What this covers

Historian Jessica Riskin of Stanford discusses her book The Restless Clock with EconTalk host Russ Roberts, tracing a fundamental divide in how science has understood living things. She argues that since the 17th century, thinkers have applied clockwork metaphors to organisms—but in radically different ways. William Paley developed a model of living things as passive machines designed by an external creator, while Gottfried Leibniz imagined them as dynamic, self-adjusting systems with internal responsiveness. This distinction between passive vs. restless clockwork shapes science's inherited assumptions about agency itself.

The conversation spans how these models influenced Charles Darwin, who drew inspiration from both Paley's notion of adaptation and Jean-Baptiste Lamarck's vision of organisms as self-transforming—an unresolved tension in his theory. Riskin argues that modern science's instinct to treat agency as unscientific is not a neutral position but an inherited theological artifact rooted in the Protestant argument from design, which outsourced all creative power to a divine designer. The discussion reveals how this historical bias shapes contemporary science: biologists speak casually of organisms striving and seeking but never publish in those terms, and the stigma against Lamarckism blinds many to developments like epigenetics. Roberts and Riskin also explore how similar patterns appear in economics, where market equilibrium models and 'as if' modeling inherit their own unexamined assumptions. Throughout, they consider how emergence, causal pluralism, and the persistent redefinition of artificial intelligence bear on the deeper question of how science distinguishes the living from the mechanical.

Sharpest takeaway

Riskin argues that the history of the life sciences contains two competing models of living things—passive clockwork machines designed from outside versus restless, self-transforming machines with internal agency—and that modern scientists' instinct to treat ascribing agency as 'unscientific' is an inherited theological artifact, not a neutral fact about nature.

  • The passive clockwork model emerged from the Protestant argument-from-design tradition, which outsourced agency to an external divine designer.
  • Darwin himself was torn between Paley's passive clockwork (adaptation/fitness) and Lamarck's self-transforming model (transformation of forms over time).
  • Because biologists don't know this history, they don't understand why 'Lamarckian' sounds like bad science, which biases them against developments like epigenetics.

The argument · threads4 threads · 32 claims
0.85

Economic models conflate prediction utility with descriptive truth, leading economists to make unwarranted welfare claims about reality.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Economists model agents 'as if' they maximize a utility function and defend this as a useful simplification for prediction, but they then make welfare statements that presuppose the models actually describe reality; confusing prediction with description is dangerous.

    “we then want to make welfare statements--statements about wellbeing--that are predicated on those models' actually describing reality. Not just trying to use a model to predict what's going to happen. And those are two very different things... And it's really dangerous.”

  • Making progress on hard puzzles requires choosing the right assumptions, and knowing what to ignore and what to focus on is a huge part of the scientific—and especially the social scientific—enterprise; in economics it is less a science than a craft or art.

    “knowing what to ignore and what to focus on is a huge part of the scientific enterprise. And even the social scientific enterprise. And it's not really science. It's a craft. It's an art. At least in economics.”

  • Economic models that make absurd demands on people's decision-making and information are useful simplifications—people can be treated 'as if' they calculate, as Friedman's truck driver takes a rainy turn as if he knows the physics—but one must be careful not to push this too far, since the opposite extreme of declaring people simply stupid and full of flaws leaves you with nothing to say about anything.

    “there's obviously parts of our behavior that are not calculated, but still can be treated as if they are calculated. Milton Friedman liked to say that the truck driver takes the turn on a rainy night as if he knows the physics... if you're not careful then you just don't have anything to say about anything: you just say, 'Well, people are stupid.'”

0.61

Markets are conceptual metaphors for complex interactions, not real equilibrium entities that remain stable or return to balance.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Markets exhibit an orderliness that looks purposive: when hundreds of millions of Chinese move to cities and demand more pencils, no central planner solves the resulting cedar shortage, yet the market raises the price of cedar, prompts substitution, and reallocates cedar to pencils so a buyer can still find pencils—a marvel, in Hayek's term, that looks as if the market tried to solve the problem and did.

    “when hundreds of millions of Chinese leave the countryside and move to the cities... now all of a sudden the world needs a lot more pencils... somehow, the market raises the price of cedar, and people start looking for substitutes... it looks like the market tried to solve that problem, and did... a marvel, is what Hayek called it.”

  • Economists model markets in equilibrium and perturb them to watch them return, but markets are not real entities—they are conceptual metaphors for complex buyer-seller interactions—and because prices and tastes change constantly, the market is really a super-restless clock that does not stay on time, a metaphor used because it is helpful rather than because it is literally true.

    “It's just a conceptual idea to help me wrap my brain around a really complicated kind of set of interactions between buyers and sellers. And, I don't really believe it's an equilibrium... it's a metaphor. It's really a restless--it's a super-restless clock.”

0.61

Scientists and economists resist revising theories when evidence contradicts them, behaving like religious believers protecting their models.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • An inherited bias against Lamarckism discourages scientists from being open to epigenetics—the idea that some acquired traits can be heritable—which is stunning given centuries of belief to the contrary, so a scientist unaware of the historical and political reasons Lamarck fell into bad odor would be biased against this genuine possibility.

    “if you have a conviction that ascribing agency to an evolving organism is unscientific, but you don't realize that that emerged from this older, theological division of labor, then I think you haven't fully understood the stakes of your own--what you take to be axiomatic.”

  • Scientists can behave like religious believers afraid their model will be refuted—relieved to explain away counter-evidence rather than welcoming it as a sign the world is richer and the theory needs revision—because human beings struggle to revise their theories in the face of disconfirming evidence.

    “I felt at times they were like religious believers who were afraid that something would refute their model... it's like, 'Oh, phew! I was able to explain it away.' You're supposed to go, 'Wow! Maybe the world's richer; maybe I need to revise my theory.'”

0.57

Historical contingency shapes intellectual frameworks; metaphors from an era's most advanced technology bias thinking about how systems work.

3 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Across intellectual history people latch onto a metaphor for life—such as the clock—because it is the most advanced thing they can think of at the time; that gave way to the steam engine and combustion engine, and now to the computer and the universe-as-simulation, suggesting that reading intellectual history reveals how much we are in the dark and counsels humility.

    “a lot of times we latch onto a metaphor like a clock because it's the most advanced thing we can possibly think of. So, that was true in, say, 1750. And at that point--then later it became the steam engine. Or the combustion engine... And now it's the computer.”

  • Smith and Darwin could write about change and transformation because they lived at the dawn of unprecedented economic and biological change: Smith wrote at the beginning of the Industrial Revolution when transformation through the division of labor and competition became visibly possible, and Darwin drew evidence for the power of selection from the contemporary agricultural revolution and animal breeding—through history before this there had been essentially no economic progress.

    “through most of human history, there is no progress. It's just the same--ox pulling a plow... And then, suddenly something starts happening. And Smith, writing in 1776 with the Wealth of Nations... they at just the beginning. So, the beginning of the Industrial Revolution”

  • Schumpeter's idea of creative destruction—things constantly arising and, through the force of competition, either surviving or knocking off existing firms and technologies—is very Darwinian, and would have made Darwin's task of combining adaptation with transformation easier.

    “if you'd been able to read Schumpeter, the idea of creative destruction, he would have made a lot--it would have been easier for him... that idea in economics, that things are constantly arising, and through the force of competition, either surviving or knocking off existing firms, existing technologies--is very Darwinian.”