What this covers

Scott Sumner of Bentley University examines the architecture of recessions and the Fed's response to the 2008 financial crisis. The conversation with EconTalk host Russ Roberts ranges across the mechanics of money, why the usual tools for reading monetary policy lead economists astray, and why fiscal stimulus cannot accomplish what its proponents claim. Sumner's core argument rests on three pillars: that large economic downturns stem from failures of monetary policy rather than real shocks, that interest rates and the monetary base are misleading gauges of whether money is tight or loose, and that because monetary policy works primarily through expectations of future Fed action, fiscal stimulus ends up redundant when the central bank is competent.

The discussion moves through specific historical cases to build this framework. Sumner traces how the 2006 housing collapse did not produce recession until nominal GDP collapsed in late 2008—showing that even a large real shock need not cause mass unemployment if the Fed maintains steady spending growth. He argues that interest rates are a symptom, not a cause: tight monetary policy lowers both inflation and activity, which both push rates down, making Japan's very low rates evidence of contractionary policy, consistent with Milton Friedman's insights decades earlier. Australia's avoidance of recession while maintaining only a 4% monetary base—versus 18% in the U.S.—illustrates his point that what matters is not the size of the balance sheet but the path of expected nominal GDP growth.

Sumner also addresses the claim that the Fed lacked tools after hitting the zero bound. He argues the Fed could have anchored expectations by announcing a target nominal GDP path and committing to whatever measures necessary to hit it, a commitment that would likely have required less quantitative easing than was actually deployed. He distinguishes this approach from earlier monetarism, which targeted the money supply itself; targeting nominal GDP directly adjusts the money supply as needed to offset velocity shifts. On fiscal stimulus, Sumner contends it is not a scientific concept because its success depends entirely on how the Fed responds—whether it offsets the stimulus—yet economists treat multipliers as fixed parameters.

Sharpest takeaway

Sumner argues that business cycles in large economies are caused by nominal/monetary shocks rather than real shocks, that interest rates and the size of the monetary base are misleading indicators of monetary policy stance, and that because monetary policy works primarily through expectations and offsets fiscal policy, fiscal stimulus is essentially redundant and not a scientific concept.

  • Major real shocks (1987 crash, Japanese tsunami, housing collapse 2006-2008) did not cause recessions absent monetary failure
  • Low interest rates and large monetary bases reflect tight money, not loose money (Friedman's insight)
  • Monetary policy works through expectations of future policy, and an inflation-targeting Fed offsets any fiscal stimulus

The argument · threads8 threads · 33 claims
0.85

Monetary policy failure to maintain nominal spending growth is the sole cause of business cycles in diversified economies.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • From the housing peak in January 2006 (unemployment 4.7%) to April 2008, housing construction fell in half but unemployment was still only 4.9%, because other sectors absorbed the jobs; unemployment only doubled to 10% when nominal spending fell sharply in the second half of 2008, showing that even a 6%-of-GDP sector decline doesn't cause recession if monetary policy keeps nominal spending growing steadily.

    “27 months later, in April of 2008, housing construction had fallen in half, but unemployment was still 4.9%.”

  • In large diversified economies like the United States, big fluctuations in employment (the key stylized fact of business cycles) are caused by nominal or monetary shocks—specifically a failure of monetary policy to keep nominal spending growing on a steady path—rather than by real shocks.

    “I think they are basically nominal or monetary shocks, although not necessarily changes in the money supply per se, but some sort of failure of monetary policy to keep nominal spending growing on a steady path.”

  • Between mid-2008 and 2009 nominal GDP fell about 4% against a trend of 5% increase—roughly 9% below trend—which had a devastating effect on the job market and drove unemployment from about 5% to 10%.

    “Over a 12-month period we had a 4% fall versus a trend rate of 5% increase. So really our nominal GDP growth was about 9% below the trend between mid-2008 and 2009.”

  • Major real shocks—the 1987 stock market crash (which lost ~45% over six weeks) and the Japanese tsunami—produced essentially no recession or rise in unemployment, demonstrating that large shocks alone don't cause recessions unless accompanied by a failure of monetary policy.

    “Not only was there no recession--there wasn't even a tiny slowdown in the economy. Not even a blip.”

  • Because nominal wages are sticky (slow to adjust), when total nominal spending in the economy falls but pay-per-hour stays roughly the same, the result is fewer hours worked—like a game of musical chairs where removing a few chairs leaves people on the floor—and that is what a recession fundamentally is.

    “I like to use a metaphor of a game of musical chairs.”

0.85

Central banks have proven ability to control nominal spending through credible commitment and communication about future policy.

5 pointscentrality 5/5
  • Central banks demonstrated their credibility by acknowledging their 1970s mistakes, adopting roughly 2% inflation targets via the Taylor principle, and successfully delivering an average inflation rate of about 2%, proving that when central banks say they will do something, people know they can do it.

    “Now we understand the Taylor principle, so we are going to start targeting inflation around 2%. And almost all the major central banks started doing that. And they basically succeeded in giving us an average inflation rate of about 2%.”

  • There is no example in all of human history of a fiat-money central bank trying to inflate and failing because of a lack of credibility, which means a central bank that genuinely commits to raising nominal spending can always succeed.

    “there's really no example in all of human history of a fiat money central bank trying to inflate and failing because of the lack of credibility.”

  • The correct way to conduct monetary policy is to start with the desired outcome—e.g., 5% nominal GDP growth—announce you will do whatever it takes for markets to expect it, and work backwards, rather than making gestures and waiting to see if they succeed; paradoxically, announcing such a target would likely require less QE than has actually been done.

    “you start with success and then work backwards and ask: What do we need to do?”

  • Even a dysfunctional, reluctant Bank of Japan being dragged toward a 2% inflation target produced dramatic market responses—the yen depreciated sharply and the stock market rose ~45% in three months—tied to specific government announcements, demonstrating that markets take central bank communication seriously even absent a firm promise.

    “what they've been able to do is, in 3 months, depreciate the yen dramatically--and we've seen the market respond to specific announcements coming out of the government on monetary policy.”

  • What matters for the economy is not what the Fed is doing now but what it is expected to do over the next several years; every asset is priced based on expected future Fed policy, and ordinary people's 'confidence' is really an implicit forecast of nominal GDP growth, so signaling and communication about the future policy path is the most important thing the Fed does.

    “What really matters is not what the Fed is doing now but what it's expected to do in the future.”

0.71

Market monetarism targets nominal GDP directly rather than money supply, adjusting monetary aggregates to offset velocity changes.

5 pointscentrality 4/5
  • Whereas early monetarists like Friedman targeted the money supply (M) assuming velocity would be stable, market monetarists target total spending (M times V, nominal GDP) directly—adjusting the money supply as needed to offset velocity changes—while retaining Friedman's assumption that money is neutral in the long run.

    “our group--sometimes called 'market monetarists'--tend to focus instead of on the money supply itself on just the total amount of spending, M times V.”

  • Sumner's analysis aligns with Steve Hanke's and Milton Friedman's in holding that the monetary base created by the Fed wasn't deployed in a way that stabilized the target variable; the only difference is the chosen target—Hanke watches broad aggregates like M4, Friedman watched M2, and Sumner watches nominal GDP—but the underlying analysis is essentially the same.

    “All three of us believe that the money created by the Fed itself, the base, wasn't done in such a way that it stabilized whatever the target variable be.”

  • The quantity theory of money—that doubling the money supply just doubles prices—only applies if the monetary increase is expected to be permanent; a temporary injection (e.g., doubling money for four weeks then reversing) would not double prices, because asset prices like houses are set based on expectations of future Fed policy, which is why the future path of policy matters far more than current actions.

    “it only applies if the monetary increase is permanent.”

  • Countries with the most inflationary (expansionary) monetary policies, like Australia, do the least money printing, while countries with the most deflationary policies, like Japan, do the most printing—because when the public expects faster nominal spending growth they have less incentive to sit on non-interest-bearing cash, making the required amount of money creation demand-determined.

    “the countries that have the most inflationary policies today, like Australia for instance, have the smallest amount of money printing going on. And the ones that have the most deflationary policies, like Japan, have the largest amount of money printing.”

  • The Fed should stop paying interest on reserves; banks would not want to sit on as much idle cash if they expected faster nominal GDP growth and earned nothing on reserves, so eliminating interest on reserves combined with a credible nominal GDP target would increase the velocity of money.

    “I would stop paying interest on reserves, too. I would tell the banks: You are not going to earn any interest on reserves.”

0.65

Fiscal stimulus cannot boost aggregate demand when central banks target inflation, as they will offset any demand increase.

4 pointscentrality 4/5
  • During normal times with positive interest rates, almost all mainstream macroeconomists—including New Keynesians since the late 1990s—agree that monetary policy, not fiscal policy, is the proper stabilization tool, because both aim at aggregate demand; if monetary policy is already setting the optimal spending path, fiscal policy is redundant and also less efficient, with long lags and deficits.

    “The so-called 'New Keynesians' decided: No, the Fed should steer the economy with a 2% inflation target and we shouldn't use fiscal stimulus any more.”

  • If fiscal stimulus actually boosted aggregate demand it would raise inflation, and an inflation-targeting Fed would simply tighten monetary policy to offset it—thwarting the stimulus; therefore making fiscal stimulus work requires an incompetent central bank that passively lets fiscal policy move inflation, which is not how the actual Fed behaves.

    “if fiscal stimulus really did boost aggregate demand, it would raise inflation. At least a little bit. Now, if the Fed is targeting inflation it will just tighten monetary policy to offset that.”

  • Fiscal stimulus is not a scientific concept because its claimed effects depend entirely on hypothetical, psychological assumptions about how the Fed will respond (whether it offsets), yet Keynesians present fiscal multipliers as if they were fixed parameters of nature like a scientific model, which they are not.

    “fiscal stimulus is not a scientific concept, because it's based on assumptions about Fed response, offset, that are completely hypothetical, psychological, mindreading.”

  • Through a series of at least five unconventional actions (QE1, QE2, Operation Twist, QE3, the Evans plan), the Fed acted aggressively each time recovery faltered and kept nominal GDP growing at about 4% regardless of whether fiscal policy was expansionary or contractionary, demonstrating that fiscal policy made little difference because the Fed neutralized it.

    “by doing all those specific actions they've been able to keep nominal GDP growth growing at about a 4% rate, pretty much regardless of what was happening to fiscal policy”

0.57

The Fed's 2008 policy failure combined oil shocks and inflation fears with zero-rate constraints and absence of backup plans.

5 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Nominal GDP fell in 2008 due to a perfect storm: the housing bubble burst, lowering the natural rate of interest, while a simultaneous oil price spike (gasoline from $2 to $4) raised headline inflation and frightened the inflation-focused Fed into not cutting rates aggressively (rates were still 2% when Lehman failed), so by the time the Fed realized it was sliding into deep recession, rates were near zero and it lacked its conventional tool; markets then crashed when they saw the Fed had no Plan B.

    “we happened to have this housing crash right at the same time as a huge oil price spike. So, because of the oil price spike of 2008, where gasoline shot up from $2 to $4 a gallon in just a couple of years, our headline inflation number was high; the Fed was frightened about inflation.”

  • The Fed designed its policy in a way almost calculated to fail by repeatedly promising to pull money back out of circulation at the slightest uptick in inflation and refusing to allow inflation above 2%, when after a severe slump it should have aimed to return to the prior trend line, which requires temporarily allowing inflation above 2% during recovery.

    “they said: Now, don't worry; we're going to pull all this money back out of circulation at the slightest sign of an uptick in inflation.”

  • Bernanke said in 2003 that the only reliable way to gauge monetary policy is the growth rate of nominal GDP and inflation; since 2008 the average of those two has been the lowest since Herbert Hoover, so by Bernanke's own criterion money over the last five years has been tighter than at any time since Hoover, contradicting his claim that policy is accommodative.

    “I would quote him from 2003, where he said that the only reliable way of looking at monetary policy is to look at the rate of growth in nominal GDP and inflation.”

  • Once interest rates hit zero in late 2008, the Fed had no backup plan; despite academic Bernanke arguing the Fed could do many things at zero rates, the institutional Fed was conservative and slow to adopt radical ideas, so it had no plan to prevent nominal GDP from plummeting and staying below trend, relying instead on low rates and hope.

    “once we got to zero interest rates, it was almost immediately apparent, around late 2008 that the Fed really didn't have a backup plan.”

  • Australia was the one developed country that avoided recession in 2009, kept interest rates above zero, and maintained a 6-7% nominal GDP growth trend—yet has a monetary base of only 4% of GDP versus 18% in the U.S. and 23% in Japan—showing that the most expansionary policy (by outcome) can look like the least and that low rates do not mean easy money.

    “Australia, interestingly, was the one developed country that didn't have a recession this time around... their interest rates never fell to zero.”

0.53

Interest rates are misleading indicators of monetary stance; low rates signal tight money, not loose money policy.

2 pointscentrality 4/5
  • The Fed does have a genuine short-term impact on interest rates—an easy money policy often lowers short-term rates in the very short run (though long-term rates may rise simultaneously)—which is the grain of truth behind the public's focus on interest rates, even though the Fed overweights interest rates in the transmission mechanism.

    “the Fed does have a short term impact on interest rates. And it is true that when they do an easy money policy, it's often the case that in the very short run, short term interest rates will fall.”

  • Interest rates are a misleading indicator of monetary policy stance because tight money lowers both inflation and economic activity, both of which lower interest rates; low inflation and a weak economy are the two main drivers of low rates, so very low interest rates (as in Japan) are a sign money has been tight, not loose—a view consistent with textbooks, Friedman, and even Bernanke.

    “Very low interest rates like in Japan--talking about Japan at the time--are a sign that money has been tight.”

0.44

Long-run structural trends like manufacturing decline do not cause cyclical recessions and coexist with very low unemployment.

5 pointscentrality 2/5
  • A nominal GDP shock is not just a synonym for a recession (which is a fall in real GDP); nominal GDP is better described as the stance of monetary policy, and real and nominal GDP are not always perfectly correlated—as in hyperinflations like Zimbabwe where nominal GDP soared while the real economy collapsed—so the strong correlation in the U.S. is an empirical claim, not a definitional one.

    “a recession would be better described as a fall in real GDP. And nominal GDP I think is better described as a stance[?] of monetary policy.”

  • The secular decline in manufacturing employment (driven by productivity and globalization) is a long-run trend that the economy absorbs gradually—as it earlier absorbed the loss of millions of farming jobs—and by itself does not create business cycles or explain the cyclicality of recessions, as evidenced by very low unemployment in 2007 despite decades of lost manufacturing jobs.

    “That's true, but it doesn't really explain the cycles.”

  • There is an entanglement between supply and demand: bad demand-side policy crashes the economy into depression, the government then reacts with counterproductive supply-side policies (like greatly extended unemployment insurance that raises the natural rate of unemployment), so while Mulligan is partly right that incentives slow recovery, the primary focus should be stabilizing demand because demand failures trigger those supply-side responses in the first place.

    “When you have very bad demand side policies and the economy crashes into a depression, the government reacts often in counterproductive ways and makes it worse.”

  • Free-market-oriented analysts tend toward wishful thinking, attributing business-cycle distress to bad government policies they dislike; but the 1960s under Lyndon Johnson saw an enormous expansion of government scope yet was a boom decade, showing such policies don't explain the business cycle even if they harm long-run efficiency.

    “we had, under Lyndon Johnson, an enormous increase in the size of the scope of government, and yet the 1960s were a boom decade.”

  • Critics of easy money repeatedly make two contradictory objections simultaneously—that it's 'pushing on a string' and won't do anything because rates are near zero, and that it will cause hyperinflation like Germany—a contradiction voiced by the business community in the Great Depression and by the Bank of Japan.

    “in the Great Depression for instance the business community had two objections to easy money. One objection was: it's pushing on a string, it won't do anything... And the other was: Well, if Roosevelt keeps doing that we'll have hyperinflation like Germany had.”

0.40

Money printing via quantitative easing creates electronic reserves, fundamentally different from actual currency creation in hyperinflations.

2 pointscentrality 3/5
  • Most of the money the Fed has supposedly printed during QE hasn't been printed—it is electronic bank reserves at the Fed on which banks earn interest; the Fed is merely swapping one interest-bearing government liability (Treasury securities) for another (bank reserves), which is fundamentally different from genuine money printing as in the German hyperinflation, where cash in wallets would surge.

    “All this money the Fed has supposedly been "printing" actually hasn't been printed. Almost all of it is an electronic entry in a bank, a deposit at the Fed that the banks earn interest on.”

  • Under Herbert Hoover the Fed did quantitative easing—starting big open-market bond purchases in 1932 as rates fell near zero, with the monetary base rising sharply between 1930 and 1933—yet monetary policy in the early 1930s is widely accepted to have been contractionary, showing that a rising monetary base does not equal loose money.

    “under Herbert Hoover, they did QE--they did quantitative easing. When interest rates fell close to zero they started to do big open market purchases of bonds, in 1932.”