What this covers
Alvin Roth sits down with Russ Roberts to discuss how matching markets—where what you want is not for sale at a price, but must be matched between willing parties—operate fundamentally differently from commodity markets and why they require deliberate institutional design to function well. Roth draws on decades of work redesigning kidney exchanges, school assignment systems, and labor markets to show that the key constraint in matching is not price but congestion, safety, and the difficulty of honest preference revelation when institutions create strategic incentives to lie. The conversation ranges across concrete cases: Boston's school system, New York City's 9th-grade admissions crisis, the matching of kidney donors and recipients, and judicial clerkship markets, each revealing how poor design can undermine what appear to be successful outcomes.
The discussion moves between the mechanics of market design and its philosophical stakes. Roth explains how the deferred acceptance algorithm makes strategy-proofness possible—allowing families to list their true preferences without fear of penalty—and how this simple change can reveal information (like which schools are genuinely unpopular) that had been hidden under prior incentive structures. He details the surprisingly technical problem of kidney exchange: because contracts for organs cannot legally involve payment, chains of donors must either happen simultaneously or begin with a non-directed donor, a constraint that shapes the entire logistics of transplantation. The pair also grapple with repugnance—the deep social resistance to buying and selling kidneys—and whether that resistance rests on sound concerns about coercion of the poor or reflects prejudice worth questioning. Throughout, Roth argues that free markets require rules and institutions, not their absence, pushing back against the idea that market design contradicts economic freedom.
Roth argues that many important allocation problems are 'matching markets' where prices alone cannot clear the market, and that careful market design—making markets thick, uncongested, and safe to participate in honestly—can dramatically improve outcomes, even saving lives, without abandoning the spirit of free markets.
- In matching markets you cannot simply choose what you want; you must also be chosen, so other institutions beyond price are required
- Well-designed clearinghouses (kidney exchange chains, deferred acceptance for schools) solve congestion and make truthful preference revelation safe
- Free markets require rules and social support, not the absence of design; Hayek's vision of competition presupposes well-functioning institutions
Matching markets fundamentally differ from commodity markets because mutual selection, not price alone, governs outcomes.
- In matching markets, prices work differently than in commodity markets—colleges adjust tuition freely and price plays a big role, but they do not set tuition so that supply equals demand, so other (non-price) signals must also be sent.
“in matching markets prices work differently than in commodity markets... they don't adjust the tuition so that supply equals demand.”
- In matching markets, prices alone don't clear the market because you can't just choose what you want—you also have to be chosen; this requires additional institutions like applications, interviews, offers, and acceptances rather than a single price equating supply and demand.
“a lot of the markets that I study are matching markets, in which prices alone don't clear the market. But there are other institutions to help clear them.”
- What makes matching markets distinct from commodity markets is not just multidimensional quality but that you care who you are matched with—admitting someone to a college, hiring an individual, or choosing a spouse involves a personal relationship; offers are made personally to individuals, not to the whole market, so a rejected offer requires finding someone else.
“a lot of the markets that I study are matching markets, in which prices alone don't clear the market. But there are other institutions to help clear them.”
- Commodities don't exist naturally—turning something into a commodity requires sufficient specification so that the buyer no longer needs to know who they are buying from, as illustrated by the Chicago Board of Trade creating 'No. 2 Hard Red Winter Wheat' from natural wheat.
“I say, 'God made wheat. But the Chicago Board of Trade made No. 2 Hard Red Winter Wheat.' And Number 2 Hard Red Winter Wheat is a commodity sufficiently specified that you no longer need to know who you are buying it from.”
- Even in markets that look like commodity transactions, emotional attachment intrudes—home sellers may accept less money from a buyer who loves the house than from a higher bidder who plans to demolish it, showing that emotional baggage attaches to many transactions beyond pure commodities.
“you might sell for not the most money if the person who offered the most money was planning to scrape the house and build an entirely different house.”
Making markets safe requires systems that let people reveal true preferences without strategic penalty or fear of harm.
- Boston's old system tried to give as many families as possible their first choice, using priorities (siblings, proximity, lottery) as tie-breakers when oversubscribed; this made it unsafe to list your true first choice because failing to get it could leave your second choice filled with first-choice applicants—even if you held priority there—so the apparent high rate of families getting 'first choices' masked strategic misreporting.
“that made it unsafe to tell Boston schools which was your first choice, because if you failed to get your first choice, your second choice might now be filled with people who had listed it as their first choice.”
- To serve a market well, marketplaces must accomplish three things: make the market thick (bring many participants together), deal with congestion (process all the decisions that have to be made when the market is thick), and make it safe to transact—including making it safe to honestly reveal what you want.
“to serve the market well, marketplaces have to help make the market thick, they have to deal with [congestion]... And then, they have to make the marketplace safe to transact in.”
- In New York City's old school system, schools saw applicants' full rank-order lists; principals could and did adopt policies admitting only students who listed them first, so listing a hard-to-get school first risked losing out on second/third choices that filled up with their first-choice applicants—making it unsafe to reveal your true first choice and forcing strategic listing of 'the best school you think you could get into.'
“school principals could, and did sometimes, decide on a policy that said, 'So many children are applying to our school that we will only admit children who list us as their first choice.'”
- A deferred acceptance algorithm with children proposing makes it safe to list your true preferences: if you don't get your first choice, your chance of getting your second is the same as if you had listed it first, because the algorithm tentatively holds applications, re-orders them by priority regardless of when they applied, and only finalizes acceptances at the end—removing the strategic penalty for honesty.
“if you don't get your first choice, you get your second choice, with just the same probability that you would have gotten it had you listed it as your first choice.”
Living kidney exchange overcomes legal constraints and logistical barriers through paired and chained non-directed donations.
- Because healthy people have two kidneys and can live with one, a loved one can donate, but often the willing donor is medically incompatible with their intended recipient; this creates the possibility of exchange where one pair's donor kidney is compatible with another pair's patient and vice versa, turning two failed donations into two successful transplants.
“it might be that my kidney is compatible with your patient, and your kidney would work for my patient. And so that opens up a possibility of exchange.”
- Because contracts for kidneys are legally unenforceable (the law forbids valuable consideration), pairwise exchanges must be done simultaneously to prevent one pair from donating and not being reciprocated, requiring four operating rooms; but a non-directed donor allows chains where each pair receives a kidney before giving one, so a broken chain merely disappoints rather than harms, enabling long non-simultaneous chains that overcome logistical constraints.
“the reason those don't have to be done simultaneously is each pair gets a kidney before they give one. So, if a chain is broken, it's disappointing; but it's not a tragedy for the people who didn't get a scheduled kidney.”
- Potential living kidney donors undergo a battery of tests assessing not just physiology but mental health and state of mind to detect coercion, including family dynamics; if a donor reveals reluctance, evaluators will report the kidney as incompatible to give the donor a graceful out.
“if you were to say to the people evaluating you, 'Well, you know, really, I never liked my brother... I really don't want to give him a kidney but it would be a terrible breach with my mom if I didn't,' they will report that your kidney is incompatible.”
- Despite victory after victory in expanding kidney exchange, it is a war being lost because more people are waiting for kidneys than before—partly good news (fewer traffic fatalities reduce deceased donors) and partly bad news (an epidemic of diabetes leading to kidney failure increases demand).
“I could tell you about victory after victory, it's in a war that we're losing. That there are more people waiting for kidneys today than there used to be.”
- End-stage renal disease is deadly; dialysis can sustain patients for some years but transplantation is the treatment of choice, with about 100,000 people on the U.S. waiting list for deceased-donor kidneys but only about 11,000 deceased-donor transplants performed per year, causing thousands to die waiting.
“we have 100,000 people on the waiting list for deceased-donor kidneys in the United States.”
- The US now performs about 6,000 additional living-donor transplants per year, and because deceased donors give two kidneys while living donors give one, there are now more living donors than deceased donors even though deceased-donor transplants (11,000) exceed live-donor transplants (6,000).
“those numbers mean that we more have more living donors in the United States than we had deceased donors. Even though we have 11,000 deceased-donor transplants and only 6,000 live-donor transplants. Because deceased donors give two kidneys.”
School choice algorithms solved strategic misreporting and congestion, visibly signaling failing schools and freeing withheld capacity.
- School choice divides cities into two political parties—the 'walk-to-school party' (people living near good schools) and the 'school-choice party' (people living near bad schools)—and school districts tinker with the rules year by year to balance the legitimate interests of both groups.
“school choice divides cities into two political parties: the people who live near good schools are the walk-to-school party, and the people who live near bad schools are the school-choice party.”
- School choice helps address the problem that children in poor neighborhoods are often condemned to poor neighborhood schools; by letting families choose, failing schools shrink, making them easier to fix, close, or co-locate with better schools, and revealing which schools nobody wants.
“when we send children to schools in their neighborhood, children who live in poor neighborhoods are often condemned to go to poor schools... if school choice can take place then it makes the schools that aren't working well smaller that makes them easier to fix or to close”
- Once a system makes it safe for families to reveal true preferences, the schools that no one lists as a first choice become visible signals of poor quality—information that has played a role in decisions to close schools in NYC—whereas under the old unsafe system families would falsely list nearby bad schools first, hiding the signal.
“now that there are a number of schools that have a system of school choice that make it safe for families to reveal their true preferences, they are starting to use them.”
- In NYC, principals had previously withheld capacity (claiming classrooms under renovation) to admit students 'over the counter' outside the official process; once the new algorithm gave good incentives to families and principals and they saw they couldn't gain preferred students by withholding places, those places came back into the system, effectively increasing the number of good school places allocated.
“as principals saw that it was working very well and that you couldn't get students you preferred by withholding the places... those places started to come back into the system”
- In NYC's old mail-based process, with ~90,000 students entering 9th grade, only three rounds of letters were feasible and about 30,000 students ended up administratively assigned to schools they hadn't ranked; the first year of the computerized deferred acceptance algorithm reduced unassigned students from 30,000 to 3,000.
“instead of having 30,000 unassigned students who had to be administratively assigned, they only had 3000. So it was a big improvement.”
Repugnance toward certain transactions reflects legitimate social concern about exploitation of vulnerable populations, not mere irrationality.
- Repugnance toward certain transactions is ancient, illustrated by an imagined prehistoric campfire dispute where a spouse objects to a hunter trading a rabbit (food) for an arrowhead (a stone)—suggesting unease about exchanging certain goods is a deep, recurring human reaction.
“one of the first discussions of repugnant transactions may have played out over campfire back before the beginning of history when some hunter came home with a rabbit”
- Studies of Iran's legal kidney market find it is not a happy market—donor/sellers interviewed in studies often ask for anonymity, indicating that while the sale is legal, it has not become respectable.
“It's not a happy market, in the sense that a lot of the donor/sellers who agree to be interviewed in studies ask for anonymity. So it's legal, but it hasn't become respectable.”
- Much of the repugnance toward buying and selling kidneys comes not from objection to surgeons being paid but from concern that monetary exchange will disadvantage poor and vulnerable donors through coercion or exploitation—which is why laws against kidney sale exist worldwide.
“much of the repugnance about buying and selling kidneys comes from the concern that somehow this will disadvantage poor and vulnerable donors. And that there may be aspects of monetary exchange in markets that can be coercive or exploitative.”
- While economists' first reaction is that you cannot make someone worse off by offering them money (absent coercion), if people are not perfectly rational, a large sum could dazzle a person into doing less due diligence and making a decision they would not have made with more time to think—justifying careful regulation and informed consent in any kidney market.
“if you offer me a lot of money, I might do less due diligence than I otherwise would have, if I hadn't been dazzled by the sum you offered me.”
Congestion and information problems arise when markets cannot price transactions freely, requiring alternative mechanisms.
- Restaurants charge for the meal but not the reservation, creating congestion since unlike a Broadway ticket a reservation can't be resold or given away; some restaurants are considering charging separately for the reservation or making the whole package transferable to facilitate their market.
“some restaurants are starting to think that maybe it would facilitate their market to change the way they give reservations, possibly charging separately for the reservation than for the meal.”
- When competitors can't compete on price (e.g., judicial clerk wages set by Congress), they compete by making exploding offers—offers with very short deadlines requiring yes/no before other offers can be considered—which forces commitments years in advance and prevents candidates from comparing alternatives.
“he would have gotten that job with an exploding offer--which meant that he had to say yes or no when the offer came, before he could find out what other offers might be coming.”
- Because the NYSE and Chicago Mercantile Exchange run continuous double auctions where the first to take a trade gets it, and signals travel between them in about 8 milliseconds (versus hundreds of milliseconds to blink), competition by speed has displaced competition by price; replacing continuous trading with frequent batch call-markets (e.g., once per second) clearing at the supply-equals-demand price would restore price competition over speed.
“competition by speed has to some extent displaced competition by price. Because the markets become very thin at the millisecond level.”
- A market for unused WiFi bandwidth (proposed by a company called BandwidthX) could let providers like Comcast and AT&T trade idle capacity that individuals access via cellphones; this would help cellphone providers smooth the need to build new microwave towers, making capital costs more bearable.
“There's a company called BandwidthX[?] that's trying to make a market for the unused WiFi... it would help smooth out when they need to build new microwave towers... So it would make their capital costs more bearable.”
Market design requires humility; well-functioning markets need social legitimacy and emerge from human institutions, not top-down impositions.
- Economists must approach their role as engineers with great humility because there is a lot we don't understand and economics is still an early science; market design intervenes only as understanding improves, and marketplaces like Uber and Airbnb are not top-down impositions but examples of the perennial human activity of designing marketplaces.
“economists have to approach their role as engineers with great humility. There's a lot we don't understand. Economics is still an early science.”
- What makes a market free is that it has rules that allow it to work freely—like a wheel that rotates freely not in a vacuum but on an axle with well-oiled bearings; Hayek himself distinguished deliberately creating a system within which competition works beneficially from passively accepting institutions as they are, so deliberate market design is consistent with, not opposed to, free markets.
“There is, in particular, all the difference between deliberately creating a system within which competition will work as beneficially as possible and passively accepting institutions as they are.”
- Markets require social support to function, and the question of what kind of social support markets receive is an important one economists have understudied—illustrated by Uber trampling municipal taxi regulations yet being tolerated because the prior taxi market was unsatisfactory.
“the question of what kind of social support markets get is an important one that economists have understudied, because markets require social support.”
- The emotional dimension of home sales—sellers not wanting to hear a buyer disparage their carefully chosen kitchen—may explain the persistence of realtors as intermediaries, which is otherwise hard to explain.
“That may be one of the reasons for the persistence of realtors as intermediaries.”
Kidney scarcity persists despite exchange expansion due to reduced deceased donors and rising diabetes-driven demand.
- It is against the law to buy and sell kidneys for transplant almost everywhere in the world except the Islamic Republic of Iran, where there is a legal cash market—making kidney sale far more uniformly legislated against than other uneasy transactions like commercial surrogacy.
“It's against the law to buy and sell kidneys for transplant, just about everywhere in the world. Except the Islamic Republic of Iran, where there is a legal cash market for kidneys.”