What this covers

Scott Sumner, an economist at Bentley University, joins Russ Roberts to challenge a widespread interpretation of contemporary interest rates. The episode centers on a single critical error: confusing cause and effect when observing prices and quantities move together. Sumner argues that low interest rates coupled with low investment is not mysterious—it is the predictable outcome of reasoning from a price change. The conversation works outward from this foundational point to diagnose why real rates remain historically depressed, examining shifts in both the investment schedule and global savings behavior, and questioning whether savings glut language accurately describes what is actually happening in supply and demand equilibrium.

The discussion spans three distinct movements. First, Sumner establishes that interest rates are strongly pro-cyclical—they fall in recessions and rise in expansions—meaning low rates naturally accompany low investment; if easy Fed money were artificially suppressing rates, inflation would rise, yet it has not. Second, the conversation moves into structural explanations for depressed real interest rate levels, including slowing population growth, aging demographics, and the rise of high-saving Asian economies. Third, it branches into related economic phenomena: the productivity puzzle raised by Robert Gordon, the role of intangible capital and network effects in modern Schumpeterian Competition, the safe vs risky asset dichotomy that troubles inequality narratives like Thomas Piketty's, and housing regulation as an overlooked driver of inequality. Throughout, Sumner emphasizes that equilibrium rates must ultimately reflect market forces—any sustained departure would produce visible inflation or deflation, which has not occurred.

Sharpest takeaway

Sumner argues that low interest rates accompanied by low investment is not a puzzle but the predictable result of 'reasoning from a price change' — interest rates and currency values can only be interpreted once you know whether supply or demand shifted, and today's low real rates reflect a leftward shift in the investment schedule plus a rightward shift in global savings, not easy Fed money.

  • Interest rates are pro-cyclical, so low rates normally coincide with low investment, the opposite of what Shiller's 'puzzle' assumes
  • If easy money were holding rates down we would see rising inflation, which we do not
  • Over any reasonable horizon interest rates reflect market savings/investment forces, not Fed manipulation

The argument · threads6 threads · 34 claims
0.85

Interest rates equilibrate supply and demand for savings and credit, shifting both schedules.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • The Fed can temporarily lower real interest rates with expansionary policy (at the cost of higher inflation) or raise them with contractionary policy, but these effects are short-term; long-term effects eventually reverse the direction, as in the 1960s when easy money initially lowered rates but later raised them via higher inflation.

    “these effects tend to be fairly short term, and the long-term effects eventually kick in, and you get it going the other way. So, in the 1960s we had an easy money policy. But after a while interest rates actually started rising because of the higher inflation.”

  • What savers want to receive and what they are willing to accept are radically different things: if there is abundant saving and little investment, savers may be so anxious to save and so lacking in good alternatives that they accept interest rates below zero rather than not saving.

    “the question of what you want and the question of what you are willing to accept are two radically different things”

  • The right way to read today's low rates is that both schedules shift: the savings curve moves slightly right while the investment curve moves left by a larger amount, both pushing rates down, with the net effect being a little less investment and savings overall at much lower rates — and in equilibrium savings always equals investment, so 'savings glut' is misleading verbal shorthand.

    “if you shift that savings line to the right a little but, but shift the investment line to the left by a larger amount, both of those shifts will put downward pressure on interest rates.”

  • Long-run global forces — slowing population growth, aging populations, and the rise of high-saving Asian economies — are creating a savings-investment imbalance that is probably permanently or semi-permanently lowering the normal (equilibrium) rate of interest even when the economy is not severely depressed.

    “the slowing population growth, the aging population, and so on, is leading to less investment. Meanwhile, you have the rise of Asia, which includes a lot of very high-saving countries.”

  • Over any reasonable period, interest rates must reflect market forces; the Fed may set rates day-to-day, but if it held rates far from the equilibrium level for years we would see hyperinflation or hyperdeflation and strong market disequilibrium — and since we don't, the current rate must be close to the market equilibrium, not artificial.

    “no one's been able to convince me that the Fed is a magician that can make interest rates be vastly different from their equilibrium level and hold them there for many, many years without any sort of inflation or deflation side-effects”

0.73

Low rates with low investment reflects leftward investment-schedule shifts, not monetary ease.

3 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Today's low rates are not the product of easy money, because if monetary policy were truly expansionary we would observe rising inflation and overheating; instead the Fed is injecting reserves that banks simply sit on at zero interest, a defensive measure with no stimulative effect, so policy is far less expansionary than it appears.

    “It's more a defensive mechanism of the Fed injecting a lot of reserves into the banking system and the banks just sit on them because interest rates are 0%. But it's not having any stimulative effect.”

  • Interest rates are strongly pro-cyclical: they fall in recessions and rise in booms, and since investment also moves with the business cycle, low interest rates are typically accompanied by low investment and high rates by high investment.

    “interest rates are strongly pro-cyclical. They go with the business cycle. So, typically, in a recession, interest rates are very low, and in a boom period interest rates are higher”

  • If low interest rates result from a leftward shift in the investment (credit demand) schedule rather than from easy money, then less investment occurs at the new, lower equilibrium rate — fully consistent with supply and demand — so low rates accompanied by low investment is exactly what we normally observe, not a puzzle.

    “if you shift that savings line to the right a little but, but shift the investment line to the left by a larger amount, both of those shifts will put downward pressure on interest rates.”

0.59

The high-tech economy generates durable profits from intellectual property, reducing capital demand.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • High-tech firms differ from the old manufacturing economy: they often use relatively little physical capital and few employees yet have huge market capitalizations, and because their profits rest on intellectual property and network effects, outside competitors cannot easily copy them — so their high returns don't put much upward pressure on interest rates and their growth doesn't spill into macro variables the way old industrial booms did.

    “it's not obvious how outside competitors would jump in and copy e-Bay or Facebook or Google... a lot of these companies are basically based on certain sorts of intellectual property, and this is protected by patents and copyrights”

  • A growing share of corporate net worth is intangible (intellectual property) rather than physical buildings and factories; because these earnings are protected and hard to compete away, incumbent firms post strong profits while new entrants cannot expect comparable returns, so investment stays lower than the strong corporate-profit picture would normally predict.

    “a greater and greater share of corporate net worth is sort of in the intangible area... at the margin, new firms entering may not be able to expect to earn nearly as high a return and therefore you are not getting the investment that you normally would have expected”

  • The old manufacturing economy was closer to perfect competition, with prices closely tracking production costs (a $20,000 car costing $16-18,000 to make), whereas in the high-tech economy many goods sell far above near-zero marginal cost, sustained by patents and network effects that block the entry that would normally compete prices down.

    “In the high-tech economy you have many, many goods for which they sell at a certain price and the cost of manufacturing is almost zero. Then normally when that is the case you would have just tremendous competition.”

0.59

Population growth, aging, and demographics have permanently lowered equilibrium interest rates.

3 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The historical real interest rate of about 2-3% reflects the overall productivity and growth of the economy — including population growth, not just productivity — because savings can typically find opportunities that grow at that rate, illustrated by Australia having both the highest population growth and the highest interest rate among developed countries.

    “Australia typically has the highest population growth of the developed countries; and it's the highest interest rate of the developed countries. And, you know, a lot of people move to Australia; they have to borrow money to build homes there”

  • The sharp fall in interest rates toward zero in 2008-2010 was driven primarily by weakness in the economy — extremely low, even negative, nominal GDP growth in 2009 with falling inflation — which is the same mechanism that produced low rates in the 1930s.

    “interest rates falling because nominal growth, nominal GDP growth, was extremely low, even negative in 2009. And typically when that occurs and you have a deep recession with falling inflation, you get lower interest rates.”

  • Japan, with zero or falling population growth and little demand for new housing, was the first country to hit zero interest rates, partly because a shrinking-population economy offers few good investment opportunities, illustrating an inward shift of the investment schedule.

    “the first country to hit low interest rates was Japan. They are kind of the opposite of Australia. They are a 0-population growth country... they were the first to hit the 0-interest rate situation.”

0.57

Regulatory barriers—zoning, copyright, land-use rules—entrench incumbents and suppress investment.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Because the US is building far fewer houses than in past decades, much less saving is needed to finance mortgages; if people still try to save just as much, that savings floods into credit markets and puts downward pressure on interest rates.

    “if we're building far fewer houses, then there's much less need for savings to support that activity. But if people are trying to save just as much, saving just sort of floods into the credit markets and puts downward pressure on interest rates.”

  • Stricter and longer copyright protection — extended from 14 years to much longer under lobbying pressure from companies like Disney — is an artificial barrier to entry that lets firms keep prices high (e.g. Mickey Mouse toys), making consumers pay more and increasing inequality, a form of regulation people rarely recognize as such.

    “copyright laws have gotten stricter and stricter. Part of this is under lobbying pressure from companies like Disney... Copyright used to be just 14 years, and it's been extended much, much longer”

  • Strong evidence of regulatory cost exists: in places like Los Angeles, a 10,000-square-foot parcel zoned for two units is worth vastly more — by hundreds of thousands of dollars — than the same parcel zoned for one, giving a direct market estimate of what a single zoning rule costs.

    “in places like Los Angeles, if you have, say, a 10,000-square-foot piece of land that is zoned for two units rather than one unit, it's worth vastly more money in the marketplace.”

  • Building and land-use regulation worsens inequality in ways the political Left often overlooks: it reduces investment, hurts renters relative to homeowners, and imposes fixed compliance costs that favor large firms over small ones — and since studies show more inequality within large firms, shifting activity toward big firms increases inequality.

    “There's sort of a fixed cost of complying with all these complex government regulations... as those regulations more and more burdensome, they are easier for bigger firms to deal with. And studies show that there is more inequality at large firms than at small firms.”

  • The perception that US housing was overbuilt during the boom is not supported nationwide: rents have risen rapidly, often faster than incomes, building since 2008 has been very low while population grows, and in the most prosperous areas regulation makes it so hard to build that there is arguably too little housing, pushing prices and rents up and delivering high returns to landlords.

    “Rents have been rising, actually fairly rapidly in recent decades... in many of the most prosperous parts of the country you can actually argue that there's too little housing because of regulations that make it difficult to build.”

0.44

Price and currency moves have opposite meanings depending on which curve shifted.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Part of the fall in real rates may reflect a decline in the risk premium (per Bernanke): investors accept lower yields on 10-year Treasuries because they now view them as safer than in the inflationary 1970s and because Treasuries rise in value when other assets fall, making them an attractive hedge in a world full of stock and housing risk.

    “if you own Treasury bonds, when everything else is going down, like in 2008 and 2009, Treasury bonds are rising in value. So that makes them very attractive as a way of hedging risk.”

  • Interpreting the effect of a price change without identifying its cause is a fallacy ('reasoning from a price change'): a high oil price implies lower consumption only if supply fell (e.g. OPEC cut), but implies higher consumption if demand shifted out (a booming economy), so the same observed price move can mean opposite things depending on which curve moved.

    “But that's actually not the prediction of the supply and demand model. It depends on what causes the price to rise.”

  • Nominal rates were thought to have a zero lower bound because everyone could hold cash, but rates have gone slightly negative in Europe because large institutions that must park billions would rather accept a slightly negative rate than physically accumulate and store that much currency; rates still cannot go far negative before people switch to holding currency in safety deposit boxes.

    “institutions in Europe that need to park a billion dollars somewhere, they would rather take a slightly negative interest rate than to try to accumulate that much cash somewhere.”

  • A strengthening dollar can be bullish or bearish depending on its cause: in the late 1990s the dollar strengthened because of high demand for US assets during a tech boom (bullish), while in late 2008 it strengthened because monetary policy was too contractionary (bearish), so you cannot infer economic implications from a currency move without knowing the cause.

    “In the late 1990s the dollar strengthened because there was more demand for U.S. assets because we had a high-tech boom... In late 2008 the dollar strengthened because monetary policy in the United States was too contractionary”

  • It is paradoxical that the widespread worry about near-zero returns to savers coexists with Piketty's famous claim that capitalists earn ever-higher returns and worsen wealth inequality; the resolution lies in the dichotomy between safe assets (Treasuries, bank accounts) with very low returns and riskier assets (stocks, real estate) with high returns, raising the puzzle of why safe-asset savers don't move into higher-return assets.

    “this worry the people have... is occurring at exactly the same time that Thomas Piketty has become famous making exactly the opposite claim--that the capitalists are doing better and better”