Jason Barr on Building the Skyline and the Economics of Skyscrapers
What this covers
Jason Barr and host Russ Roberts examine why Manhattan's skyline clusters into two distinct zones — towering skyscrapers downtown and in midtown, with almost nothing in between — and challenge the widespread belief that geology determined this pattern. Barr argues instead that the skyline emerged from nineteenth-century settlement decisions, later calcified by twentieth-century policy. The conversation traces how economics, technology, and regulation shaped Manhattan's vertical landscape: from Elisha Otis's elevator safety brake in the 1850s and the rise of steel construction, through the clustering of finance and media industries that drove up land values, to the 1916 zoning code that locked existing patterns in place and the rent-control regimes that persist today.
The discussion covers several distinct layers. Barr dismantles the "bedrock myth" using Correlation vs Causation — engineers could have built tall anywhere demand existed; bedrock depth was never an economic barrier. He then shifts to history: how streetcar expansion after 1830 reversed residential geography, allowing the wealthy to flee the center while working-class immigrants remained, creating the spatial foundation for later skyscraper distribution. On policy, he shows how Bootleggers and Baptists dynamics shaped height regulation, how the 1916 zoning's "shape tax" via setback requirements produced the iconic wedding-cake profile, and how rent stabilization paradoxically deepens the housing shortage it was meant to cure. A final thread distinguishes Open City vs Closed City models — Houston can expand on farmland, but New York faces supply constraints that policy alone cannot solve without addressing schools, transit, and amenities simultaneously.
Barr argues that Manhattan's distinctive skyline -- skyscrapers downtown and in midtown but not in between -- was determined not by bedrock geology but by pre-Civil-War settlement patterns that were later locked in by zoning and rent regulation, making the skyline an emergent outcome of economics and policy rather than nature.
- The bedrock-depth explanation is a correlation mistaken for causation; engineers could have built skyscrapers anywhere demand existed
- Immigrant working-class neighborhoods between City Hall and 14th Street stayed low-rise because tenements were profitable there and demand for tall buildings was elsewhere
- 1916 and 1961 zoning plus rent stabilization locked in existing height patterns and constrain supply today
Elevator economics create inherent constraints on skyscraper height and rentable floor space.
- Elevator speeds have risen dramatically: the 1913 Woolworth Building ran cars at about 700 feet per minute (~8 mph), while the Burj Khalifa in Dubai runs at about 40 mph -- a roughly fivefold increase, with maximum speeds rising at an average rate of 1.7% per year since 1913, illustrating continual innovation; modern elevators now face the constraint of moving too fast for passenger comfort (popping ears) and cable strength limits.
“Today, the elevator at Burj Khalifa, which is in...Dubai...It goes 40 miles an hour...it's a five-fold increase in speed...Maximum speeds increased at an average rate of 1.7% since 1913”
- Skyscrapers must devote roughly 30% of their total space to elevators, including shafts, hallways, and machinery -- a cost invisible to ordinary users but central to the economics of building height.
“In general, skyscrapers must devote about 30% of the total space to elevators, including their shafts, hallways, and machinery.”
- Adding floors to a skyscraper requires adding elevators because all occupants must board at the bottom, and each additional elevator shaft consumes core space that could otherwise be rented; this creates a tradeoff where extra height yields diminishing net rentable area, so the economically optimal height is set by whether the revenue from upper floors justifies the lost space -- essentially a cost-benefit and supply-and-demand calculation.
“there are certain rules of thumb in the industry...that if you want a goal of a few more floors you have to add an extra building shaft, an elevator shaft, and you have to eat into the rental of the space”
Zoning and rent regulations reduce housing supply by inflating land prices and deterring construction.
- The history of tinkering with rent control and stabilization creates regulatory uncertainty that discourages building rental property: developers prefer to build ownership (condo) property because they are less likely to be 'messed around with' in the future and have more certainty about the income stream, so even loosening zoning leaves the risk of reversion that politicians struggle to credibly commit against.
“part of the tinkering with rent control and rent stabilization has meant that if you have a plot of land, you don't want to build rental property. You want to build ownership property, because you are less likely to be messed around with in the future.”
- Restrictions like zoning and rent stabilization in New York, San Francisco, and Washington DC -- which drove land prices up sharply (Manhattan land rose over 20% a year from 1993 to 2007) -- effectively privilege expensive land for rich people by preventing developers from adding square footage; though intuitively seen as protecting low-income residents, the zoning artificially inflates land prices, and rent-stabilized apartments often benefit not the poor but the children and grandchildren of wealthy people who inherited them.
“the zoning is privileged. These spaces--San Francisco, Washington, D.C., New York--for rich people more or less, because they artificially increased the price of land through the inability of developers to add square footage”
Height restrictions serve incumbent developers' financial interests under the guise of safety reform.
- Building-height caps like those Chicago imposed in the 1890s were popular with those who had already built the tallest buildings because they reduced competition for tall-building space and thereby increased the value of existing structures and land -- a classic Bootleggers-and-Baptists dynamic where safety-minded reformers gave political cover to self-interested incumbent developers.
“those were very popular with people who had already built the tallest building, because it reduced competition for that land. This increased the price.”
Public transportation access has inverted from luxury good to necessity for lower-income people.
- In the early 19th century public transportation was effectively a luxury used by the wealthy because it cost cash money, while walking -- which most people relied on -- had no out-of-pocket cost; this is the reverse of today's pattern where public transit primarily serves lower-income people who cannot afford a car.
“public transportation was an incredible luxury--because it cost money. Because walking, there was no out-of-pocket cost in terms of cash.”