Terry Anderson on Native American Economics
What this covers
Terry Anderson of PERC joins Russ Roberts to examine Native American economics through an institutional lens. Rather than treating reservation poverty as cultural or inevitable, Anderson argues that the primary driver is federal policy—specifically the trusteeship system established by the Dawes Act of 1887, which placed Indian lands "in trust" and prevented individual ownership, sale, borrowing, or productive investment. The conversation traces how this legal regime departed from Native American economic practice both before European settlement and during the early reservation era, when tribes managed sophisticated property systems and trade networks. Anderson draws on historical examples—the Blackfeet's cattle operations, West Coast salmon stream management, and extensive pre-Columbian trade routes—to show that institutional capacity existed. The core argument: when reservations have escaped federal control over specific resources (timber, oil, judicial authority), they have consistently outperformed their federally managed counterparts.
The discussion moves through concrete comparisons. The Flathead Reservation's timber management returned $2 for every $1 spent while the Forest Service broke even; Fort Berthold's oil development exploded once freed from 49 federal regulations; White Mountain Apache's tourism enterprises thrive under tribal control. Conversely, trust land parcels sit degraded while adjacent fee simple property flourishes—a fence-line contrast visible across reservations. Anderson and Nick Parker found higher incomes and growth where state courts rather than tribal courts govern. The conversation also explores why reform stalls: tribal leaders who allocate welfare hold concentrated power, creating a Collective Action Problem and Public Choice / Concentrated Power Incentives against change. A final tension emerges: even when Indians leave reservations to access economic opportunity, they often face urban unemployment and underemployment—suggesting institutional barriers extend beyond land policy into broader labor-market access.
Anderson argues that Native American poverty on reservations is not a cultural inevitability but the product of institutions—chiefly federal trusteeship over land and resources—that block the property rights, contracting, and investment that Native Americans historically practiced and excelled at.
- Pre-Columbian and reservation-era tribes had sophisticated, productive property-rights and trade institutions adapted to their resources
- Federal trusteeship under the Dawes Act holds land 'in trust' so Indians cannot fully own, sell, borrow against, or invest in it
- Reservations that escape federal control (timber, oil, courts) consistently outperform federally managed equivalents
Trust land restrictions prevent investment, collateral, and productive use across generations.
- Allotted trust lands cannot be inherited except in equal shares to all heirs, so over generations a single 160-acre parcel can end up with literally thousands of owners, making it nearly impossible to get agreement on how to use the land.
“They can't be inherited other than equal shares to all heirs. Some of these lands now have literally thousands of owners, and they are 160 acres. So, pretty hard to get everybody to agree what to do.”
- After allotment, huge amounts of Indian land transferred to white settlers because BIA agents declared members 'competent' so they would sell land they didn't understand the value of, and because reservations larger than needed for 160-acre allotments had surplus land declared open to homesteading—leaving many reservations as Swiss-cheese patterns of trust parcels amid productive privately owned land, which conditioned Indians' deep wariness of any outside ownership.
“huge amounts of land transferred out of Indian ownership, still within the confines of the reservation; but became fee-simple land owned by non-Indians.”
- When tribal members receive resource royalty checks (e.g., Crow members reportedly get about $400 every three months from coal), the money gets spent on consumer goods because there is no land they can invest it in, no collateral to borrow against, and no way to buy productive assets like a tractor—so wealth that could be generative is consumed.
“What are you going to do with it living on the reservation? You don't have any land you can invest it in... you can't borrow the money to get a tractor because you don't have any collateral to put up: You don't own the land. It's in trust. And so, this money gets spent on consumer goods.”
- On reservations, federally held trust parcels have run-down structures and unproductive land because there is no way to invest in them, while adjacent privately owned fee-simple land features irrigation, barns, tractors, and nice houses—creating a stark fence-line contrast of poverty next to wealth driven by ownership differences.
“The land isn't very productive, because there's no way to invest in it.”
- The 1887 Dawes (Allotment) Act allotted 160 acres to individual Indians but held the land in trust for 25 years because the legislation deemed Indians 'not competent' to own it, requiring the Bureau of Indian Affairs to declare a person competent before they could remove land from trusteeship—a paternalistic legal status that, remarkably, persists today.
“'They're not competent yet.' 'And so we'll hold this land in trust for 25 years until the Indian is deemed competent by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.' Just imagine those words applied to any minority group; and yet that law persists.”
Removing federal regulation and devolving control to tribes dramatically improves resource development and wealth.
- The Fort Berthold Reservation sat in the center of the booming Bakken fracking play yet had no wells drilled on it until a law freed it from 49 different federal regulations controlling its oil and gas; once that passed, the reservation flourished with drilling and made millions of dollars—demonstrating that trust-related regulation, not lack of resources, blocked development.
“None were on the Fort Berthold Reservation, until a law was passed that allowed them to get out from under 49 different regulations... Once that passed, the Reservation flourished with oil wells or fracking wells being drilled. And they made millions and millions of dollars.”
- After the Flathead Reservation used a special law to wrest timber control from the federal government, PERC's comparison with neighboring U.S. Forest Service land found the tribe earned $2 for every $1 spent (while the Forest Service merely broke even on an unusually productive forest), and the tribe beat the government on timber quality, age and species distribution, water quality, and wildlife habitat—because tribal control functioned like ownership and aligned incentives.
“For every dollar the Forest Service spent, they basically broke even... The Tribe, however, was earning $2 for every $1 it spent. It had better timber; it had better age distribution... It beat the government on every count. And the reason was that the tribe had control.”
- The White Mountain Apache Reservation thrives by running tourism enterprises—a for-profit ski run, managing the largest elk herd in the U.S. and selling $20,000 trophy hunts, and renting lakes and cabins—because they wrested control from the federal government into tribal leaders who understand how to create working government and enterprise through private and well-managed tribal ownership.
“they've managed to get control out of the hands of the Federal government and into the hands of tribal leaders who understand how to create a government that works and how to create enterprise through private ownership.”
- Getting the federal government out is only a start; tribal governments then must learn to manage their own affairs under the rule of law in ways that expand the pie for tribal members, not just the government—which is difficult, as building a fiscally responsible rule-of-law government is hard even at the U.S. federal and state level.
“getting the Federal government out is a start; but then tribal governments have to find ways of managing their affairs in a way that is consistent with expanding the pie. Not just for the government, but for the tribal members themselves.”
Reservation poverty is real and severe, trapping people despite substantial federal spending.
- Economic life on Western reservations is dominated by extreme poverty and unemployment: 68% of American Indians on reservations have household incomes significantly below the U.S. average, 20% of households make less than $5,000 annually (versus 6% nationally), and 25% are below the poverty level (versus 15% nationally).
“Twenty percent of households make less than $5000 annually--compared to 6% for the overall U.S. population. Twenty five percent is below the poverty level; 15% for the nation as a whole.”
- American Indians can leave reservations any time and many do; off-reservation Indian income is astoundingly higher than on-reservation income, and leaving is almost a necessity for success because on the reservation, without ownable land or usable human capital, you have nothing—though those who move to big cities often face unemployment.
“the comparison of off-reservation Indian income with on-reservation is astounding. Just much richer off reservations.”
- Native Americans were poor and somehow separated from the rest of society onto remote reservations.
“Twenty percent of households make less than $5000 annually--compared to 6% for the overall U.S. population. Twenty five percent is below the poverty level; 15% for the nation as a whole.”
- American Indians face a poverty trap: substantial welfare-type payments flow into reservations (subsidized housing, the BIA spending $2.9 billion a year with one bureaucrat per 322 Indians, and $20,000 per student in reservation education versus $12,000 off), so without enough education to confidently earn more elsewhere, the wall to climb over is too high and people stay.
“I'm reminded of the notion of there being a poverty trap: that you at a low level and you can't really get out of that without some major step upward.”
Reliable rule of law and secure property rights enable economic growth better than tribal courts or federal paternalism.
- Comparing reservations whose judicial systems run through state courts versus tribal courts, Anderson and Nick Parker found significantly higher incomes and higher income growth rates on reservations using state courts, because a more reliable rule of law lets people contract with one another and make the investments that improve productivity—whereas tribal courts are often biased against non-Indian owners.
“what we found was incredibly more--higher incomes, higher growth rates of incomes in the reservations that use state courts. And the argument we make is this provides a legal system that allows people to interact better, to contract with one another”
- Cultural norms and rituals—like family prayers teaching 'Thou shalt not steal'—are part of what binds society together and have an important part to play in economic institutions, a point economists like Elinor Ostrom and Douglass North have made clear.
“those kinds of cultural positions have an important part to play in institutions. And we economists get some credit for having made this clear. Certainly Nobel Laureate Lin Ostrom, for example, or Douglass North have made that clear.”
- A proposed Canadian approach lets each reservation decide individually whether to have the federal government step out and take responsibility for managing its own lands with fee ownership—a reservation-by-reservation choice that would serve as a great test of how important devolved authority and federalism are to tribal prosperity.
“for each reservation to simply decide: Does it want the Federal government out, and does it want to take responsibility for managing its lands... It would be a great test of just how important the flexibility and essentially a kind of Federalism is to devolving authority back to tribes.”
Gaming and casinos cannot solve reservation poverty because location and state competition limit their viability.
- The Lumbee Indians of North Carolina, who are not a federally recognized tribe and therefore have no reservation and no welfare, are noted for their entrepreneurship and capitalism while maintaining their cultural roots—an example of Indians who can have their cake and eat it too.
“the Lumbee Indians are noted for their entrepreneurship... they don't have a reservation; they don't have all this welfare, because they are not a recognized tribe.”
- The Crow Tribe owns the biggest coal reserves in the United States but cannot develop them, both because of federal trust requirements and because they cannot export the coal—the Lummi Indians in Washington oppose construction of the coal export terminals, pitting tribe against tribe.
“they can't export their coal because, in their case, the Lummi--not the Lumbee, but the Lummi Indians in Washington--oppose construction of the coal export terminals. So you've got tribe against tribe.”
- The Indian Wars of the late 19th century resulted from the creation of a standing army after the Civil War: once a professional army existed, the cost-benefit calculus shifted from trading to raiding because settlers no longer had to mobilize their own families to fight—bored, idle soldiers stationed in remote forts could be dispatched against Indians, and new weapons like the Gatling gun made defeat of the tribes possible.
“the big turning point was the creation of a standing army after the Spanish-American War, and then it specially with the Civil War. Once you have a standing army, the costs and benefits of raiding versus trading change.”
- Despite numbering 3 million, Native Americans get little political traction because they are scattered in small groups across hundreds of reservations rather than concentrated, creating a typical collective action problem—their dispersed voices struggle against a well-organized D.C. bureaucracy and tribal leaderships through which federal money flows.
“it's just a typical collective action problem: you have a hard time getting these 3 million people together, getting your agreement, and their voices don't get heard. And then that's competing with a well-organized bureaucracy in D.C.”
- Eastern casinos generate substantial income because they are near population centers, but Western reservation casinos are in remote places with nobody to gamble, so they generate little income—making gaming a poor general solution to reservation poverty.
“Casinos in the West of course are in remote places where there is nobody to gamble. So they don't generate much income.”
- Gaming is not a path to reservation wealth: it only works in urban areas, and when tribes succeed at gaming the state demands a share—either taking part of the profits or opening competing casinos—so expanding casinos is not the answer.
“what happens when tribes are really successful with gaming; and the answer is: The state says, 'We want a share.' And they either get the tribes to contribute part of their profits to the state, or they open up casinos to compete with them.”
Pre-contact Native Americans built sophisticated ownership and institutional arrangements adapted to their environments.
- Early European-Indian interaction in the 1600s-1700s was largely cooperative trade rather than war, because few settlers, abundant land, and superior Indian weapons (a bow could fire 25 arrows while a settler reloaded a blunderbuss) made fighting costly; conflict required mobilizing one's own family and neighbors, so people generally bought land and cooperated.
“if you were going to fight the Indians, you had to get together with your uncle, your sons, a few of your neighbors... they had far superior weapons. A bow and arrow compared to an old blunderbuss was hardly a match. An Indian can shoot 25 arrows before you could reload.”
- Lewis and Clark's Corps of Discovery axe, traded at the Mandan Villages trading hub in North Dakota, reached the West Coast's Fort Clatsop ahead of the expedition itself—demonstrating extensive, fast-moving Native American trade networks across the continent before European settlement.
“It wasn't delivered by Fed Ex. But it was a matter of that trade axe, finding its way, probably from one person to another, until it beat them all the way across the area they were discovering.”
- West Coast streams historically owned by clans, which selectively released large salmon to spawn, retained bigger salmon stocks, and to this day some of those formerly privately owned streams still produce bigger salmon because of that preserved stock.
“to this day, some of those streams that had private ownership, if you will, still produce bigger salmon--because they had bigger salmon stock to start with.”
- Before European arrival, Native Americans created and adapted institutions to fit their resource constraints: Eastern tribes were sedentary with well-defined family/clan land rights and crops, West Coast clans owned clam gardens and salmon streams (managing them sustainably by releasing large salmon to spawn), and nomadic Plains tribes held clear private property in personal goods like teepees, bows, and arrows—reflecting the investment required to produce them.
“each of those backward looks taught me just how innovative Native Americans were and how well they created and adapted institutions to fit their resource constraints.”
- The Blackfeet, who had communally herded their individually-owned horses, applied the same arrangement to cattle when placed on a reservation—each owning a few cows but herding them communally—and became productive enough to export beef to the Great Northern Railroad, demonstrating institutional innovation.
“each get a few cows, and the cows will belong to us individually; but we'll herd them communally.' They started to become productive; they exported beef to the Great Northern Railroad”
Tribal and individual leaders have financial incentives to resist reforms that reduce their federal welfare power.
- A core obstacle to unlocking reservation wealth is that tribal chairmen and elders who allocate incoming welfare hold significant power, so reforms that would free the tribe from federal red tape would also reduce that power—creating a political incentive against the very changes that would raise prosperity.
“if you are a tribal elder, you are a tribal chairman, and you are the one who allocates all of the welfare that's coming in, then you have a lot of power. And if somehow the tribe is able to pull out of this... it means that you may have less power.”