Mariana Mazzucato on the Value of Everything
What this covers
Mariana Mazzucato and Russ Roberts discuss the historical role of government in funding transformative technologies and the economic frameworks that have obscured this contribution. Mazzucato traces how the shift from objective to subjective theories of value enabled value extraction to masquerade as value creation, erasing the distinction between genuinely productive activity and rent-seeking behavior. She argues that the internet, GPS, touchscreen displays, and biotech—the backbone of modern innovation—were financed by government risk capital, not venture capital, yet government has systematically failed to capture proportional returns on these bets. The Entrepreneurial State acted as an investor of first resort, absorbing initial risks that the private sector would not touch, only to see those gains privatized downstream.
The conversation ranges across how to restructure mission-oriented innovation through agencies like DARPA and ARPA-E, the difference between upstream basic research (which should expect no monetary return) and downstream company investments (which should capture equity and other returns), and why patent finance matters more than finance in general. Roberts raises counterarguments about government short-termism and the private sector's underappreciated willingness to fund high-risk, long-horizon ventures. Mazzucato also revisits Adam Smith and Marx to argue that Smith's free market meant freedom from rent-seeking, not from the state, and that Marx's dynamic view of value—where the same activity can be creative or extractive—offers a sharper lens than static classifications. The pair contests how to measure public investment success and why societies have stopped asking how to structure public institutions for genuine risk-taking and experimentation.
Mazzucato argues that mainstream economics has lost the debate over what creates value versus what merely extracts it, which obscures the government's role as an active 'investor of first resort' and risk-taker in innovation; therefore the state should share proportionally in the rewards of the innovations it funds.
- The shift from objective to subjective theories of value let extraction masquerade as creation
- Major general-purpose technologies (Internet, GPS, touchscreen, biotech) were financed by government risk capital, not venture capital
- Because government takes downstream investment risk (e.g. Tesla's loan guarantee), it should capture rewards via equity, reinvestment conditions, IP, or pricing
Private sector innovation and market forces, not government policy or unions, historically drove technological progress and worker welfare improvements.
- Government is really good at two things—killing people (a powerful military) and taking money from one group to give to another (transfers)—and most useful technological spillovers came as unintended byproducts of military spending rather than deliberate innovation policy.
“Government is really good at two things--killing people and taking money from one group and giving it to another.”
- When government was small, up until about 1930, the private sector and individual creators drove amazing innovation—Orville Wright had no pilot's license and Isaac Newton invented calculus not for riches but for love of thinking and the respect of peers—and this private, often non-financial creative drive worked well for a long time and could have continued.
“Orville Wright didn't have a pilot's license. A lot of the great innovations that people came from were just private people fiddling around.”
- The decline in working hours and the end of child labor were driven primarily by market forces—as people grew richer they chose to work less—rather than by trade unions, evidenced by the fact that the work week continues to shorten even as unions decline in importance.
“the amount of time people work has been falling steadily because we want to work less. We are richer. It's a market force.”
Government lacks the financial discipline and risk accountability that force private firms to succeed or fail.
- Government is no more patient than private investors and is often short-termist for electoral reasons, leading politicians to pursue small pet projects or hand out money to voters; private R&D, by contrast, pours enormous patient capital into iffy long-horizon bets like genome biotech and driverless cars, so patience is not the fundamental barrier to innovation—innovation is simply hard.
“Government is pretty short term, too. Most politicians have a very short time horizon. I don't see any reason to think they are going to be more long-term than private sector investors.”
- A crucial difference between the public and private sectors is that the public sector does not really have to take risk because it can always raise money through the tax system, whereas a private firm runs out of money and disappears if its idea fails; without an accounting measure of success, there is nothing to stop bad public ideas from continuing to drain money from good ones.
“The public sector doesn't really have to take risk. Because it can always raise money at the point of a gun, through the tax system.”
Government performs poorly at core responsibilities, making expansion into innovation policy unlikely to outperform private investors.
- Americans are skeptical of an expanded government innovation role because government does even its fundamental tasks badly—the school system, which is one of government's core responsibilities, performs poorly—so there is little reason to expect officials to outperform private investors who, despite having their own money at stake, still make many mistakes.
“education, a thing government should be doing and should be doing well, doesn't do well. Why should we have a more active role?”
Corporate buybacks are not a meaningful problem in debates about value creation and economic performance.
- Corporate share buybacks to boost stock options and executive pay, such as those by Pfizer and Cisco, are not a serious problem and amount to a red herring in the debate about value.
“That doesn't bother me. We might talk about that. I think that's a bit of a red herring.”