Two Cheers for Libertarianism and Econ 101 (with Noah Smith)
What this covers
Noah Smith and Russ Roberts discuss why Smith has revised his assessment of libertarianism and introductory economics upward, prompted by Donald Trump's tariff policies. Smith argues that he had fixated on marginal theoretical flaws while missing the inframarginal political achievement: anchoring the American Right in economic liberty was historically unusual and valuable. Ronald Reagan's conservatism, unlike the corporatist Right elsewhere, made free markets a core pillar. That achievement has now eroded, displaced not by better arguments but by immigration backlash and identity politics that rendered economic-policy debate politically irrelevant around 2015. The conversation ranges across why Models as Useful Fictions—supply and demand curves, perfect competition—remain powerful despite being literally untrue, illustrated through housing costs in San Francisco and minimum wage effects in concentrated labor markets.
Beyond economic tools, the speakers address why libertarianism has failed as a political movement. Milton Friedman and other figures never grappled with identity and national belonging, leaving libertarians defenseless against the tribalism that grassroots conservatism demanded. Smith reflects on larger historical questions: why America's response to crisis differed from totalitarian regimes, how Franklin Delano Roosevelt's "rainbow mosaic" framing of American identity worked for decades, and whether social media has now destroyed the moderate center irreparably. Roberts pushes back on claims that America ever was a free-market paradise, noting Reagan imposed Japanese car quotas. The discussion also covers industrial policy as potentially justified for defense, the difference between norm erosion and mere corner-cutting in governance, and why Trump's tariffs fail even on their own merits, while the politically dead TPP approach would have succeeded.
Smith argues that libertarianism and Econ 101 deserve more credit than he previously gave them: their political value lay not at the margin but in the rare 'inframarginal' achievement of anchoring an American conservatism in economic freedom, and their simple models, while unrealistic, remain powerfully useful for avoiding policy mistakes.
- Marginal thinking blinded Smith to the large-scale (inframarginal) good libertarianism did by keeping the American Right oriented toward economic liberty, which is historically rare.
- Immigration backlash and identity politics displaced economic-policy debate, dissolving the libertarian wing's relevance.
- Econ 101 models like supply and demand are not literally true but are useful tools that should be paired with empirical estimation.
Economics education and policymaking must ground theory in empirical evidence about how markets actually function rather than abstract models.
- Econ 101's flaw is that it is too theoretical and not empirical enough; rather than teaching only abstract supply and demand, it should engage with evidence—teaching how to estimate a demand curve, how to know whether monopoly power exists in a market, and how to determine which of two competing stylized models applies—giving economics the joy of figuring out how the world really works, like physics experiments.
“my critique of Econ 101 was that it was too theoretical, not empirical enough.”
- The basic supply-and-demand insight that building more housing lowers prices is hard for people to believe for the same reason it is hard to estimate empirically: when 100,000 people flood into San Francisco and only 10,000 houses are built, observers see the visible supply response (cranes, buildings) and rising prices and conclude 'supply and demand is fake,' missing the larger unobserved demand shock that outweighed the supply increase.
“the reason it's hard to get people to believe it is the same reason why it's hard to estimate empirically, your basic supply and demand model.”
- Economics offers competing stylized models—perfect competition predicts minimum wage hikes cut jobs, while the monopsony model predicts some wage increases can create jobs—and since neither is what's actually happening, you must use empirics ('look out the window') to determine which model applies and how big the trade-offs are, because policy depends on getting the model choice right.
“if you pull out the old monopoly model, you say there's some amount that you can raise the minimum wage where you will create jobs.”
- Marinescu's research on local labor market concentration found that in highly concentrated markets (a small town with one big Walmart or chicken-processing plant employing everyone), minimum wage hikes show very small or even positive employment effects, while in more competitive labor markets there are bigger negative effects—exactly what the competing perfect-competition and monopsony theories predict.
“Where you've got these very concentrated small labor markets, you see very small or even positive effects of minimum wage unemployment; where in, like, more competitive labor markets... You'll see a bigger negative effect.”
- High school and undergraduate physics students do the same experiments Galileo did—dropping balls and timing them to measure gravitational acceleration—giving them the joy of discovering how the world really works, a joy Smith argues economics education should replicate through empirical engagement.
“We do the same thing in undergrad in high school physics that Galileo was doing. He was a little smarter, because he thought of it first.”
A capable state is essential to protect freedom because private actors and local power can oppress people as effectively as government.
- State power is not the only kind of power in society; if the state keeps entirely hands-off, local bullies (segregationist businesses, churches covering up abuse) can oppress people, so a strong state is needed to countermand the 'little bullies'—a role libertarianism underemphasized.
“libertarianism always under-emphasized the degree to which you need the big bully of the state to kind of countermand the little bullies; to which you need dad to say, 'Stop beating up your sister,' without being an abusive parent himself.”
- Even if one values freedom intrinsically, preserving freedom over time requires the ability to defend against bad actors, which may justify industrial policy to maintain a peacetime manufacturing base that can surge into wartime production, as the U.S. did in WWII.
“if industrial policy is necessary to have the peacetime manufacturing capacity to be able to surge production during wartime, like we did in World War II.”
- Every society that gets to choose freely chooses some form of welfare state—redistribution from rich to poor—because the marginal utility of a dollar is higher for the poor, even though taxation distorts the economy (the 'leaky bucket'); the relentless drive to eliminate the welfare state was misguided since even economically free Singapore gives citizens a house.
“every society that gets to choose, chooses this. They choose welfarism. And they choose to take some from the rich and give some to the poor.”
American exceptionalism lies in choosing democratic freedom during crises and developing a uniquely libertarian-inflected conservatism and inclusive national identity.
- Crisis enables greatness but does not confer it: America's four singular leaders (Washington, Lincoln, FDR, Reagan) faced major crises with great popularity that gave them a choice of what their nation would become, but unlike Hitler, Stalin, Lenin, Mao, and Pol Pot who faced similar crisis-driven opportunities and chose poorly, the American leaders chose well—proving national character does not automatically determine choices.
“I think that the crisis is what enables greatness. But, the crisis does not confer greatness.”
- The Great Depression of the 1930s gave rise to authoritarianism in arguably every country—helping Hitler and Mussolini—except the United States and possibly Britain, which instead became more respectful of freedom and diversity, reversing a slide toward authoritarianism that had accelerated under Woodrow Wilson's wartime press censorship and the 1920s KKK resurgence.
“the 1930s gave rise to authoritarianism in every country--arguably every country--except ours, and maybe Britain.”
- It was historically unusual and special for a conservative movement to make economic liberty one of its core pillars: in Japan, France, Germany, Russia, and India the Political Right was corporatist, protectionist, and pro-intervention, whereas the American Right from Reagan onward was broadly libertarian—a uniqueness Smith failed to appreciate.
“In Japan, the Right was corporatist. It was protectionist, it was corporatist, it was for heavy interference in the economy.”
- FDR and his administration (and later Truman) created a vision of American identity—the 'rainbow mosaic' where one can be fully Chinese-American, both fully ethnic and fully American—that worked for a long time, was the source of ideas later repurposed for 'Woke' diversity concepts, and could restore national greatness if revived.
“FDR and Truman, these New Deal guys created a vision of American identity that worked for a long time.”
Immigration and cultural backlash, not economic logic, displaced free-market conservatism and now threaten the liberal consensus despite majority support for immigration.
- Smith's prior belief that 'Normies'—regular, mildly conservative, business-oriented average Americans—would always win and keep radicals on the outs has been overturned, because social media's 'brain poison' has destroyed the moderate center, leaving the country ruled by pseudonymous extremists (possibly a teenager from Bulgaria posing as a right-wing influencer), and possibly only authoritarian states like China can be insulated from social media's chaos.
“Mr. and Mrs. Normie have been utterly destroyed by just online brain poison of social media. And, they're gone.”
- The short answer for why the free-market wing of the Republican Party became irrelevant is immigration: Reagan was the biggest supporter of immigration, but anti-immigrant anger built up over decades, and because libertarians were insufficiently focused on the tribalism that grassroots Right demanded, the movement was eventually displaced by a temporary majority focused on cultural purification.
“libertarians were, too, were not sufficiently focused on the tribalism that a lot of the grassroots people on the Right demanded”
- A majority of Americans is still pro-immigration and wants democratic control over who gets in (a border, the ability to say yes or no), and only a minority believes kicking people out is purifying the country against pollution of Western civilization; that minority knows it's a minority but became at least a temporary majority of the Republican Party.
“even now, a majority of America is pro-immigration. Even though a majority of America wants to stop the sort of disorderly, chaotic, asylum flood”
Current policies like Trump's tariffs and healthcare arrangements fail empirically, and better-designed interventions addressing real market failures remain politically impossible.
- The United States, despite people thinking it has a private healthcare market, has large public intervention and ends up with the worst of both worlds—neither a properly functioning private market nor effective government provision.
“We have the worst of both worlds.”
- There probably are policies that would make the average American better off than perfect free trade, but Trump's protectionist approach has essentially nothing to do with those better policies, so the corrections Smith would want to make to free trade's errors will likely never be implemented.
“I do believe that there probably are policies that would make the average American better off than perfect free trade. And, I think Trump's approach has essentially nothing to do with those policies.”
- Trump's tariffs, which he believes will magically create manufacturing, in fact destroy manufacturing; the better path for industrial policy would be a large common market with all countries that might side with the US against China (the TPP/TTIP idea), but that approach is now politically dead.
“doing tariffs instead, which he thinks will magically create manufacturing when in fact they destroy manufacturing.”
- The neoliberal era can be dated from roughly Carter's deregulations around 1978 to Trump in 2016, spanning about four decades, and Smith hopes Trumpism will not similarly define American economic thinking for another four decades the way Peronism dominated Argentina for 60-70 years before Milei.
“we can say maybe the neoliberal era began with Carter and his de-regulations, which let's say 1978 or something. And then... it ended with Trump, 2016... That's, like, around four decades”
Marginal analysis missed libertarianism's large foundational benefits, and welfare states represent societies' reasoned choice to redistribute given diminishing marginal utility.
- By using marginal thinking—asking whether society should have a little more or a little less libertarianism from its current position—Smith ignored the inframarginal effect: the large submerged body of good that libertarianism did by anchoring society, which only becomes visible when considering large-scale change rather than marginal adjustments.
“What I didn't think about was the inframarginal part, the submerged bottom of the iceberg.”
- Kenneth Arrow, despite being a mathematical economist focused on Pareto efficiency, wrote that healthcare is something people simply want the government to provide, reflecting norms and expectations rather than pure efficiency logic—more than half of rich countries have government-provided health insurance.
“you have Kenneth Arrow who is just sitting there... And he just writes this paper about healthcare, and he is like, 'Look, people want government to do this, man. They want it.'”
- Clinton's 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act went much farther than California's failed Prop 87 by stripping most federal welfare from legal as well as illegal immigrants at the national level, yet Democrats were not punished because it was framed as personal responsibility rather than anti-Latino backlash.
“Clinton comes along and does, like, something 10 times more severe at the national level, because it includes legal immigrants, too.”