Catherine Semcer on Poaching, Preserves, and African Wildlife
What this covers
Catherine Semcer of the Property and Environment Research Center discusses with Russ Roberts why regulated trophy hunting that directs revenue and meat to local African communities stands as the most effective conservation mechanism for wildlife and habitat. The conversation centers on a counterintuitive argument rooted in economics: when wildlife generates income for the people who live alongside it, they gain a material incentive to protect rather than exploit it. Semcer draws on her experience managing elephant conservation programs and details two case studies—Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE program and Mozambique's Coutada 11—where hunting revenue doubled or dramatically expanded animal populations while reducing poaching, alongside a recent large-scale lion translocation undertaken by professional hunter Mark Haldane.
The conversation covers the mechanics of Incentive Alignment and Property Rights in conservation, exploring how the Tragedy of the Commons operates when wildlife is unowned and how implicit ownership—created through revenue-sharing arrangements—can reverse it. Semcer contrasts this approach with what she terms "fortress conservation," the militarized model that alienates local populations, and argues that photo-tourism and external philanthropy cannot sustain African conservation at the necessary scale. A central tension emerges around post-Cecil-the-Lion trophy-import bans: Semcer presents evidence that U.S. restrictions on trophy imports have increased poaching and reduced anti-poaching capacity by eliminating the revenue stream locals depend on, an argument that sits in direct conflict with Western animal-welfare sentiment. The discussion also examines questions of sovereignty and Unintended Consequences, touching on whether outsiders should dictate African conservation policy and whether deliberate ecosystem manipulation—like introducing predators into complex systems—can proceed with sufficient foresight.
Semcer argues that legal, regulated trophy hunting that channels revenue and meat to local African communities is the most effective and sustainable mechanism for conserving wildlife and habitat, because it makes wildlife economically competitive with other land uses and gives locals a stake in protecting it.
- Programs like CAMPFIRE and Coutada 11 show hunting revenue doubled elephant and game populations while reducing poaching
- Banning trophy imports removes wildlife's value to locals, increasing poaching and habitat loss
- Photo-tourism and external philanthropy are not viable substitutes in most wildlife-use areas
Community-based hunting programs create local economic incentives that make wildlife conservation self-sustaining and effective.
- Beyond directly sharing hunt revenue, some of the income goes to local district councils that build infrastructure—roads, schools, clinics, wells—used day-to-day, and it does not escape local people that 'it was the elephants that paid for this,' creating a tangible truce with the costs of living alongside dangerous wildlife.
“Some of that revenue goes into the local district councils, who then use that to build infrastructure--roads, schools, clinics, wells.”
- Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE program, which gives local communities use-rights over wildlife and lets them partner with hunting outfitters while keeping the majority of hunt revenue, created an incentive to keep more elephants on the landscape; since its institution the elephant population in CAMPFIRE areas has doubled, helping make Zimbabwe home to Africa's second-largest elephant population, while raising community incomes 15-25% and benefiting about 2.4 million people across 800,000 households.
“since the CAMPFIRE area was put into place, we've seen a doubling of the elephant population within the CAMPFIRE areas”
- In a Mozambique area where the hunting concession provided trophy-animal meat to local villagers, a poacher's own wife turned him in because she feared his poaching would reduce the meat allotment for her family and village, illustrating how meat distribution creates incentives for locals to report poachers.
“this woman turned her husband in because she was concerned that, because he was poaching, it would reduce the meat draw[?] for her family and her village”
- Funding anti-poaching protection externally year after year is not sustainable; national parks in Africa with limited or no hunting still experience poaching because local people lack buy-in to the conservation model when they see no material benefit, whereas places like Namibia's conservancies and Zimbabwe's CAMPFIRE areas succeed because conservation efforts have become self-sustaining.
“We are doing that, in places like national parks in Africa where there is limited to no hunting, in many cases. And, there's still poaching taking place.”
- The widespread militarized 'fortress conservation' approach to counter-poaching—using fences, helicopters, high-powered rifles, and military-trained staff to wall off habitat—has had only mixed effectiveness and has largely alienated local populations from wildlife conservation; research by the IUCN, UN, and IIED showed the real way to address poaching is to build support among people who live among the wildlife and raise the opportunity cost of poaching.
“it's really, to a large part, alienated local populations from the idea of wildlife conservation”
Eliminating trophy hunting causes dramatic increases in poaching and habitat loss by removing wildlife's economic value to local people.
- Since 2015 and the Cecil the Lion affair there has been a concerted effort to list African wildlife under the U.S. Endangered Species Act solely to prohibit trophy imports; because about 70% of the global trophy-hunting market is U.S.-based, closing it would destabilize African conservation, and University of Pretoria research indicates ending lion hunting in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia would reduce viability of nearly 15 million acres (about seven Yellowstones), causing negative consequences for the very wildlife the listings aim to protect.
“if lion hunting were to end in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia, almost 15 million acres of conservation areas would suffer decreased viability, and become increasingly vulnerable to development”
- When the United States banned the import of elephant trophies from Zimbabwe in 2014, Zimbabwe's safari-hunting industry declined about 30%, and the Donde safari area's anti-poaching unit reported a five-fold increase in elephant poaching, because elephants lost their value to local people (worth more dead with tusks smuggled out) and reduced revenue meant the anti-poaching unit could no longer pay patrol salaries.
“When the United States instituted a ban on the import of elephant trophies from Zimbabwe back in 2014, we saw a 30% decline in Zimbabwe's safari-hunting industry”
- Poaching is a major problem in Africa because tourism is a roughly $40 billion industry providing about 6% of total continental employment, so every illegal killing of charismatic wildlife is effectively a theft from people whose livelihoods depend on those animals; it also has a security dimension because organized crime syndicates and armed militant groups poach to fund weapons and wage war against governments.
“Tourism is a tremendously large industry in Africa, valued at about $40 billion, according to the World Tourism Council. And, it provides about 6% of total employment on the continent.”
- Research from Namibia indicates that if hunting were eliminated in community conservancies, 84% of those conservancies would no longer be economically viable, which would leave more than 12 million acres of wildlife habitat—roughly five times the size of Yosemite—immediately more vulnerable to development.
“if hunting was eliminated in the community conservancies, 84% of those conservancies would no longer be economically viable”
Trophy hunting's substantial financial contribution justifies its conservation role despite appearing modest by Western economic standards.
- Although critics say trophy hunting contributes little to African economies, its actual cash contribution of around $426 million is three times the total amount collected in entrance fees to all of Africa's national parks, so its conservation value should not be discounted despite seeming small by Western standards.
“the actual cash contribution is around $426 million dollars. That doesn't sound like a lot, but to put it in context, that contribution is 3 times the amount collected in entrance fees to all of Africa's national parks.”
- Given the inevitability of African economic growth (the IMF projects about 6% growth), the central conservation question is how wildlife habitat will remain economically competitive with alternative land uses; if it cannot, elephants, lions, and rhinos will not persist on the landscape because the land will be developed.
“wildlife is going to have to be economically competitive with other land uses. Wildlife habitat is going to have to be economically competitive with other land uses. If we're going to see elephants and lions and rhinos persist on the landscape.”
- One of the most effective ways to disrupt the ivory and rhino horn supply chain near the source is through trophy-hunting programs in which local people economically benefit from healthy long-term wildlife populations, managing wildlife as a renewable resource rather than killing large numbers quickly for a quick cash return.
“people are economically benefiting from having healthy populations of wildlife over the long term, managing it as a renewable resource, as opposed to killing large numbers of animals in a short period of time just to get a quick cash return”
- Zimbabwe, with about 83,000 elephants, exports less than 1% (about 0.3%) of its total elephant population as trophies each year under CITES permits, so replacement far outpaces take—meaning a very small number of animals generates substantial income and social license for conservation.
“Zimbabwe exports less than 1% of its total elephant population each year. Replacement, you know, far outpaces take, with regard to trophy hunting in that country. I believe it's .3% that are leaving the country”
Private enterprise and community-based African conservation programs demonstrate capacity for dramatic wildlife restoration outcomes.
- The Coutada 11 partners sourced the 24 genetically distinct lions from South Africa because, unlike the United States and Canada, South Africa permits private ownership of wildlife (from giraffes to elephants to lions), which is one reason South Africa has so much wildlife.
“unlike the United States and Canada and some other countries, South Africa allows for private ownership of wildlife... And it's one reason that South Africa has so much wildlife.”
- Through a deliberate, scientific wildlife-management program subsidized by his other hunting concessions, professional hunter Mark Haldane increased Coutada 11's Cape Buffalo from around 2,100 to more than 21,000 and Sable Antelope from 44 to over 5,000, primarily by securing local support (distributing trophy meat, employing 150 people including a 20-man anti-poaching patrol of former poachers) and vigorous self-funded anti-poaching.
“he increased the Cape Buffalo number from around 2100 to more than 21,000. The number of Sable Antelope grew from 44 to over 5000.”
- Coutada 11's game populations grew to exceed ecological carrying capacity even with hunting and legal local harvest, creating environmental problems, so Haldane partnered with the Cabela Family Foundation and Ivan Carter Wildlife Foundation to restore 24 lions (two prides with redundancy) to control herbivore numbers—an effort with full local support and the largest international translocation of lions in history, with the lions intended never to be hunted and studied long-term.
“they are exceeding their ecological carrying capacity. Even with hunting taking place... So, to solve that, he partnered recently with the Cabela Family Foundation and the Ivan Carter Wildlife Foundation. And they've begun restoring lions to the Coutada, to help control the game herds.”
- The Coutada 11 lion translocation—the largest international translocation of lions in history—shows that private enterprise and private initiative can have an impact on wildlife restoration just as dramatic as government-run programs like the reintroduction of wolves to Yellowstone.
“it shows that private enterprise and private initiative can have a very similar impact that government-run programs can have”
Western conservation advocates should avoid imposing moral objections to hunting on African communities managing their own wildlife sustainably.
- The African conservation system is beginning to fray—Tanzania has finalized plans to dam a river in the Selous Game Reserve, one of the continent's premier protected areas—and if a world-famous photo-tourism destination like the Selous cannot be protected, then community programs like CAMPFIRE and Coutada 11 are even more at risk, so everything possible should be done to make them economically competitive.
“Tanzania has finalized plans to dam a river in the Selous Game Reserve, one of the premier protected areas on the continent.”
- Outsiders in the United States or United Kingdom should be very careful about telling Africans how to manage their wildlife, because community-based programs like CAMPFIRE originated within African communities and have local buy-in; imposing Western moral discomfort about hunting risks a form of eco-colonialism toward African partners.
“Who are we in the United States or in the United Kingdom or elsewhere to tell Africans how they should be managing their wildlife?”
- Given mega-trends of urbanization and rural depopulation across the Western world, rewilding proponents are a valuable part of deciding the best and highest use of emptying lands, but rewilding should proceed with caution because it is no longer 1867 and trying to recapture a mythic past is likely to lead to disappointment; programs must be pragmatic and sensitive to people still living in these places, since they ultimately decide whether conservation succeeds or fails.
“the reality is that it is no longer 1867. Things have changed dramatically on the landscape since that time, and trying to recapture some mythic past is probably not necessarily something that is going to lead to anything other than disappointment”
Supply-side interventions like ivory bans have limited effectiveness; demand reduction in consuming nations faces cultural and economic obstacles.
- Mozambique's decades of conflict (war of independence 1964-1975, civil war 1977-1992) turned the Zambezi Delta's Coutada 11 into a 'meat locker' where warring factions shot bush meat to feed forces—reportedly including Russian helicopter gunships gunning down Cape Buffalo herds and canning the meat to feed troops in Afghanistan—leaving the high-quality habitat almost devoid of game by 1994.
“this area, which is in the Zambezi River Delta, was essentially a meat locker for all of the warring factions in the country over the year. Everyone would go there to shoot bush meat”
- Efforts to reduce the trade in ivory and rhino horn have met mixed success: while domestic ivory and rhino horn consumption in China has declined, Chinese travelers buying overseas remain at historic rates, driven by a rising middle class and a cultural value placed on ivory and rhino horn going back thousands of years.
“while, you know, ivory consumption and rhino horn consumption in China has been on the decline domestically, Chinese who travel overseas are still borrowing[?] at historic rates”
- Whether a conservation effort like the Yellowstone wolf reintroduction is judged a success depends on where one sits in relation to it: environmentalists may call it a great success while the livestock industry may call it too much of a success, with most people resting on a middle ground.
“how you judge the success of conservation efforts really depends on where you sit in relation to them”