David Schmidtz on Rawls, Nozick, and Justice
What this covers
David Schmidtz discusses the philosophical foundations of two rival accounts of justice with Russ Roberts, centered on the work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick. Both thinkers, Schmidtz argues, begin from the same bedrock commitment: that persons are separate agents whose lives and choices belong to themselves, not to the collective. The divergence lies in what follows. Rawls uses the Veil of Ignorance to derive the Difference Principle—an end-state rule requiring that inequalities be arranged to maximize the share of the least advantaged. Nozick rejects patterned distributions as unjust impositions, arguing instead that justice depends on how holdings came into being: whether through voluntary consent or force. For Nozick, the Lockean Appropriation theory grounds legitimate property claims in labor and first occupancy, making Self-Ownership the foundation of entitlement rather than welfare.
The conversation maps three separate objections to redistributive taxation and state intervention. The first, rooted in self-ownership, holds that such redistribution amounts to theft. The second, which Rawls himself would accept, claims inefficiency—that patterned distribution shrinks the overall pie. The third and most practically consequential, Schmidtz contends, concerns the Power Corrupts Dynamic: even well-intentioned grants of state authority become vehicles for capture by special interests and the pursuit of power for its own sake. A liberal society must ultimately answer whether individuals retain the right to refuse, to exit, and to retain their talents—a threshold question that precedes all debate about optimal distribution. The discussion ranges across how Rawls reinvigorated political philosophy after decades of academic detachment, how Nozick borrowed Rawls's foundational premises while drawing opposite conclusions, and where the strongest practical case against state power actually lies.
Schmidtz argues that Rawls and Nozick share the premise of respecting persons as separate, inviolate agents, but diverge over whether justice is a patterned end-state to be engineered or a matter of historical, consent-based entitlement; and that the strongest practical objection to redistributive taxation is not its injustice or inefficiency but the corrupting dynamics of concentrated state power.
- Rawls's difference principle picks a specific egalitarian end-state, which Nozick rejects in favor of historical entitlement based on legitimate acquisition and consent
- A liberal society must answer whether the individual owns himself and has the right to refuse and exit
- Even well-meaning grants of state power get captured and abused because power's value rises with its scope
Self-ownership and voluntary consent form the foundation of legitimate political authority and property rights.
- On Nozick's implicit view, one can exploit one's own talents without making anyone else worse off, but no one else can commandeer or enslave another's talents without mixing their labor with something the person reliably regards as theirs—so talents belong to the individual, not to society.
“I can exploit my talents; I can make use of my talents without making anybody else worse off, without putting anybody else in a worse position; but nobody else can come along and commandeer my talents, can enslave me for example”
- In the Lockean theory Nozick adopts, one acquires property by mixing one's labor with something to which nobody else has a prior claim; the claim need not be strong, only first and exclusive, so that anyone coming second must get the first claimant's permission to avoid disrespecting them as a separate person.
“the way we acquire land is by mixing our labor with something to which nobody else has a claim. And that latter part is not a throwaway.”
- In Nozick's historical theory, the justice of a holding is determined not by the resulting distribution but by how the transfer occurred—whether it was acquired by force or by voluntary consent—and the preeminent principle of legitimate transfer is consent.
“The justice question gets resolved when we look at how the transfer actually occurred; and did the transfer occur legitimately. And Nozick says the pre-eminent principle of legitimate transfer is consent.”
- A self-owner can rationally consent to taxation for public goods—including roads, which lower transaction costs for his customers, and even military service—because paying his share is a way of being respected as a separate person, but consenting to public goods is categorically different from being treated as society's property.
“I want to minimize transactions costs because I want it to be as cheap as possible for my customers to get to my store. And so I would rather pay for that in part of my taxes than have to put up a toll road”
- A genuinely liberal society—one that treats individuals as real agents who own themselves—must answer affirmatively the fundamental question of whether a person has the right to say no, to refuse the deal, and to leave with his talents; if society denies that right by claiming ownership of his labor, kidney, or blood, it has ceased to be liberal.
“there's a fundamental matter of principle, a question that needs an answer at the end of the day, which is: Do I have the right to say No? Do I have the right to walk? Do I own myself?”
- Nozick borrowed his foundations largely from Rawls—the premise that people are separate persons with their own lives whose utility cannot be traded off by others and who have rights such that the aggregate is not a trump—but argued that taking this premise seriously yields not Rawls's conclusions but a puzzle about justifying the emergence and enforcement of a state-imposed rule of law.
“what is true is that he borrowed his foundations from Rawls, to a large degree. He said: Well, suppose Rawls is right, that people are separate persons with lives of their own to live and that their utility, it isn't up to somebody else to decide how their utility trades off against someone else's.”
Rawls shifted from open-ended principles to selecting specific distributive outcomes, which wrongly treats justice as picking results rather than enabling individual agency.
- Before 1971 Rawls stated the difference principle in an open-ended way (inequalities to everyone's advantage), but by 1971 he narrowed it to pick a single definite spot on the welfare frontier—maximizing the least advantaged's share—because he wanted a complete rather than merely incomplete ordering principle.
“the first two statements of that difference principle, before 1971, actually said it in that open-ended way: make sure that the inequalities are to everyone's advantage, including the least-advantaged. Now, by 1971, he's actually changing his story, in a seemingly subtle but in fact momentous way.”
- The job of a basic structure is not to pick a particular outcome but to put people in a position to pursue their own plans without threatening each other, like traffic rules that minimize the cost of everyone reaching their own destinations; Rawls's insistence on selecting a specific outcome is a subtle but major turn in the wrong direction.
“the reason we want to agree that red means stop and green means go, is that we want to minimize the cost for everyone, including the least advantaged, of getting to their destinations. So, the point isn't to be maximally advantageous; the point isn't to get everyone to the same destination.”
- Rawls's difference principle holds that you distribute inequalities so as to be to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged, tolerating unequal shares only when even the smallest share is larger than it would be under strict equality because the variable-sized pie grows under unequal division.
“It says you distribute inequalities in such a way that even the least advantaged ends up more advantaged than would be possible under a more egalitarian scheme. That principle is called the difference principle--distribute inequalities so as to be to the greatest advantage of the least advantaged.”
- Nozick distinguishes principles of justice into current time-slice principles (judge a distribution by a snapshot of share sizes regardless of how they arose), end-state principles (judge by a fuller picture such as lifetime income), and patterned principles (require distribution to track a pattern such as merit or absence of discrimination); he classifies Rawls's difference principle as patterned and argues for a historical alternative instead.
“He distinguishes between historical and patterned principles, and he says that Rawls's theory is actually a patterned principle, based on a patterned principle, the difference principle, and that is, Nozick wants us to consider an historical alternative.”
- Rawls's Theory of Justice treats theorizing about justice as modeling fairness, asking what would make shares fair, where the intuitive starting point is dividing a pie into equal shares.
“he sees theorizing about justice as a project of modeling a kind of fairness, like different things can be fair, and evaluation can be fair or not, and shares can be fair or not”
Concentrating state power to solve problems generates escalating corruption as power becomes valuable and subject to capture, regardless of initial intentions.
- Following Hayek, there is always a reason—often a genuinely good one—to create more state power because some unsolved problem always arises that seems to need a czar, committee, or agency; but the result of creating that power is power that gets captured and auctioned to the highest bidder, so one must weigh the reasons at every step.
“There's always a reason, even a good reason, to create more power. There's always a problem coming up that hasn't been solved where we think we need a Czar or a committee or an agency”
- The dynamic that absolute power corrupts absolutely is a real-world mechanism: the more power available, the more it is worth acquiring, so the more people will invest in and be unscrupulous about acquiring it—spending and lying to get it—which means even well-meaning grants of power to solve real problems generate escalating corruption.
“the more power there is available, the more that that power is worth; the more it's worth to acquire that power; and so the more people will invest and the more unscrupulous they will be in doing whatever it takes to acquire that power”
- The main concern with granting state power is that it will not be used for the purpose for which it was ostensibly created but for whatever purposes the person currently holding that power happens to have—illustrated by King Leopold, who was constrained and popular in Belgium but unconstrained and murderous in the Congo.
“power is not going to be used for the purpose for which it was ostensibly created. It's going to be used for the purposes that the person holding that power currently has.”
Cognitive processing constraints make perfect impartiality impossible, requiring deliberate scholarly effort to counteract inherent bias.
- The Veil of Ignorance is a thought-experiment about our actual world, not a different one; it asks us to imagine viewing our world impartially while still knowing general facts of economics, sociology, and psychology, but not the particular facts that determine our own payoff.
“It's not meant to be theorizing about a different world. It's meant to be theorizing about our world, but meant to make us kind of envision what it would be like to be looking at our world impartially.”
- Because our minds process information one bit at a time, the first information we acquire becomes a default that requires extra energy and evidence to overturn, which inescapably produces bias; we cannot escape this and would not be better off if we could, so scholars must consciously strive for impartiality.
“we process bits of information one at a time, and the first bits of information we acquire are going to become the defaults, and it's going to take more energy and so on, and evidence to overturn those defaults. And that results in bias.”
- If everyone were a common owner of the earth, nobody could do anything—we would not even have the right to take a breath or stand our ground without the permission of every other human—so universal common ownership cannot be the correct account of property, a Lockean point against Filmer's premise.
“if it were the case that we all were common owners, then nobody could do anything. We'd all be paralyzed. We wouldn't have the right to take a breath or to stand, even just to simply stand our ground without getting the permission of everybody else in the human race to stand there.”
- Deeply compelling emotional convictions about justice and injustice make poor premises for arguments but good conclusions; if you can derive them from your arguments that is interesting, but merely insisting on them is not.
“these table-thumping, deeply compelling emotional beliefs about justice and injustice--they don't make great premises for arguments. They are better as conclusions.”
- Rawls's Veil of Ignorance asks people to decide distributive questions as if they don't know who they are—not knowing their talents, risk tolerance, or social position—so that decisions about what someone like Russ Roberts should get are made impartially rather than self-servingly.
“if you decide here's what Russ Roberts should get and you don't know that you are Russ Roberts, well then the answer you come up with will be a lot more impartial than if you do know that you are Russ Roberts. So pretend you don't know who you are.”
- Nozick told Schmidtz his genuine departure from libertarianism was limited to rejecting voluntary self-enslavement: having earlier argued a man should be free to sell himself into slavery (even to save his daughter), he later concluded that a country which is to stand for freedom cannot allow the emergence of a class of slaves, so such contracts are unconscionable and unenforceable—but otherwise he had not changed much.
“I want you to know that my departure from libertarianism has been greatly exaggerated.”
- Nozick told Schmidtz that beyond the slavery issue, his apparent abandonment of libertarianism was a moment of weakness: after winning a rent-control suit against his landlord Erich Segal and being welcomed back by colleagues who had treated him as a pariah, he simply enjoyed not being vilified and let the misunderstanding stand rather than correct it.
“it was a moment of weakness on my part, but it was so nice for people to be slapping me on the back and telling me that they had faith in me... I just liked to not be vilified for a change.”
Rawls revitalized political philosophy by dragging it back to practical normative questions after decades of mere conceptual analysis.
- Rawls's discussion group and mentors included James Buchanan, Ken Arrow, William Riker, and Amartya Sen, making the young Rawls deeply versed in the game theory and welfare economics of his time.
“Among his friends were James Buchanan, Ken Arrow, William Riker, Amartya Sen. And these folks were different generations, too. But that was a group of people that formed--these were Rawls's friends and mentors, his discussion group.”
- Rawls more than anyone else broke the equilibrium in which moral and political philosophers merely defined terms and poked holes in definitions, dragging the profession back to engaging hard practical questions about what to do, after philosophy had proudly come to have nothing to say about politics or ethics.
“philosophy had almost proudly come to a state where it had nothing to say about politics. Or ethics, for that matter.”
- Rawls has been far more influential inside the Academy than any other 20th-century philosopher, reshaping not just philosophy but the social sciences, whereas Peter Singer has had greater influence outside the Academy through work on animal welfare while having relatively little influence within it.
“Rawls has been much more influential inside the Academy, I think, by far, than any other philosopher in the 20th century.”
Desert-based claims to earnings face the objection that success depends on contributions from many others, not individual effort alone.
- A counterpoint to desert-based entitlement holds that one's success depends not only on one's own work but on the work of parents, grandparents, teachers, employers, grocers, and cabdrivers—all of society worked to put the individual in their position—so the community has a claim on the resulting holdings.
“It's your parents that worked and your grandparents that worked and actually your parents' employers, your parents' teachers, your parents' grocers, cabdrivers. So, all of society worked to put you in the situation that you are in.”