Kimberly Clausing on Open and the Progressive Case for Free Trade
What this covers
Kimberly Clausing, an economist at Reed College, sits down with Russ Roberts to defend free trade from a progressive standpoint. The conversation centers on a counterintuitive claim: that protectionism, despite its political appeal to workers harmed by global competition, actually causes more economic damage than the trade it seeks to constrain. Clausing's argument rests on two pillars. First, she explains why trade deficits cannot be fixed by tariffs—they are determined by macroeconomic fundamentals like national savings rates and investment flows, not by unfair foreign behavior. Second, she contends that the real solution to worker displacement lies not in blocking trade but in aggressive domestic redistribution: a reformed tax system with uniform income treatment, an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit, and a carbon tax designed to benefit lower-income households.
The discussion moves through several distinct territories. Clausing and Roberts examine why the Musical Chairs Fallacy—the idea that jobs are a fixed supply—misleads policymakers, and how job churn dwarfs any single source of displacement. They unpack the mechanics of Trade Deficit as Capital Surplus, showing why a trade deficit can persist for decades without crisis. A key tension emerges around feasibility: Clausing argues economists too often retreat into "that's political," abandoning the hard work of designing inequality relief that could actually pass Congress, whereas Roberts invokes Milton Friedman's example of radical ideas eventually becoming policy. The pair also debate Targeting vs Universality, with Clausing defending the Earned Income Tax Credit over Universal Basic Income as the more cost-effective anti-poverty lever, and explore how Rent-Seeking turns protection into a magnet for corporate influence-peddling rather than genuine worker support.
Clausing argues that the U.S. should continue to embrace free trade because protectionism creates more harm than it prevents, while pairing trade with progressive interventions—especially a more redistributive tax system—to help workers left behind.
- Trade deficits are determined by macroeconomic saving/investment balances, not unfair foreign behavior, so tariffs cannot fix them
- Protectionism saves a few jobs at enormous cost while creating new shocks elsewhere in the economy
- The tax system (expanded EITC, uniform income taxation, carbon tax) is a feasible, demonstrated way to share the gains from a growing pie
Trade and technological change create genuine worker displacement that must be addressed through redistribution, progressive taxation, and means-tested transfers.
- Roberts argues that efficiency (the utilitarian 'bigger pie' calculus) is morally problematic as a justification for free trade because real groups of people struggle; instead the better justification is that trade-driven dynamism lets each generation mold its skills, encourages innovation and human flourishing, and means that even if someone struggles at a point in time, their children will do better.
“I've come to argue that efficiency is not the reason I'm a free trader. The real reason I'm a free trader is for other reasons. I think that over time, each generation gets a chance to mold its skills to the dynamism of an economy that has trade”
- The labor market is not a game of musical chairs where removing chairs leaves people without seats; chairs are constantly removed and added, usually with more added than removed—but the real moral problem is that displaced workers can struggle to find the new chairs because they lack the skills, are geographically distant, or don't know about them.
“I think often people think that the job market is a game of musical chairs... And that's not what happens. There's a bunch of chairs being taken away, and there's a bunch of chairs being added.”
- When a very large share of revenue comes from a small group of high earners while many pay no income tax (partly due to negative rates), two problematic political-economy incentives emerge: many people feel government costs them nothing, and politicians are incentivized to keep the goodies flowing to the small group that funds the government.
“when enormous sum of your revenue comes from a very small group of people, politicians have an incentive to take care of those folks--keep the goodies coming in. That sounds like a really bad political-economy set of incentives.”
- The payroll tax is an enormous tax on workers that is couched and sold as a personal savings program for one's future, but it is not: the money goes out the door to pay current recipients, with a promise of future repayment that people increasingly doubt; this disguise—plus splitting it between employee and employer (though much of the employer share is borne by workers as lower wages)—makes a true tax feel like something other than a tax.
“we have an enormous tax on workers, which is the payroll tax, that is couched and sold as a savings program for your future. But it's not... It's money that goes out the door to pay current recipients of Social Security”
- Means-testing transfers—consistent with preferring a targeted Earned Income Tax Credit over Universal Basic Income—could quickly address looming budget pressures from the expensive Baby Boomer retirement, as exemplified by Roberts noting it is odd that he will receive Social Security he does not need, which effectively transfers resources from his children.
“if we means-tested it the way you suggest--we should means-test the Earned Income Tax Credit rather than having Universal Basic Income--we could fix that really quickly.”
Protectionism and growth-limiting policies fail because they either cause rent-seeking corruption or prove impossible to calibrate moderately.
- Once a firm can be protected from foreign competition, it changes executive incentives—energy shifts from making a better product toward securing influence in Washington and currying favor with bureaucrats to obtain protection (rent-seeking)—which Roberts calls an underappreciated cost of activist trade policy.
“once you open up the possibility of protecting your sector, your industry, your company from that foreign competition, you change the incentives to where you spend your energy as an executive in that company from making a better product to making sure you have influence in Washington.”
- Politicians and even economists act as if there is a dial to set globalization or technological change to a preferred moderate level, but those smooth knobs don't exist; attempts to slow growth must be sector-specific and are prone to rent-seeking and cronyism, so the better approach is to let the pie grow and use other policies—especially a progressive tax code—to soften the blow on those who don't share in the gains.
“they act as if there's a lever or a knob that we could dial and say, 'Well, you know, I don't want 10 on the globalization, I want 7-and-a-half.'... And those knobs aren't available.”
- Globalization and technological change are essentially the same phenomenon—both are ways to get more output from the same resources—so the difficulty of reversing the China shock is analogous to the absurdity of throwing away our computers; in both cases the displacement is real, but undoing the source destroys broad value, so the harm must be addressed by other means.
“Technological change and globalization are really a very similar phenomenon. They are both ways we can get more from the same amount of resources. That analogy, that parallelism is unappreciated in my view.”
Trade deficits reflect foreign investment attraction and capital flows that enable growth, while aggregate job losses to trade are economically misleading.
- A trade deficit is the near-perfect mirror of a capital surplus: because the U.S. is an attractive place to invest and saves little, foreigners invest more here than Americans invest abroad, which simultaneously grows U.S. productive capital and lets Americans consume more than they produce—an arrangement that resembles 'magic' and can persist for a century, the main risk being a sudden loss of foreign appetite for U.S. assets requiring a traumatic adjustment.
“a trade deficit is almost a perfect mirror of a capital surplus--that is, the gap between what is invested and saved in a country.”
- Attributing two million job losses to China is misleading because it is a general-equilibrium problem: jobs lost in import-competing sectors are offset by jobs created elsewhere from lower prices that free up resources and capital, and the Fed responds to the overall picture, so claiming an aggregate net job loss from China is probably not true.
“to point to China and say that they are responsible for loss of two million jobs without accounting for the increases in jobs that you can't count, because they're harder to identify from lower prices, which freed up resources for people and capital to do other things--just strikes me as--actually, I won't say anything more than that. I just think it's wrong.”
Pessimism about living standards is partly statistical artifact from mismeasured inflation and demographic shifts in household composition.
- There is a competing political strategy argument that one should always advocate the ideal policy rather than the merely feasible, because doing so can move the window of possibility—exemplified by Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom, whose radical ideas like an all-volunteer army were once seen as absurd but were later adopted.
“You can look at Capitalism and Freedom, by Milton Friedman, and every idea in that book, at the time--almost every idea--was incredibly radical. The idea that we would actually have a volunteer army... is absurd when he wrote it; and we got it.”
- Restrictive zoning in thriving metropolitan areas (driven mainly by policy, not just demand) does not only price out potential newcomers from places like West Virginia; per Kevin Erdmann's work, it also forces existing residents to leave for less-thriving places, worsening conditions for the people already there—a self-defeating policy mistake.
“not only is it hard for people to move there, but the people who already lived there can't afford to stay there. So, they end up having to leave--this is Erdmann's point--and move to places where it's not thriving”
- Much of the pessimism about the bottom 50% being no better off than 30-40 years ago is a statistical artifact, because inflation is badly mismeasured (overstating real declines) and because household-based measures are distorted by demographic change—the low-education left-hand tail is now more likely to be single rather than married—so correcting for both yields a very different, less crisis-like picture.
“So, the people in the left-hand tail are more likely to be single, whereas before they used to be married. So, I feel that a lot of the pessimism about the state of the economy is a statistical artifact.”