Benn Steil on the Battle of Bretton Woods
What this covers
Benn Steil of the Council on Foreign Relations discusses the 1944 Bretton Woods conference with EconTalk host Russ Roberts, challenging popular accounts of how the postwar international monetary system came to be. The conventional story credits John Maynard Keynes with shaping the resulting institutions—the IMF and World Bank—but Steil argues that Harry Dexter White, the US Treasury architect, won every major negotiation and designed a system that entrenched American monetary dominance. The conversation centers on how the conference reflected a fundamental power struggle between the world's largest creditor (the United States) and its largest debtor (Britain), with Britain's position having inverted dramatically from the eve of World War I, when it held vast reserves, to 1944, when it faced near bankruptcy.
Steil traces how White used America's control of two-thirds of global monetary gold to make the dollar the sole equivalent to gold, defeating Keynes's proposal for a new supranational currency called Bancor. He argues that the IMF proved largely irrelevant to postwar recovery, sitting idle through the late 1940s and 1950s while the Marshall Plan and the European Payments Union actually drove European revival. The discussion reveals White's character—a political romantic obsessed with besting Britain and advancing a Soviet-sympathetic agenda while designing harsh terms that exploited Britain's desperation. Steil also explores how the creditor-debtor framework explains current geopolitics: the US now occupies Britain's old position as a debtor facing a creditor surplus nation in China, leading American officials like Tim Geithner to adopt positions on balance of payments management that mirror Keynes's wartime arguments almost exactly.
Steil argues that Bretton Woods was fundamentally a power negotiation between the world's largest creditor (the US) and largest debtor (Britain) in which Harry Dexter White entrenched the dollar's supremacy, and that the institutions it created (especially the IMF) were largely irrelevant to postwar recovery, which was actually driven by the Marshall Plan and European Payments Union.
- White used the US's two-thirds control of monetary gold to make the dollar the sole gold-equivalent, defeating Keynes's Bancor proposal
- The IMF was effectively mothballed through the late 1940s and 1950s; recovery came from the Marshall Plan and European Payments Union
- The creditor-debtor positions explain why the US's modern stance toward China mirrors Britain's WWII-era position
White's personal political passions and Soviet sympathies drove his design of an architecture favoring US dollar dominance over alternatives.
- Harry Dexter White was a Soviet spy who copied classified documents and passed information to Soviet agents, but he did it out of misplaced admiration for Soviet economic success rather than for pay, though there is evidence he accepted some gifts and that the Soviets agreed to fund his daughter's education.
“He was certainly passing documents. He copied classified documents. He wrote down classified information that he was privy to at meetings and passed them on to his conduits, both American interlocutors and to Soviet agents”
- Harry Dexter White was a political romantic whose political passions always came first, who saw economics as a tool to advance his political agenda, was fascinated by the Russian Revolution and Soviet state economic planning, and was obsessed from 1934 onward with besting Britain at a future international monetary conference.
“Harry Dexter White was a man whose political passions always came first, and his economics he saw as a tool to advance his political agenda.”
- White, while engaging in freelance pro-Soviet diplomacy, was also strongly anti-imperialist and determined to force the liquidation of the British Empire after the war, which shaped the Treasury's insistence that Britain end imperial trade preference.
“he was very much against the old European imperial powers... And he was determined to force liquidation of the British Empire after the War.”
- Keynes wanted the US dollar to have no special role in the postwar monetary architecture and proposed a new supranational currency called Bancor that he hoped over time would supplant the dominant international role of the dollar; White and the Americans refused, instead wanting to give the US an even more privileged role than it held in 1944.
“He had proposed a new supranational currency which was to be called Bancor, which he hoped over time would come to supplant the dominant international role of the U.S. dollar.”
- The Americans were in a powerful negotiating position because the US controlled about two-thirds of the world's monetary gold reserves, which let White use a number of ruses to have the US dollar—and only the dollar—declared the equivalent of gold for the operations of the new IMF.
“they were in a powerful negotiating position because of the fact that the United States at the time controlled about two-thirds of the world's monetary gold reserves.”
Gold standard mismanagement in the 1920s and dollar scarcity in the 1930s-40s created the monetary chaos Bretton Woods aimed to solve.
- When countries returned to the gold standard in the 1920s they abandoned the 'Golden Rule of the Gold Standard'—raising rates when gold flowed out and lowering them when it flowed in—and the US and France in particular sterilized (hoarded) gold inflows, which destroyed the natural correspondence between money and gold flows that had previously alleviated global imbalances, creating grievous problems for Britain.
“in the 1920s, countries were no longer obeying what you might call the Golden Rule of the Gold Standard. That is, when gold flowed out, they did not raise interest rates; when gold flowed in, they did not lower interest rates. The United States and France in particular were "sterilizing" gold inflows.”
- From the US Treasury's economic-determinist view, Britain's exit from the gold standard in 1931 set off a series of currency and trade wars that spread the Great Depression globally and created the environment of misery and anger that paved the path to aggression for Hitler and Mussolini.
“it was Britain exiting the gold standard in 1931 that set off a series of currency and trade wars that spread the Great Depression globally and created the environment of misery and anger that paved the path to aggression for the European dictators, Hitler and Mussolini.”
- As the dollar became the only credible surrogate for gold during the 1930s-40s, countries without significant gold or dollar reserves were forced into barter—exchanging commodities for fixed amounts of finished goods—which is highly inefficient, and this mad scramble for gold and dollars was one of the causes of the collapse in international trade.
“the monetary chaos of the 1930s, as you had this mad scramble for gold and dollars was one of the causes of the collapse in international trade.”
Bretton Woods rested on four foundational misconceptions about empire, Soviet cooperation, Germany, and multilateral lending that collapsed by 1947.
- Morgenthau and White brought four foundational ideas into Bretton Woods—that the British Empire could be peaceably dismantled, that the Soviet Union could be co-opted into a permanent peacetime alliance, that Germany could be deindustrialized and reduced to an agricultural nation, and that a multilateral trading system could be built by making short-term loans to deficit countries—and by 1947 all four turned out to be completely misconceived.
“There were really four major foundational ideas that Morgenthau/White brought into Bretton Woods... Now, all of these things turned out to be completely misconceived.”
- The Morgenthau Plan, whose actual blueprint was written by Harry Dexter White, aimed to deindustrialize Germany and return it to an agricultural nation; Morgenthau was repeatedly warned by the War and State Departments that this would cause mass starvation and impose enormous costs on the US, but he dismissed the warnings, and by 1947 US policy reversed 180 degrees to rebuild West Germany as an industrial bulwark against Soviet expansion.
“This was the Morgenthau plan for post-War Germany, restoring to return Germany to an agricultural nation.”
Britain was coerced into accepting harsh terms and dollar dominance by US leverage, transforming it from creditor to debtor nation.
- Keynes's most conspicuous diplomatic weakness was that he had a vested personal interest in the Bretton Woods agenda—wanting to be known as the man who overthrew the gold standard—so he rejected viable alternatives (borrowing from Canada, the Export-Import Bank, or a $3 billion private offer from New York bankers) that could have spared Britain the harsh American terms.
“this, I think, was perhaps Keynes's most conspicuous weakness as a diplomatic--that he really had a vested interest in the Bretton Woods agenda.”
- Britain's debt-to-GDP ratio went from about 25% on the eve of WWI to about 250% by Bretton Woods, transforming it from the world's largest creditor nation into the world's largest debtor nation.
“On the eve of WWI, Britain's debt-to-GDP ratio was about 25%. By the time we get to Bretton Woods it was about 250%. So, Britain had gone from the world's largest creditor nation to the world's largest debtor nation.”
- When Keynes sought a postwar gift from the US in 1945, the Americans instead offered a loan that Keynes was forced to accept against his advice to his own furious government, and that loan was only finally paid off in 2006.
“This loan was ultimately paid off--you know when, Russ?... 2006.”
- Although Churchill called Lend-Lease 'the most unsordid act,' it came with objectionable conditions devised by the US Treasury—exploiting Congress's demand for 'consideration'—including ending Britain's imperial trade preference, making sterling fully convertible at an overvalued rate by July 15, 1947, and accepting the dollar as the foundation of the postwar order; the convertibility date effectively marked Britain's bankruptcy.
“the three things the Treasury demanded were, first, that after the War, Britain would have to end imperial trade preference... Second, it would have to make the pound sterling once again fully convertible into U.S. dollars at a fixed and overvalued exchange rate, on a fixed date after the War.”
The IMF remained operationally inert for years while the Marshall Plan and European Payments Union, not Bretton Woods, actually revived Europe.
- The symbolism of 44 allied nations agreeing on a grand new architecture was powerful, but very little of it became operational after the war—IMF directors in 1949 and 1952 lamented that inconvertible currencies and barter were worse than in the 1930s—so the conference's importance was largely symbolic rather than functional.
“the IMF directors in 1949 and again in 1952 issued official statements lamenting the fact that the problem of inconvertible currencies and countries resorting to barter was actually worse than it was in the 1930s.”
- The IMF was effectively mothballed by the Truman Administration and did nothing for the rest of the 1940s and most of the 1950s; the European economy was actually revived by the Marshall Plan (grants rather than loans) and multilateral trade within Europe by the European Payments Union in 1950—not the IMF—so Bretton Woods deserves no credit for the economic successes of the 1950s.
“the IMF was basically mothballed by the Truman Administration. It did nothing for the rest of the 1940s and for most of the 1950s. It was the Marshall Plan that began to revive the European economy and it was the establishment of the European Payments Union in 1950 that began to revive some form of multilateral trade within Europe. It was not the IMF.”
- The monetary system White designed could not be said to have started until 1961, when the first 9 European countries finally met the convertibility requirements of IMF Article 8—17 years after the conference—and by then the system was already under extreme strain as the US lost gold reserves.
“the Bretton Woods monetary system, the system set up by Harry Dexter White at Bretton Woods could not really be said to have started until 1961, because it was only in 1961 that the first 9 European countries met the convertibility requirements of IMF Article 8.”
- The IMF today is essentially a crisis fire-fighter, a role both Keynes and White would have vehemently objected to; neither wanted it to deal with crises—it was supposed to prevent them, with countries at the source of crises expected to change their own domestic policies—so the IMF's modern power rests on a blueprint wholly different from the one established at Bretton Woods.
“the institution that the IMF is today was never one that was envisioned by Keynes or White... essentially a crisis fire-fighter. Neither Keynes nor White ever wanted the IMF to play a major role in dealing with crises. It was supposed to be an institution that would help prevent crises.”
The Morgenthau Plan became Hitler propaganda, and White's postwar spy activities were eventually covered up by placing a European at IMF helm.
- The Morgenthau Plan, announced during the war, was a huge propaganda coup for Hitler and Goebbels, who used it to convince German troops they would be enslaved and starved after defeat, and many US commanders believed the war lasted longer with more US casualties because of it.
“The Morgenthau plan was a huge propaganda coup for Hitler and Goebbels. They used it relentlessly to motivate the German troops”
- The convention that a European heads the IMF exists only because, after J. Edgar Hoover warned Truman that Harry Dexter White was a Soviet spy, Truman quarantined White as US Executive Director rather than Managing Director and had Treasury Secretary Vinson decline the IMF leadership for the US under cover of 'graciousness'—so the Bretton Woods leadership tradition is a legacy of Truman's effort to cover up the White spy scandal.
“the only reason why a European still continues to head the IMF to this day is because of President Truman's efforts to cover up the growing White spy scandal.”
- The FDR and Truman Administrations insisted the IMF and World Bank be located in Washington rather than New York to keep bankers away from the system—Morgenthau said he wanted to move the financial center of the world from London and Wall Street to the US Treasury, an explicitly anti-banker agenda.
“he said, 'I wanted "to move the financial center of the world from London and Wall Street to the U.S. Treasury".'... This is very much an anti-banker agenda.”
- The World Bank, originally the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development with 'reconstruction' deliberately before 'development,' was mainly meant to finance Europe's postwar reconstruction; its development function was tacked on as a compromise because Latin American nations objected to using their scarce dollars to rebuild Europe, and development eventually became its dominant role.
“a number of nations, particularly those in Latin America, objected to having their scarce dollars put to use reconstructing Europe, and that was part of the reason why the development function of this institution was tacked on.”
- A country's position on the international monetary system depends on whether it is a creditor or debtor—'where you stand depends on where you sit': the US took a creditor-friendly position at Bretton Woods, but today, as the world's largest debtor facing creditor China, the US takes almost exactly the position Keynes and Britain took during WWII (e.g., Geithner's 2010 proposal to cap persistent current account surpluses mirrors Keynes's proposal to penalize creditor nations).
“So, where you stand depends on where you sit.”
- White structured the IMF so countries would contribute gold, securities, dollars, and limited domestic currency to a pool used to finance countries running temporary balance-of-payments deficits, the goal being to stop deficit countries from erecting trade barriers that would make it harder for the US to export.
“What White was trying to achieve was to stop those countries' running balance of payments deficits from erecting trade barriers and making it more difficult for the United States to export.”
Keynes's preference for stable rates and a supranational currency lost to White's agenda, though Friedman later vindicated alternative monetary paths.
- Contrary to mythology, Keynes was not in favor of floating exchange rates—he favored stable rates with British autonomy and argued passionately against postwar British devaluation, which proved a huge mistake since Britain's financial problems dissipated quickly after it devalued by 30% in 1949; flexible exchange rates were Milton Friedman's idea, not part of the Bretton Woods debate.
“He was not in favor of fluctuating exchange rates. He was in favor of stable exchange rates... he argued very, very passionately against British devaluation after the war, which turned out to be a huge mistake, because when Britain did wind up devaluing by 30% in 1949, its financial problems started dissipating very, very quickly.”
- White insisted that if the day ever came when the US could not credibly back its currency with gold, the international role of the dollar would be finished; Milton Friedman thought this was nonsense, and the post-1971 era—despite its difficulties and being far from a perfect system—bore Friedman out.
“Harry Dexter White said that this could never happen... But he insisted that should that day ever come, the international role of the U.S. dollar would be finished. Of course, Milton Friedman thought this was absolute nonsense, and I think the post-1971 era... really bore him out.”