Arnold Kling on Economics for the 21st Century
What this covers
Arnold Kling and Russ Roberts discuss the shortcomings of 20th-century economics for understanding the modern world. Kling argues that standard economic theory rests on a materialist bias—treating the economy as a problem of assembling physical resources into tangible output—and in doing so ignores or mishandles the intangible dimensions that have grown to dominate contemporary economic life. His central complaint is that economists cling to inherited models rather than observing how the actual economy works. The conversation ranges across finance, labor markets, corporate strategy, and the role of culture, with Roberts probing where traditional theory breaks down and where Kling thinks economists need to rethink their foundations.
The discussion covers several linked failures. Financial intermediation, treated as economically inert by irrelevance theorems, actually performs the crucial function of transforming how savers and borrowers perceive risk and time. Intangible capital and team production defy measurement and break marginal productivity theory—a Google engineer's wage depends as much on firm strategy as on any measurable individual contribution. Excludability and rivalry invert for digital goods, yet the private sector solves them through advertising and bundling, contradicting predictions that only governments can provide public goods. Tribalism shapes corporate cultures and worker loyalty in ways economics ignores entirely. The conversation also touches on why stabilization policy may be ineffective due to information lags, why theory of the firm has struggled to explain firm boundaries or emergence of firms like Amazon, and whether macroeconomics itself—built on the assumption of cyclical business activity—would be reconstructed from scratch in a modern, evolving economy.
Kling argues that 20th-century economics is poorly equipped for a 21st-century economy because it ignores intangibles—financial intermediation, intangible capital and output, team production, and the cultural embedding of economic life—and that economists should 'stare at the world, not at their models.'
- The economy is embedded in a rapidly changing culture, unlike the static subject matter of physics, so economic concepts must keep evolving
- Economists' materialist bias treats intangible activity (finance, information goods) as irrelevant even though it is real and important
- Marginal productivity theory and other inherited models break down where team synergy, business strategy, and intangibles dominate
Economists lack tools to measure or predict culture's effects on firms, teams, and workers' life choices.
- Replacing a unique leader like Steve Jobs with Tim Cook matters because Jobs provided non-replicable insights and a particular culture that is not a written-down recipe; even seemingly neurotic traits (like obsessing over the aesthetics of a computer's interior) cannot be confidently judged as success factors or mistakes, because corporate culture's effect on excellence may be beyond economists' understanding.
“Steve Jobs provided something unique in both his insights and his ability to create a particular kind of culture at Apple. And that's not a cookbook. It's not a recipe.”
- The standard economic depiction of the firm as deciding 'how much to make' is unrealistically narrow; a firm's biggest and trickiest decision is actually figuring out what market it's in and who its competitors are, which it chooses by deciding the nature, components, and price of its product.
“the firm's trying to figure out... what market it's in. Who are its competitors?... they choose who their competitors are. It's really what your biggest choice is, as a firm.”
- Group production—like a school project or corporate team—ranges from one person doing all the work while others free-ride, to incredible synergy, and it is essentially impossible to measure with precision who contributed most; office politics further distorts credit (schmoozers over-rewarded, quiet introverts ignored), so economists recognize the challenge but have little useful to contribute beyond stylized images.
“anybody who has ever worked on a group project... understands that that process is very hard to describe... At one extreme, one person does all the work and the other people free-ride; at the other extreme, there's this incredible synergy.”
- People in economically depressed areas may not move not merely because of high urban rents (a housing-policy problem) but because of cultural reasons—emotional ties, family, upbringing, and meaning—and treating their problem as merely 'low skills' misses that they may instead be experiencing despair.
“There's cultural reasons they don't want to move. They like where they live. They were raised there. They have emotional ties there.”
Economic core principles endure because human nature and motivation are unchanged since Smith and Marshall.
- Even if culture changes, human nature has not changed since Smith and Marshall, and since economics is fundamentally about what motivates human behavior and how people interact, the discipline's core insights need not change just because culture does.
“human nature hasn't changed. The economist's vision of what motivates human behavior, that goes back... to Alfred Marshall... isn't that all that we really are trying to understand about what motivates people and how they interact?”
Macroeconomic models failed to account for debt and leverage, and intervention timing creates lags that waste effort or worsen outcomes.
- Macroeconomic stabilization suffers from an information problem like a general getting battlefield reports too late: by the time intervention arrives, the situation has either recovered (wasting the effort) or already been lost (making it counterproductive), as shown by the recession beginning in late 2007 before anyone recognized it.
“we're a little bit like the general in the battlefield getting the report too late that this particular flank is under attack... by the time it gets there, that flank is doing fine--or it's already lost”
- Macroeconomists were sandbagged by the 2008 crisis primarily because their models failed to integrate the role of debt and leverage, and finance was treated as an arcane specialization disconnected from mainstream macro training.
“macroeconomists--struggled to integrate the role of debt and leverage into their models. And, as a result, I think that's the biggest reason we were sandbagged by the Financial Crisis of 2008.”
Supply and demand remains useful as a framework for emergent order, though it struggles with intangible and non-rivalrous goods.
- Supply and demand is a crude blackboard version of emergent order—a way of capturing the complexity of interactions at the heart of economic life—and remains useful, though for intangible goods that are non-rivalrous and often priced at zero, the supply-and-demand story for the end product is harder to tell even if prices still appear somewhere (in advertising or in other goods' prices).
“It's for me a crude version of emergent order. It's a way of capturing the complexity of interactions that are at the heart of economic life.”
- The fact that valuable intangible goods like Google Maps and YouTube are produced with relatively few employees should be seen as a feature, not a bug: it is a great thing that society can obtain glorious goods without devoting a huge portion of human time and effort to them.
“I, of course, see that as mainly a feature, not a bug. It's a great thing that we can get these glorious things without a huge portion of human time and effort devoted to them.”
- As host of EconTalk, Roberts sees his job as giving guests a hard time while also helping listeners understand the guest.
“my job here, as host of EconTalk is to give my guests a hard time, from time to time. My other job is to help the listeners and myself understand what the guest is saying.”