Alberto Alesina on Immigration and Redistribution
What this covers
Alesina of Harvard, in conversation with Russ Roberts, reports on research conducted with Stefanie Stantcheva examining how residents of the US and five European countries perceive legal immigrants. The core finding is that native-born respondents systematically overestimate immigrant population share—estimating around 30% in the US when the actual figure is 10%—and simultaneously underestimate immigrants' economic standing and educational attainment. A second line of inquiry tests whether these distorted perceptions causally affect policy preferences: when respondents answer questions about immigration before being asked about redistribution, their support for welfare programs drops measurably across all six countries surveyed, a priming effect roughly equivalent to 13% of the left-right ideological gap.
The conversation ranges across several distinct domains. On perception itself, the research distinguishes systematic patterns: right-wing respondents overestimate immigrants' welfare dependence and laziness far more sharply than left-wing ones, yet both groups equally overestimate numbers; interestingly, working in an immigration-intensive sector is the only respondent characteristic that predicts size overestimation, while income and education do not. The mechanisms driving misperception point toward salience and confirmation-seeking media consumption rather than exposure—Sweden, with an 18% immigrant share, achieves only half the error of countries with smaller populations. On economic reality, the evidence contradicts common stereotypes: Italian immigrants contribute more to pensions than they receive, and when asked directly about laziness, respondents in all countries judge poor immigrants only slightly lazier than poor natives, suggesting the laziness judgment attaches to poverty rather than immigration. The discussion concludes by exploring historical differences: the US developed integration infrastructure and identity frameworks absent in Europe, which Alesina characterizes as structured around a melting pot vs little pots that don't melt.
Alesina argues that people across the US and Europe systematically overestimate the number and 'undesirability' of legal immigrants while underestimating their economic standing, and that merely priming these distorted perceptions of immigration measurably reduces support for redistribution.
- Across six countries natives overestimate immigrant share (US: ~30% estimate vs ~10% actual) and misjudge their origins and economic status
- Respondents primed with immigration questions first become significantly less favorable toward redistribution
- Misperceptions appear driven by salience and media framing of 'the other' rather than accurate data
Native-born respondents systematically overestimate immigrant population share and mischaracterize immigrant origins and attributes.
- Even highly educated dinner companions, when informally asked, every single one overestimated the number of immigrants—giving answers around 15% versus an actual 10%—though by less than the average survey respondent, suggesting the misperception extends beyond the uninformed public.
“I asked them your question, and every single one overestimated the number of immigrants. Not as much as the average in our sample. But, the range of answers that I was getting was about 15% rather than 10%.”
- Left and right-wing respondents misperceive the number of immigrants about equally, but they diverge sharply on immigrant characteristics: right-wing respondents view immigrants as poorer, more welfare-reliant, less educated, and lazier, and more strongly overestimate immigrants' origins from problematic countries or religions.
“Both right-wing and left-wing responders misperceive about the same level the number of the immigrants. They misperceive other things. The right-wing thinks that the immigrants are poorer, more reliant on welfare, less educated, lazier than the left-winger.”
- Across all six surveyed countries native-born respondents systematically overestimate the share of immigrants in their population—in the US the actual figure is about 10% but the average estimate is around 30%—and this overestimation is consistent rather than randomly inaccurate.
“a large fraction of the respondents give an answer between 25 and 35, and the average answer is about 30.”
- Sweden, which has a larger immigrant share (close to 18%), produces more accurate perceptions than the other countries, with an average estimate around 27%—about half the error of the others—suggesting that higher actual exposure can narrow misperception.
“the number of immigrants in Sweden is close to 18%, and their average answer is around 27.”
- In every surveyed country except France, natives vastly overestimate the share of Muslim immigrants and underestimate the share of Christian immigrants, reflecting a broader tendency to overestimate immigrants from problematic or salient origins relative to those from more culturally similar countries.
“everybody in every country overestimates the number of, say, Muslims and underestimate the number of Christians, with the exception of France.”
Redistribution support declines when ethnic diversity increases because generosity travels better among culturally similar groups.
- Both private generosity and public welfare-state generosity travel much better among people who are similar in race, religion, and culture, and travel poorly across ethnic, racial, and cultural groups, which is why immigration interacts powerfully with attitudes toward redistribution.
“the generosity, both private generosity... and public general, that they see it via the welfare state, travels[?] much better amongst people who are similar, of the same race, the same religion, the same culture. But it doesn't travel as well across ethnic groups, race, and so on.”
- In a randomized experiment, respondents who answered immigration questions before redistribution questions became significantly more averse to redistribution than those who answered redistribution first—a robust effect across every country—with the priming shifting attitudes by about 5% (roughly 3 percentage points), equal to about 13% of the gap between left- and right-wing respondents.
“those people who have seen the immigration question first, they are much more averse to redistribution--holding everything else constant--than people who have seen the redistribution question first. So, making people think about immigration makes them much less favorable to redistribution.”
- When presented with two hypothetical individuals of identical income and family circumstances differing only in having a native versus an immigrant name, large fractions of respondents (over 50% in France and Italy, and about 20% of French believing the immigrant gets more than twice as much) thought the immigrant received more transfers, implying natives perceive the welfare system as discriminating in favor of immigrants.
“more than 50% of French and Italians--believe that the Mohammed guy gets more than John... about 20% of French respondents... believe that the person named with an immigrant name received more than twice as much as the native.”
- Attitudes toward redistribution depend heavily on whether the poor are seen as worthy of help: believing the poor are poor due to laziness reduces support for redistribution, while believing they are unfortunate increases it, and 70% of Americans attribute poverty to lack of effort versus about 30% of Europeans.
“in the United States something like 70% of respondents say that the poor are poor because of lack of effort; and in Europe, that number is 30%.”
Immigration attitudes reflect economic self-interest and ideological position; US integration capacity exceeds European institutional readiness; immigration policy requires factual data not ideological screens.
- Support for immigration follows economic interest and ideology: left-wingers and rich people favor immigration even when living amid it, while poor people working in immigration-intensive sectors—who face direct labor-market competition—do not want immigrants.
“poor people working in immigration-intensive sector did not want immigrant. But, rich people, even though they are living in, immigration-intensive people, wanted them.”
- The US was born as a country of immigrants and developed a reasonably working melting-pot system and a vast body of thinking on integration, whereas European countries lack that history, are unused to waves of immigration, and have produced almost no comparable research, leaving them ages behind in coping with integrating immigrants into cultures that are 'little pots that don't melt.'
“Europeans are ages behind Americans in dealing with that... since European countries have not been melting pots historically, now, how do immigrants integrate in culture which are much less melting pot but little pots that don't melt? Like Italy, or France”
- Because immigration debates in both the US and Europe are driven by stereotypes and inaccurate perceptions rather than facts, the conversation about immigration policy should be conducted with real data rather than perceived data or ideological screens, even though the research itself offers no specific policy prescription.
“all that this paper suggests is that this conversation should be happening with real data and not with perceived data. And not with ideological screen, but reality.”
- The only respondent characteristic that meaningfully predicts overestimating the number of immigrants is working in a sector with over-representation of immigrants; income, gender, education, and ideology do not predict the size estimate, even though they predict other beliefs about immigrants.
“native respondents who work in sectors with more immigrants, they tend to overestimate more than their fellow natives about the number of immigrants. And other than that, no other characteristic mattered.”
- Americans believe upward mobility is much higher in the US than in Europe and Europeans believe the opposite about themselves, yet average measured social mobility is not very different between the US and countries like Germany, France, and Italy—so Americans are overly optimistic and Europeans overly pessimistic about whether the poor can rise.
“in reality, the data on social mobility for the United States and Europe show that, on average, there is not that much difference... Americans are more optimistic about poor can make it. And probably more optimistic than they should be. And Europeans are very pessimistic”
Actual immigrant economic contributions contradict native perceptions of welfare dependence and work ethic.
- While natives broadly think poor immigrants are lazy, when asked directly whether immigrants are poorer because they are lazier than natives, a substantial fraction in all countries judged immigrants only slightly lazier—not much lazier—than native poor, so the laziness judgment attaches mainly to being poor rather than to being an immigrant.
“in all countries there is a good portion that people did not think that immigrants were that much lazier than... A little bit--they were a little bit. But, not that much lazier than natives.”
- Contrary to the popular belief that immigrants get rich on welfare without working, both legal and illegal immigrants in Italy actually contribute more to the pension system than they receive because they are younger than the aging native population and pay contributions, helping a Social Security system in bad shape.
“in Italy, actually because the age in population... immigrants are helping us because they are [?] and they have more kids and they pay contribution to our pension system which is in bad shape.”