanation, and emphasizes that reform must reckon with genuine attachment to place rather than simply overriding it.

Sharpest takeaway

Schuetz and Roberts argue that discretionary local land-use regulation, driven by existing homeowners protecting their property values, artificially restricts housing supply, raises rents, excludes the poor, and that the fix requires shifting decisions to higher levels of government and changing financial incentives.

  • Procedural and discretionary approval processes add time, risk, and cost that only large developers can bear, reducing competition and raising prices
  • Local political power rests with existing homeowners who vote and show up, while renters and would-be residents have no voice
  • Bans on small units, boarding houses, and multifamily housing close off cheap options, pushing poor people into unsafe or no housing

The argument · threads7 threads · 37 claims
0.71

Building more housing at varied price points requires state intervention through funding leverage, reform leadership, and middle-density zoning options.

10 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The federal government has only limited financial carrots and sticks for housing (e.g. attaching strings to transportation dollars) but a powerful bully pulpit, so an administration or Congress that frequently spotlighted and shamed the worst-performing jurisdictions while applying its limited financial leverage could meaningfully move the needle, since a handful of states constitute most of the problem.

    “The Federal Government doesn't have a ton of these financial carrots and sticks, but it has a really big bully pulpit.”

  • States are well-positioned to drive reform because they redistribute money to local governments (for schools, roads, police, fire); they could set quantitative targets for housing units produced—including units below the current median price—and withhold funds from local governments that fail to allow private developers to build more at a wider range of price points, though state legislators from exclusionary suburbs make this a heavy political lift.

    “state governments have a bunch of pots of money that they move around, and they could withhold some of that money from local governments that are really being bad actors and not contributing enough housing.”

  • Economists must remember that people are genuinely attached to where they live and resist change regardless of income or city health, so dismissing that attachment makes productive conversation impossible; reform must acknowledge the human reality of place attachment and proceed at a pace people can tolerate rather than telling them to accept change whether they like it or not.

    “I think economists have to remember that people are attached to the places they live.”

  • Most cities, including big ones like New York, San Francisco, and Washington D.C., have outlawed multifamily building on two-thirds to three-quarters of their land, so apartments simply cannot be built there.

    “have just outlawed multi-family building on two-thirds to three-quarters of their lands. So, you just can't build apartments, period.”

  • Left-leaning proposals like national rent control and expansive tenant protections are less constructive than supply-side reforms because they may be unenforceable and have the potential to hurt the most vulnerable tenants, whereas subsidizing poor people's rents drives up rents for those who don't qualify for the subsidy.

    “'Let's have national rent control,' or, 'Let's have lots of tenant protections,' which we may or may not be able to enforce and may have the potential actually for hurting vulnerable tenants the most.”

  • Today's restrictive community-engagement process originated in legitimate 1960s-70s reactions to urban renewal (federal bulldozing of poor and minority neighborhoods for highways) and the environmental movement, which together established mandatory community consultation; but this process was later co-opted by wealthy white homeowners who define 'the community' as themselves and use it to block all change.

    “both the community planning process that came out of urban renewal and the environmental push started to merge together to say... the community... needs to be consulted.”

  • Paris is far denser than San Francisco yet remains lovely, showing that more housing does not require skyscrapers: six-to-eight-story buildings built right up to the curb line with narrow streets and no setbacks yield much more housing than San Francisco's setback-and-yard pattern, but this middle-density option isn't even on the table for discussion.

    “If we'd let San Francisco become Paris, it could still be lovely and charming, but you could house more people.”

  • Much current zoning was explicitly racist in origin: when racially restrictive covenants became illegal, jurisdictions adopted zoning requiring large, expensive houses—discriminating by income since they could no longer discriminate by race—which remains legal though not ethical and effectively excludes poorer people who are disproportionately black.

    “a lot of current zoning was explicitly racist. So, when you couldn't have racially restrictive covenants, you instead adopted zoning that required new houses to be large and expensive. If you can't legally discriminate by race, you can discriminate based on income.”

  • Adding housing supply does lower prices, as evidenced by places that build more when demand rises having lower price growth; but because expensive coastal metros have under-built multifamily rental for 30 years, only large-scale, sustained, and cheaper-to-produce construction over a decade or more will soften rents, not a token few thousand units.

    “We know from the places where it's easier to build housing and that have historically built a lot of new supply when there's demand, their prices are lower.”

  • High rents are not explained by landlord greed because landlords can only charge what the market will bear; in a well-functioning market competitors would undercut high rents, so high rents reflect limited supply relative to demand, and the best remedy is flooding the market with new supply to erode landlords' market power.

    “landlords can only charge what the market will bear.”

0.70

Regulatory and procedural barriers—zoning, environmental review, multiple agency approvals—make development riskier, longer, and more expensive, directly raising housing prices.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Regulatory barriers in homebuilding make the process riskier, longer, and more expensive, which has direct consequences for housing affordability because all of those costs ultimately get passed into the price of units.

    “Regulatory barriers make it riskier, longer and more expensive, which has consequences for housing affordability.”

  • Beyond zoning, the procedural barriers to building—multiple separate agency approvals (zoning, environmental review, fire marshal sign-off, rezoning negotiations) with no standardization across jurisdictions—are a major and underappreciated obstacle, since construction is actually far into the process rather than the beginning.

    “the procedural barriers are one of the parts that I think don't get talked about enough”

  • Like the pharmaceutical industry's FDA compliance burden, heavy and complex land-use regulation can only be borne by a small number of large, well-capitalized firms with developed expertise and government relationships, which reduces competition among developers and further raises prices.

    “the less regulated markets, where there's a shorter period to development and a more straightforward process tend to have more small-scale developers”

  • Most development, especially infill, is discretionary rather than rule-based: there is no standardized roadmap, the order of approvals is unclear, processes run simultaneously or in conflict, and one body's required change can negate another's approval—so compliance with known rules does not guarantee permission.

    “Most of the development that we see, especially in infill locations, is really discretionary at this point.”

  • Major New York developments (Atlantic Yards, Hudson Yards, the proposed Amazon HQ2 in Queens) have circumvented the city's complex ULURP land-use process by going through the state's Empire State Development Corporation, which can take control of big projects, is more development-friendly, and offers subsidies—because the state cares about regional economic growth and faces less direct neighborhood political pressure than the city.

    “most of the big projects that have happened in New York have circumvented the city's land use process and gone through the state.”

0.67

Local land-use decisions privilege existing homeowners who can vote while excluding renters and future residents who would benefit from new housing.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Renters, who would benefit from more housing, turn out to vote and attend community meetings far less than homeowners—partly because they are younger, have multiple jobs, or plan to leave—so their interests are systematically underrepresented in local land-use decisions.

    “we see really big differences in the rate of voting between homeowners and renters.”

  • Many city mayors and especially city councilors face no opponent in general elections or even party primaries, so incumbents face little pressure; combined with change being inherently scary, this lets them stay in office by avoiding change, while disengaged residents who can't vote against anyone reinforce incumbency.

    “There's often not competition within the party in the primaries. An awful lot of mayors, and even more city councilers, never have an opponent.”

  • Even well-connected developers cannot simply have projects approved by calling the mayor, because the decisive pushback comes from small, organized groups of neighborhood voters who hold sway over elected officials—and at present the neighbors are winning.

    “ultimately, a lot of the pushback is coming from neighborhoods. It's coming from small groups of organized voters who, as it turns out, also have sway over elected officials.”

  • The land-use process privileges existing homeowners because only current residents can vote and apply political pressure, while the people who would benefit from new housing live in other jurisdictions and have no voice; hyperlocal decision-making thus serves neither the region nor the country.

    “The only people who get to vote, who get to put direct political pressure on elected officials, are the people who already live there. The people who would benefit from the new housing live in another jurisdiction altogether.”

0.53

Property tax caps and neighborhood veto norms create financial and political incentives for homeowners to block development and preserve their untaxed wealth gains.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • California's Proposition 13 caps property tax increases so long-time owners pay taxes on the value at purchase rather than market value, which is inequitable to new buyers (who may pay ten times as much) and, crucially, removes any incentive for owners of low-density expensive homes to sell to developers, since their tiny tax bills make holding the land off the market costless.

    “the state caps the increase of property taxes in the late 1970s. So essentially if you have been in a house for a long time and the house has appreciated in value, you're not paying property taxes on the market value.”

  • A fundamental and hard-to-reverse shift has occurred from the principle that owning property gives you say over your own land but not your neighbor's, to a norm where you can veto what your neighbor builds; once that norm of weighing in on neighbors' property is established, it is very difficult to reverse.

    “when I buy a piece of property I have some say in what I can do on my property, but I don't have the right to control what my neighbors do with their property.”

  • Existing homeowners in expensive markets have become 'millionaires by sitting on dirt'—enormous, largely untaxed wealth gains from buying in the right place at the right time—and they resist new development that would at most cap future appreciation rather than erase their existing gains.

    “We have created a whole generation of people who have become millionaires by sitting on dirt. They haven't done anything.”

  • Schemes requiring a vote or agreement of neighborhood landowners face holdout problems: if a developer needs 50% approval and has 49%, the marginal holdout can demand an outrageous payout, which is historically why eminent domain has been used to overcome holdouts—so any compensation scheme must be structured to prevent a handful of holdouts from blocking it.

    “in land use we wind up with holdout problems. If the developer has to get 50% of the landowners to vote for something and you've got 49%, that last person is going to ask for an outrageous payout.”

0.47

Zoning and building codes eliminated affordable housing types like boarding houses and SROs that poor people relied on.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Zoning and building codes eliminated boarding houses and single-room-occupancy units—where people rented just a room, sometimes short-term, without a private kitchen or bathroom—removing the affordable, flexible options that poor people once used to find shelter other than their car or the sidewalk.

    “We no longer have any of these cheap options. So, small units, fitting a lot of units onto one piece of land, things that are not a complete housing unit with kitchen and bath, shorter term leases--all of these options that we used to have... we've basically made those only illegal.”

  • Modern co-living companies and Airbnb function as workarounds to boarding-house and SRO bans, obtaining zoning waivers, variances, or hotel-style regulation; but the high-end co-living versions are rebranded fancy dorms that are no cheaper than apartments, selling social amenities rather than affordability.

    “At the high-end, they've rebranded this as co-living. It's basically like a college dorm and a pretty fancy one... But those are expensive. Those are not any cheaper than just renting an apartment.”

0.34

Infill development faces unique obstacles including neighbor resistance, contaminated land remediation, and parking disputes that add substantial cost and negotiation.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Infill development is more complicated than greenfield subdivision because you have existing neighbors who resist change, parcel-specific physical constraints, likely environmental remediation of contaminated land, and contentious parking requirements—all of which add cost and negotiation.

    “It's usually more complicated to do some kind of an Infill Development in part just because you have a lot of neighbors.”

  • Houston lacks formal zoning but uses restrictive covenants that function similarly, and Texas metros have accommodated population growth and kept prices lower mainly by building farther out as sprawl; but they face limits once commute distances become intolerable, and even Dallas finds redevelopment harder than greenfield suburbs—putting Texas cities roughly 20 years behind coastal cities on these problems.

    “Houston doesn't have zoning the way that other cities do, so they don't have a municipal zoning code. They do have a bunch of restrictive covenants that govern certain neighborhoods.”

0.34

Banning affordable housing forces poor people into homelessness, overcrowding, or illegal dwellings with serious safety consequences.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Because poor people must live somewhere, banning cheap housing forces them into homelessness, RVs, overcrowded family situations, or illegal and dangerous dwellings—as in the fatal DC row-house fire where an unlicensed apartment rented to immigrants caught fire and several people died.

    “If you make cheap housing illegal, they will find whatever work-around they can.”

  • There is a floor below which rents do not fall—about $500 a month even in places like Detroit where land is essentially free—because that covers minimum operating costs (mortgage, property taxes, water, sewer, common electricity); below that, landlords abandon or close units rather than operate at a loss.

    “it's hard to pay the minimum operating costs on an apartment for less than about $500 a month.”