David Owen on the Environment, Unintended Consequences, and The Conundrum
What this covers
David Owen, author of The Conundrum, joins Russ Roberts to argue that the standard toolkit of environmental solutions—energy efficiency, renewable energy, and green consumption choices—fails to address climate change and often makes it worse. The discussion centers on a historical pattern: as civilization has made production more efficient, total energy consumption has risen rather than fallen. Owen frames this as a fundamental economic reality: efficiency makes energy cheaper, which encourages more use across both intensive margins (people use more of what's cheaper) and extensive margins (products get bigger, more abundant). He illustrates this through examples ranging from the transistor to refrigeration to airline travel, arguing that unintended consequences flow from every well-intentioned intervention.
The conversation pivots into specific domains where green intuitions mislead. Locavorism violates basic economics by forcing inefficient production on unsuitable land. Traffic congestion measures, by making driving cheaper and easier, worsen the actual problem—driving itself. Electric cars and solar panels address symptoms rather than root causes. The exchange becomes most counterintuitive when discussing density: New York City, despite its concrete sprawl, stands as one of America's greenest places because the per-capita energy footprint of a New Yorker is far lower than that of a suburban or rural dweller. Owen attributes this paradox to physical constraints that make sprawling consumption patterns impossible. The pair also weighs whether adaptation to climate change should rival mitigation in urgency, and whether incentives embedded in zoning, subsidies, and fuel pricing make the environmental problem structurally resistant to the solutions on offer.
Owen argues that energy efficiency and 'green' innovations paradoxically increase total energy consumption rather than reducing it, so only large reductions in consumption (or radically reframing the problem) can address climate impact—and dense urban living, counterintuitively, is among the greenest ways to live.
- Historically, doing more with less energy has driven prosperity and rising total energy use, not falling consumption (rebound/Jevons effect)
- Density (e.g., New York City) constrains per-capita energy, water, and resource use far more effectively than rural 'green' living
- Popular green gestures (recycling, locavorism, electric cars, solar/wind) are largely symbolic and don't address the underlying consumption problem
Efficiency improvements throughout history amplify consumption rather than reduce it.
- Even when acting with the best intentions, our efforts to solve energy and climate problems often produce results at cross purposes with our goals; scientific innovation, increased efficiency, and good intentions frequently make energy and climate problems worse rather than better.
“the conundrum is that even when we are acting with the very best of intentions, the results are very often at cross purposes with our goals”
- At the global level, energy use per capita is climbing rather than falling, total energy use is climbing faster than population, and it is expected to roughly double by mid-century while population is not expected to grow at the same rate—because as we get better at doing things, we do more things.
“the intensive margin is that when something gets a little cheaper, I use a little bit more of it. The extensive margin is that the bottles get bigger, more plastic is demanded; that's more petroleum used.”
- The transistor, invented in the late 1940s, did all the things efficiency would predict—smaller, less material, less energy per unit—but the effect was not that devices simply shrank while doing the same work; instead consumption exploded, with billions of transistors now in a single household, so efficiency-driven miniaturization multiplied rather than reduced total resource use.
“It wasn't that consumption fell. On the contrary--it exploded. And those two trends are not unrelated.”
- When things become cheaper, we tend to do more of them; airplanes today are roughly 70% more fuel efficient than decades ago, yet we don't fly less or consume less fuel—the main impediment to long vacation travel is now perceived unpleasantness, not ticket cost.
“Airplanes today are something like 70% more fuel efficient than they were when I first started flying. I'm 56. And yet we don't fly less. We don't consume less fuel.”
- Energy efficiency—doing more with less fuel—is not a new invention but something civilization has done throughout its history; rather than causing global energy consumption to fall, this continuous efficiency improvement has been the very source of our prosperity, so there is no basis to expect that the same process will now reduce energy consumption.
“the intensive margin is that when something gets a little cheaper, I use a little bit more of it. The extensive margin is that the bottles get bigger, more plastic is demanded; that's more petroleum used.”
- Using a thought experiment from early human history when food was the only energy input, inventing the wheel reduced the energy needed to move things, but humans did not respond by gathering less food—instead the wheel acted as an amplifier of consumption, freeing energy for new uses and multiplying feedback loops, illustrating that efficiency historically expands rather than contracts consumption.
“we do not expect in this thought experiment for the human population to cut back its food gathering now that it needs less. We expect the wheel to act as an amplifier of consumption.”
- Vastly increased and ubiquitous refrigeration capacity (hotel rooms, gas stations, second home refrigerators) has improved life by keeping food fresh, but it has also driven up consumption—e.g., the 20-ounce soda—and American food waste has grown right along with refrigeration capacity.
“The amount of food that is wasted by American consumers has grown right along with the increased refrigeration capacity.”
Solutions addressing the wrong problem—convenience over root cause—make environmental damage worse.
- Traffic congestion is not an environmental problem but a driving problem—driving is the environmental problem—so measures that ease congestion (more lanes, smart traffic systems, parking-finder apps, audiobooks) actually make the real problem worse by making driving more convenient and pleasant.
“Traffic congestion is not an environmental problem. It's a driving problem. Driving is the environmental problem. So, if you think of congestion as the problem, then almost everything you do actually makes the real problem worse”
- Framing renewable energy as 'how to power a car' makes it a huge engineering problem because storage is the bottleneck—solar is too dispersed, recharging via rooftop panels would take weeks, and you need to deliver large power bursts from stop to highway speed and store enough for a day's drive—so no level of ingenuity makes that affordable at, say, $1/day; flipping to delivering minimal cheap electricity makes the problem solvable.
“if you think of the renewable energy problem as how to power a car, it's a huge engineering problem, because storage is a problem... solar energy is too dispersed. You need a huge storage; it's extremely expensive.”
- Increasing a car's miles per gallon is economically equivalent to decreasing the cost of fuel—it makes a mile less expensive to drive—so the same logic that says expensive fuel is good for the environment implies that fuel efficiency, by cheapening driving, is bad.
“When you increase the miles per gallon in the car, you are doing the same thing as decreasing the cost of the fuel. You are just making a mile less expensive to drive.”
- A genuinely green car would look more like a golf cart—no doors, no heater, very low top speed—usable to get a child to the hospital but not for tooling around the country all day; the implication is that real environmental solutions for driving require making driving less pleasant.
“I was thinking it would probably look something more like a golf cart. It wouldn't have doors on it. It wouldn't have a heater. It would have a very low top speed.”
Unintended consequences undermine nearly all policy solutions because problems adapt and innovate alongside interventions.
- Hundreds of millions of people have no access to electricity; when they get it the benefits (health care, education, longevity) are real and good, but it compounds energy problems because an electric light extends the workday past sunset, and when consumption rises in one category it eventually rises in all—they want cars, refrigerators, and more.
“when you have an electric light, your workday doesn't end when the sun goes down. Your energy consumption rises in other categories. And when it rises in one category, it rises in all, eventually.”
- The U.S. military had roughly 300,000 buildings until recently with no metering of electricity or water and thus no incentive to conserve; only with budget pressure to shrink does an incentive to think about energy emerge—and the military as a single entity is probably the world's single largest energy consumer, with jet fuel measured in gallons per mile.
“they had 300,000 American buildings and until very recently none of them had metering of any kind. Electricity or water. There's no incentive.”
- We tend to identify a problem and imagine it sitting still while we offer a solution, but problems innovate as well—and often have better funding than solutions; the sudden abundance of natural gas, which raised reserve estimates and pushed down prices, is an example of the problem innovating.
“problems innovate, too. You tend to think, you identify a problem, you just imagine the problem sitting still while we offer a solution to it. But in fact the problem is innovating as well; and it often has better funding than the solution does.”
- Natural gas has been rebranded as 'great for the environment' but it is a fossil fuel; its sudden abundance has taken the wind out of wind power, and rather than being a 'bridge fuel' to renewables, if it is a bridge to anything it is a bridge back to coal—because once gas runs out we'll reconsider what we disliked about coal and burn it again.
“If natural gas is a bridge to anything, it is a bridge to coal. Because when we get to the end of it, if we ever do, then we'll say: What was it we didn't like about coal? And go on to burning it.”
- When evaluating any proposed solution, the key question is what the unintended consequences will be—indeed, in Owen's framing, all consequences are unintended consequences, a position supported by the history of science.
“what are the unintended consequences? All consequences are unintended consequences. And if you look back through the history of science, there is support for that position.”
Dense urban living, especially New York City, produces far smaller per-capita environmental footprint than sprawl.
- New York City is one of the last places in the country where walking is a primary form of transportation, which is probably one of the reasons New Yorkers live longer than other Americans.
“That's why New Yorkers live longer than other Americans, probably it's one of the reasons. NYC is one of the very last places in the country where walking is a primary form of transportation.”
- New York City, despite appearing to be an environmental disaster of concrete and fumes, is actually among the greenest places to live because density forces a very small per-capita energy footprint—New Yorkers use the least energy per capita of any Americans and New York State has the lowest per-capita energy use of any state because of NYC.
“what you really have is a large number of people living on a very small energy footprint. New Yorkers use the smallest amount of energy per capita of any Americans.”
- Density has tremendous value for constraining energy, water, and resource use because moving people closer together makes driving difficult or impossible; half of all US subway stops and nearly a third of US public transit passenger miles are in the NYC metro area, and 77% of Manhattan households own no car—because density makes driving impractical.
“Half of all subway stops in the United States are in NYC; almost a third of all public service passenger transit miles are in the NYC metropolitan area”
- All the incentives—home-buying subsidies, transportation networks, cheap fuel, and especially zoning regulations—push people toward suburban sprawl rather than density; zoning rules grew up with the automobile and are framed to create distance between uses and ensure everyone always has a place to park, making environmentally valuable density less likely.
“All our zoning regulations encourage what we call sprawl, suburban sprawl. They are all framed in terms of creating distance between uses rather than shrinking it.”
Real environmental improvement requires accepting reduced comfort and convenience, not technological fixes.
- MIT chemist Daniel Nocera's 'artificial leaf' uses sunlight to split water into hydrogen and oxygen; his approach inverts the usual energy problem by asking how to deliver a minimal level of power (about 100 watts) cheaply to the hundreds of millions with no electricity, rather than how to power a car—because solving the energy problem from the bottom of the global income scale makes the chemistry and engineering tractable and could eventually yield technologies that let everyone live comfortably at smaller impact.
“He is most famous for inventing what he calls the artificial leaf--it basically uses sunlight to split water into hydrogen and oxygen.”
- Beyond carbon, increased affluence reaches a point where it ceases to increase wellbeing and can even reduce our sense of wellbeing—houses too big, commutes too long, and health care spending that rises without a corresponding increase in actual health—showing that treating increased economic activity as the only source of good is mistaken.
“the point at which our increased affluence ceases to increase our wellbeing, and in some ways can reduce our sense of wellbeing... houses that are too big, with commutes that are too long”
- Reducing our environmental imprint does not necessarily mean making life worse; it can mean finding different sources of wellbeing beyond income—not burning up money on an oversized house or thousands of extra miles—so thinking about consuming less can mean thinking about living better, not worse.
“thinking about less doesn't necessarily mean thinking about worse, in many categories. I think it means thinking about better.”
Environmental groups and cultural intuitions about nature drive harmful suburban consumption patterns.
- Demanding that goods be produced locally—e.g., requiring cotton clothing to come from a field within 25 or 100 miles—makes no sense because it would force inefficient production on land unsuited to it, wasting resources; the locavore intuition fails when you think more than one step through the problem.
“It wouldn't make any sense at all to demand that my cotton clothing come from a cotton field within 25 or 100 miles of where I live... if you had to grow cotton that inefficiently, you'd be using up land that shouldn't be producing that.”
- Environmental groups, from Thoreau and Muir to the Sierra Club, have done a disservice by impressing the idea that urban life is evil and that authenticity requires personal contact with the green world; this drives people into rural settings at great cost in personal environmental damage and energy consumption.
“groups like the Sierra Club that I pick on in the book have done a disservice to the environment by making us feel... that we need this personal contact with the green world... but at great cost in terms of our personal environmental damage and energy consumption”
Global scale and rational incentive structures, not individual action or moral psychology, determine climate outcomes.
- The low and declining sense of emergency about climate change among educated people is not because they haven't thought about it or reject science; rather they have consciously thought about it and decided the potential downside of action is not worth the potential upside.
“I think it's because people have consciously thought about it and decided the potential downside is not worth the potential upside.”
- Because climate is a global problem spanning a huge range of affluence levels, individual actions like setting cans at the curb are not enough—every individual bit doesn't count because the problem is so large—and even national-level action is insufficient; it requires global action, which seems discouragingly inconceivable.
“what you do as an individual is not enough; every individual bit doesn't count because it's a huge problem. Even at a national level it's not sufficient.”
- In 2008 there was an actual global reduction in energy use and carbon output—not because people became green but because the price of oil rose sharply and the global economy tanked; this shows we know how to push down global energy use and carbon output through price, since people threatened in their livelihood consume less.
“in 2008, we saw an actual reduction globally in energy use and carbon output. The reason wasn't that everybody suddenly became green. It was the price of oil went way high, and the global economy tanked.”
- If an asteroid were bearing down on Earth, people would respond unemotionally and clearly because there would be no implicit self-criticism in the threat; climate change is harder to address rationally precisely because it carries an implicit criticism of ourselves, whereas the U.S. military approaches climate in a bracingly unemotional, non-ideological way.
“if an asteroid were bearing down on the Earth, people would be much less emotional about deciding whether we were going to do something about it, because we wouldn't feel that there was this sort of implicit criticism of yourself”
Adaptation must accompany climate mitigation because stopping all environmental change is neither realistic nor universally believed.
- Even if you believe we must try to stop climate change, you still must plan for adaptation, because no one who advocates stopping it believes our actions will make the effects disappear; the Pentagon, with sea-level bases, is already planning for a meter of sea-level rise over the coming half-century or century—affecting not just bases but the communities that support them—so even someone like Bill McKibben must think about adaptation alongside prevention.
“even if you believe we have to try to stop it, you still should be thinking about the adaptation question, too, because nobody who talks about stopping it thinks that anything we can do will cause the effects to disappear.”
Gasoline is remarkably cheap compared to other retail liquids, rarely noted in cost debates.
- Gasoline is probably the cheapest manufactured liquid for sale at a gas station—milk and bottled water inside the same station cost more—a fact rarely noted in debates about whether energy is too cheap.
“gasoline is probably the cheapest manufactured liquid that is for sale there. You go inside there and milk costs more. Bottled water costs more.”
- In any field, including environmentalism, there is a great deal of comfortable thinking; sometimes comfortable thinking is accurate, but often it is not, and conventional wisdom is frequently not a good guide to the truth.
“there's lots of comfortable thinking. And sometimes comfortable thinking is accurate. But sometimes it's not. And the conventional wisdom is often not a good guide to the truth.”
- In the United States today there are more registered automobiles than licensed drivers.
“In the United States today we have more registered automobiles than we have licensed drivers.”
- Children today cannot experience boredom the way people did in the late 1950s and early 1960s—the whole concept of that kind of boredom no longer exists—and losing the ability to gaze off and be pensive may not be a good thing.
“your kids today... I think that you and I experienced boredom in a way a modern child can't. The whole concept of late 1950s, early 1960s boredom just doesn't exist any more.”