Robin Feldman on Drug Patents, Generics, and Drug Wars
What this covers
Robin Feldman of UC Hastings College of Law discusses her book Drug Wars with EconTalk host Russ Roberts, examining how pharmaceutical companies use the regulatory system to delay or block generic competition. The conversation centers on the Hatch-Waxman Act, the 1984 statute that dramatically increased generic drug adoption from 13% to 80-90% of prescriptions, and explores the tactics brand-name companies have developed to circumvent its intended effect. Feldman argues that the problem is not market failure but regulatory complexity itself—each legislative patch creates new loopholes that sophisticated firms exploit, a dynamic she calls death by tinkering.
Feldman traces three generations of delay tactics. First-generation pay-for-delay settlements involve brand companies paying generic competitors to stay off the market, effectively dividing monopoly profits while consumers bear the cost through prolonged high prices. Second-generation tactics use complex side-deals—such as hiring an inexperienced generic manufacturer to perform work it cannot actually complete—to achieve the same anticompetitive result while obscuring the value transfer. Third-generation obstruction exploits regulatory mechanisms directly: blocking generic access to drug samples, invoking safety protocols like REMS, or practicing product hopping and evergreening—making trivial modifications to obtain new patents just as old ones expire. Feldman documents how brand companies file FDA citizen petitions at rates nearly triple their 2003 levels, with one in five petitions in some years serving as delay tactics, and how the five-month FDA response window alone yields hundreds of millions in extra revenue for blockbuster drugs.
Rather than price controls, Feldman proposes ruthless simplification of regulations paired with transparency and functioning competitive markets. She argues the system exemplifies regulatory arbitrage—the same dynamic that created the 2008 financial crisis—where accumulated rules designed to achieve one goal create incentives to manufacture workarounds that defeat it entirely.
Feldman argues that the complexity of the Hatch-Waxman pharmaceutical regulatory system breeds endless opportunities for brand-name drug companies to delay or block generic competition, and that the solution is not price controls but ruthless simplification, functioning competitive markets, and pricing transparency.
- Complexity breeds opportunity: each legislative fix adds complexity that creates new loopholes ('death by tinkering')
- Brand companies have evolved three generations of tactics (pay-for-delay, complex side-deals, regulatory obstruction) to extend monopoly profits
- The fix is competition, simplification, and sunshine on pricing, not telling companies what to charge
Brand companies exploit Hatch-Waxman's complexity through evergreening, product hopping, and regulatory abuse to block generic competition and extend monopolies.
- Within Hatch-Waxman, companies practice evergreening and product hopping—making a minor modification to a drug's delivery, dosage, or form right as the patent expires, obtaining a new patent on the trivially changed version, and then withdrawing the old version so generics of the original cannot be substituted.
“you try to make a minor modification to the drug's delivery or dosage or something else related to the system and then get a new patent on this new version, and then keep the generic from being able to come on”
- In the Asacol/Delzicol case the company introduced a new patented product identical to the old drug except for an ineffective capsule that did nothing, then withdrew the original Asacol from the market; because pharmacists could not substitute a generic of the now-unavailable original, and generics could not add a matching capsule without infringing the new patent, the maneuver blocked generic competition despite the change being therapeutically meaningless.
“it introduced a new product, which was the same drug except with an ineffective capsule around it. You cut the capsule, and the old drug just falls out. Even the FDA agreed that the two drugs were exactly the same.”
- Whereas Generations 1 and 2 relied on collusion between brand and generic, Generation 3.0 is about obstruction: unilaterally exploiting aspects of the regulatory system—either within Hatch-Waxman or through separate non-patent exclusivities—to block generics from the market entirely and keep them out.
“in Generation 1 and 2, the game was about collusion. Generation 3.0 is about obstruction: trying to exploit aspects of the regulatory system to block the generics out of the market, and to keep them out completely.”
- Brand companies can block generics by refusing to sell them a sample needed to prove bioequivalence, restricting distribution to certain pharmacies or hospitals or invoking REMS safety protocols to claim the generic isn't a qualified buyer—and even when the FDA says transfer is fine, the brand can refuse, leaving the parties in a standoff that keeps the generic off the market.
“if the Brand-name company won't sell me the sample, I can't do that.”
- The core problem of the Hatch-Waxman system is its complexity: every elaborate rule built to introduce generics creates new opportunities to manipulate it, and as Congress tinkers with patches to stop exploitation it only adds more complexity and new loopholes, so the same battle is fought without gaining ground—'death by tinkering.'
“Complexity breeds opportunity. The key problem in the Hatch-Waxman system is its complexity. All of this system that we've come up with for the introduction of generic drugs breeds opportunities for manipulating it.”
Hatch-Waxman transformed the generic market from 13% to 80-90% of prescriptions through expedited bioequivalence review and Paragraph IV patent challenges.
- Prior to the 1984 Hatch-Waxman Act, only about 13% of prescriptions in the United States were filled by generics; today that figure is 80-90%, demonstrating the Act's dramatic effect on generic adoption.
“prior to Hatch-Waxman, approximately 13% of the prescriptions in this country were filled by generics. That's a very small number.”
- Hatch-Waxman's Paragraph IV Certification lets a generic certify either that its drug does not infringe a patent or that the patent is invalid; filing that paper creates an artificial act of infringement, giving the brand notice and a window to sue, so the patent dispute can be resolved in court before the patent expires—allowing the generic to launch the moment it does, without first risking ruinous damages.
“I certify one of two things: Either that my drug does not infringe the patent, or, that the patent is invalid. And plunking that piece of paper down creates an artificial act of infringement.”
- To entice generics into costly patent battles, Hatch-Waxman grants the first generic to successfully challenge a patent six months of marketing exclusivity—effectively a duopoly with only the brand and that one generic on the market—after which all other generics may enter.
“Hatch-Waxman creates a system where the first generic to successfully challenge a patent gets 6 months of exclusivity as a generic. It's really a duopoly--a time when there will be two on the market.”
- Hatch-Waxman's key reform allowed generic companies to rely on the brand-name drug's already-proven safety and efficacy: the brand must show the drug is safe and works, but the generic only has to show bioequivalence—that its product is the same as the approved drug—avoiding the absurdity of repeating years of clinical trials on an identical chemical.
“Hatch-Waxman allowed the generic drug companies to rely on the safety and the efficacy status of the brand-name drug, the original trials that were done to prove that. That was a key implementation.”
Pay-for-delay settlements and hidden rebate schemes allow brands to share monopoly profits with generics while keeping prices high for consumers.
- The defense of pay-for-delay as a rational settlement is suspect because in ordinary settlements the defendant pays the plaintiff, not the reverse; here the plaintiff (brand) paying the defendant (generic) strongly suggests the deal is not about resolving litigation risk but about protecting and extending an exclusivity the company is not supposed to have.
“In settlements, generally one doesn't see the plaintiff paying the defendant. Usually it's the other way around.”
- For a blockbuster drug with $1-2 billion in annual sales, holding off generic competition even for six months can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars in unchallenged sales, which is why the dramatic post-generic price drops create powerful incentives to delay competition as long as possible.
“For a blockbuster drug, sales can be in the $1-2 billion dollars a year. So, to hold off generic competition even for 6 months in a blockbuster drug, that can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, in unchallenged sales.”
- Because the statute prevents any other generic from entering until the first-filing generic has actually come to market, a brand company can pay that first generic to stay off the market and thereby block all subsequent generic competition, since the six-month exclusivity clock never starts running.
“the way the statute is written, no one else can come in until the generic has come on the market... The 6-month clock doesn't start running until the generic makes it to market.”
- Second-generation tactics keep the generic off the market through complex side-deals rather than cash—for example paying an inexperienced generic to market or manufacture for the brand, work it cannot actually perform—so the value transfer for staying out is harder to detect and harder for antitrust courts to analyze, while reaching the same anticompetitive result.
“a Brand-name company may pay a generic that's never existed and never done anything to market the Brand-name company for it. So, you are paying someone who has no experience and knows nothing to do something for you.”
- In the first-generation Pay-for-Delay strategy, a brand-name company settles a Hatch-Waxman lawsuit by paying the first-filing generic to stay off the market for a period—effectively sharing part of its monopoly rent with the generic so both profit while consumers and society lose through prolonged high prices.
“In economic terms, the Brand-name company is sharing a part of its monopoly rent with the first-filing generic. And they are both happy. Who is not happy are the consumers and society in general, because the price stays higher for a longer period of time.”
- The Supreme Court's 2013 Actavis decision ruled that pay-for-delay settlements could be challenged as antitrust violations; though limited, that pronouncement let lower courts attack these deals and, in anticipation, companies began moving away from simple pay-for-delay settlements.
“the Supreme Court in 2013, in a case called Actavis, eventually ruled that these types of settlements could be challenged as an Antitrust violation. That pronouncement in itself, although quite limited, was enough to allow the lower courts to begin pounding away at these.”
Pricing transparency and systemic simplification with anti-abuse doctrines are essential; competition, not price controls, disciplines drug markets.
- Pricing and game transparency ('sunshine') is a critical reform because the tactics succeed precisely by being complex and opaque, hard for the public and policymakers to understand; exposing prices and translating the games into terms ordinary citizens grasp—amplified by modern social media—would go a long way toward a more rational, competitive system.
“Part of the reason that the types of games have been so effective in the pharmaceutical market is that they are complex. They are difficult for the public to understand... nice, bright sunshine goes a long way.”
- The first key reform is ruthless simplification: replace complex, manipulable systems with much simpler ones, complemented by standards-based, anti-abuse doctrines—like the tax system's Step Transaction Doctrine that collapses technically-compliant arrangements designed to reach an illegitimate result—to cut through gaming.
“One is: Ruthless simplification. You have to have to much more simple systems that are not subject to the same types of complex manipulation as the system we have in place.”
- The solution to drug pricing is functioning competitive markets and attention to incentives, not telling companies what to charge or imposing price controls; even when companies plead to be spared competition, policymakers must ignore that plea because effective competition is the bottom line.
“You cannot imagine that you'll solve the problem by telling a pharmaceutical company what to charge, or by putting in a price control... You have to understand that the bottom line is effective competition.”
- Although insurers have an incentive to keep costs down, the largest insurer is the federal government through Medicare, and legislation bars the government from negotiating drug prices—it must take what it gets—so even this powerful payer is structurally prevented from disciplining prices, an economically irrational arrangement.
“the largest insurance company is the Federal government through its Medicare system. And we have a piece of legislation that says the Medicare--the government can't negotiate on prices: it's got to just take what it gets. So, that system is set up in an economically irrational fashion.”
- Rather than bashing companies for acting in their economic self-interest, society—including a heavily lobbied Congress—has an obligation to construct a better system with the right incentives; blaming HMOs, insurers, or pharmaceutical companies is unproductive because if we care, we must take responsibility for designing institutions that point the incentives the right way.
“It's not helpful to go around bashing companies and saying, 'Oh, they are these horrible people; they are acting in economic self-interest.' We have an obligation as a society to figure out a better system.”
- Companies neutralize price objections through opaque, targeted concessions—offering special rebates to a complaining large payer or to a patient advocacy group worried about indigent patients—so as long as there is no sunshine on pricing and the deals stay hidden, firms can 'move the shells around' and take the heat off in various places without lowering prices broadly.
“As long as we don't have sunshine on pricing--as long as we can't see what's happening with all of these deals--you can move the shells around fairly effectively.”
Generics win three-quarters of patent challenges but face steep litigation costs and delays that sustain brand monopolies despite weak patent validity.
- When generics fight brand-name patents through Paragraph IV certification challenges, they win about three-quarters of the time, indicating how many of the challenged patents are weak—yet litigating still costs money and time during which the brand retains its monopoly.
“when the generics fight the Brand-name patent in those paragraphs for certification, they win three-quarters of the time. But that takes money, and that takes time.”
- When the first generic reaches market the drug price can drop 15-20%, and over time as multiple generics enter the price can fall by as much as 85%, creating enormous incentives for brand companies to keep competition off the market.
“For a blockbuster drug, sales can be in the $1-2 billion dollars a year. So, to hold off generic competition even for 6 months in a blockbuster drug, that can be worth hundreds of millions of dollars, in unchallenged sales.”
- Pharmaceutical patents work by suspending the vigorous competition we normally prize for a limited period, because drug R&D is long and expensive, so the temporary monopoly gives drug companies enough incentive to invest and earn a healthy return, after which the patent term ends and generics should enter.
“We love vigorous competition, but with patents we suspend that for a period of time, because research and development on pharmaceuticals takes a long time, is expensive. And so we want to create enough incentives so drug companies will invest in this research.”
Weak patents persist because the Patent Office lacks time to examine complex claims and relies on later litigation to weed them out.
- A weak patent is not one easily worked around but one that ought never to have been granted and should be invalidated; of roughly 2 million patents outstanding, many would not survive a court challenge, yet they sit on the books blocking competition because challenging them is costly and uncertain.
“A weak patent means that it ought to be invalidated. A weak patent means it shouldn't have been granted in the first place.”
- Weak patents persist because the Patent and Trademark Office is overwhelmed: approval takes about two years, but a patent examiner spends only about two days' total reading a patent that may contain hundreds of complex pharmaceutical claims, relying on the theory that significant patents will be litigated later.
“estimates are that it takes about two years for a patent to be approved. A patent agent will spend, across that two years, approximately two days' worth of time reading the patent. Pharmaceutical patents are very complex and difficult. There may be hundreds of claims in a single patent.”
Citizen petitions and FDA delays function as profitable last-ditch tactics blocking generic entry for months, yielding hundreds of millions in sales.
- Analysis of 12 years of FDA citizen petition data shows the 'concerned citizen' is frequently a drug company raising questionable claims in a last-ditch effort to delay generic competition; such petitions doubled since 2003, the FDA denies the petition and requested action about 80% of the time, and in some years nearly 1 in 5 of all citizen petitions filed at the FDA were attempts to delay generic entry.
“The concerned citizen at the FDA is frequently a drug company who is raising questionable claims in a last-ditch effort to hold up competition.”
- Even when the FDA denies a citizen petition, its five-month response window grants the brand another five months of unchallenged sales; with about 40% of these petitions filed within a year of generic approval and filing costing roughly $25,000 in legal fees, the strategy can yield hundreds of millions of dollars for a blockbuster, making it a highly profitable last-ditch delay tactic.
“The concerned citizen at the FDA is frequently a drug company who is raising questionable claims in a last-ditch effort to hold up competition.”
- Martin Shkreli raised an off-patent drug from $13.50 to $750 a tablet and, although the drug had no REMS safety protocol, his company unilaterally declared it would distribute only through certain safety protocols and distributors—an FDA-unrequested move designed to deny generics a sample and create a competition-free zone, with an executive admitting they wouldn't make it easier for generics.
“he bought a drug that was selling at $13.50 a tablet. And hiked the price to $750 a tablet.”
Information gaps and physician unawareness of generic equivalence allow brands to maintain higher prices despite cheaper therapeutic alternatives available.
- Doctors prescribe expensive brand drugs over cheaper generics not because they are corrupt but because of an information gap: generics avoid the costly direct-to-consumer and physician advertising that brands use, the system assumes pharmacists will substitute the cheapest version, and busy doctors lack time to compare prices and marginal efficacy, so 'nobody's watching the henhouse.'
“There's a huge information gap. It's not that doctors are corrupt. It's that they don't have information.”
- Drugs that sell for $400 abroad can sell for $30,000 in the United States, meaning American citizens essentially subsidize lower prices in foreign countries—an extraordinary international price disparity that reflects the distorted nature of the US drug market.
“drugs that sell for $400 overseas in other countries, sell for $30,000 here... American citizens essentially are subsidizing lower prices in foreign countries.”
- On balance Hatch-Waxman is half-full and even miraculous in moving the United States toward a system of generic drugs, but the real challenge—and the looming question—is whether it can continue to survive as new waves of game-playing unfold.
“I view Hatch-Waxman as half-full. In fact, I'd say Hatch-Waxman has been miraculous, in moving us toward a system of generic drugs. The real miracle, however, will be if it continues to survive, as these new waves of game-playing unfold.”