What this covers

Megan McArdle and Russ Roberts examine how internet-enabled shaming has created a new form of social punishment distinct from anything that came before. The conversation moves across the mechanics of online shaming—its permanence through search engines, its near-zero cost to the accuser, and its capacity to follow individuals indefinitely into employment and dating—to the broader erosion of what can be said in public discourse. McArdle argues that internet shaming combines the prying surveillance of small-town life with the total absence of the mercy, forgiveness, and human connection that once bounded traditional communities. Roberts and McArdle both contend that this system now damages the causes it claims to advance, particularly through the expansion of unsayable opinions into territory that once allowed open debate.

The two pursue how disproportionate punishment reduces enforcement: when social exile becomes the consequence for increasingly broad categories of speech—abortion, gender roles, genetic differences—people become reluctant to apply the punishment even when justified, and fearful of speaking altogether. McArdle draws on Coercion as a form of private power vs public power, arguing that internet shaming occupies a third and dangerous space between bounded private power and state power, capable of destroying someone's economic livelihood without the legitimacy or constraints of either. The discussion also turns to how persuasion through empathy and analogy succeeds where outrage fails, and how call-out culture creates a recursive fear in which even its practitioners dread becoming the next target. Roberts emphasizes epistemic humility and the necessity of treating those you disagree with as worthy of continued engagement rather than contempt, positioning this as foundational to civilized coexistence.

Sharpest takeaway

McArdle and Roberts argue that internet shaming constitutes a novel, unbounded form of coercion that combines the cruelty of small-town surveillance with permanent, escape-proof reach, and that the expanding categories of unsayable opinions are corroding open discourse and self-defeating even for the causes shamers champion.

  • The internet removes the 'exit' and 'mercy' that bounded traditional community shaming, while lowering the cost of shaming to near zero
  • Threatening someone's economic livelihood is a quasi-governmental power that sits between bounded private power and unbounded public power
  • Over-broadening punishable offenses to social death makes people both fearful and unwilling to apply the punishment, undermining the moral goals shamers pursue

The argument · threads5 threads · 25 claims
0.79

Internet shaming strips human connection from norm enforcement, creating permanent damage without redemption or forgiveness.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Internet shaming reproduces the worst features of small-town life (prying, long memories, punishment of norm violators) but strips out the mitigating human connection—the care for the sick, the felt sympathy at someone's ruin, and the eventual willingness to forgive—producing a uniquely bad equilibrium that no one actually likes.

    “It's all of the bad things we hated about small-town life, and none of the good things that made small town life rewarding. It's a really bad equilibrium”

  • Internet shaming differs from traditional community shaming primarily because of scale and permanence: there is only one internet with no place to escape to, Google's memory makes embarrassing episodes follow people forever in jobs and dating, and the transaction cost of shaming someone is now near zero compared to the social risk of gossip in a small town.

    “if you got a big trouble in your local town or city, at the last resort, you could move... And if you look at the Internet now, first of all, just the number--and also, I should say, the ease. It's not just scale. It's also the kind of transaction cost of shaming and punishing someone.”

  • Unlike ten years ago, when saying something bad online drew screaming and then faded with the episode bounded, the modern internet permanently damages a fired person's economic prospects because all companies become afraid to hire him, illustrating how the consequence is no longer bounded.

    “All companies are probably going to be afraid to hire this guy... He's damaged. In a way that was not true 10 years ago”

  • Classical liberals divide power into private power (acceptable because it is bounded and offers exit) and public power (dangerous because it has guns behind it and is unbounded), but internet shaming is a third creature in between: it is not one company yet it can make all employers afraid to hire someone, approaching the state's power to deprive someone of their livelihood, which is close to the worst thing short of bodily harm a government can do.

    “classical liberals, and libertarians... we normally have two categories: Private power, which is fine, because it's bounded; because there's exit. And then there's Public power, which has guns behind it... This is a third creature, that seems to be in between those two things.”

0.79

Expanding categories of moral offense with motte-and-bailey definitions paradoxically undermine support for genuine structural injustice.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Throughout history there have always been things one could not say in public, but the number of forbidden topics is now exploding rapidly—abortion, trans rights, men's and women's roles, genetic differences—such that things one could openly discuss five or ten years ago now brand the speaker a moral horror.

    “There have always been things that you can't say in public, for whatever reason. Fifty years ago, it was, 'Hey, we should let homosexuals get married'... the number of topics seems to be exploding, on which I hear this.”

  • Every profession has had a small number of well-delineated, bright-line offenses that get you permanently exiled (for journalists, fabricating a story), but the categories that trigger exile—being deemed sexist or racist—are expanding from a small to a large and ill-defined set, which is what makes the phenomenon alarming.

    “those offences used to be like a small number of things. And they are growing to be a large number of things.”

  • Using a motte-and-bailey definition of an offense (a bland defensible definition and a much broader contestable one used interchangeably) combined with a punishment as severe as social death causes people to demand a very high burden of proof and apply the punishment only to the narrowest cases, which paradoxically excludes genuinely problematic things like structural sexism and erodes support for fighting racism and bigotry.

    “if you make a punishment for anything too severe, people don't want to apply it... if you say that sexism is so bad that people who practice it need to be exiled, then people are going to be very, very narrow about the definition they are going to use”

  • Companies exist to do a job, not to defend free speech, so angering enough fellow employees that they cannot work with you has always been a legitimate firing offense, and Google additionally faced regulatory and litigation pressure over female employment that made Damore's memo a liability they had to address.

    “Angering your fellow employees has always been a firing offense... companies, they are not there to make a big statement about free speech and the values. They are there to do a job.”

0.71

Call-out culture produces distributed fear resembling authoritarian soft control, leaving all participants trapped in an unhealthy equilibrium.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Call-out culture creates a Stalinist-purge dynamic in which even the people participating in shaming are afraid, because anyone could be the next person purged, making it an unhealthy equilibrium that no participant actually wants.

    “as the Stalinists found out with the purges: You could be the next person purged. Everyone is afraid. Everyone's worried about the call-out culture, even as they participate in it.”

  • Under Brezhnev the operative risk for dissent was not a labor camp but losing your job and apartment, after which no one would associate with you for fear of the same fate—a soft, decentralized fear that resembles today's expanding shaming, where people fear social and economic consequences for opinions on which there is no genuine social consensus.

    “Under Brezhnev, the risk wasn't that you weren't going to get sent to a camp. The risk was you would lose your job and your apartment. And then no one would go on and talk to you, because they knew it was dangerous to talk to you”

  • When people tell racist jokes and their friends say that's not funny and you shouldn't say that, that kind of in-group correction is completely useful and no society can function without it—it is how Smithian norms of judgment evolve—so the problem is not norm enforcement itself but its unbounded, life-destroying form.

    “When people tell racist jokes, and their friends turn around and say, 'That's not funny and you shouldn't say that,' right? That's useful. Completely useful. There is no society that gets along without that.”

  • America is like a marriage in a country with no divorce: you cannot win it, you can only win something that ends before you do, so since the other half of the population is not going away, the only options are a miserable marriage of mutual hurt or figuring out how to live together civilly—and every blow you land guarantees a return blow that makes you more unhappy.

    “America is like a marriage. It's like a marriage in a country with no divorce. You cannot win a marriage. You can only win something that ends before you do.”

  • The shift from arguing with opponents to simply labeling them racists or bigots and ending the conversation is a cultural change, but it is combined with internet technology, and the two factors heterodyne each other into something that feels unhealthy for everyone.

    “I think it is a cultural shift. But, I think that that cultural shift is combined with a, with a technology; and that both of those two things are kind of heterodyning each other into something that feels unhealthy for everyone.”

0.59

Respectful, empathetic argument persuades and changes minds where condemnation and outrage alienate and entrench opposition.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • In persuasive writing, the moment you become clever, mean, sarcastic, or outrageous you permanently lose the audience you are trying to persuade, because they turn off; kindness is harder than cleverness but more effective at actually changing minds.

    “the minute you are clever and mean and outrageous, you've lost someone. That's it. They will never listen to you. The minute you are sarcastic to them.”

  • McArdle's most effective piece compared academic bias against conservatives to structural racism, and it worked precisely because it was respectful rather than condemnatory—conservatives who had dismissed structural racism as nonsense suddenly understood it through an analogy they empathized with—demonstrating that respectful, empathetic argument changes minds where outrage does not.

    “I got a bunch of conservatives who wrote me and said, 'You know what? I always thought this structural racism stuff was nonsense; and now I understand what they were talking about.'”

  • When every disagreement is equated to uniquely terrible moral horrors like the Holocaust, society loses the moral language needed to discuss anything lesser, and the tactic ultimately works against the accuser's own cause by infuriating people and provoking equally vehement responses.

    “if everything is the Holocaust, we now just don't have any moral language to talk about anything lesser. And also, people don't actually--it worst against your cause in the end.”

0.53

Media economics now incentivize outrage and amplification, replacing pre-internet editorial restraint with pursuit of engagement.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Online outlets that shed expensive reporting and editing now depend on cheap outrage content, creating a supply-side economy in which the primary reason to visit news or social media is to find a reason to be mad, which incentivizes amplifying minor episodes that would never have been published in the pre-internet era.

    “there is an economy on the supply side of people just looking for people for being to outraged... the primary reason to go onto news media or social media right now is to find a reason to be mad”

  • Good policy writing acknowledges both sides of the ledger—as with the minimum wage having both beneficiaries and a disemployment effect on the most vulnerable—but climate change reporting almost never presents the net of upsides and downsides, instead delivering a litany of horrors, even though the IPCC reports themselves attempt the net assessment.

    “you don't write a piece about the minimum wage and just say it's all cost, no benefit... And you don't see that on climate change right now.”