Adam Davidson on Hollywood and the Future of Work
What this covers
Adam Davidson and Russ Roberts explore how the film industry's project-based workforce—where hundreds of specialized craftspeople assemble temporarily, negotiate per-project wages, and live under continuous market signals about their value—might become the model for much of the broader economy. The conversation draws on Ronald Coase's explanation of why large firms exist at all (because using price signals is costly) and argues that as transaction costs fall and production shifts from homogeneous commodity goods toward value-added, customized offerings, the sheltering effect of the traditional corporation erodes. Davidson, who worked as a technical advisor on the film The Big Short, observes that the Hollywood Model exhibits extreme Division of Labor / Specialization—150 to 250 people in narrowly defined roles who self-organize instantly without prior meetings—and that this stands in sharp contrast to 20th-century industrial employment, where workers were deliberately kept from market information.
The discussion widens to question whether the shift toward value-added production actually requires project-based work or merely enables it. Roberts presses on whether falling transaction costs alone explain the trend, noting that Apple's Jony Ive remained in-house across multiple products. Davidson concedes much historical data runs against his thesis—job tenure has lengthened, firms remain large, and new-firm creation lags—but argues he sees something emerging others miss. The conversation also addresses distributional concerns: a Barbell Economy may emerge, with enormous returns for high-skill specialists and small, passionate businesses on one end and growing precarity for workers without marketable skills on the other. Roberts counters that gig arrangements like Uber offer genuine flexibility that many workers choose, while Davidson worries that relying solely on such income would be punishing. The talk concludes with neither speaker resolving whether the Hollywood Model represents economic destiny or merely one plausible future.
Davidson argues that the 'Hollywood Model'—where specialized, highly-skilled freelancers assemble temporarily for projects and receive continuous market signals about their value—is likely to spread through the wider economy as production shifts from cheap commodity output toward customized, value-added goods and services.
- Hollywood projects assemble hundreds of specialists who self-organize instantly, negotiate wages per-project, and are continuously priced by the market
- The 20th-century Coasean/Chandlerian firm that shielded workers from market signals was partly an aberration enabled by commodity production and high transaction costs
- As demand shifts toward customization and value-added products, businesses need continuous market sensitivity, favoring project-based, reputation-driven work
Falling transaction costs enable spontaneous assembly of talent without sacrificing quality through market signals.
- The Hollywood Model is rising for a Coasean reason—the reduction in transaction costs. When information and reputation are more easily discovered, a producer can quickly assemble the best people from anywhere without fear of disaster, so the quality once requiring in-house staff can be maintained through a more spontaneous, project-based model.
“one of the reasons the Hollywood Model is on the rise is the Coasean reason, which is the reduction in transactions costs.”
- The Hollywood Model is where Hayek and Coase come together: prices convey information (Hayekian price signals) while workers must also possess the particular circumstances of time and place—local knowledge and adaptive feel for a specific director's tastes—which they draw from past experience, and poor performance is punished by reduced future demand.
“I think of the Hayekian role of prices to convey information... there's also this--what Hayek called the particular circumstances of time and place.”
- Although a rider cannot directly select an Uber driver, the rating system functions as a market signal: customers rate drivers, and drivers who consistently earn five stars become more likely to be matched with the best customers, so a quality-discovery mechanism operates even within an opaque dispatch system.
“You rate her, you give her 5 stars, and people who continually give her 5 stars make it more likely that Uber will give her the best customers. And there are other ways that that market signal I think is working.”
Workers freely choose flexible, project-based arrangements because they value mobility and often earn more than alternatives.
- The Alliance (by Reid Hoffman and Ben Casnocha) argues that even within corporations, the lingering allure of a long-term employer-employee relationship is dying; most people don't stay on the job long, which changes incentives on both sides, and it would be better for both parties to be transparent about the relationship's likely impermanence.
“we sort of having this lingering allure of this relationship between employer and employee that is dying.”
- Roberts argues that criticism of companies like Uber misses that workers choose this arrangement freely—'how do they get people to do it if it's really so awful?'—and that many people actively like the flexibility to move in and out of work as they choose (entrepreneurs working 80 hours while waiting for funding, then stopping), owing no loyalty; the financial outcome depends on what you can earn while working, and many Uber drivers are former taxi drivers who earn more.
“But how do they get people to do it, if it's really so awful?”
The hundred-year corporate employment model may be historical aberration rather than natural or permanent form.
- The last hundred years of economic history—the corporate form and longer-term employment—may be an aberration rather than something that persists; the Hollywood Model of temporary, project-based work may represent a return to or emergence of a more common arrangement.
“perhaps the last hundred years of economic history--the corporate form and the more longer-term employment--is an aberration rather than something that would persist.”
- Roberts questions Davidson's thesis: even granting the value-added/customization shift on the output/product side, it is not obvious it implies a project-based, short-term workforce—Apple's Jony Ive remained the in-house design lead across very different products—so the move to short-term teams may be driven mainly by falling transaction costs (cheaper to assemble teams) rather than by superior effectiveness in producing output.
“What's not obviously true is that seems to me mainly on the output/product side. The question is, why is it going to be the case... that workers then... will tend to be more project based?”
Rising wealth drives demand for customized products, creating pressure for differentiated output rather than workforce structure.
- Adam Smith argued in The Theory of Moral Sentiments that man naturally desires not only to be loved but to be lovely, and that there are two ways to be loved: by being rich, famous, and powerful (which is seductive because people pay attention to such people), or by being virtuous.
“Man naturally desires not only to be loved but to be lovely. And he says there's two ways to be loved. One is to be rich, famous, and powerful. And the other is to be virtuous.”
- The value-added shift is driven not only by supply but by demand: as we get wealthier we want more choice and products more tailored to our interests, so the central question becomes how to give customers what they want—either through differentiated products or products they can tailor themselves—making customization the dynamism of the last twenty years.
“As we get wealthier we want more choice; we want something more tailored to our interests, so one way to think about this is it's all about customization.”