Jason Zweig on Finance and the Devil's Financial Dictionary
What this covers
Jason Zweig, Wall Street Journal columnist and author of The Devil's Financial Dictionary, joins Russ Roberts to examine the psychology of investing and the financial industry's incentive structure. The conversation ranges across rationality, self-restraint, financial journalism, and the lessons of the 2008 crisis, arguing that success in investing depends overwhelmingly on self-control and humility rather than information or analytical skill. Zweig contends that the financial industry profits from convincing people they cannot achieve fair market returns without expensive intermediation—a claim increasingly undermined by the arrival of Index Funds and ETFs that let investors own the market at near-zero cost.
The discussion moves through several distinct claims about human nature and market behavior. Zweig rejects the term "irrational" as unhelpful in describing investor mistakes, arguing that behavioral errors like anchoring, overconfidence, and the planning fallacy are simply human—not signs of stupidity. He notes that even experts in psychology and economics cannot escape these pitfalls, and that knowledge of them offers little protection. The conversation covers the damage caused by constant portfolio monitoring, the poor lessons taught by school stock-market contests, and the repetitive work of financial journalism, which must essentially restate the same sensible advice dozens of times yearly. Zweig also reflects on what the financial industry lost after 2008 by avoiding public reckoning—contrasting it to the regulatory catharsis that followed the 1929 crash—and argues that humility before market complexity should inform both individual investors and policymakers.
Zweig argues that successful investing is overwhelmingly a matter of self-control and humility rather than information or cleverness, and that the financial industry profits from convincing investors otherwise.
- Self-control is the single greatest asset an investor can have, more important than information speed or analytical sophistication
- Financial intermediation rests on convincing people they cannot reach fair returns without paying hefty fees
- Behavioral pitfalls like the planning fallacy and anchoring reflect basic human nature even experts cannot escape
Self-control, not information or tools, is the core driver of long-term investment success.
- If investing success is distilled to a single principle, it is self-control: well-informed principles, thorough research, and the best information are all undone by a single moment of weakness (e.g., dumping savings into a hot tip), and self-control is what made Graham, Buffett, and Munger great while most investors waste energy chasing faster information or better tools.
“I'm a huge believer that the single greatest asset any investor can have is self-control.”
- Self-control must come from family and peers and is especially difficult today because everyone carries a supercomputer in their pocket and communication and gratification feel instantaneous, making it very hard to get young people to defer rewards into the future and see deferral as good rather than bad.
“it's very difficult for young people in a world where everyone carries a supercomputer in a back pocket and communication is instantaneous. And gratification feels instantaneous.”
- The acceleration of financial information delivery has not clearly made investors better informed, and the constant minute-by-minute updating of portfolio values is psychologically harmful, encouraging destructive trading the way knowing your home's value every minute would make you anxious about your house.
“I think it's really bad for investors to have the ability to get, sort of, momentary updates on every single asset they own.”
- Good personal finance journalism is fundamentally an advice business, not a news business, and because there are very few genuinely new investment ideas that benefit ordinary investors, the job is to repeat sensible advice 50 to 100 times a year without readers or editors noticing.
“It's my job to repeat myself 50 to 100 times a year so that neither my editors nor my readers will notice I'm doing it.”
- Kierkegaard's claim that no individual can save the age but can only express that it is lost should be answered by trying anyway, because doing or saying the right thing is the only way an individual can attain dignity; in the advice business this means the goal is not to get everyone to do the right thing but to get anyone to, regardless of whether anyone listens.
“It doesn't matter whether saying or doing the right thing will make a difference; you have to try it anyway, because that's the only way that you as an individual can attain any dignity in this world.”
Investors must recognize their cognitive limitations and maintain humility about their knowledge relative to markets.
- The planning fallacy is the tendency to estimate a project's duration and difficulty based on personal experience and feelings rather than consulting the ready-made database of how long similar projects took for everyone who attempted them; this is why contractors' kitchen estimates typically end up costing 2x and taking 2x as long.
“we estimate how long it will take and how hard it will be to do based on our own experience, and also how we feel about the project, rather than doing what we should do, which is consult a ready-made database that's already available to us.”
- People who study psychology and the pitfalls of the human mind are no less prone to errors of judgment and cognition than people who know nothing about it, because these errors stem from the cognitive 'software we're born with.'
“people who study psychology and the pitfalls of the human mind are no less prone to making errors of judgment and cognition than people who don't know anything about it.”
- The term 'irrational' should be banished from behavioral economics because it functions as a tribal shibboleth dividing 'smart money' from everyone else (while the labelers commit the same errors), and because it has little real meaning: investors are not rational or irrational, they are simply human, and reconsidering a decision when something you paid $180 for becomes worth $1000 is a normal human response, not irrationality.
“Investors aren't rational or irrational. They are just human.”
- Just as people feel awe and smallness before nature at the Grand Canyon or the ocean, individuals and even policymakers are tiny compared to the financial markets and should retain the humility of being a speck of sand on a long beach, because whatever any of us knows is minuscule relative to the totality of information out there.
“individuals, and for that matter policy makers are small when we compare ourselves with the financial markets. But most of us forget that.”
Low-cost index funds and ETFs are disrupting the traditional financial intermediation model built on high fees.
- The often-cited ~9% average annual return of US stocks since 1926 was purely hypothetical for individuals and institutions until the index fund arrived in 1975-76, because reinvesting dividends across 500 stocks in perfect proportion was previously impractical and prohibitively expensive; the index fund will be judged historically as one of the greatest financial innovations.
“until 1975 or 1976, when the Vanguard Funds introduced the S&P500 Index Fund... no one, individual or institution alike, was earning that total return. It was completely hypothetical.”
- The financial intermediation industry rests on the premise that people cannot get their fair share of market returns without help and hefty fees, but the same destructive disintermediation seen in Uber and Airbnb applies to finance: with index funds and ETFs you can own the whole market at near-zero cost, so paying 3-5% up front and 1-2% annually in perpetuity is not a sustainable model in 2016 and will continue to shrink.
“the idea that you need to pay somebody 3-5% up front and then 1-2% annually in perpetuity just for putting you into something like that in the first place--I don't think that's a sustainable idea in 2016.”
Understanding behavioral finance provides insight into human nature but lacks meaningful protection against errors or creates accountability for past financial crises.
- Once a gain is unrealized profit (such as an $820 paper gain on tickets), people treat it as 'house money' they are playing with, which changes the psychological dynamic of the decision compared to spending their own original capital.
“you are playing with the house money, which changes the dynamic as well, because that $820, that's yours to play with.”
- Central banks contain genuine intellectual honesty but it doesn't always reach policy: Fed staff privately admit their forecasts are about as accurate as a coin flip, and the Fed not only cannot predict the economy but cannot even predict its own actions, often declaring policy will stay accommodative and then raising rates weeks later as new data arrive.
“the Fed doesn't even know what the Fed will do in advance. So often, the Open Market Committee will make a periodic statement... saying... policy should remain accommodative... And then three weeks later, they raise interest rates because new data become available.”
- After 2008 society missed the ritual public humiliation that followed the Crash of 1929, when the Pecora Commission forced senior bankers into public apology and some, like NYSE President Richard Whitney, served prison time; Dodd-Frank delivered thousands of pages of microscopic regulation but not the catharsis that would have benefited both the public and the industry.
“we didn't really get the level of public apology and humiliation that the financial industry had to go through in the late 1920s and early 1930s. And I think that's unfortunate.”
- While many priming experiments in social psychology involving unconscious variables fail to replicate, the core findings of behavioral economics and cognitive psychology, such as anchoring (any irrelevant number shapes subsequent numerical judgments) and overconfidence, are robust because they tap basic aspects of human nature rather than experimental artifacts.
“Things like the anchoring experiments that Danny Kahneman did in the 1970s... simply putting people in mind of any number, no matter how irrelevant, tends to shape their judgment of the number they are being asked to measure--I don't think those results go away when you try to replicate them.”
- Investors can avoid exploitation but must be intelligent consumers of information and control their relationship with Wall Street, because the people on the other side of a trade want to trade precisely because they believe they will profit at your expense, and they often know more than you do, including when you wrongly believe you know more than they do.
“the people on the other side of the trade from you are trying to take advantage of you if you let them. Because that's the main reason they want to trade with you in the first place.”
Common financial education and practices, especially stock-market contests, teach gambling rather than sound investing principles.
- The common school stock-market contest is among the worst possible lessons in investing because it rewards short horizons, encourages taking maximum risk to win a winner-take-all game unlike the real market, and even lets children use leverage and margin, effectively teaching impressionable young people to gamble rather than invest; schools would do far better teaching shopkeepers' arithmetic, basic accounting, humility, and self-control.
“the form it often takes is essentially teaching impressionable young people to gamble in the financial markets. Not to invest. Not even to speculate, but to gamble.”
- The ability to participate in financial markets at virtually zero cost is a powerful boost to capitalism, because a far greater proportion of the public now holds a stake in the economy than in the 19th century, which cannot be a bad thing even though instant information is harmful.
“the ability to participate in the financial markets at virtually zero cost is an incredibly powerful boost to capitalism”