Jagdish Bhagwati on India
What this covers
Jagdish Bhagwati of Columbia University joins Russ Roberts to discuss India's economic trajectory since 1991. The conversation centers on how sweeping dismantling of industrial licensing and trade restrictions reshaped the Indian economy, roughly doubling its growth rate and lifting roughly 200 million people out of poverty. Bhagwati argues that this transformation was endogenous—a change of minds from within India, not imposed externally—and that the reforms, once begun, accelerated rather than reversed. Against this empirical record, he develops an argument about sequencing: that Growth-First Sequencing must precede expanded social spending because only growth generates the revenue to make such spending sustainable without causing inflation.
The discussion ranges across how growth operates on poverty, what it means to compare direct foreign investment flows before and after reform, and whether India's degree of openness to trade is optimal. Bhagwati distinguishes his position from Pull-Up vs Trickle-Down, arguing that growth creates opportunities for the poor to escape feudal structures rather than merely redistributing gains. He challenges the assumption that public provision of services like education is inherently superior, invoking the Sen Fallacy and the need to Compare Reality to Reality between public and private alternatives. He also contests Amartya Sen's historical positions on trade liberalization and direct foreign investment. The conversation becomes notably contentious on fiscal sustainability: Bhagwati argues the Food Security Bill risks inflation by expanding spending ahead of revenue, and disputes claims that Indira Gandhi's earlier policies had already begun meaningful reform in the 1980s.
Bhagwati argues India's 1991 reforms ushered in growth that pulled hundreds of millions out of poverty, and that growth must precede expanded social spending because it generates the revenue that makes such spending sustainable rather than inflationary.
- The 1991 dismantling of industrial licensing and trade/investment restrictions roughly doubled India's growth rate
- Growth is a 'pull-up' strategy that gives the poor opportunities, not a 'trickle-down' strategy
- Spending ahead of revenue growth (e.g. the Food Security Bill) risks inflation and fiscal imbalance
Socialist controls and import-substitution ruined India's economy; 1991 reforms removing licensing and opening trade proved far superior.
- Indira Gandhi's turn to socialism in the late 1960s—including nationalizations done through Parliament rather than executive action, making them hard to reverse—introduced extremely populist and socialist policies that ruined the Indian economy over roughly a decade.
“those 10 years basically ruined the economy in a very big way”
- Critics who claim growth predated the 1991 reforms are wrong: pre-reform 1980s growth came near the end of the decade as some tariffs were already being reduced, but it was modest 'inching' (around 5%) versus the 'blitzkrieg' reforms of 1991 that pushed growth closer to 8%.
“if you take the entire decade, it's true it is more like 5%; but after that, 1991, we get something closer to 8%. So there is a huge escalation afterwards”
- India's import-substitution and control regime was not adopted as a deliberate theoretical embrace of protection or regulation, but slipped into accidentally as a poorly-handled response to balance-of-payments crises that should have been managed through the exchange rate.
“it wasn't a theoretical approach which led to our import substitution policies, but simply a side-effect of the fact that we weren't handling the balance-of-payments crisis effectively”
- The most important 1991 reform was sweeping away virtually the entire industrial licensing system, which had blocked both domestic entry and foreign entry, producing monopoly rents and preventing economies of scale—exemplified by three car plants each making only 10,000 cars under guaranteed automatic protection.
“The most important was sweeping away the entire industrial licensing system. Virtually all of it. This is the biggest problem we had, because we had no competition as a result”
- After the 1991 reforms India never looked back: the economy took off, doubling and then escalating the growth rate to roughly 8.5-9%, compared to 3.5-4% over the previous 25 years.
“after 1991 we never looked back, because the economy took off in a very big way, doubling the growth rate and escalating it till it reached about 8.5-9%, compared to 3.5%, at most 4% in the previous 25 years”
- Under its inward-looking, autarkic regime India was the only country that over two decades actually reduced trade as a proportion of GNP, and it drove inward direct foreign equity investment down to roughly $100 million—smaller than the budget of a single university.
“We were the only country that over two decades reduced that share”
Growth creates broad-based opportunity for poor people to escape poverty and feudal structures, not mere trickle-down.
- For large countries with massive poverty like China, India, Brazil, South Africa and Indonesia, growth is a 'pull-up' strategy that creates opportunities lifting poor people above the poverty line—drawing roughly 200 million Indians above it—and characterizing this as mere 'trickle-down' is an absurd and wrong image.
“to say that you are going to have growth means you are pulling people up through providing opportunities to them, pulling them up above a poverty line”
- A growing economy disproportionately helps the poor because the poor are stuck in villages with no way to improve themselves unless opportunities present themselves; growth lets them break through feudal structures, as documented even among untouchables and tribals who report benefiting from opportunity rather than affirmative action.
“the poor are stuck in villages and so on, unlikely to be able to improve themselves unless opportunities present themselves. So they are able to break through the feudal structure”
- Rather than asking people whether a specific reform helped them (which they can't connect), surveys that simply ask 'Have you improved yourself in the last 5 years?' find a definite majority say yes, and a large number expect continued improvement—providing better evidence of broad-based gains than abstract policy questions.
“if you ask them: Have you improved yourselves? Large numbers, a definite majority, say, Yes”
Liberal democracy channels growth-driven aspirations through institutions, and quality Indian data supports the hypothesis that growth works.
- A core problem of Indian public debate is that it doesn't produce genuine debate but mere assertions—people want their own arguments and their own facts—which is disappointing because one learns through disagreement, but the deferential culture toward figures like Sen prevents real challenge.
“in India it just degenerates into assertions I'm afraid... One of the problems about Indian debate is that we don't really have debates; we just have assertions”
- India's economic data is of very good quality and not politically manipulated like China's, because the Indian Statistical Institute has produced statistically unassailable sample surveys for over 50 years, demonstrating that world-class human capital matters more than brick-and-mortar facilities.
“the quality of the data is very good... And I don't think there is any politically motivated data generation like many people fear in China”
- Growth has aroused expectations—what Bhagwati calls the 'revolution of perceived possibilities'—which could be highly disruptive in such a large country, but India's liberal-democratic institutions (free press, independent judiciary, opposition, NGOs) channel those aspirations through the ballot box into political democracy, making them a stabilizing rather than destabilizing force.
“I call it, a little more pointedly, the 'revolution of perceived possibilities.'”
- Bhagwati predicts that within a couple of months the smart UPA leadership will quietly sideline Sen and disregard his advice to expand expenditures, because roughly 15 economists have written specific (not general) criticisms of the Food Security Bill expansion that he has been unable to answer, and such spending would hurt them in elections.
“my prediction is that in a couple of months they will simply put the man into low key and gone on with their own business”
- The government has been shifting from treating welfare goals as cost-free 'directive principles' to enshrining them as enforceable economic rights, which—unlike cheap civil-political rights like habeas corpus—are expensive and create great pressure to spend more money, driving the fiscal imbalance.
“the civil and political rights are supposed to be relatively cost-free... But the economic rights, they are expensive... turning each of these things into rights. Which means you've got to spend moneys”
- There is an optimum amount of openness: because India is less open than it should be, it gains less from trade but also loses less when a global downturn comes (less than China, which is more output-oriented), so the right degree of openness is a careful assessment of these pros and cons.
“Because we are less open than we should be... we also gain less. On the other hand, when the downturn comes, we lose less”
- Bhagwati notes his famous concept of 'immiserizing growth'—where growth can hurt a country itself—is often misinterpreted as a case against international trade, but he is not accountable for such misinterpretations; the correct model for India's situation is that a growing economy provides opportunities for both rich and poor.
“I'm known, as you know, for an article that may be cited if I get the Nobel, on immiserizing growth--where growth hurts yourself”
- Unlike China, where Bhagwati says the only cultural value seems to be accumulating personal fortunes, parts of India (like Gujarat's tradition) combine wealth accumulation with social good—building schools and health facilities—so growth there reinforces rather than erodes a philanthropic culture, now joined by IT-sector wealth deployed in a Bill Gates-style public-good fashion.
“the growth and using it for increasing the benefits to the poor comes naturally, in my opinion, because that fits in with the traditional culture”
Governments must grow revenue first through economic expansion before committing to large social spending to avoid fiscal crisis and inflation.
- The Food Security Bill would double food-subsidy expenditure from about 1% to at least 2% of GDP at a time when growth-enhancing measures have stalled and revenue growth has slowed, creating a disjunction between high social spending and low revenue growth that will most definitely cause inflation.
“the Food Security Bill will double the share of expenditure from about 1% to at least 2% of GDP”
- For large countries with too few rich and too many poor, the proper sequence is to first grow the economy and then, in proper sequence, increase social expenditures—because only growth generates the revenue to make significant social spending sustainable.
“We see therefore a sequencing for large countries with too few rich and too many poor... We first have to grow the economy. Then we come in, in a proper sequence, to spending more on social expenditures”
- The claim that you can simply reallocate spending—e.g. cut a tank to build five primary schools—is 'pure arithmetic' that ignores political reality; for a country like India surrounded by hostile or Chinese-cultivated neighbors, defense cuts are not feasible, so raising revenue through growth is the realistic path to fund social spending.
“If you don't buy a tack[?] you can build 5 primary schools. But that is pure arithmetic. Go into the political process and say, I'm going to reduce defense? That's not always possible”
- Growth raises tax revenues at any given tax rate, which then enables governments to spend additionally on health and education for the poor; this revenue-financed social spending is the secondary channel by which growth improves welfare, beyond gainful employment.
“the growth itself, as we doubtless know here, too, means that your revenues at any given tax rate are likely to go up. Once the revenues go up, then you can spend money additionally to improve the poor”
India's reforms were endogenous, driven by diaspora pressure and psychological need for international respect, not Washington Consensus imposition.
- India's reform was driven by internal factors rather than Washington Consensus pressure: a 'diaspora effect' where families abroad pressed for change, and the psychologically intolerable position of having a superiority complex (ancient culture) combined with inferior status as Indian officials were disregarded internationally.
“the diaspora effect is what I call it. A lot of young people coming back said: You really cannot have this”
- India's reform, like Gorbachev's Russia and Deng Xiaoping's China, was an endogenous change of minds rather than externally imposed by the IMF, World Bank, or Washington Consensus; the proof is that India surmounted the crisis within two years yet never reversed the reforms but kept adding to them.
“it was internal change of minds, and it was 'endogenous' as we say in economics. And that's what gave it particular resilience”
- When democracy empowered lower castes after independence and pushed Brahmins out of the civil service, those brilliant Brahmins moved into the IT sector, which then took off—a dynamic Bhagwati compares to Malaysia's bumiputera policy pushing Chinese and Indian Malaysians to educate their children abroad and succeed there.
“they bundled out all these brahmins[?] who used to provide us with the Indian civil service offices... So they then went off into the Information Technology (IT) sector... and that sector then takes off”
Growth-enabling policies most benefit the poor while Sen wrongly opposed reforms like FDI and trade liberalization that poor people need.
- Bhagwati is confident the reforms worked because he has seen the hypothesis—that growing the economy pulls people out of poverty—finally tested in reality after decades of theory; opponents' models, by contrast, have been tried and failed, echoing Galbraith's quip about Friedman that his policies' trouble was that they had been tried.
“the reason why I'm pretty optimistic is because I've seen the thing happen as a result of the reforms”
- Bhagwati charges that Amartya Sen, despite later denials, was never genuinely supportive of growth-enhancing measures—opposing direct foreign investment (the Coca-Cola example), never enthusiastically backing trade liberalization, and defending public enterprises and public transport against privatization—even though such reforms most benefit the poor while the rich insulate themselves with private generators and cars.
“Whenever it came to growth... he always on growth-enhancing measures, he was always against them”
- Bhagwati identifies the 'Sen fallacy'—the assumption that because money is public revenue it must be spent through the public sector—as nonsense; since public-sector teachers and doctors often don't turn up, poor people are starting their own low-budget private schools, and the reality of private provision must be compared against the reality, not the ideal, of public provision.
“this is what I call the 'Sen fallacy,' because it is public money, therefore it should be through the public sector. I mean that's just nonsense”
Education and public provision are supporting inputs, not initiating causes of growth; output orientation and decollectivization drive expansion.
- Education alone is a 'field of dreams' approach that does not initiate growth; Singapore grew because of its output orientation, which let high literacy be leveraged to extract more from imported machinery, while China's growth came from decollectivization and export orientation rather than labor-force education—so education is supportive but not the initiating cause.
“Education in itself is not going to lead to massive expansion of productive investment and growth and prosperity because you first have to have the output orientation. That's what Singapore had”