What this covers
David Zetland and Russ Roberts discuss why water scarcity persists despite technological abundance. The conversation centers on a counterintuitive claim: the crisis is not one of supply or engineering but of water governance and pricing structure. Zetland argues that artificially cheap or free water creates unlimited demand that outstrips renewable supply, leading to aquifer depletion, dried rivers, and environmental collapse. The solution, he contends, is to price water according to its true scarcity cost while protecting poor households through targeted subsidies—a model that generates revenue for reliable infrastructure, allows customers to make trade-offs rather than face rationing, and has succeeded in places like Singapore and Cambodia despite skepticism in wealthy democracies.
The episode spans practical and theoretical ground. It examines how marginal value resolves the Diamond-Water Paradox, why unbundling a natural monopoly works in Scotland but not the United States, and what went wrong in Cochabamba and California. Zetland argues that utility monopolies have perverse incentives—they profit from high consumption and suffer when conservation reduces revenue—making conservation campaigns largely theatrical. He defends high prices as superior to rationing and regulation because they let each customer choose their response, whether shorter showers, drip irrigation, or relocation. The conversation also touches on governance failures in poor countries, the impossibility of desalination as a silver bullet, and the often-overlooked environmental costs of cheap water in the American West. Throughout, Zetland emphasizes that skin in the game and proper incentive design matter more than finding virtuous managers.
Zetland argues that water scarcity is fundamentally a governance and pricing problem, not an engineering or supply problem: pricing water to reflect its full scarcity cost (while subsidizing the poor) gives customers choice, funds reliable systems, and avoids the environmental destruction and rationing that artificially cheap water produces.
- Cheap or free water drives consumption beyond renewable supply, draining aquifers, rivers, and lakes
- Pricing water for scarcity sends a signal that lets customers choose how to respond, unlike nagging, regulations, or rationing
- Most failures in poor countries trace to broken governance and price caps, not lack of technology
Low water prices create perverse incentives that utilities cannot escape without revenue collapse and debt default.
- Because water utilities load their costs onto the volumetric price of water, they make money when you use water; if you conserve, revenues drop much faster than costs, which is a huge problem given their large debt -- so conservation campaigns are designed to make customers feel good without actually reducing use, since lower use threatens the bond rating that utilities prioritize.
“they are making money when you use water. And if you stop using water, you cut it back and you believe those messages, then their revenues drop much faster than their costs. And that's a huge problem given that they have millions, even billions of dollars in debt. So, what you tend to have are water conservation campaigns that are out there to kind of make you feel good, but really they don't want you to use less water. Because that's going to hit the bond rating.”
- Water systems built 50 to 100 years ago provide a subsidy from prior generations because current prices don't reflect the cost of renewing those systems, which is why infrastructure earns low grades and has serious leakages -- billions must be spent to renew them that doesn't show up in today's water prices.
“a lot of the systems have been built 50 or 100 years ago. And there's a subsidy in the sense that they are not paying prices that do not reflect the cost of renewing those systems... massive, massive billions of dollars has to be spent to renew those systems that don't necessarily show up on water prices today.”
- In cities like Cairo, the very low prices charged mean utilities cannot raise enough money to build a distribution network or treatment plant capable of meeting demand; raising prices would let demand drop and generate the revenue needed to pay for the supply network, and people who get reliable 24-7 service paradoxically first increase use then settle into using less.
“given the price that they are charging to the Cairo-eens... they don't have enough money to build a distribution network, let alone a treatment plant, that can create enough volume to create a demand at that low price. So, if you were to raise prices, you would see a drop in demand... And the additional revenue would make it possible to deliver, to pay for the supply network.”
- Setting water prices very low (as in typical Indian cities) leaves utilities with no revenue, so they serve only the urban core for limited hours, driving residents to private tanks and suction pumps that contaminate supply -- this is directly related to governments imposing a price limit on water because they think it helps the poor.
“that is, as far as I'm concerned, directly related to the government putting a price limit on water, because they think it's the proper way to help poor people.”
- The biggest water subsidies by far go to farmers through Bureau of Reclamation and Army Corps of Engineers projects where farmers paid as little as $0.10 on the dollar, plus an opportunity-cost subsidy: those with free rights to very valuable water that neighbors would pay a lot for cannot sell those rights because there is no market or because bureaucracy favors established over newer farmers.
“The biggest subsidies by far are subsidies that go to farmers in terms of projects that the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army Corps of Engineers has built. And collected $0.10 on the dollar, for example. So taxpayers are subsidizing farmers. As well as what I call an opportunity cost subsidy.”
- Water costs are endogenous, not fixed: if utilities pursue ever more expensive supply (like Las Vegas's billion-dollar Lake Mead tunnel) instead of discouraging use, that's not necessarily good -- and the higher prices often reduce demand enough that the expensive infrastructure becomes unnecessary, as happened in Australia where billion-dollar desalination plants ended up mothballed.
“the costs are endogenous. They are not writ in stone. And of course if utilities come up with more and more expensive ways to get water rather than discouraging people from using the water that we already have, that's not necessarily a good thing.”
Scarcity pricing that reflects environmental and replacement costs should govern water allocation and consumption decisions.
- Most Southern California water consumption does not include any price for environmental sustainability; including that shadow price would add significantly to the cost of water, and the absence of it is why the Colorado River no longer reaches its delta with normal flow.
“most of Southern California water consumption does not include any kind of price for what you would call environmental sustainability. And that would be something--so, that kind of shadow price would add significantly to the cost of water.”
- The diamond-water paradox -- water is extremely valuable yet sold cheaply -- was resolved by the marginal economists a century after Adam Smith: the first units of water are very valuable and people will pay a lot, but once you already have a lot of water, additional units have low value, which is how we should think about water (some uses high value, abundant uses low value).
“he talked about the diamond-water paradox--the idea that water is extremely valuable but we sell it for cheap. And that paradox, so to speak, was resolved by the Marginal economists 100 years later when they said, Well yes, the first bits of water that you get are very, very valuable and you are willing to pay a lot; but once you already have a lot of water, then the price is quite low.”
- If water markets were allowed to work for farmers, agricultural productivity would jump dramatically, and proper scarcity pricing in cities would prevent disputes like Atlanta going to court to take water from Florida -- many U.S. water problems would disappear if water were managed as an economic good.
“if we allow, for example, water markets to work for farmers then agricultural productivity would jump dramatically, and if you have proper water pricing for scarcity in cities then you would not have, for example, Atlanta going to court to try to take water away from Florida... a lot of the problems in the United States that are really good for newspaper sales would go away if we manage water as an economic good.”
- The norm of pricing water only to recover costs and not make a profit is wrong; the cost of water in terms of scarcity or replacement is a real cost that should be included in the price, even though lawyers representing high-volume users (e.g. lawns) oppose that logic.
“there's this norm of pricing water to recover costs and not make a so-called profit. And I argue that the cost of the water, in terms of scarcity or replacing the water, whatever, is a cost that should be included in the price.”
- California's water situation is getting worse rather than reaching equilibrium because consumption is ahead of renewable supply, which forces mining of aquifers and reliance on hoped-for wet years -- a gambler's strategy of doubling down that eventually leads to a wipe-out where businesses get cut off from water.
“the consumption is ahead of that renewable supply. And that means that we are mining the aquifers. That means that we are counting on wet years.”
Water consumption in wealthy regions reflects cultural preference and abundant low-priced supply, not necessity or climate.
- Real estate developers in 1920s-30s Los Angeles planted and irrigated imported palm trees to give people the feeling of moving to an oasis of water abundance, which backfired as everyone who showed up then demanded their own palm trees requiring imported water.
“a lot of palm trees were planted in Los Angeles back in the 1920s and 1930s. And palm trees are universally a symbol of the oasis and water abundance. And all these palm trees were imported and planted and irrigated to give people the feeling they were moving to an oasis.”
- San Diegans consume about twice as much water as people in Sydney and about five times as much as people in Amsterdam not because of differences in price (prices are roughly comparable) but because their demand is higher -- driven by lawns and pools, i.e. culture or lifestyle.
“That's because they have lawns.”
- Las Vegas sells water at about a quarter the price of comparable cities and has the highest consumption (220 gallons per capita per day), yet runs a Lawn Rebate Program paying people not to use water on lawns -- a high-profile conservation campaign that is more about propaganda than effectiveness.
“they sell their water very, very cheap. They sell it for about a quarter of the price of all these other cities we've been talking about. And the consumption of water is higher than all of the cities we've been talking about. They are at 220 gallons per capita per day.”
- A San Diego resident using the local average of 150 gallons per person per day at roughly $5.20 per thousand gallons pays about a dollar a day, or around $360 a year, for near-unlimited water on demand.
“San Diego citizens pay about $5.20 per thousand gallons for water”
- Water managers have a persistent supply-side bias -- they treat demand as sacred, associate growing consumption with growing wealth, prefer drilling wells to asking customers to use less, are engineers who like to build things, and must maintain reliability as politicians invite more people to use more water -- analogous to building more roads instead of pricing road use.
“In the Beginning was Demand, and water managers treated it as sacred. Modern managers keep their supply-side bias for several reasons. They associate growing consumption with growing wealth. They prefer to drill wells than ask customers to use less water. They are engineers who like to build things.”
- The Metropolitan Water District is one of the largest water utilities in the country, founded around 1929 to import Colorado River water to Southern California, with 26 member agencies; San Diego is the largest purchaser by volume but not a controlling member, leaving it dependent on Metropolitan.
“It was founded in 1929 or so, with the purpose of importing water to southern California from the Colorado River. It has 26 Member Agencies. San Diego is the largest purchaser of water by volume.”
Competition and benchmarking among utilities improve service quality and efficiency where monopoly structure allows them.
- Because water utilities are monopolies, virtual competition can be created through benchmarking -- the World Bank's IBNet reports metrics like leakage per kilometer of pipe and personnel per 1000 customers, and the Dutch Vewin association publishes four-yearly benchmarks utilities use to beat each other and show customers good performance, though US utilities decline to participate since monopolies do what they want.
“you can do benchmarking, and there's a fantastic effort being supported by the World Bank called IBNet... they are showing leakage per kilometer of pipes. They are looking at the number of personnel per 1000 customers, which tends to give you an idea of overstaffing... In the Netherlands... they have an association called Vewin, and they put out reports every 4 years benchmarking against each other.”
- Scotland's Scottish Water keeps one public utility owning the pipes and supplying water, but introduced retail competition where competing companies handle billing, customer service, and leak repair -- unbundling the monopoly into pieces where competition is possible has been a success in Scotland and is being adopted in England.
“there's one utility that owns the pipes and supplies the water. But they've got competing companies that are essentially sending bills and doing customer service and repairing leaks... they are trying to unbundle the monopoly into pieces that will allow competition. And that's been quite a success in Scotland and it's being adopted in England now.”
- Ironically, competition for urban water is easiest to find in developing countries, where unserved residents are supplied by competing tankers and purification kiosks that battle on price and quality (sometimes using microscopes to show what's in the tap versus their water), whereas in developed countries the monopoly's huge economies of scale (its immense pipe network) make direct competition very hard.
“the easiest place to look for competition for urban water is in developing countries... You can have two kiosks right next to each other, in a price battle, in a quality battle, trying to get customers... In developed countries it's a lot harder to compete with the monopoly because they have ridiculous economies of scale.”
- Water management improves when managers have 'skin in the game' -- bearing the consequences of their actions, drinking from the same tap, and facing customers who can choose a different tap; failure with no consequences (like the TVA paying its $1.3 billion in spill fines by raising customer prices) breeds poor performance, while competition forces diligence.
“I worry when failure has no consequences. The Tennessee Valley Authority, for example, spilled toxic tailwater into a river and destroyed homes in 2008. How did managers pay the resulting $1.3 billion in fines and cleanup costs? They raised prices for customers... Managers with "skin in the game" will work harder. They will be diligent about water quality when they drink from the same tap.”
- Almost all water utilities, whether investor-owned or municipal, are regulated to set prices close to their costs, which matters for those worried about gouging monopolies.
“almost all of these utilities are regulated, whether or not they are private in terms of investor-owned, or they are public, they are municipal. So, they are all regulated to have prices that are close to their costs. This is important for people that are thinking about gouging monopolies.”
Declaring water a human right distracts from solving the governance and pricing failures that prevent reliable delivery.
- Declaring water a human right is a red herring because delivering water still costs money for energy and infrastructure, giving it away free causes demand to exceed supply, and naming it a right doesn't make government deliver it -- it distracts from the more important issue of water governance.
“just because you make it a right doesn't mean the government is going to deliver it. So, it seems to be a bit of a red herring; in fact, you call it a human right, because people get distracted with laws and rights instead of bigger, more important issues like water governance.”
- Lack of access to safe drinking water causes massive waterborne disease -- contaminated water is among the leading causes of death worldwide; clean drinking water and sanitation produced the biggest public health improvements ever in the developed world a century ago, dropping child mortality, but developing countries still suffer this problem, with secondary harms like girls sent to fetch water who miss school or are assaulted.
“the biggest public health improvements ever to happen in the developed world are drinking water and sanitation... That's why all of our child mortality dropped and so on. In developing countries they still have that problem, and that's why contaminated water is the leading cause of death, as far as I recall, around the world.”
- The Millennium Development Goal for water was quietly changed from halving the number of people lacking access to 'safe' water to halving those lacking an 'improved' water source (essentially a pipe with cement around it), so countries installed 'improved' sources without ensuring water was present or drinkable; consequently the widely cited figure of about one billion people lacking safe water is really closer to three billion when measured by safe drinking water.
“let's change the goal to reduce by half the number of people who lack access to improved water source. Which means more or less a pipe with cement around it... the statistic that's widely cited is that around a billion people lack access to safe water... But it's actually more like 3 billion people, because they lack access to safe drinking water.”
Environmental damage from unsustainable water extraction is the hidden cost of cheap water and sprawling consumption.
- The California water crisis shows up first in the environment: aquifers are drained unsustainably, rivers like the San Joaquin run dry, and entire lakes like Owens Lake and Tulare Lake have been drained -- the environment has borne the brunt of water consumption to keep the taps on.
“aquifers are being drained in an unsustainable way. So, those aquifers are not going to be available--there will not be water in them when you want it. Rivers are drained--the San Joaquin River for decades has been dry... Entire lakes have been drained: Owens Lake, Tulare Lake. So, the environment has borne the brunt of our water consumption to keep the taps on.”
- Dams increase evaporation by holding water in reservoirs; Lake Nasser behind the Aswan High Dam loses roughly 12 cubic kilometers of water per year -- over 20% of Egypt's water supply, or 400 liters per Egyptian per day -- losses that are unacceptable when 40% of Cairo's 17 million inhabitants receive tap water for fewer than three hours per day.
“Dams also increase evaporation by holding water in reservoirs. Lake Nasser, the desert reservoir created by Aswan High Dam, loses roughly 12 cubic kilometers of water each year. That quantity--over 20 percent of Egypt's water supply--works out to 400 liters per Egyptian per day.”
- Desalination is not a silver bullet for California: a back-of-the-envelope calculation suggests over 500 desalination plants would be needed to replace the state's water, when it took 20 years of fighting to build just one near San Diego, and beyond massive energy and capital costs, the desalinated water still must be pumped (8 lbs per gallon) up hills, which is extremely energy-intensive.
“you'd need 500-plus desal [desalination] plants for California. And they just spent 20 years fighting to get one, near San Diego. So, that's not going to happen.”
Prices are more effective than mandates or campaigns for reducing demand while accommodating diverse conservation choices.
- Singapore charges a high water price (around $8 per thousand gallons), uses the revenue to build a highly reliable monitored system that recycles discharge into high-demand 'new water', and uses some of the money to subsidize poor households -- demonstrating that high prices and equity can be reconciled, especially since the increases under discussion (e.g. $1 to $2 per thousand gallons in Las Vegas) are trivial in absolute terms.
“They charge a pretty high price--roughly about $8 per thousand gallons. And they use that money to build a very reliable system... And then they also use some of that money to subsidize the poor households in Singapore so that they address this problem of equity that comes up all the time when people talk about higher water prices.”
- Zetland proposes 'performance insurance': requiring utilities to buy a bond/insurance against service failure (contamination, broken pipes), so the insurance company -- not wanting to pay out -- polices the utility's practices and improves service quality, an idea inspired by a TVA spill that depends on competitive, non-corrupt insurers.
“the utilities are required to buy insurance against, essentially, service failure... the insurance company, which doesn't want to pay any money, is going to be all over that utility, in terms of improving its practices.”
- Prices are superior to regulations, education campaigns, and mandated technologies for managing water because they generate revenue, reduce demand, and accommodate many responses simultaneously -- a higher price lets each customer choose their own mix (shorter showers, drip irrigation, showering at work, or simply paying more), which is more pleasant than shortages or tickets from water cops.
“Prices send a direct signal at the same time as they accommodate many responses. Customers can choose their own mix of technologies and techniques. Some will take shorter showers. Others will install drip irrigation... A higher price for water, like a higher price for any commodity, allows people to choose how much water to use. Choice is a pleasant option compared to water shortages or tickets from water cops.”
- Under 'postage stamp' pricing, new suburban communities are charged the same average water price as existing customers rather than the marginal cost of their additional demand and network extension, so existing customers end up subsidizing growth -- even free-riding works in reverse, with the new system expansion cost spread across all existing customers, encouraging sprawl.
“those new communities are not paying the marginal cost of their additional demand, or even the additional network reaching into that community. They are paying an average cost for the entire network. Which tends to mean that the existing customers are subsidizing growth for the new customers.”
Reliable 24-7 pressurized service with proper pricing can be achieved even in poor corrupt countries by enforcing payment and accountability.
- When public water systems supply only a few days or hours, households build massive private infrastructure (tanks and cisterns) and use suction pumps that create negative pressure in the mains, sucking in sewage from cracks and contaminating supply; moving to 24-7 pressurized service dramatically improves water quality and actually reduces consumption because people can get water whenever they want.
“they are going to have suction pumps that they drop into the mains that will try and suck out as much water as is there when it's around. This tends to create negative pressure, which sucks in sewage from all the cracks in the mains... when they go onto a 24-7 pressurized system, not only does the water quality increase dramatically... but also they end up using less water because they can get it whenever they want to.”
- A new general manager at the Phnom Penh Water Authority in Cambodia -- one of the world's poorest and most corrupt countries -- transformed the utility by insisting on payment (even from the army at gunpoint), firing corrupt staff, rewarding competent ones, expanding service to slums, and lowering prices for the underserved who had been buying truck water at ten times the official price, demonstrating that broken systems can be fixed even though relying on individual virtue is unreliable.
“he insisted on getting paid for the water. So, the army had not paid its bill for years... the guy put a gun to his head and said, 'The army doesn't pay.' And the guy said, 'I'm a good Buddhist; do what you have to.' And then the guy rolled, and he paid... not only did they expand that system to the slums in Phnom Pehn, but they also lowered the price of water, especially to the people who were under-served.”
Privatization failures like Cochabamba show governance and regulation matter more than public versus private ownership.
- The Cochabamba, Bolivia water privatization of the 1990s -- pushed by the World Bank, awarded to a single-bidder consortium including Bechtel that demanded control of all water supply (giving rise to the phrase 'they privatized the rain') -- failed not because of private vs public but because the governance system was broken; the deeper lesson is that improving the world is hard because regulators with monopoly power, if incompetent or corrupt, doom either arrangement.
“the consortium said, 'We need to control all the water supply.' Where is where we got that expression, 'They privatized the rain.'... So, that's [?] public-private public failure. The worst nepotism and corruption you can think of.”