What this covers
Vincent Rajkumar, an oncologist at the Mayo Clinic, joins Russ Roberts on EconTalk to diagnose why cancer drugs in the United States cost up to $300,000 annually—often multiples of what patients pay elsewhere. The conversation centers on Rajkumar's argument that these prices reflect not the cost of development or market competition, but rather a sequence of policy choices that have eliminated normal economic constraint. He walks through each mechanism: cancer patients must cycle through available drugs sequentially as resistance develops, turning each drug into a virtual monopoly via sequential use despite multiple options existing on paper; the FDA approves drugs solely on safety and efficacy without weighing them against price or real-world benefit; Medicare Part D law forbids the government from negotiating drug prices despite being forced to purchase them; and oncologists' reimbursement under Medicare Part B ties their income directly to the cost of chemotherapy administered, creating financial incentive toward more expensive treatments.
The discussion spans the structural and behavioral reasons these arrangements persist. Rajkumar explains how incentives shape innovation—that tying price to value-based pricing standards, as most developed nations do, would paradoxically spur genuine breakthrough research rather than safe "me-too" reformulations. He addresses conflict of interest not as individual corruption but as subtle influence baked into the system, and notes how demand without price sensitivity operates when patients face life-or-death choices insulated from cost. Roberts and Rajkumar discuss barriers to entry and the role of crony capitalism in the midnight passage of Medicare Part D, along with genuine countervailing forces—that the FDA's relative liberality in approving myeloma drugs has benefited American patients faster than Europeans, and that U.S. profitability does subsidize global pharmaceutical innovation.
Rajkumar argues that cancer drug prices are high not because of market forces but because government-granted monopolies, the absence of value-based pricing, a prohibition on Medicare price negotiation, and physician reimbursement incentives combine to let manufacturers charge whatever they want for life-saving drugs.
- Each cancer drug functions as a virtual monopoly because patients must cycle through every drug, so the drugs do not compete with one another
- The U.S. approves drugs only on safety and efficacy and never ties price to value, unlike other developed countries that use quality-adjusted life years
- Medicare is legally barred from negotiating Part D drug prices, removing the one buyer large enough to discipline price
Absent market forces, vulnerable cancer patients, and sequential drug use without real competition enable companies to raise prices annually with impunity.
- Because insurance or Medicare pays rather than individuals, normal market forces are absent and drug prices rise to the level the whole of society can bear rather than what individuals can afford out of pocket; in countries like India where care is out-of-pocket, patients simply cannot buy unaffordable drugs, so prices reflect what people can actually pay.
“the cost reflects what people can actually pay for. So, that's not here because insurance is paying, or Medicare is paying. So, the costs then go up to the level that the whole of society and market can bear rather than just what individuals can manage out of their salaries”
- A third driver of high prices is that cancer patients and families are a vulnerable population willing to pay any cost to save a life—unlike a luxury such as a car—so well-insured patients explicitly ask for the best treatment regardless of cost, and people would sell their houses for six more months, making demand essentially price-insensitive.
“These are patients and family members who are willing to pay any costs to save a life... 'What would you do if money was not a concern?'... they would be willing to sell their houses to get that 6 months”
- Because most cancers are incurable, patients must sequentially try every drug as each prior one stops working, so even with seven myeloma drugs there is no real competition among them; each drug is a government-granted virtual monopoly that no competitor can market for 7-10 years, and unlike a phone you can live without, a dying patient has no luxury to choose a competitor's product, so the company can command whatever price.
“Even though we have 7 drugs for myeloma, I cannot simply say, 'Oh, I have 7 drugs so therefore there's competition.' There isn't. Since patients will have to try Velcade and Revlimid and carfilzomib and elotuzumab and so on”
- The only thing preventing companies from raising prices is public outrage, so rather than hike overnight like Shkreli they raise prices 10-15% every year so no one notices—boiling the frog slowly—and a 10% annual increase on a $15,000 drug is far larger in absolute dollars than Shkreli's 5000% increase on a $1.50 drug.
“the only thing stopping them or preventing them is outrage... They would raise it 10% every single year. And I made a comment recently: 10% a year of a $15,000 drug is more than 5000% of a $1.50 drug. In absolute dollar money”
- Revlimid maintenance therapy costs about $15,000 a month, roughly $180,000 a year, taken for three to four years, with Velcade adding about $5,000 a month during the first four months.
“That costs, right now, probably $15,000 a month.”
Law forbidding Medicare negotiation while requiring it to buy creates a design flaw that lets companies price drugs independent of clinical value.
- U.S. law requires Medicare to buy and provide Part D drugs for its citizens while forbidding it from negotiating the price, so it must pay whatever the pharmaceutical company says the drug is worth; from the point that law passed, drug costs rose faster than before, a design flaw that benefits the industry.
“we passed a law saying that Medicare will buy and provide for its citizens free drugs that are under the Part D program. But at the same time, Medicare will have to pay the pharmaceutical company whatever money they say their drug is worth. Now that's a system, from that point onwards, the cost of drugs has gone up faster than it did before that”
- The FDA approves drugs based only on demonstrated safety and clinical benefit and never judges what the drug is worth, so a drug prolonging life by four weeks can be priced as high as one doubling survival; most other countries add a second step that ties price to value, so the U.S. has no correlation at all between the value a drug provides and its price.
“the FDA approves drugs just simply based on: Have they shown safety? And have they shown clinical benefit?... they don't make a judgment on what is a drug worth... In most other countries, there is a second step, which is: What does it add in terms of value?”
- The single most important reform, endorsed across the industry at an HHS forum, is to change the law so Medicare can negotiate drug prices on behalf of its citizens, with safeguards and a value benchmark—such as paying $50,000-$150,000 for a drug that adds a year of life—since the bargaining power of so large a buyer cannot be overestimated and most countries already do this.
“'Medicare should be able to negotiate the price of drugs.'... The power of Medicare to bargain on behalf of its citizens for the best price for drugs--you know, you cannot overestimate that. It's something very important. And that law has to be changed”
- Pharmaceutical companies are not to be blamed because they are simply following the incentives that have been put in place; given that they can avoid innovating and just raise prices yearly to meet targets, their behavior is unsurprising, though the crony side is that industry influenced the midnight passage of the Medicare Part D law.
“this is not the blaming of pharma. They're just following their... These are the incentives that have been put in place. So, it's not surprising that they respond accordingly”
Generic competition and drug importation would dramatically lower prices; Medicare negotiation with value benchmarks is the single most important reform.
- True market competition through easier generic entry would dramatically cut prices: with only one competitor a firm prices at about 90% of the original, but with many generics—like the 19 versions of Gleevec sold in Poland or store-brand Tylenol at Costco—prices fall sharply, so the U.S. should shorten monopoly protection, block Big Pharma from delaying generics, and ease entry from India, China and elsewhere.
“there are 19 versions of Gleevec sold in Poland. If I have only one competitor to Gleevec, I will price it as about like the airlines--like 90% of the Gleevec price. If I have, you know, like Tylenol in CostCo--if I have every store making its version of Tylenol--then the Tylenol price is very, very cheap. Because, there is true competition”
- A further reform is to legalize importation of drugs for personal use, so a patient who cannot afford a drug in the U.S. could obtain it from abroad for their own use—not to start an import-resale business—which would push U.S. prices toward those of other countries rather than far above them.
“if I have cancer, and I simply cannot afford the drugs here, allow me to get the drug from somewhere else. And bring it back for my own use... But it's still illegal. And so, if we allow that, then the prices at least of the United States will be similar to other countries”
- New myeloma drugs like Revlimid and Velcade have roughly doubled survival, turning a disease where patients lived an average of 3-4 years into one where patients can expect to live 7-10 years longer.
“what was once a disease that people died an average of 3 years to 4 years, is now something that patients that can expect to live 7-10 years longer”
- Multiple myeloma is a cancer of plasma cells—the antibody-producing cells that fight infection—that destroys bone, causes low blood counts, kidney failure and infections, affecting about 25-30,000 Americans a year, mostly over age 65 though 4-5% are under 40.
“Myeloma is a cancer of plasma cells. These are the cells that normally help us fight infection: they make antibodies. When they become cancerous, the condition is called multiple myeloma”
- Value-based systems use the quality-adjusted life year, paying for a year of life with no side effects at full value (e.g. $70,000-$80,000 in Europe, 3x GDP per capita per WHO) but discounting the price when the drug makes the patient miserable for part of that time; this places a value on what the drug is worth, not on the patient's life, a distinction patients commonly misunderstand.
“if my drug prolongs life by one year, and you have absolutely no side-effects at all whatsover, that would be one quality-adjusted life year... It's not a value on a patient's life, but it's the value on the drug”
- The FDA is more liberal than European authorities in approving drugs, willing to grant accelerated approval based on smaller single-arm studies for life-threatening diseases—approving a drug that helped 30 of 200 patients with no good alternative while the company promises a controlled trial later—so myeloma drugs reached the U.S. years before the rest of the world, which is good for patients.
“The FDA is actually more liberal in approving drugs than European authorities. Which is good for our patients. So, we have access sooner... That's called accelerated approval”
- Martin Shkreli went to jail for securities fraud, not for raising the price of Daraprim from about $1.50 to roughly $750, because that price increase was legal; the drug still sells for about $4,000 a month, because he was the only one selling it and entering the drug market is not as easy as making iPhone cases.
“that drug is still selling for the same price. It's still selling for $4000 a month. Okay? Because that is legal. And he is going to jail for something else--securities fraud or something. But not for thing, because what he did is legal”
Monopoly protection lasts seven to ten years regardless of marginal benefit, spawning me-too drugs that block genuine innovation.
- Because a company can command a high price regardless of value, the rational strategy is to make low-risk 'me-too' drugs—slightly modifying an existing drug to win a new patent and capture the market for another 7-10 years—rather than risk a genuine breakthrough; many blockbusters come from buying small innovative firms rather than in-house innovation, so tying price to value would actually increase innovation by rewarding real risk-taking.
“the fact that you can command a high price regardless of value means that there's really no reason for you to innovate when you can make Me-Too drugs all year long... If we tie value to the price, then you would really innovate, because you want to get the bigger reward for the risk that you've taken”
- Even when an old drug like Velcade becomes generic and cheap, manufacturers introduce a newer, more expensive drug positioned as the first choice—using slightly biased trial designs, continuing medical education lectures, and advisory boards to persuade experts it is better—so prices never fall because there is always a new sheriff in town with fresh 7-10 year monopoly protection.
“by the time drugs become generic, there is another sheriff in town, a new drug comes along. And that's the one people are using; and now that one's now going to have monopoly for 7-10 years”
- A new drug that works only marginally better than an existing one still receives 7-10 years of monopoly protection where no one else can market that formulation, even if it barely improves the quantity of life, removing any link between the size of the benefit and the exclusivity granted.
“it's still going to have a monopoly on that formulation for 7 to 10 years even if it barely improves the quality of life--not the quality--the quantity of life. Is that correct? ... That is correct.”
Physician financial incentives tied to drug cost create subtle, subconscious bias toward expensive treatments regardless of clinical equivalence.
- The problem with financial conflicts of interest is not whether an individual is consciously corrupt but that influence operates subtly and often subconsciously, so neither patients nor even the doctors themselves can tell who is being swayed; with tens of thousands of doctors, no one is immune from temptation, and the right policy is to avoid putting physicians in a position where drug choice changes their take-home pay.
“conflicts of interest are always about the fact that we don't know who is conflicted and who is not. A patient has no way of knowing... It's all subtle. When there are financial conflicts, it's very hard. It's not conscious, often”
- A fourth driver is that the system pays doctors more for more expensive treatment: under Medicare Part B, oncologists who buy and administer chemotherapy in their own offices are reimbursed average sales price plus 6%, so a 6% margin on a $6,000 drug like Abraxane is far larger than 6% on a $600 drug like Taxol, creating a financial pull toward the costlier option.
“they can ask for an average sales price plus 6% on Medicare. And so what happens is that if you have a choice between Taxol and Abraxane... Taxol, you would get 6% of $600. Abraxane, you might get 6% of $6000”
High development costs and clinical trial failure rates justify innovation investment but not indefinite pricing power without value correlation.
- Medicine is so complex because, unlike a car mechanic who knows exactly what each part does and can fix a leak with confidence, doctors are largely guessing; a drug that targets the exact cancer pathway and works in animals fails in roughly 90% of clinical trials because the human body, like a road network with many alternate routes, lets cancer cells bypass a blocked pathway, which is why large randomized trials and a high failure rate are unavoidable.
“We don't understand the human body like a car mechanic understands the car... you put it into a clinical trial. And you'll be surprised--like 90% of the drugs don't work. And that's because the human body is complex”
- Bringing a new cancer drug to market costs an estimated $750 million to several billion dollars because efficacy must usually be shown in large randomized controlled trials, many promising drugs fail that test, companies run multiple trials to ensure one succeeds, and differing FDA and European endpoints force larger trials; this high cost is a legitimate reason a high price is needed as an incentive.
“people have estimated it from $750 million to several billion dollars to bring a new drug to the market... if you are going to invest in such a high-risk proposition, you should have some way of making that money back”