What this covers

Leonard Wong, an analyst at the U.S. Army War College's Strategic Studies Institute, joins Russ Roberts to discuss a structural crisis in military honesty. Wong argues that U.S. Army officers face an impossible mandate: the sum of compliance requirements—training certifications, counseling sessions, equipment checks, and paperwork—exceeds the hours available to complete them truthfully. Officers therefore routinely falsify reports, marking tasks as done when they have only been documented as done. This creates a tension at the heart of an institution that stakes its legitimacy on integrity and trust. The conversation traces how individual dishonesty, born from an impossible workload, becomes normalized through rationalization and compartmentalization, ultimately corroding the professional bonds that military effectiveness depends on.

The discussion moves through three layers of the problem. First, Wong identifies the mechanism: ethical fading, a concept from Ann Tenbrunsel, describes how dishonesty stops registering as an ethical choice when the link between action and consequence grows distant—a falsified form vanishes into bureaucracy with no visible feedback. Second, Wong and Roberts examine why the burden has grown so severe. The military almost never removes requirements, only adds them; digitization makes issuing new mandates trivially easy; and force reductions have created a zero-defect competition among officers, accelerating the pressure to appear compliant. Third, they confront the paradox that no individual requirement is unreasonable, yet their accumulation is corrosive. The conversation closes with proposals for self-correction: leaders must tolerate less than 100% compliance targets, use sampling instead of universal verification, and observe directly rather than trust statistics. Reform, Wong argues, requires the all-volunteer army itself to correct course, not external pressure from Congress.

Sharpest takeaway

Wong argues that the volume of compliance requirements placed on U.S. Army officers is literally impossible to fulfill, which forces routine dishonesty; over time this produces 'ethical fading' that erodes the trust on which the military profession depends, and only a deliberate self-correction (acknowledging the problem, reducing requirements, and leading truthfully) can reverse it.

  • The sum of mandated requirements exceeds the time officers physically have, so some must merely be reported as done rather than actually done.
  • Dishonesty is reframed through euphemisms and rationalizations ('prioritizing,' 'doing it for the troops') so it no longer registers as an ethical decision.
  • Downsizing competition and pervasive digitization accelerate the pressure to falsely report compliance, worsening the erosion of trust.

The argument · threads6 threads · 34 claims
0.85

Dishonesty arises from institutional pressure and structural impossibility rather than individual moral failing.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The Army is a strong generator of well-intentioned new requirements, continually placing more on those at the bottom, but it almost never removes any, so the cumulative burden only grows.

    “more and more of these requirements get placed on those at the bottom. But none are ever taken away.”

  • Reporting requirements are worse than 20 years ago for two reasons: the Army is a cumulative organization that almost never removes requirements even when no longer needed, and digitization makes verification far easier than the old rosters and face-to-face contact, so it is now trivially easy for any staff officer to create a new compliance requirement.

    “the army is a cumulative organization. We never take anything off... The other reason is technology--it's so much easier now to verify through digitization than in the old days”

  • When you add up all the requirements placed on company commanders, the total exceeds the amount of time they actually have to execute them, making full compliance literally impossible.

    “if you add up all the requirements, it exceeds the amount of time that company commanders have to execute them”

  • Two current factors make the dishonesty worse than before: a force downsizing creates zero-defect competition where officers fear looking bad versus peers, and pervasive digitization makes it trivially easy to demand and certify compliance instantly, so the ethical numbing is accelerating rather than improving.

    “you put in that technology being asked to verify so many things so fast along with the competition, it's a lot of pressure on the bottom officers to fall into 'Well, I'll just tell them what they want to hear.' It's not getting better. It's getting worse.”

  • The dishonest culture arises despite every requirement being well-intentioned and without any evil, dishonest, or ill-intentioned person designing it; the irony is that good intentions at every step produce a corrosive outcome.

    “There is no evil person, no dishonest person, no person with mal-intent trying to create a culture that does this. That's the irony.”

0.85

Ethical fading allows officers to rationalize false reporting as protecting troops rather than experiencing it as lying.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Through 'ethical fading'—a concept from Ann Tenbrunsel—the clear right-and-wrong dimensions of a decision recede into the background so that what is actually dishonesty (like clicking 'Agree' on documents one hasn't read, or falsely reporting compliance) stops being experienced as an ethical dilemma and instead becomes an administrative decision or 'just the way you do business.'

    “what ethical fading is, is when the moral implications, the clear 'this is right and wrong,' when all that starts fading into the background and it stops being an ethical decision”

  • The greater the distance between an action and visible consequence—such as storyboards that vanish into an unknown bureaucratic void with no feedback—the less the action is perceived as an ethical decision, which fuels ethical fading and dishonest reporting.

    “the distance from the consequence of being unethical is so far that they don't see it as an ethical decision. And that contributes to the ethical fading.”

  • Because officers see themselves as selfless servants focused on mission and troops, they rationalize false compliance reporting as 'protecting soldiers' from dumb requirements rather than as lying, creating a crack in the ethical framework that doesn't feel like one.

    “So I'm going to say that we did them. And then we'll move on and do the important things. So right there, there's a crack in the ethical framework. But we don't view it as lying. We just view it as protecting soldiers.”

  • Once you allow ethical-fading decisions—lying for ostensibly good reasons—three damaging consequences follow: there is no longer any shared standard because everyone becomes their own judge of which lies are permissible; each permitted lie becomes a precedent others cite to justify their own dishonesty (a slippery slope); and the practice masks self-interested liars among those acting for the mission.

    “as soon as you start allowing these types of ethical fading decisions, the question becomes who decides which ones are allowed and which ones aren't. Because everyone becomes an expert then. Everyone gets to judge. And then there is no standard.”

  • The Atlanta school cheating scandal is an example of the same mechanism—well-intentioned rules and pressure to deliver results led good people to convince themselves that cheating was acceptable, showing how ethics go unchecked when people rationalize wrongdoing as serving a larger good.

    “we have teachers there that felt the pressure that you need to turn these schools around. And so they convinced themselves that maybe the best way to do that is through cheating.”

0.65

Reform requires individual leaders to exercise restraint, cut requirements, and lead by direct observation rather than statistics.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The military has let the system substitute for leadership; the remedy is to lead truthfully by not over-relying on statistics and briefing charts, accepting less than 100% targets, and using sampling, audits, or sending leaders down to directly observe—just as a parent should check the child's room rather than accept the answer that it was cleaned.

    “What we've done is we've allowed the system to substitute for leadership. But the role of the leader is to go down and check.”

  • There will never be a consensus on which requirements to cut, so reform requires an individual leader to take a stand and expend political capital—for example telling a political appointee that a newly-demanded training will be deferred because now is not a good time—since the Army is built on leaders making decisions rather than waiting for agreement.

    “there will never be a consensus. And that's what--the nice thing about the army, it's built on leaders. It's going to require a leader to make a decision.”

  • The study's three remedies are: acknowledge the problem (openly admit the profession has lowered its standards), exercise restraint (senior leaders must stop creating new requirements and start removing existing ones rather than continually piling on), and lead truthfully (leaders accept less-than-100% honesty while subordinates report the truth and accept the consequences).

    “they are: Acknowledge the problem, exercise restraint, and lead truthfully”

  • Officers are required to counsel rated subordinates at the start of and every quarter of a rating period and to initial and date each session, but because doing so is hard, thousands of forms are submitted with signatures and fabricated dates for counseling sessions that never occurred—with the only constraint being to avoid dating them on a weekend.

    “nobody ever gets counseled, and yet initials get put there, signatures get put there, and dates even get put in--when I counseled the person. And it's become routine that--just put in a date as long as it's not on a weekend.”

0.59

The Army's dual identity as both a trust-based profession and a control-focused bureaucracy creates competing ethical frameworks.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The Army holds two competing identities—a profession built on trust where honesty must be near-total, and a bureaucracy demanding control and compliance—and because officers spend most of their time in the bureaucracy, the ethical fading and rationalization developed there does not simply vanish when they shift to combat, so the same honest persona must be extended across all identities.

    “the army has two competing identities. One is the profession... The other one is, the army is also a bureaucracy... we live most of our time in the bureaucracy. That's where your thought patterns and your culture gets developed.”

  • Senior officers at the Pentagon who receive compliance reports know they are not always true because they once held those lower positions and did the same fudging themselves, producing a shared façade where everyone leaves meetings satisfied despite knowing the data is unreliable.

    “We used to be there. We were not born yesterday. We used to be there. We used to do the same thing.”

  • The Army profession rests on a foundation of trust both internally and from American society, and it will cease to be a profession if it loses society's trust; the slow erosion of honesty on the bureaucratic 'dark side' threatens that foundation and must be confronted by admitting human fallibility.

    “the whole army profession is based on a foundation of trust--trust within it, but also trust of the American society. And it will not be a profession if we lose the trust of the American society.”

0.59

Organizational culture emerges from bottom-up incentives and shared facades that make individual truth-telling costly.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Like the rest of American society, the Army has become an 'audit culture' in which everything is measured and audited, leading people to routinely certify things (like reading lengthy permission notices) that they have not actually done.

    “the army, like the rest of American society has become an audit culture--in other words, we measure everything and we audit a lot of things”

  • Putting bosses and subordinates in the same discussion session would produce silence about dishonest reporting, because no one will admit in front of superiors that the briefings they gave were falsely rated green when they were really red—implying anonymity (even masks or online forums) is needed to surface honest accounts.

    “If you want a silent session, yeah, put the bosses in there with the people... who's going to in front of the bosses say, 'Yeah, all the briefings we gave, we always gave it a green; it was really red.' Nobody would say that.”

  • Organizational culture emerges from the bottom up rather than being steered from the top, with incentives that lead people to conform to a partly dishonest culture; consequently, changing it is very hard because no individual wants to be the lone person who tells the truth while the other nine stay silent, so reform requires everyone to commit simultaneously.

    “everyone has this drive to not be the one who stands up and says, 'All right, I'm going to tell the truth,' and the other 9 out of 10 people don't say anything. It requires everybody to jump on board.”

0.38

The paper's findings represent genuine institutional patterns, supported by broad data collection and adoption by senior leadership.

4 pointscentrality 2/5
  • The fact that the paper's findings, after initial hostility, came to be pushed by the highest levels of Army leadership rather than only the bottom is itself evidence that the dishonesty described is genuinely representative of the institution.

    “now it's being pushed by the highest levels of leadership, not just those on the bottom”

  • The U.S. Army War College trains 40-year-old lieutenant colonels and colonels for strategic leadership, awarding a Master's degree and preparing them to consider diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power alongside military ones.

    “they get a Master's Degree here. And what it prepares them to do is start not just looking at military but also diplomatic, informational, and economic instruments of power”

  • The data came from roughly 120 people through open group discussions rather than formal interviews, conducted with captains, majors, lieutenant colonels and colonels at various posts and at the Pentagon.

    “It wasn't really interviews. It was discussions... roughly, I'd say about 120.”

  • The shift from a draft army (a flat reflection of society) to an all-volunteer professional army brings a conscious effort to police itself, and the appropriate response to the erosion of honesty is a profession-driven self-correction rather than externally imposed correction from Congress.

    “with a professional army, there is a conscious effort to police itself... we need a self-correction. And that's part of what professions do, is they correct themselves”