Amrita Narlikar on Fair Trade and Free Trade
What this covers
Amrita Narlikar of the University of Cambridge speaks with Russ Roberts on the economics and politics of trade, drawing on recent research with Dan Kim and Jagdish Bhagwati. The conversation runs through three distinct contentions: that the Fair Trade movement, despite its humanitarian appeal, fragments agricultural markets and depresses wages for non-certified producers while doing little for those it purports to help; that the better path to lifting poor workers is elimination of subsidies in developed agriculture, which would restore comparative advantage to efficient producers in the developing world; and that the WTO, far from being a tool of the powerful, functions as a pluralistic arena where developing countries now hold genuine veto power over international agreements.
The conversation ranges across labor standards, consumer ethics, and institutional design. Narlikar argues that Western pressure on garment factories—spurred by tragedies in Bangladesh—risks driving firms out of poor countries entirely, stripping workers of employment that, however imperfect, has lifted millions into the labor force and generated genuine improvements in living standards. She defends the WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism and negotiating structure as real constraints on protectionism and points to the TRIPS agreement on medicines as evidence that coalitions of developing nations and NGOs can bend the institution toward their interests. Roberts presses back on multiple fronts: whether free trade in commodities alone helps the poor, whether the WTO merely masks protectionism by other means, and whether natural market incentives—like worker flight from unsafe factories—suffice without intervention. The exchange surfaces genuine disagreements about which institutions and policies actually serve the poorest, and at what cost.
Narlikar argues that the Fair Trade movement does little for the poor it targets and harms non-Fair-Trade farmers, that eliminating developed-world agricultural subsidies (free trade) is the better long-term solution, and that international institutions like the WTO are valuable, pluralistic bulwarks against protectionism rather than tools of the powerful.
- Fair Trade premiums fragment the agricultural market and depress wages for non-Fair-Trade producers while counteracting one subsidy with another
- Western reactions to Bangladesh factory tragedies risk stripping poor countries of comparative advantage and driving firms to exit
- The WTO's Dispute Settlement Mechanism and negotiating rounds restrain protectionism and give voice to developing countries
Fair Trade deflects from real solutions and harms non-Fair-Trade producers through market distortion.
- If the underlying problem is government subsidies distorting markets, it is ironic and inefficient to counteract one subsidy with another (Fair Trade premiums) rather than addressing the source of the problem -- the original government subsidies.
“if the problems are actually subsidies then it seems pretty ironic and inefficient to counteract one subsidy with another rather than just address the source of the problem, which is the original government subsidies.”
- The Fair Trade movement deflects attention from the real long-term solution, which is free trade, and risks fragmenting the world agricultural market while depressing the wages of non-Fair-Trade farmers.
“First, that Fair Trade deflects attention from the real long-term solution, which is free trade. And second, that the Fair Trade movement runs the risk of fragmenting the world market on agriculture and depressing the wages of the non-Fair-Trade farmer.”
- Because Fair Trade producers receive an above-market premium that regular producers do not, the guarantee likely leads to increased production, lowering overall commodity prices and decreasing profits and wages for non-Fair-Trade producers who lack the price guarantee.
“if we have a guarantee of above-market price for the Fair Trade portion of producers, this would likely lead to increased production, resulting in lower overall commodity prices. And ultimately decrease profits for all regular trade producers who do not enjoy the price guarantee.”
- Some studies find that only a small proportion of the Fair Trade premium -- around 1-2% of the retail price -- actually reaches the poor farmer in the developing world.
“only a small proportion of the premium--so, 1-2% of retail price according to some studies, but actually retail is the poor farmer in the developing world.”
- In the United Kingdom alone, Fair Trade certified products increased by over 2000% between 2001 and 2011, indicating the movement is growing very rapidly even if from a low base.
“in the United Kingdom alone, Fair Trade certified products recorded a staggering percentage increase in just one decade; between 2001 and 2011 we saw an increase of over 2000%.”
Western ethical consumerism and labor pressure misplace responsibility and risk harming the workers they aim to help.
- If Western labor unions pressure suppliers to raise wages prematurely in Bangladeshi factories, this will deprive countries like Bangladesh of their comparative advantage and render their products uncompetitive in global markets.
“if we pressurize suppliers to increase wages prematurely, we will be depriving countries like Bangladesh of their comparative advantage. And we will be rendering Bangladesh's product uncompetitive in global markets.”
- The trading system is founded on a mercantilist value of denying market access to others' products, but it is often forgotten that imposing such restrictions, like suspending Bangladesh from the Generalized System of Preferences, also punishes your own consumers along with the targeted country's workers.
“The entire trading system is founded on this very mercantilist value, that I'm denying market access to your products. But what is often forgotten is the really important point, as you just raised, that you also punish your own consumers.”
- Brands guilt-tripped into accepting responsibility for Bangladeshi factories over which they have no control will quietly relocate to locations with better governance to avoid being tainted by future fires, with Disney already announcing such a move, leaving Bangladeshi workers worse off.
“it's very likely that brands that have been guilt-tripped into accepting responsibility for Bangladeshi units, over which they actually have no control, will quietly seek to move to locations with better governance.”
- The Western brands blamed for buying garments from locally-owned Bangladeshi factories have actually provided an engine for remarkable improvements in worker wellbeing, with the garment industry nurturing 4 million jobs, most of which went to women.
“the various Western firms that have been getting so much of the blame, by buying garments from these locally-owned factories...have provided an engine for remarkable improvements in the wellbeing of Bangladeshi workers. So, the garment industry in Bangladesh has nurtured 4 million jobs, most of which have gone to women.”
- Misguided ethical consumerism deflects attention from those actually responsible for maintaining safety standards -- national and local governments and the managers and owners of the factories themselves.
“it's again deflecting attention away from the people who are actually responsible for maintaining good safety standards...those people happen to be local governments--national governments, local governments. And the managers and owners of these factories themselves. So, we're often misallocating responsibility by this kind of misguided consumerism.”
- Garment industries in Vietnam and China have experienced few fires even though unions do not exist there, so unionization is not a necessary condition for safety, nor will trade unions suddenly become health and safety experts.
“garment industries in Vietnam and China have experienced few fires, even though unions to not exist there. So, we're not against unionization per se; but unionization does not seem to be a necessary condition for safety.”
Removing agricultural subsidies in developed countries would immediately benefit efficient developing-world farmers.
- The agricultural commodities market is volatile and distorted, evidenced by the $252 billion in subsidies OECD governments paid to their farmers in 2011, which makes it very difficult for even super-efficient developing-world farmers to compete with subsidized products.
“in 2011, OECD governments doled out $252 billion dollars' worth of subsidies to their farmers. And the problem with these subsidies then is that it becomes very difficult for even super-efficient farmers from the developing world to compete with these subsidized products.”
- Removing developed-world agricultural subsidies would immediately benefit efficient farming economies like Brazil and Argentina, and over time allow countries previously unable to sustain farming due to U.S. and EU competition to develop their comparative advantage.
“removing these subsidies won't immediately result--it will immediately benefit certain countries, like Brazil and Argentina, which do have incredibly efficient systems of farming. And they would be able to corner the bit of the market that opened up as a result.”
- The 2008 Doha talks came close to a deal on agriculture in which the United States agreed to cap its subsidies -- a significant concession enabled by high food prices at the time -- but the deal was turned down by some developing countries, showing a deal on agriculture is not impossible.
“we have come very close to a deal on agriculture, where the United States had agreed to cap its subsidies in the 2008 Doha talks.”
The WTO's pluralistic structure and enforcement mechanisms protect developing countries and prevent protectionism.
- A Rising Power is best understood not by economic or military size alone but as a power with effective veto-player status -- one whose participation is required for international agreements and which can walk away from negotiations and derail them; by this definition Brazil, India, and China are the constants across regimes.
“the way I think about a Rising Power is those powers that have what is effectively veto[?] player status. So, you can't really get an international agreement unless these powers are on board. So, these are the powers that have the ability to walk away from a negotiation and thereby completely derail it.”
- Unlike the old GATT, which functioned as a rich man's club where the EU, Canada, US, and Japan made decisions, today's WTO has a New Quad with Brazil, India, and recently China as constants working in coalitions with least-developed countries, making it a pluralistic organization where consensus is hard to reach -- which is partly why it is so badly developed.
“the GATT...used to be known as a rich man's club and decisions were made between the EU, Canada, the United States, and Japan...And today we have something called New Quad, where Brazil and India and recently China have become the constants.”
- The WTO and a concluded new round are valuable insurance against a return of 1930s-style protectionism because countries have a large gap between applied and bound tariff rates and could legally raise tariffs significantly toward the bound ceiling; concluding the round would help prevent that.
“one very important reason why we need the WTO is...to prevent the return of protectionism.”
- The TRIPS and public health declaration shows the WTO empowering the weak: facing the AIDS pandemic, a coalition of least-developed countries, emerging markets like Brazil and India, and northern and southern NGOs lobbied successfully to allow parallel imports of cheaper medicines despite U.S. pharmaceutical lobbying.
“a coalition emerged of the least developing countries, what we call emerging markets or rising powers, so, countries like Brazil and India, and northern NGOs...as well as southern NGOs. And they lobbied really hard to allow parallel imports. And now this is allowed under the regime.”
- The WTO's enforceable Dispute Settlement Mechanism is a key reason there has been no major resurgence of 1930s-style protectionism or a US-China trade war, because if a country hikes trade barriers, partners -- increasingly including developing countries -- can use the DSM to get sanctions raised against it.
“This is...the only organization that has...an enforceable dispute settle mechanism. And if you slap on tariffs against your trading partner, chances are, if they are able to use the DSM and increasingly countries from the developing world are...”
- Negotiating rounds are important because they enable big tradeoffs across issue areas, as in the Grand Bargain of the Uruguay Round where developed countries pushed TRIPS in exchange for promising developing countries that issues they cared about, such as agriculture, would be brought in.
“this is one of the reasons why Rounds are important, because you are able to get big tradeoffs across issue areas. In this case, the tradeoff was, developed countries were pushing for, particularly the United States, bringing TRIPS into the Uruguay Round, and in return, developing countries were told some of the issues that they cared about, such as agriculture would be brought in.”
Free trade with supporting infrastructure and education enables productive transitions for poor farmers.
- Freer agricultural trade alone will not automatically improve the life of the poor Indian farmer, but having that market opportunity is a vital first step that, combined with government commitment to infrastructure, literacy, and education, enables transitions to more productive activities.
“free trade in agriculture itself isn't automatically going to improve the life of the poor farmer, in India. But having that opportunity will be a very vital first step to lead to all these other steps.”
Rising Powers exercise influence through veto status and coalition negotiation rather than economic size alone.
- Power transition is seldom solely a function of growing economic or military prowess; how power is exercised, relative to whom, and how actions and reactions are interpreted or misinterpreted in negotiation are crucial aspects missed by both economic and political-science analyses of Rising Powers.
“power transition is seldom solely a function of growing economic or military prowess. And a lot depends on how power is exercised, in relative to whom, and how action and reaction are interpreted and misinterpreted.”
- Constructivist thinking holds that the more a country becomes a member of an international regime and is given greater voice, the more it buys into the regime's values, so if socialization works we are likely to see more satiated (status quo) powers rather than revolutionary revisionist powers.
“the more a country becomes a member of a regime and the more it's given greater voice in the regime, the more it also starts buying into some of its values...if socialization in regimes works, then we are likely to see more satiated powers than revolutionist power.”