What this covers

Paul Sabin of Yale discusses his book The Bet with host Russ Roberts, using the famous 1980 wager between Paul Ehrlich and Julian Simon as a lens for examining how environmental debates became polarized and what each side got right. The conversation examines not just who won—Simon did, when commodity prices fell over the decade—but why a single bet proved almost nothing about the underlying questions of resource scarcity, human ingenuity, and what we actually value as a society. Sabin argues that framing resource questions as simple yes-or-no survival questions obscures the real terrain: both markets and human creativity have solved real problems, yet both have hard limits when facing externalities like climate change.

The discussion ranges across several distinct claims. Ehrlich and Simon disagreed fundamentally not about whether markets work but about values—Ehrlich viewed humans as one creature among many with limited claims on resources, while Simon put people first and measured progress by their numbers and prosperity. Sabin notes that Price Signal and Substitution solved population-driven scarcity for metals and food, yet cannot solve climate change, which remains external to market incentives absent policy intervention. He also critiques both intellectuals for reinforcing polarization rather than listening—a structural problem in public discourse where combativeness gets rewarded over nuance. The conversation also examines why the environmental movement's genuine policy victories came on concrete problems like air and water pollution, not on apocalyptic predictions of imminent collapse, and how Tribal/Group Identity Bias keeps both doomsayers and cornucopians from integrating what the other side sees clearly.

Sharpest takeaway

Sabin uses the Ehrlich-Simon bet to argue that resource scarcity is not a simple yes/no question of survival but a question of social values, and that both the doomsayer and the cornucopian camps fail society by refusing to integrate each other's genuine insights.

  • Commodity prices over a century show no linear relationship between population and scarcity, so a single 10-year bet proves little
  • Markets and human ingenuity solve some problems (population, substitution) but cannot, by themselves, mitigate external global problems like climate change
  • Both Ehrlich and Simon were combative intellectuals who reinforced polarization rather than listening to dissonant views

The argument · threads6 threads · 30 claims
0.85

Ehrlich predicted imminent catastrophe through biological overshoot models, diverging fundamentally from Simon's faith in perpetual innovation.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Unlike Malthus, Ehrlich and his contemporaries made adamant predictions of imminent catastrophe—massive famines sweeping the world by 1975, running out of oil by the early 1980s, and millions of deaths—predicting disaster within 5 to 15 years rather than centuries away.

    “There was a book called Famine, 1975! about massive famines that were going to sweep the world by 1975. That we were going to run out of oil by the early 1980s. So it was about imminent decline.”

  • Ehrlich's 1968 The Population Bomb argued that population growth would lead to food scarcities, famines, possibly thermonuclear war, and spread of disease, applying a biological population-overshoot-and-crash model observed in other species to human society.

    “his 1968 blockbuster book called The Population Bomb, which warned that over-population, population growth, was going to lead to food scarcities, famines, possibly thermo-nuclear war, spread of disease”

  • The core divergence is over the shape of history: Simon held that past centuries of falling prices and innovation will continue into the future, while Ehrlich held a linear view that we are ending a one-time phase of fossil-fuel-driven abundance and living on nature's capital rather than its interest, so past success cannot be projected forward.

    “we are essentially living on the capital rather than on the interest of nature's capital on the planet and that just can't be sustained. That it's been a one-time boom that is going to come to an end.”

  • Ehrlich was paradoxically both deeply pessimistic and optimistic: he predicted disaster not merely to be proven right but because he believed warning people in time could still avert catastrophe, which is why he stayed active in the public sphere.

    “he's actually very optimistic because he believes that something can still be done about these problems. And that was why he continued to be active in the public sphere.”

  • Simon argued that scarcity raises prices, which calls forth innovation, substitution, and new development that then lowers prices, so resources are not finite because human ingenuity—the 'ultimate resource'—continually creates new resources and substitutes.

    “scarcity leads to higher prices; higher prices lead to a call for more innovation, for more substitutions or other kinds of new developments, and that then the prices would go down”

0.71

Both Ehrlich and Simon erred by projecting infinite futures instead of addressing underlying values about resource distribution and human claims.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Rather than siding entirely with either, society should learn from both: take seriously the economists' insights about market adaptability and the power of incentives, while crediting scientists like Ehrlich for identifying genuine threats (nuclear fallout, CFCs and ozone, climate) that society could then act on—developing a more integrated way of thinking.

    “what we all need to do is figure out how to bring these ideas together and develop a more integrated way of thinking about environmental and economic problems.”

  • Whether the planet can sustain its current billions is less a yes/no survival question than a question of values—what does it take to sustain that many people, how we want to live on the planet, and what kind of world we want to create—because both Ehrlich and Simon erred by projecting into the infinite future rather than addressing the values at stake.

    “this becomes much more of a question of values. It's about: How do we want to live on the planet and what does it take to sustain the number of people than we have, rather than kind of the either/or: Can we sustain them or not?”

  • Where populations grow fast but economies fail to keep up in productivity, Simon would argue the principal problem is not population growth but the absence of rule of law and property rights, which prevents people from keeping what they earn, investing, and building up the economy.

    “the principle problem there is not one of population growth but is one that has to do with the rule of law of property rights and the ability of people to be productive, to keep what they earn”

  • A characteristic problem of contemporary intellectual life is that both sides of polarized debates stay with their own group, fail to hear the genuine insights in opposing views, and do too much talking and too little listening—reinforced by group identity—which prevents pragmatic discussion of major challenges like climate change.

    “the tendency of both sides in the polarized country to stay with their own and not listen very well to the viewpoints of the other side... there is not much listening and there's too much talking going on”

  • Their disagreement was not only about whether markets work but about values: Ehrlich viewed humans as one of many creatures with a partial claim to earth's resources, favoring balance and humility, while Simon put 'people first,' measuring societal success by the number of people living productive lives and favoring human claims over those of other creatures.

    “Ehrlich has tended to have a view of humans as one of many creatures on earth... Simon's view was really about: people first.”

0.53

Climate change differs from population because markets cannot internalize external costs without deliberate societal mechanisms.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Climate change is not analogous to population growth because population pressures could be answered within the economy through many market substitutions, whereas climate change is largely external to the economy, so absent a societal mechanism to internalize it, markets can only drive adaptation to its effects, not mitigation of the problem itself.

    “climate change is external to the economy to a large extent, and so without some societal force to bring into the economy, there are really no market pressures that are going to be brought to bear except in the area of adaptation”

  • Optimism becomes Pollyannaish when high confidence in market processes leads people to deny a problem exists, because it is precisely the worry about and recognition of problems that mobilizes the market forces and ingenuity that produce solutions—so denying climate change holds back the very market response that could solve it.

    “it's actually the worrying about the problems and the concern about the problems that often generates the kinds of solutions that people like Simon have celebrated”

0.52

Commodity prices poorly measure population impact because multiple independent factors drive prices regardless of demographic pressure.

4 pointscentrality 3/5
  • A bet over commodity prices is a poor proxy for population's impact because so many factors—labor strikes, war, market cartels, technological substitution—shape prices, so population and commodity prices do not move in lock step even though population is not entirely without impact.

    “a bet over commodity prices is really not a very good proxy for anything. That, because there are so many factors that come to bear--whether it's labor strikes, war, market cartels”

  • Across rolling ten-year windows from 1900, Ehrlich would have won the metals bet about 63% of the time, showing that a single bet is a misleading proxy for the larger argument—though that figure is itself skewed by the post-WWI price plunge and slow recovery.

    “if you were to go back and redo the bet from 1900 to 1910... every 10-year period, Ehrlich actually would have won the bet 63% of the time”

  • Ehrlich lost partly because commodity prices were at a historically high peak at the end of the 1970s, making it a poor time to bet on continued price increases, and because specific developments—fiber optic substitution for copper, resolved labor strikes, and the collapse of an international tin cartel—drove prices down independently of population.

    “they had made their bet at a historically high moment in commodity prices at the end of the 1970s, so it was a supremely poor time in retrospect to take Ehrlich's side”

  • Ehrlich's group chose a bundle of five metals (nickel, tin, tungsten, chromium, copper) worth $200 each in 1980, betting on whether their inflation-adjusted prices would rise or fall over ten years; by 1990 the prices had fallen about 50% on average and Ehrlich paid Simon $576.07.

    “they selected five metals... nickel, tin, tungsten, chromium and copper... they would wait for 10 years to see whether the prices of those metals had gone up or down, and the loser would pay the difference”

0.40

Environmental movement achieved tangible improvements in air, water, and toxics through pragmatic market-based tools, not apocalyptic rhetoric.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • The environmental movement's real policy successes of the late 1960s and 1970s were not on population or resource scarcity but on pragmatic problems—air pollution, water pollution, land and forest management, and toxics—using tools like taxes and emissions credits, leaving open the historical question of how the apocalyptic rhetoric related to these incremental advances.

    “The policy successes of the environmental movement tended to focus more on air pollution, water pollution, land management questions about how to manage the national forests, toxics and things like that. So they were actually in a much more pragmatic zone of activity”

  • On the pragmatic level of air and water pollution, the environmental community contributed substantially to improving Americans' quality of life and cleaning up air and water at much, much less cost than critics of those regulations had feared.

    “the environmental community has really contributed a tremendous amount to improving the quality of life for Americans and cleaning up the air and the water at much, much less cost than was feared by many critics of those regulations”

0.32

Cultural polarization prevents pragmatic problem-solving as ideological tribes ignore opposing views that contain genuine insights.

3 pointscentrality 2/5
  • Carter embraced Ehrlich's sensibility of limits—centering energy scarcity, symbolically wearing sweaters and turning down White House heat—while Reagan lined up with Simon, denouncing the Limits to Growth authors and the Global 2000 report and invoking pesticides and fertilizer as evidence of human capacity to produce more.

    “Carter was a real believer in Ehrlich's point of view, the threat of scarcity. He really put energy policy... at the center of his Presidency”

  • Ehrlich appeared on Johnny Carson's Tonight Show more than 20 times, unusual for a biologist, in part because Carson himself sided with Ehrlich's view that population growth was a significant problem.

    “I think it was maybe more than 20.”

  • It can be easier to be critical of people on your own side or who share your values than of opponents, because shared values make their reasoning more legible to you when you are trying to explain what you see.

    “In some ways it's actually easier to be critical of folks on your own side or who share values with you than it is”