What this covers
Steve Meyer, a music industry veteran and former Capitol Records marketer, speaks with Russ Roberts on EconTalk about how the digital revolution has reshaped music economics. Meyer's core argument inverts the conventional panic: the internet is not destroying the music business but revealing its true structure. He traces this shift through the careers of major and independent artists, record label economics, and the changing role of radio and retail, arguing that the industry's struggles stem not from technology but from an inability to reimagine revenue streams and artist development.
The conversation ranges across concrete examples and broader economic principles. Meyer shows how familiarity—not scarcity—now drives value; Lady Gaga's viral YouTube success before radio play and Susan Boyle's emotional connection through visual media illustrate how emotional connection outweighs traditional channels. He details the 360 model through Live Nation's Madonna deal, demonstrating that major labels already abandoned record sales as their primary revenue source. Radio emerges as a cautionary tale: homogenized playlists have made the medium nearly obsolete, while independent artists sustain themselves through relentless touring and marketing enabled by the internet—a model unavailable before digital distribution. Meyer also challenges simpler narratives: research shows illegal downloaders buy more music legally than others, and new artists now build audiences to 50,000–100,000 album sales through peer-to-peer networks before achieving radio play. The discussion touches a deeper worry—whether future generations, raised on free music, will sustain the economic incentives for artists to enter the field—though Meyer suggests innovation may yet create unforeseen revenue models.
Meyer argues the internet is not the music industry's enemy but its greatest opportunity, because it shifts value from scarcity to familiarity and lets artists monetize through touring, licensing, and emotional connection rather than record sales—failures to adapt are failures of imagination, not technology.
- Independent artists report they could not make a living without the internet, surviving via touring and relentless marketing
- Net revenue from live performance and licensing far exceeds record-sales revenue for major artists
- Value is driven by familiarity, not scarcity—giving music away widely enhances a creator's value
Record labels fundamentally misunderstand their role and the economics of artist development in the modern era.
- Like other industries facing a sea change, the music industry has had trouble adjusting; rather than a technological problem, the challenge facing record companies is fundamentally a failure of imagination in exploiting new distribution channels.
“A lot of times industries have a sea change like this; obviously trouble adjusting.”
- The widespread belief that a label simply puts out a record and keeps the money is wrong; the label spends a fortune on marketing, promotion, and videos, and securing radio play today is harder than ever—which is why new artists now develop themselves via peer-to-peer sharing and YouTube, often selling 50,000-100,000 albums before they get radio play.
“everybody thinks all you have to do today is you make your record, and the label signs it and they just put it out... That's just wrong. The label spends a fortune in marketing, promotion, videos.”
- Contrary to the belief that labels arbitrarily pick and choose which records to promote, no record label cares where its hits come from—they want every release to sell because every signed artist receives an advance, but radio ultimately selects records for its own reasons beyond the label's control.
“No record label cares where their hits come from. A hit is a hit. Would love every record they put out to sell.”
- The pre-digital music business model relied solely on either an already-established public figure (like Elvis or Sinatra) or on securing radio play; labels marketed to radio audiences and depended on strong retail distribution channels.
“Labels based on a model reliant solely on one or two things: either you had an established artist that was in the public light previously--literally from the 1950s Elvis Presley or Frank Sinatra--or everything was established via radio play.”
Video, film, television, and live performance now drive music discovery and revenue far more than radio ever did.
- Artists can use the web virally to build hits before radio: Lady Gaga's Bad Romance racked up nearly 10 million YouTube views overnight before being pushed to radio, reaching 25 million views before entering the Top 10, signaling the record was destined to hit Number 1—demonstrating that all media is a marketing tool.
“before Lady Gaga released Bad Romance to radio, right before it went out, the single wasn't pushed at radio, almost simultaneously, overnight on YouTube almost 10 million views”
- Susan Boyle's success illustrates a subtle point: hearing 'I Dreamed a Dream' on the radio is not the same as seeing the staged, emotionally charged YouTube clip where she wows skeptical judges; the emotional connection generated by visual media—YouTube, American Idol's months-long audience bond, TV placements like Journey in The Sopranos or Glee—drives music sales in a way radio no longer does.
“If just heard song I Dreamed a Dream on the radio--had a great voice; but thought about buying album because of emotional connection, clip on YouTube... wows the audience and judges. Not the same song as if you just heard it on the radio.”
- Film and television have become powerful music-discovery and revenue engines because they create emotional connection: songs like Sia's track in Six Feet Under and Yael Naim's spread virally after placement, soundtracks like Forrest Gump and Beverly Hills Cop sold enormously off their films, and producers are now inundated with artists wanting placement on shows like Mad Men.
“What happens with great music when coupled with great movies--Forrest Gump, sound track did great because of the movie”
- Wilco offered their album as the first free downloadable album online because they knew their record-sales revenue was far less than what they earned from live appearances; the strategy worked, the album still sold 300,000-400,000 copies, and they were signed by a Warner Music Group label.
“Band did it because they knew the money they were making from their record sales wasn't near what they were making from their live appearances.”
Piracy does not destroy music sales; illegal downloaders are heavy legal purchasers and industry revenue decline has other causes.
- Multiple studies worldwide have found that the people who download music illegally also tend to be the biggest consumers of legally purchased music, undercutting the simple narrative that piracy purely destroys sales.
“studies all over the world that have been done that have cited that those who download music illegally also happen to be the biggest consumers of legal music”
- A 2009 Forrester Research report showed the record industry's revenues fell from $14.6 billion to $6.3 billion over the decade from 1999 to 2009, a decline the industry attributes to online piracy.
“Report in 2009 by Forrester Research shows that the record industry in one decade, from 199-2009, went from $14.6 billion to $6.3 billion in revenues.”
Artists and labels must price competitively, develop talent through new channels, and recognize that touring and ancillary revenue now exceed album sales.
- Hundreds of independent artists report that without the internet they could not make a living; while none get rich or have big hits, they sustain themselves by marketing and touring relentlessly, because the internet has changed their ability to gain notoriety and generate revenue.
“Couple of hundred independent artists receive my newsletter; all say that if it weren't for the Internet, they couldn't make a living.”
- For major artists like U2 or Bruce Springsteen, net concert revenue after production costs is far higher than what they earn from record sales; the same is true for smaller acts like Wilco, where touring, licensing, and merchandising dwarf the split revenues from a 400,000-selling album—and this has likely always been true, but the modern problem is artists no longer release album after album.
“The amount of money that U-2 or Bruce Springsteen grossed from their concerts, after you take off their production costs, can still see that the net revenue to the artists is way higher than what it is from their record sales.”
- To keep a CD in the marketplace longer and to sell music in the digital era, artists and labels should lower their prices and stop releasing albums with only one or two good tracks, since consumers will not pay $10 for an album with one good song.
“If you are interested in keeping your CD in the marketplace for a longer period of time, lower your prices. Don't release albums with one or two good tracks.”
- The modern 360 model—exemplified by Live Nation signing Madonna to a $100 million, 10-year deal guaranteeing $10 million a year for her records, tour revenue, and merchandising—shows labels no longer count on record sales but on ancillary revenue streams like commercials and licensing, since they aren't expecting a 50-year-old Madonna to sell $50 million in records.
“360 model--Live Nation signed Madonna to a hundred million dollar deal for 10 years... get her records, her tour revenue, her merchandising.”
The pre-digital retail and CD model generated artificial profits by converting existing catalogs; digital distribution demands new monetization strategies.
- Vinyl records, which cost only about a dollar to make in the old days, now cost more to produce than they did then because there are far fewer plants capable of making them, even as vinyl has returned as a large niche market.
“Vinyl has come back as a huge niche market, but not many vinyl plants around, so it costs more to make vinyl today because there are not as many places that can make it.”
- The intuitive marketing logic that placing albums in thousands of retail outlets like Starbucks (or hypothetically McDonald's or China) would automatically multiply sales does not work in practice—it succeeded with the Ray Charles album but failed with the Paul McCartney album.
“to a marketing person, first thought is there's 10,000 Starbucks; we'll put 5 albums in every one... Doesn't work that way.”
- The CD format dramatically increased label profits because labels could convert their existing catalogs to digital and resell music they already owned to consumers who re-bought what they had on vinyl, cassette, or 8-track, all without spending heavily on new artists.
“Labels could make a lot of money converting catalogs to digital without spending a lot of money on artists--reselling to the public a lot of the music they already had.”
- The critical element missing from today's music market is the great record store; people miss the emotional connection and the experience of browsing and spending time, as exemplified by Amoeba Records in Los Angeles which recreates something like Tower Records' heyday—an experience iTunes cannot replicate.
“Critical element that's missing today is the great record store. People miss the emotional connection.”
- The Beatles catalog still isn't sold digitally and is being stolen daily, representing missed value; iTunes can't create rich packaged offerings (buy this and get something else) without the labels because the labels own the content.
“The Beatles have--still not for sale digitally, and every day it's not people are stealing it--imagine what they could do by packaging it”
- Unlike the movie industry, initial sales projections for new music acts in the pre-digital era were not that hard because experienced executives could assess an artist and set realistic baselines (e.g., 50,000-100,000 to build on), though over- and under-projections still happened.
“Initial projections back then not that hard. Experience: an artist you looked at; went out and secured the talent.”
- iTunes has become the number one online music store worldwide through superb branding, but it is not a label—it doesn't go out and secure or develop talent—because Steve Jobs has no vested interest in making CDs or operating in the brick-and-mortar world, only in selling digital music and iPods.
“iTunes is a store and an online store, but not a label, don't go out and secure talent.”
Radio has become economically irrelevant because homogenization destroyed the personalities and local identity that once attracted listeners.
- Meyer's lecture audiences reveal a generational shift: when asked, almost no one listens to radio for new music, everyone has iPods and goes online, about 95% share files with friends, and nearly 70% still buy music—demonstrating that the old radio-driven model cannot be revived.
“First question to ask when lecturing: How many of you listen to radio for new music? Maybe 1 or 2 hands go up.”
- The era of distinctive radio personalities and disc jockeys is over because stations no longer allow that kind of on-air talent; gifted communicators who once defined stations like WNEW now have no place in modern radio.
“Personalities gone today. If you had that talent--you can't be a DJ today. The stations don't allow it any more.”
- Radio is dying—revenues down, stocks now penny stocks—largely because it has become homogenized: every market plays the same 30-40 records that are 95-98% identical, and the personalities and local identity that once distinguished stations like KMET in LA or WNEW in NYC are gone, leaving little reason for entertainment-seeking listeners to tune in.
“If you go into any market today, you hear the same 30-40 records... Records 95-98% the same.”