Matt Stoller on Modern Monopolies
What this covers
Matthew Stoller and Russ Roberts examine the market power accumulated by Google, Facebook, and Amazon, focusing on how these platforms function as controlled intermediaries rather than open markets. Stoller argues that these companies have grown too large to manage responsibly, producing what he calls absentee ownership harms. He contends that their attention-maximizing incentive structures—borrowed from casinos and video games—work systematically to worsen social behavior and polarization, with recommendation engines functioning as what he describes using the bar agitator metaphor: they reliably nudge users toward conflict and dysfunction regardless of users' baseline beliefs. Roberts raises counterpoints throughout, particularly questioning whether antitrust enforcement truly drives innovation or whether market forces alone explain the rise and fall of tech giants.
The conversation spans the mechanisms by which these platforms entrench power. Stoller details self-preferencing practices—Google demoting shopping competitors while promoting its own offerings, Amazon favoring its own books as publisher and retailer—and shows how vertical integration extends control into education via Chromebooks. He reframes the problem through citizen-producer versus consumer welfare, arguing that focusing only on consumer prices misses harms to creators, authors, and small businesses. The discussion returns repeatedly to history: how DOJ action against IBM through unbundling and patent-sharing created the software industry, suggesting antitrust as market oxygenation rather than mere punishment. Stoller distinguishes between technological excellence and political concentration, proposing that splitting acquired units like YouTube from Alphabet would liberate technology without destroying it—an instance of disaggregating technology from political power. Roberts questions whether the historical cases truly support these conclusions, introducing empirical skepticism into otherwise sympathetic terrain.
Stoller argues that Google, Facebook, and Amazon have accumulated unprecedented political and economic power as unaccountable intermediaries, and that this concentration—enabled by lax antitrust enforcement—threatens democracy, free markets, and creative livelihoods, requiring renewed antitrust intervention rather than reliance on consumer choice.
- These platforms are too large to manage, producing absentee-ownership harms and attention-maximizing algorithms that worsen social behavior
- Antitrust enforcement (against IBM, AT&T, Microsoft) historically oxygenated markets and created new industries; companies don't fall by natural cycle
- Consumer 'choice' is largely illusory because data scale, network effects, and vertical integration foreclose real competition
Tech platforms have become political institutions replacing democratic government in mediating citizen interaction and idea flow.
- Google, Facebook, and Amazon have become so powerful at controlling how citizens interact with each other, information, ideas, goods, and services that they are in some ways replacing democratic government and now exert political, not just market, power.
“they are in some ways replacing democratic government. So, they've gone way beyond sort of controlling markets. Now they are controlling in some ways our political system.”
- The power of Google and similar firms is fundamentally a political problem that can only be addressed through politics—including the recognition that schools are political institutions over which citizens have democratic leverage—rather than something solvable purely by individual consumer choice.
“you have to just admit that we have a really serious problem with the power of Google. That's the very first thing that we have to do. And, once we've admitted that, and that it's a political problem--it can only be addressed through politics”
- Facebook and Amazon are not well-structured, open and fair markets but controlled intermediaries that have placed themselves between citizens and their ability to interact freely; they only care that you click or watch, not whether the content or relationship is good for you, analogous to needing to rebel against the British East India Company.
“These are controlled intermediaries who have placed themselves between American citizens and our ability to actually interact with each other freely and fairly.”
- The 'just don't use it' argument fails because these institutions mediate society regardless of personal use: they track non-users across other sites, fund the media you read, and run the platforms where elections are debated, so they govern you whether or not you use their products.
“If you don't use Google, everyone you interact with does. If you don't use Facebook, you know, Facebook is still taking money from the newspapers that you read, so you have worse news.”
- Citizens are mature enough to simultaneously love using a product and recognize that the company wields excessive political power; appreciating a search engine does not preclude judging Google to be too powerful as a political institution.
“I can separate out the technology from the political power. And I think you--I think people can say, 'Yeah, I really like using the search engine. But I also think that Google as a political institution has too much power.' People are mature enough to handle that.”
- Through cheap Chromebooks tied to school systems, Google has vertically integrated into education such that a tech-savvy parent (Mike Turk) cannot block YouTube for his addicted child—because schools require Google products for homework—giving Google more power over what the child sees than the parent has.
“They've actually vertically integrated into the school system. And they have more power over what Mike's kid sees than Mike does.”
- Amazon's HQ2 bidding process, in which cities offered to hand over employee taxes and even rename themselves, reveals an erosion of local democratic self-confidence in which mayors believe they cannot generate commercial activity and must beg corporations for it.
“You had this really weird outcry from mayors all over the country saying 'Democracy doesn't really work and we can't generate our own commercial activity. We have to beg Jeff Bezos for that, and so we are going to do whatever we can to attract him.'”
Antitrust action has historically oxygenated markets by forcing unbundling and competition, as IBM enforcement created the software industry.
- Antitrust enforcement against IBM forced it to unbundle hardware and software and share patents, which created the American software industry and an open electronics industry (enabling Motorola, Texas Instruments, and others), demonstrating that antitrust action can oxygenate markets rather than merely punish firms.
“one of the things that they did was they unbundled their hardware and their software. So, they said, 'You can buy the software separately.' And what this did, is it opened up the market for other software players to sell into IBM Machines. It created the American software industry.”
- The DOJ blocking Microsoft's Intuit acquisition and the subsequent antitrust suit changed Microsoft's culture so it stopped strangling rivals 'in the crib'; though it could crush Netscape, it could not do the same to Google and Facebook, allowing the modern web to emerge.
“after the Intuit acquisition was blocked by the DOJ... then there was the antitrust suit against Microsoft. And Microsoft stopped engaging in anticompetitve behavior.”
- Dominant companies do not fall because of a natural market cycle; they fall because of political choices—antitrust law—made to open and oxygenate the market for others, since the revolutionary who becomes king will do everything possible to keep the next revolutionaries out.
“Companies don't just fall because of a natural cycle in the market. They fall because of political choices to open up and oxygenate the market for other people.”
- The rate of small business formation is at a 50-year low, which Stoller offers as data contradicting Roberts's impression that entrepreneurial creative opportunity is abundant.
“The rate of small business formation is at a 50-year low.”
Platforms as controlled intermediaries harm creators, authors, and merchants by manipulating visibility and capturing their economic value.
- Facebook used a widely downloaded malware-tracking app, Onavo, to monitor how people use their phones and the web in real time, letting it spy on which apps are gaining users and then rapidly copy or buy fast-growing competitors—sometimes within a month (e.g., acquiring TBH after three months).
“what Facebook does with the data that it gets from Onavo is it basically looks and sees which apps are becoming popular. And how people are using them. So, it can spy on any new potential competitor.”
- As the dominant bookseller and now the biggest publisher, Amazon chooses which books to promote, can pull a publisher's books (as it did with Hachette), and can favor its own published titles in recommendations—manipulating the flow of ideas from author to reader in an unprecedented way that endangers a free society.
“Amazon can choose, and does choose which books to put in front of you. So, they had a big fight with Hachette, where they just pulled Hachette's books off of their shelves.”
- Amazon is not a true market: if a third-party seller's product sells well, Amazon will start selling it itself and place its own product ahead of the seller's in search results, so sellers cannot rely on standing on their merits.
“if your products are selling on Amazon and they are doing well, then Amazon will simply downgrade--like, they will simply start selling it themselves. And when people search for it, Amazon will place their own product ahead of yours.”
- Google demoted competing shopping-comparison engines like Foundem to spam in its organic search while promoting its own comparison engine, killing rivals' traffic; it then replaced its own comparison engine with an ad-driven one, so users now see paid merchant listings rather than genuine price comparisons—a dangerous shift users never noticed.
“they actually downgraded all of these shopping engines in their natural search algorithm into spam. So, you'd have to go through multiple pages when you searched to even find them. And this, of course, killed all of their traffic.”
- Since Amazon introduced the Kindle, the median author's income has dropped by about 25% (per the Authors Guild), hollowing out the mid-tier of the creative community and resulting in many serious books not being written because there is no longer money in it.
“the average income of authors has dropped by 25% since Amazon came out with the Kindle. And probably more by this time.”
- Amazon is a massively profitable company that generates enormous free cash flow and chooses not to show accounting (GAAP) profits because it reinvests everything to build a long-term monopoly; it could show large profits at any time by spending less, so the absence of accounting profit does not mean the retail business is unprofitable.
“They aren't making a GAAP--profit based on accounting metrics. But they generate massive free cash flow... Amazon is a massively profitable company.”
Platforms engineer addiction through algorithmic attention-capture and psychological manipulation that users cannot opt out of or resist.
- Because of the political choices we've made in structuring antitrust and political economy, gifted technologies have been turned into mechanisms to get people to look at ads—'the greatest minds of our generation are trying really hard to figure out how to get people to click on more ads'—which is a tragedy compared to what could be achieved if incentives were oriented around political liberty.
“somebody at Facebook said that the greatest minds of our generation are trying really hard to figure out how to get people to click on more ads. And that is such a tragedy.”
- Platforms deliberately borrow addictive psychological techniques from casinos and video games—such as notification counts ('you have 8 notifications')—that work on everyone to trigger compulsive engagement, causing users to lose time they did not intend to spend, and users have no ability to opt for a version without these addictive properties.
“these guys draw from gaming, from gaming--I don't what to call it, but basically from casinos and from video games-- ... Addictive social, psychological tricks that work on everyone.”
- Attention-based algorithms work like an agitator in a bar constantly urging a fight; they may not make anyone violent or change strong beliefs, but they reliably shift everyone—even the most peaceful person—marginally toward more conflict and dysfunction, because they can only make such behavior more likely, never less.
“it's kind of like having somebody in a bar, where you are talking to a friend, and there's a guy in the corner just constantly saying, 'Fight. Fight. Come on.'”
- Because Facebook's and Google's recommendation algorithms are designed to maximize attention so they can sell advertising, they have built-in biases that pull users toward progressively more extremist, socially dysfunctional positions—functioning as an 'extremist-generating engine' regardless of whether the content is left or right.
“the algorithms themselves drive extremist behavior. So, these are based, the algorithms that Facebook uses or that Google uses to sort of attract you and keep you using their technologies, keep your attention so they can sell you more advertising--they have specific biases built in that are not good for human beings.”
Market competition cannot constrain platform power because switching costs are prohibitive and data advantages make rivals uncompetitive.
- The notion that competition is just a click away is empirically false: Microsoft spent enormous sums promoting Bing as an alternative to Google search and it failed entirely, demonstrating that switching alternatives do not discipline these markets.
“there's sort of this notion that competition is just a click away. But the actual evidence is that it's not. It just isn't.”
- Modern search no longer works by mapping the web; Google structures the web using massive data it holds about users, and because high-quality search and services like Translate require enormous data sets that only Facebook, Google, and Amazon possess, entrants like DuckDuckGo cannot match quality—so effectively there are no real competitors.
“Google's search engine no longer works by mapping the web. Google is so powerful that it in fact in many ways structures the web based on the data that it has about everyone else.”
Blocking acquisitions and splitting merged units would restore competition and liberate technology without destroying the products people use.
- A simple, available policy is to block all acquisitions by Facebook, Amazon, and Google under the existing Clayton Act, which would prevent them from buying or copying emerging competitors and encourage entrepreneurs to build competing businesses rather than sell out.
“a very simple thing that we could do is to block all acquisitions by Facebook, Amazon, and Google. I mean, just stop them from acquiring companies.”
- Google is really a financial holding company (Alphabet) whose products are largely the result of mergers and acquisitions rather than internal development; therefore splitting off acquired units like YouTube, Maps, or DoubleClick would not destroy the technology people love but would liberate it, distinguishing financial concentration from the concentration necessary to build great products.
“Google is a financial--it's a search engine but it's also a financial holding company called Alphabet. And it has a bunch of different products in that holding company. And those products are largely the result of mergers and acquisitions.”
Apparent abundance of choice masks loss of diversity and quality in ideas, books, and information at scale that ordinary people cannot replace.
- Pointing to platforms like Medium overstates choice because a quick essay and deeply researched work (a month in Iraq understanding a conflict, or years writing a sourced biography of Cornelius Vanderbilt) are fundamentally different products; one requires massive financing while the other needs only an afternoon, so abundance of the cheap kind does not replace the loss of the expensive kind.
“What about going to Iraq and spending a month there and trying to understand the culture and what the conflict has done and actually putting something in writing around that?”
- Amazon does not care whether you find the specific book that is right for you or that serves an author-reader relationship; it only wants you to find some book (or watch Prime), just as Facebook only cares that you keep clicking regardless of whether the content is good, false, or angering.
“They don't care if you find my book or not. They just want you to find a book.”
- Evaluating these platforms only through consumer prices is wrong because people are not just consumers but citizens and creators; the relevant harms fall on authors, musicians, brewers, and farmers whose ability to make and sell things is being constrained.
“you are not thinking about us, as consumers. But you can't think about people as just consumers. You know, we are citizens, and we make things.”
- Apparent abundance is an illusion of choice: the right question is not whether we have access to more books or channels but whether we have access to a good, diverse set of compelling ideas; like a beer market dominated by a few conglomerates or TV with many channels but no foreign bureaus, more options can coincide with worse, less diverse information.
“the question isn't whether we have access to more books. The question is whether we have access to a good set of diverse ideas that are compelling and effective--essential for democracy.”
Institutional scale and algorithmic logic produce harm regardless of malice, and absentee ownership at platform scale enables manipulation and dysfunction.
- After Google removed lucrative but predatory rehab-clinic ads in response to harm, its organic search algorithm was then gamed by scummy clinics, so opioid addicts searching for rehab still cannot find good help—an illustration that institutional scale, not malice, produces harm.
“when people who are addicted to opioids do a search for rehab clinics, what they will find is, first, about a year ago they would find a whole bunch of different ads from rehab clinics that weren't particularly good but were from out of state, would rip them off”
- Platforms like Facebook (two billion users) and Google (seven products with over a billion users each) are so large that the people managing them cannot pay attention to harmful parts of the network—an 'absentee ownership' problem where no one is minding the store, not because anyone is a bad person.
“You have institutions that are so large that they simply can't be managed. So, Facebook has two billion users on its various networks. Google has 7 products with more than a billion users.”
- The national security problem of foreign actors (e.g., Russia) manipulating users to organize real-world confrontations is a subset of the absentee-ownership problem: because Facebook is a platform with no rules and no real community leaders, disruptive actors can come in the back door unchecked.
“Russia, could, for example, come in and organize people who are pro-Black-Lives-Matter, or against-Black-Lives-Matter, to all come to a, you know, to a protest together outside a mosque and encourage people to engage in open carry.”