What this covers

Gillian Hadfield and Russ Roberts discuss the economic structure of law itself. Hadfield, author of Rules for a Flat World, argues that the production system for legal infrastructure—not just the rules it produces—is fundamentally broken. She contends that law operates as critical platform for all markets, yet its creation and enforcement remain monopolized by closed professional gatekeepers and territorial governments poorly adapted to a complex, global, digital economy. The conversation centers on a counterintuitive proposal: government should stop creating and enforcing law directly, and instead license competing private regulators to deliver outcomes the state defines, letting these firms innovate freely on how to achieve them.

Hadfield grounds this argument in concrete comparisons. She notes that since 2007, England and Wales have allowed diverse organizations—not just lawyers—to provide legal services and separated regulatory authority from the bar association's trade function, resulting in higher access and lower costs than the American system. By contrast, American Bar Association restrictions on non-lawyer ownership, profit-sharing, and partnerships exemplify how professional gatekeeping blocks innovation and prices ordinary people out of legal help. She illustrates outcome-based regulation through examples like kosher certification: competing agencies agree on standards, firms pay for certification, and government oversees the process—all without requiring a single approved method. The discussion also addresses obstacles, including regulatory capture risks and the self-interested incentives that keep politicians and lawyers defending the status quo. Hadfield distinguishes her Competitive Approved Private Regulators model from both unaccountable self-regulation and libertarian objections about accountability distance, treating law's production as an economic problem amenable to market structure rather than as a uniquely governmental function.

Sharpest takeaway

Hadfield argues that law is critical infrastructure whose production system—not just its content—is failing in a complex, global, digital economy, and that the fix is competitive, government-approved private regulators judged on outcomes rather than the closed, lawyer-dominated, command-and-control system we have now.

  • Law is the platform markets are built on, and its production process is monopolized by closed professions and territorial governments ill-suited to complex adaptive systems.
  • Government should set politically-determined outcome criteria while licensing competing private regulators to innovate on how those outcomes are achieved.
  • The American Bar Association's economic regulations block innovation in legal services, whereas less restrictive systems like the UK's expand access.

The argument · threads5 threads · 21 claims
0.79

Bar association restrictions on lawyer business models suppress innovation and access by blocking competition that tiered licensing and non-lawyer providers elsewhere have proven feasible.

4 pointscentrality 5/5
  • If medicine were regulated like law, every medical provider would need an MD; instead medicine has phlebotomists, nurses, chiropractors, and pharmacists with varied licenses, and law should similarly not require a full three-year-plus-degree license for everything legal, allowing tiered licenses for basic services like explaining a subpoena or filing family-law documents.

    “If medicine was regulated the way law is regulated, every single person who performed any kind of medical care would have to have an M.D.”

  • Through state bar associations it coordinates, the American Bar Association imposes economic regulations—barring lawyers from partnering with, taking equity from, being employed by non-lawyers, or sharing profits via incentive contracts—that are far more restrictive than genuine ethics rules and that block innovation in legal services and keep them too costly for most people to access.

    “the really important regulations in there, and they are regulations--they are economic regulations... 'A lawyer can't be in a partnership or a business entity with someone who is not licensed as a lawyer.'”

  • Unlike the US, England and Wales have always allowed anyone—unions, community organizations, volunteer bureaus, for- or non-profit entities—to provide legal advice and draft documents, and since 2007 the UK has separated the regulatory function from the trade-association function of legal professions to keep lawyers from deciding their own rules.

    “anybody can provide legal advice or help draft documents--wills, contracts, etc.--in England and Wales. So, that's never been restricted.”

  • Truly innovative solutions generally come from outsiders not steeped in a field's established ways—like Brin and Page solving search with PageRank rather than librarians cataloguing—so regulating an activity to require insider licensing (as law does) suppresses the diverse, risk-taking idea pool that produces breakthroughs.

    “what we know is that the truly innovative move generally comes in from the outside, with somebody who hasn't been steeped in that problem, saying, 'Huh. How come we don't do it this way?'”

0.73

Current legal infrastructure produced by government and closed professions is too expensive and complex, leaving most people unable to access help and businesses unable to navigate global complexity.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Access to legal help is inversely related to the level of economic development: the simpler a society, the easier most people find legal help, because complexity and the cost of legal services grow alongside the complexity of the economy.

    “The simpler a society is, the more likely it is that more people have easy access to legal help.”

  • The legal infrastructure produced today—government-made law adjudicated in public courts through closed professions—is too expensive and too complex, inaccessible to ordinary people and inadequate even for large global corporations operating in a complex global environment.

    “It's too expensive; it's too complex. And, surprisingly, it's just not solving the kinds of problems that we face in light of globalization and technology”

  • Surveys suggest 30-40% of Americans facing legal problems (housing, family, misdemeanor, small business) do nothing, compared to roughly 5-10% in the UK and similar low figures in the Netherlands where ~40-45% hold legal insurance giving direct access to lawyers, indicating less restrictive regimes expand effective access.

    “people face in those kinds of situations as much as 30-40% just don't do anything in response to them. And that percentage in the United Kingdom is probably between 5 and 10%.”

0.67

Legal infrastructure is foundational shared capital, not a market-failure fix, on which all value-creating relationships in society depend.

2 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Legal infrastructure is not something layered on top of a market economy to fix market failures; it is the basic platform on which humans build their rules and the value-creating relationships in a society, making it shared capital comparable to traffic infrastructure.

    “it's not just something we layer on top of our market economy to maybe respond to market failures; but it's the basic platform on which humans have always built sets of rules”

  • The idea of a free market without rules is a fantasy because all markets are constituted by rules—you cannot even define a market without defining who owns what and the criteria under which goods transfer for a price—and the absence of basic legal infrastructure (governance, rule of law) is widely seen as a key reason poor and transition countries fail to grow.

    “there's no such thing as a free market in that sense. All markets are constituted by rules.”

0.65

Government should shift from command-and-control to outcome-based regulation with competing private regulators approved by the state, a model better suited to complex adaptive systems than traditional rule-making.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The belief that government alone can produce good regulation is a fantasy because government is not the kind of entity adapted to innovate or produce technology, and complex global technologies need jurisdiction-jumping solutions that territorially-based governments cannot provide.

    “they are not the type of entity that we think of as well-adapted to innovate. They don't produce technology.”

  • Autonomous vehicles form a complex adaptive system of many interacting agents whose trajectory is hard to predict, and our existing regulatory technology—experts writing down rules that lawyers advise on and enforcers penalize—cannot regulate such systems; they may instead require AI that regulates through constant data exchange and direct intervention.

    “to regulate complex traffic systems with lots of machines in them--maybe we need technology to do that. Maybe we need AI (artificial intelligence) that is actually performing the function of regulation in constant data exchange”

  • Government should shift from command-and-control regulation (mandating specific technologies and behaviors) to setting politically-determined outcome criteria—like maximum tolerable workplace accidents or suspicious transactions—leaving private competitors free to invent how to achieve them, a shift analogous to moving from central planning to a regulated market economy.

    “Right now, we have, almost all our regulation through government is command-and-control style... As opposed to outcomes.”

  • Hadfield proposes 'super-regulation': an industry of private (for- or non-profit) regulators that are approved/licensed by the state to achieve publicly-determined outcome criteria but compete on how they achieve them, distinct from self-regulation and from monopoly private regulators like FINRA who end up behaving like governments.

    “it's a private regulator. So, that's a profit or nonprofit that's in the business of developing regulatory schemes, regulatory services. It's approved, in the sense that it's licensed by the state... And, it's competitive.”

0.57

Law's distinctiveness lies in deliberate institutional choice and amendment capacity, and gatekeepers resist reform because they profit from the current monopoly structure.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Law differs from emergent social norms not in its enforcement mechanism but in its capacity for deliberate content: with law the source of the rule is an identifiable institution everybody knows everybody recognizes, allowing a community to deliberately choose to change the rule overnight and have everyone confidently know the new rule the next morning.

    “the concept that really matters here is that of common knowledge”

  • We spend almost all our time debating what rules we should have and almost none on how well the production system for legal infrastructure works; recognizing that government-made, state-enforced law is not the only way to make law lets us treat rule-production like any other production process that economists analyze.

    “we spend a lot of time talking about what rules we think we should have, and almost none talking about, 'How well is the production system working?'”

  • The reason we don't already have a reformed system is partly public choice: current gatekeepers—politicians and especially lawyers—have self-interested incentives to retain control, so reform requires holding their feet to the fire, with outcome-based regulation offering a more transparent alternative to opaque 2000-page lobbyist-shaped statutes.

    “public choice is a big obstacle here; and that's also why I talk about the market for lawyers... one of the groups that I'm saying needs to not be so fully in charge of how our legal infrastructure is designed and developed are lawyers”

  • Because no rule can cover every case, ambiguity in what the rules mean inevitably arises, and it is precisely this pressure that generates the demand for and production of formal institutions—courts or arbitrators—whose rulings everyone commonly knows to be final, allowing disputes to stop and behavior to be predicted.

    “it's precisely the pressure and the creation of ambiguity in what the rules are, that we think generates the demand for, and then the production of, institutions that perform that role”

  • Europe's right-to-be-forgotten ruling forces search engines like Google to adjudicate requests (reportedly around 500 a day) to remove old or false information, but because governments lack the capacity and technology to implement it, the adjudication is handed to Google to regulate itself—a problematic single private regulator rather than a competitive, accountable one.

    “governments are not capable of actually implementing that regulation. And so, it's been handed to search engines like Google to do the actually adjudication of that.”