Erik Hurst on Work, Play, and the Dynamics of U.S. Labor Markets
What this covers
Erik Hurst of the University of Chicago joins Russ Roberts to examine a sharp decline in employment and work hours among less-educated American men since 2000. The conversation centers on two intersecting forces: a structural collapse in manufacturing that predates the Great Recession but was temporarily masked by the housing boom, and a surge in the appeal of leisure—particularly video games—paired with young men's ability to live at home supported by family income. Hurst walks through regional labor-market data, time-use surveys, and structural models to show how workers whose market wages hover near their reservation wage become especially responsive to changes in the attractiveness of not working.
The discussion moves across several distinct empirical claims and their implications. Hurst presents evidence that manufacturing lost roughly 4 million jobs between 2000 and 2005, that nearly all the increase in leisure time for young less-educated men went into computer and gaming hours, and that roughly 70 percent of non-working men in their twenties live with parents—a marked rise from the early 2000s and the primary mechanism sustaining their idleness through private income effect rather than public benefits. He uses Spatial/Regional Variation as Natural Experiment to separate Supply and Demand shifts, estimates that leisure-technology improvements explain about 20 percent of the work-hour decline, and notes the striking finding that reported life satisfaction among idle young men has actually risen. The pair also touch on the puzzle of rising interregional migration barriers, the parallels to historical shifts in home production technology, and longer-term risks from automation in driving and transportation.
Hurst argues that declining employment among less-educated American men reflects two interacting forces: weak labor demand (structural manufacturing decline masked by the housing boom) and rising labor supply elasticity driven by more attractive leisure technology like video games plus family-provided income support, with young men near their reservation wage most affected.
- The housing boom masked a structural decline in manufacturing employment that began before the Great Recession
- Young less-educated men's hours fell more than older men's, with nearly all leisure increase going to video games/computer time
- Private family transfers (living with parents), not public benefits, sustain idle young men and raise their reservation-wage threshold for working
Educational and labor-market structures fail to create productive work habits and human-capital investment among disconnected youth.
- Attending college is not that helpful for labor-market outcomes if one does not graduate, a point Roberts attributes to Bryan Caplan.
“as I've learned from Bryan Caplan, and as you are pointing out, attending college is not that helpful if you do not graduate”
- The US labor market may be becoming like Europe's, with a growing share of young people not getting into the habit of working or investing in on-the-job human capital, which carries unpleasant social consequences and may be a long-run rather than short-run problem requiring urgent reform of the education system.
“it does raise the question of whether the United States' labor market is increasingly something like Europe's”
Technological displacement and lack of alternative employment pathways threaten less-educated workers in vulnerable occupations.
- If driverless cars and trucks become reality in the next 5-10 years, which is likely, another large group of less-educated workers in decent-paying driving jobs will be displaced with no obvious destination sector, predicting a continued decline in the employment-to-population ratio for low-skilled men.
“If driverless cars and trucks become a reality in the next 5-10 years, which I think they probably will, that's another group of millions of workers who find decent jobs... And those jobs might just totally disappear.”
Improved living conditions at home reduce incentives for young men to leave and establish independent working lives.
- Because houses have become larger—due to both rising wealth and artificial housing subsidies—young men living at home now get their own bedroom rather than rooming with a sibling, removing a friction that historically made staying home less pleasant and contributing to higher reported happiness among idle young men.
“since houses have gotten larger... it's easier just to live at home. And I'm not surprised that happiness levels are high.”