Lee Ohanian on the Great Recession and the Labor Market
What this covers
Lee Ohanian and Russ Roberts discuss the 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath, centering on a puzzle: why the U.S. recovery has been so different from other nations and from prior American recessions. The conversation spans the labor market, business investment, productivity, and policy, with Ohanian arguing that the collapse in employment—not productivity or financial constraints—lies at the heart of the weak recovery. Because U.S. productivity remained essentially flat during the Great Recession while per capita hours worked fell dramatically, Ohanian contends the crisis reveals not a financial problem but a labor-market problem rooted in policy and structural decline.
The discussion traces several specific mechanisms. Skill-Biased Technical Change has hollowed out opportunities for less-educated workers, with low-wage labor displaced by capital over decades. The foreclosure crisis created perverse incentives: as the time to foreclose stretched from months to 15 months, unemployed homeowners gained an effective free pass to delay job search, raising their reservation wage. On the policy side, Ohanian draws a historical parallel to the Great Depression, where wage-fixing and cartelization policies under Hoover and Franklin Delano Roosevelt prevented market clearing and prolonged unemployment. The farm sector, exempt from these policies, maintained employment because wages could adjust downward. Today, policy uncertainty, including the unfinished Affordable Care Act and Dodd-Frank, discourages the costly, irreversible investments in factories and workers that drive hiring. Corporate cash reserves are robust, undermining the claim that credit constraints bind; firms are choosing not to invest. The pair also examine whether structural weakness—weaker job creation even before 2008—suggests a more sluggish underlying economy than in prior decades.
Ohanian argues the post-2008 U.S. recovery is unique because the entire output decline came from collapsed employment rather than productivity, pointing to labor-market and policy problems—not the financial crisis itself—as the binding cause, paralleling how anti-competitive wage and cartel policies prolonged the Great Depression.
- U.S. productivity did not fall in the Great Recession; all output loss came from employment, unlike other countries and prior U.S. recessions
- Corporate cash positions are high and firms are self-financing, undermining the financial-constraint explanation for weak investment and hiring
- Policy uncertainty, structural decline, and incentive-distorting policies (foreclosure delay, high relative wages) better explain the weak labor recovery
Recession-driven job destruction in construction left workers stranded with skills unsuited to available alternatives.
- A government-stimulated housing construction boom drew large numbers of low-skilled workers into the sand states (Nevada, Arizona, western California), and when it collapsed those construction jobs did not return; these workers cannot easily transfer to stimulus highway projects, and many wait for the old high wage rather than accept lower-paying alternatives, making this recovery look unlike others.
“we had this massive boom, artificially stimulated I believe by government housing policy; and as a result, in areas where it was easy to expand... huge increases in the number of workers. And those jobs have not come back for 5 years.”
Per capita hours worked fell sharply during the recession, representing an enormous historical decline since 1956.
- Per capita hours worked (per adult/working-age population) fell roughly 10% during the recession, from about 368 to about 335 hours, an enormous drop relative to the historical series beginning in 1956.
“So, 368, say, to 335. It's a 10% drop.”
Multiple simultaneous causes make causal attribution difficult and invite selective cherry-picking of favored explanations.
- The current situation has very high causal density (Jim Manzi's term)—many things happening at once—which creates a temptation to cherry-pick the causes one favors and discount those one dislikes, making causal attribution genuinely difficult.
“what Jim Manzi calls high causal density: there's a lot of things going on at once and there's a temptation to cherry-pick the causes you like”
Education reform requires radical restructuring beyond STEM to build diverse productive skills across the workforce.
- Education reform that merely calls for more STEM (science, technology, engineering, math) graduates is not the right answer because STEM will always be a smallish portion of college graduates; the system needs radical restructuring and more creativity to help people acquire productive skills, especially given high-skill manufacturing work now requiring calculus.
“saying: We just need more STEM graduates so they can be part of the modern economy, is not the right answer.”