Tammy Frisby on Tax Reform
What this covers
Tammy Frisby of Stanford's Hoover Institution and Russ Roberts examine tax reform through a historical and political lens, focusing on why the 1986 Tax Reform Act succeeded and whether conditions exist for comparable change in 2013. Frisby traces the arc from the 1981 Economic Recovery Tax Act through subsequent tax policy, while Roberts presses on the mechanics and incentives shaping reform outcomes. The core argument turns on three interlocking claims: that the 1986 reform required a specific political constellation (public perception of unfairness, divided government, and bipartisan willingness to trade rate cuts for base-broadening), that the 2013 fiscal cliff creates a comparable opening, and that political dysfunction makes another round of rate cuts without corresponding spending discipline the more likely outcome.
The conversation covers substantial ground across the tax code's architecture and politics. Frisby explains how marginal tax rate reductions in 1986 were funded by closing tax expenditures—eliminating the two-earner deduction, restricting mortgage interest, ending consumer interest deductibility, and raising capital gains rates—and distinguishes this comprehensive restructuring from later "tax cuts" that were actually distribution checks, not structural changes. A pointed dispute emerges over who gets to claim savings from closing the employer health exclusion, illustrating Double-Counting of Revenue. Roberts raises Spending as the True Tax, arguing that marginal tax rate cuts paired with spending increases are ultimately tax increases. Frisby documents how tax extenders—habitually renewed provisions—create annual lobbying rents and perpetual code instability. The speakers also clarify the distinction between rates and collections, revisit bracket creep before indexation, and debate whether the Earned Income Tax Credit's roots in Milton Friedman's thinking represent a model for reform.
Frisby argues that meaningful U.S. tax reform requires the conditions present in 1986—latent public anger at unfairness plus bipartisan political will to trade rate cuts for base-broadening—and that while the 2013 fiscal cliff creates a comparable opening, political dysfunction makes another round of rate cuts with deferred spending discipline the more likely outcome.
- The 1986 reform succeeded because it was revenue-neutral, paired rate cuts with closing loopholes, and rode latent public perception of unfairness
- The 2013 fiscal cliff and proliferation of temporary 'tax extenders' create instability that could catalyze reform
- Competing claims on the same loopholes (e.g. employer health exclusion) and entrenched deductions make comprehensive reform politically fragile
Measuring true tax burden requires accounting for government spending and behavioral responses, not just stated rates.
- Milton Friedman argued that the true measure of how high taxes are is how much government spends, not the tax rate—so Bush's 2001 rate cuts paired with dramatic spending increases for war and Medicare expansion were effectively tax increases, meaning taxes are very high now even if rates fall.
“Milton Friedman used to always say that you shouldn't look at the tax rate; you should look at how much government spends, and that's the measure of how high people's taxes are.”
- Estimates of how much revenue a tax change raises or loses are inherently imprecise because they require assuming away dynamic behavioral responses—people change their working habits, declared income, and investment behavior in response to rate changes—so the figures rest on many hypotheticals.
“they are inherently imprecise because there is dynamic behavioral changes in response to the rates. You can't, there's a lot of hypotheticals that have to be presumed when you are trying to measure changes in revenue collection.”
- Workers pay significant payroll taxes that they may falsely perceive as going into a personal Social Security retirement account, but the money goes out the door to fund current government spending—war, agricultural payments, anything—so the dedicated-account framing is an illusion; and because employees don't file on it, it barely registers in their consciousness.
“they may decide, falsely in my opinion, that it goes toward Social Security retirement. Into a little box for them, a little account. But it doesn't. It goes out the door to pay for the war or the agricultural price payments or anything else. It's fake, an illusion.”
Political and structural pressures—from inequality concerns to special interests—push toward complexity and perpetual uncertainty that harms economic decision-making.
- To the extent that anger at the 1% and inequality is politically salient, it will push the next round of policy toward higher marginal rates, not lower—and a system where the top 1% pay around 40% of income taxes and so many people pay little is unhealthy for a democracy, fostering government dependence on a small successful group while most have little stake.
“to the extent that is politically salient, debates over inequality, that's going to push us towards higher marginal tax rates in the next round, not lower.”
- Perpetual uncertainty about whether and how the tax code will change is harmful to economic decision-making, and an economy that needs stable, predictable policy for a meaningful recovery is undermined by temporary tax policy—which is ground on which both parties can agree reform is needed.
“the perpetual uncertainty for economic decision-making. Because you don't know whether the tax code is going to change or not change, or how it might change; and that uncertainty can't be a good thing.”
- A Value-Added Tax is efficient but politically resisted because in the U.S. it would likely be added on top of existing rates rather than replacing them, and its low visibility to taxpayers makes it a revenue machine that encourages government revenue creep—so critics argue it would increase taxes rather than fix the system.
“VAT being a Value Added Tax... Which has the great virtue of being relatively efficient, but has the horror of being relatively unnoticed. So it does tend to lead to revenue creep, in my perception of it.”
- Tax complexity and opacity function as a make-work program for accountants and lawyers, who will always favor a complex, opaque, painful tax code because they profit from it—creating a constituency with an interest in resisting simplification.
“that's a wonderful make-work program for accountants and lawyers. They are going to always like complexity and opacity and pain, because they profit from it.”
Recent U.S. tax changes differ fundamentally from structural reforms like Reagan's in permanence and their actual impact on rates.
- If Republicans win and pursue a further across-the-board marginal rate cut (Romney's proposed 20%) amid massive deficits, with promises of entitlement and spending reform 'down the road,' the country is heading into a familiar pattern—cut rates now and defer the spending discipline—that has played out before.
“I am getting a sense of deja vu about the future. I've heard that song before, right? Cut taxes now, cut rates now, and we'll make up the spending cuts later. You think that's where we might be headed?”
- The 2001 Bush tax cuts were a proportional cut in rates across the board, not a tax cut targeted at the rich; the rich got the same proportional rate reduction as everyone but a bigger dollar benefit because of higher incomes, and the cuts roughly restored the proportional burden after a prior increase on high earners.
“they were a proportional cut in rates across the board, not a tax cut for the rich. The rich got the same proportional rates, but because the rich have higher income, they get a bigger dollar benefit”
- The 1980s tax changes were fundamentally different in kind from later policymaking: the Reagan reforms altered marginal rates structurally, whereas the recent Bush and Obama 'tax cuts' were largely temporary one-time checks in the mail—changes in collections, not in rates—so calling them all 'tax cuts' obscures a crucial distinction.
“it doesn't distinguish between changes in rates--which was the centerpiece of the Reagan tax cuts--and changes in collections--which have been, the last couple of tax cuts, the Bush tax change and the Obama tax change. These were temporary one-time checks in the mail, not alterations in the marginal rate.”
Before 1981, inflation-driven bracket creep functioned as an automatic, implicit tax increase without legislative action.
- Before 1981, because the tax code was not indexed to inflation, inflation pushed people's nominal incomes into higher brackets, generating automatically higher tax revenues for the government without any legislation—an implicit, unlegislated tax increase.
“Without legislation. Automatic tax increases--the more people's incomes were pushed into higher brackets, generate more income--more revenues.”