
MacroVoices #444 Mike Alkin: Uranium Fundamentals Couldn’t Be Better
What this covers
This is a MacroVoices interview in which hosts Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna bring back Mike Allen to walk through how the uranium market is built and why it misleads people who watch only one price. The vocabulary list splits the host and guest names into several variants, but the roles are plain: the hosts ask, and Allen explains. He begins with market plumbing. Roughly 80-85% of pounds move under long-term contracts, and the COMEX futures contract has no liquidity because its 250-pound units are tiny against typical 100,000-pound physical deals. The spot market is set by a single month-end pricing event, and he says 30-40% of its volume is trader-to-trader churn.
The middle of the conversation turns to the buyers. Allen argues that the fuel buyer is shaped by incentive misalignment: fuel is only 5-10% of a reactor's operating cost, buyers gain nothing from timing a bottom, and nobody is fired if supply is secured. He calls this structural complacency, not incompetence. He recalls his 2017 inventory work and a hostile reception at a 2018 industry conference. Townsend presses on why buyers wouldn't welcome the deficit case as cover for buying more.
The supply side covers the most ground. Allen walks the fuel cycle from mining through conversion, enrichment) and fabrication, and he names enrichment as the tightest link, with Russia holding about 40% of capacity alongside Urenco, Orano and China. He is skeptical of Kazatomprom's "value over volume" stance, reading it as forced by rising costs and by the pain of renegotiating a subsoil use agreement. He also flags a possible Chinese inventory dump as a tail risk and argues that quoted prices understate true contract terms. The final stretch is a short market postgame covering crude, equities, gold, copper and rates.
The uranium market's bullish fundamentals—driven by structural supply deficits, geopolitical risks, and surging long-term contracting demand—remain largely unpriced in spot markets because utilities are complacent, lack incentive to actively contract, and focus on near-term pricing rather than the supply-demand reality reflected in long-term contract markets.
- 85% of uranium trades in long-term contracts (up 21% this year on tight supply) while spot market (15% of volume) remains stagnant, yet investors fixate on spot price as market indicator
- Utility fuel buyers have no financial incentive to call market bottoms and remain complacent despite clear structural deficits; 25% of 2030 supply is not yet permitted or built
- Kazatomprom, expected swing producer, faces spiraling costs (from $12 to $28 per pound) and production constraints that reduce its ability to flex supply despite state-owned status
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Uranium fuel (U308) represents only 5-10% of the total operating cost of a nuclear reactor, compared to 80-90% for natural gas or coal plants; this structural cost difference means fuel buyers have zero financial incentive to call market bottoms or actively trade—they only care about securing supply.
“because there's such infrequent price Discovery because they're in the market so infrequently a contract could be seven years five years 10 years and the fact of the matter is that actual uranium itself is mid single digits to maybe 10% pick a number depending on price uranium of the cost to operate one of these reactors if you're running a natural gas or a Coal Fired power plant the feed stock is 80 90%”
The COMEX uranium futures contract (250-pound units) has no liquidity because typical physical uranium purchases are 100,000 pounds per transaction; the contract size mismatch means utilities and speculators never evolved to use it for hedging, leaving the uranium market without a functioning price discovery futures mechanism unlike other commodities.
“there is a uranium contract on comx sort of I mean they use it as a benchmark but it doesn't have any liquidity in it what's going on there's no liquidity so it's it's 250 pound contracts if if I'm buying we buy physical uranium I'm typically buying 100,000 pounds at a clip not 250 pounds and so it's never it's never ever evolved into something that utilities or speculators was use as hedging”
Approximately 80-85% of uranium pounds purchased annually trade through long-term contracts (3-10 years forward from contract signing date), while only 15-20% trades on the spot market, with occasional years seeing slightly higher spot volumes post-Fukushima.
“about 80 85% of the pounds that are purchased in a year go through a long-term contract Market from three years forward from the date signed and it could last five years seven years 10 years that's that's what a term Market is that's the vast majority of the pound sold and on occasion the spot Market comes into play uh which is 15 20% of the pounds depending on the year”
Enrichment capacity is the tightest constraint in the fuel cycle; Russia controls 40% of global enrichment capacity, with the remainder split between Western operators (Urenco and Orano) and China; enrichment prices have risen 5x in recent years from $35/SWU to $176/SWU due to underinvestment and capacity tightness after Fukushima.
“enrichment is controlled up in 40% % of the market is is Russia then you have the the West has urano and Orono...about five or six years ago the price of enrichment which is priced in a unit of work called a separative work unit was about $35 per swoo would be the acronym today a unit of swoo is $176”
Traders in the uranium spot market are not utility buyers or producers and have short time horizons measured in days, weeks, and months; they source pounds through off-take agreements with mines and then resell them, making them price-takers dependent on mine supply rather than price-setters with market power
“if you look at the data over uh last 25 years or so what you will see is they are almost non-existent in the long-term contract Market because they can't guarantee pounds typically right they don't produce it they don't have a mind that says we have a mind life of X so they're very active”
As much as 25% of uranium supply needed by 2030 is not yet mined, permitted, built, or financed, representing a structural supply deficit that is 'enormous' and creates the real supply-demand risk that will drive future prices.
“by by the way 2030 25% of the supply that is needed to meet the demand in 2030 is not a mine it's not per permitted they're not built they're not financed nothing so it's enormous structural deficits”
The nuclear fuel cycle spans approximately 2 years from mining U308 through conversion to UF6, enrichment (the critical bottleneck), and fabrication into fuel assemblies, giving utilities strong incentive to control each step contractually rather than buying finished fuel
“it could be upwards of two years right U u308 is mined it gets converted to uf6 uf6 then goes to the enrichment plant that gets enriched then it goes off to fabrication”
Major nuclear policy support for uranium has emerged over the past 5 years (government support for utilities, nuclear inclusion in ESG frameworks, etc.) beyond what Mike Allen expected; this represents an upside surprise to the bullish thesis.
“on the uh policy front that's been something that has surprised us to the upside there's been far more support than I ever thought we would see um just five years ago I never thought we'd see the policy support we're getting now”
The world's largest uranium producer has transitioned through four different management teams (CEO and CFO) in the past five years, a sign of operational instability; management is uncomfortable with production guidance below -20% of subsoil use agreements because renegotiating the agreement with the Kazakhstani government is bureaucratically painful
“this is the fourth management team CEO CFO in the last five years but what's what happened during that time period is this world's lowcost producer which was producing uranium by 2019 at $1.94 a pound Allin sustaining cost um”
Fuel buyers do not share in upside savings if they successfully time market bottoms and do not face firing if prices rise, provided supply is secured; this asymmetric incentive structure removes all motivation to actively forecast or trade, creating structural complacency distinct from incompetence.
“the average fuel buyer if he picks off a bottom and it moves materially it doesn't matter conversely if prices rip out of and they go higher like they have they don't get fired as long as they get the uranium it is what it is”
A Russian uranium import ban in the US and ongoing uncertainty over waiver allocations caused utilities to step back from contracting in early 2024, reducing term market volume; this is a rational response to regulatory uncertainty, not a signal of weak demand.
“there's a Russian uranium ban that was uh uh put into law in the United States and they're still working through the the guidelines and uh who's going to get wavers so it makes sense for the for the utilities to kind of step back until they know what's happening”
Kazatomprom was a state-owned entity producing uranium in the mid-$13-15/lb all-in sustaining cost range when it went public in 2018-19, benefiting primarily from currency devaluation (tenge weakness) rather than genuinely low-cost operations; when adjusted for constant 2018 currency, production costs are mid-$30s/lb.
“it's a company that uh is in Kazakhstan they cost in teni and they sell in dollars so when the t is weak against a dollar they get a margin boost...if you went back and did the analysis before they put out the big perspectus they were a private company but they had public debt...if you look you realize wow those guys produce uranium in the mid-30s they're not really a great lowcost producer they've been a great beneficiary of a devalued currency”
Spot prices are determined not by a volume-weighted moving average but by a single pricing event at month-end (often the last Monday of the month at a specific time like 4 PM), creating perverse incentives for traders with off-take flow to aggressively offer pounds at that moment to achieve a lower contract price.
“the way historically this and and up to today this Market gets priced is they say okay well we're going to deliver into you every month every three months whatever the structure is of that contract and we'll price it on it could be the last Monday of the month at uxc one of the price reporters on their last Monday of the month at 4M we're going to price it there so what winds up happening what you wind up seeing in the market because there's not a lot of pounds trading you what you wind up seeing around the periods of of month end...you will see the Cadence of selling coming from some of the Traders will accelerate”
Of the 40-45 million pounds trading in the spot market, 30-40% is trader-to-trader churn volume, meaning actual pounds swishing around represent a much smaller real supply flow, making spot price movements often meaningless for inferring market tightness.
“so your actual pounds that are swishing around the market are di Minimus but because it has a daily price attached to it that's what people tend to focus on they don't either have the patients or the they don't want to just go spend the time to to understand what's happening in the contract market”
Utilities contract bilaterally and negotiate custom terms rather than using open RFP (Request for Proposal) processes; RFPs are mainly used to 'sniff out' current pricing, not to actually conduct major contracting; this bilateral structure creates opacity and limits price discovery.
“these contracts are mostly bilaterally negotiated they're not rfps request for proposals go into the market that's just for the fuel buyers to kind of sniff out where the pricing is but then when they really want to get down to Brass tax most contracts are signed under hey let's sit down and hash out what we really need”
Townsen notes that fuel buyers would have every incentive to listen to supply deficit analysis as cover for their own procurement decisions ('that's my excuse for buying too much'), yet they remain dismissive, suggesting psychological resistance or organizational inertia rather than rational disbelief
“if these guys were uh were opposing you as Traders I would get it I would say they were lousy Traders but I would get it but these are people whose Financial incentive is to make sure they don't get fired for running out of fuel”
The triple nuclear initiative announcement by 25+ nations to build 746 GW of additional nuclear capacity over the next 25 years generated zero reaction in the uranium spot market, further illustrating that structural supply-demand announcements do not move the spot market because the market is not forward-looking on a day-to-day basis
“you've got the triple nuclear initiative where you know 25 Nations have signed on to building 746 GW of additional uh capacity over the next you know 25 years these are things things that you would expect each one of these announcements would be a shock that sends you know just Tremors through the the Contracting Market there's zero”
New reactor announcements (China's bulk reactor builds, triple nuclear initiative) will drive contracting acceleration when producers and utilities begin bilateral negotiations at industry conferences, but these negotiations don't respond to headlines—they respond to supply availability and internal inventory assessments, making contracting cycle timing unpredictable but inevitable.
“most contracts are signed under hey let's sit down and hash out what we really need I feel pretty good for our due diligence that you're going to start to see that accelerate more which we think ultimately will lead to higher pricing”
After Mike's October 2018 NEI presentation, an industry journalist verbally accosted him claiming he was a predatory Wall Street person and accused him of trying to scare people, but when presented with detailed modeling (100+ Excel tabs), the journalist apologized and recognized the original research. Yet fuel buyers at the same conference (2019 Nashville) remained dismissive despite uranium prices having already started rising.
“I got off the stage and I was literally verbally accosted by someone from the industry who told me I'm a I'm a terrible Wall Street person I'm here praying on good hardworking people unlike me because I'm a Wall Street person I'm just a money hungry money grubbing person uh and I I thought wow and she said why would you want to scare these people”
China built up uranium inventories significantly greater than Western utility levels (China targets 50-100 years of supply vs. Western 2-3 years), reflecting its long-term strategic thinking; a potential reversal of Chinese uranium accumulation strategy (e.g., inventory dump to drive prices down before major contracting) represents a tail risk.
“the Chinese uh have a significant amount of inventory now they're a Big Driver of the nuclear cycle and they built up uh inventories that are significantly greater than you have in the in the west...China is not blessed with indigenous copious amounts of indigenous uranium...they've got to go to tough places of the world to try and get it in parts of Africa...one of the things that Chinese do sometimes in other Commodities is before they want to go into a major Contracting cycle it's not uncommon for them to dump some pounds into a market”
In 2017, Mike Allen identified that industry inventory forecasts of 1.4-1.7 billion pounds (suggesting 8-10 years of supply) were inflated; actual economically viable inventory was 3-4 years of supply against utilities' target of 1.5-2 years, signaling imminent tightness that fuel buyers dismissed as misunderstanding on his part.
“and it was 2017 and I was in a nuclear conference and we hadn't expressed The View yet through a vehicle and I had just read an inventory report from one of the forecasters out there and they they referenced the amount of inventory out there it was something like 1.4 1.7 billion pounds of inventory in the world...the real number might be I don't know three three and a half years worth of of Supply if I'm really wrong it's four years and they want two”
Uranium prices in bull markets are still quoted as though base-escalated (fixed + annual escalation), a pricing convention from bear markets that no longer reflects actual contracts being signed; this creates a systematic understatement of true market pricing.
“the price reporters still report yesterday's news just like they forecast yesterday's news they're pricing a contract that is by far uh the one less being uh conducted in the marketplace”
Mike Allen believes Kazatomprom's 'value over volume' strategy is primarily forced on them by production problems (costs spiraling, capex per pound rising) rather than altruistic strategic choice; if they regain cost control and Russia increases influence, they could abandon the strategy and flood the market.
“I think a lot of that's forced upon them because I think they have production problems when you know when capex per pound goes from $3 to $10 you have problems...so I don't believe that it's this altruistic we're just really wanting to be you know really value over volume folks...should they be able to uh to to get their Co spiraling out of control costs under control should the Russians have more of an impact over there...could they lose their value over volume sure”
Post-Fukushima (2011-2012), utilities were complacent due to recency bias and excess supply, leading them to stay out of contracting market when prices were in teens and twenties; this was actually a shrewd move that allowed them to benefit from falling prices over subsequent years, but it created overconfidence.
“I stood up there and I I said you folks have done a fabulous job staying out of the contract Market when your contracts were expiring the price of uranium was tumbling from as high as it was 137 in June of 07 but after Fukushima it was in the 60s then and now it kept coming to 50 and 40 and 30 and when their long-term contracts were expiring the Traders were doing near short-term carry trades with them so they didn't recommitted high prices so they did a great job they stayed out of the market”
Allen expects that as utilities recognize supply tightness and transition back from 35% to 100%+ of annual demand contracting, prices will accelerate higher in long-term contracts; this transition is the 'rubber meets the road' moment where economic supply capacity will be constrained against rising demand
“when economic demand when they start to contract back to their annual consumption and you're last year you were close uh this year with the for the reasons I mentioned before it's pulled back a little bit but that's where the rubber meets the road that's where the economic capacity that's why pricing is up 21% this year that's normal supply and demand they're hosed on that scenario”
Kazatomprom's capex per pound has risen from $3 in 2019 to almost $10 in first-half 2024, indicating the company is consuming massive capital to maintain current production levels, which cannot be sustained while producing 60 million pounds annually against subsoil use agreement commitments that would require higher volumes
“if I could point you at the capex per pound slide you'll see that capex per pound is gone from $3 in 2019 to almost $10 in the first half of 2024 it's costing a fortune”
Kazakhstomi operates joint ventures with Western producers (Cameco) and state-owned entities (Orano/France, Chinese partners, Japanese partners), and Cameco's interest in Kazakhstan operations has diminished as costs have risen and production stalled, making Kazakhstomi partnerships less attractive than Northern Saskatchewan operations with comparable costs.
“they also have Ventures with Western producers with camoo with orano the state french-owned utility with some of the Chinese with some of the Japanese but if you were camoo what was really appealing to you was to be a participant in Kaza prom in Kazakhstan uh in the in the mid teens and because you could produce pounds at a at a low cost and much more much lower than it you can produce in Northern Saskatchewan which is the highest grade uh reserves in the world but uh but you had lower costs in Kazakhstan now now if you're cico today you've got the same costs as as you do in Northern s Saskatchewan”
A major accident at Zaporizhzhia or Kursk nuclear plants due to military action could trigger Fukushima-like market sentiment and scare utilities away from nuclear expansion for years, despite the fact that accidents prove nothing about nuclear energy's safety profile; this tail risk is dismissed by utilities but could have multi-year demand destruction implications
“I do think and that's one of the risks when when people ask me like what you know what are the key risk like you're asking I you know that's one that you just hope cooler heads prevail because I do think if was a major event yeah I think that people would get scared”
When Kazatomprom released August 23, 2024 guidance showing production down 17.7% from subsoil use agreement (much worse than prior -20% guidance), equities fell 7-8% but spot uranium prices did not move, exemplifying the disconnect between fundamentals reflected in equity markets and the near-term-focused spot market.
“on August 23rd they came out and said for 2025 uh we're going to be 177% lower than our our subsoil use agreements that's significant you know you're talking close to double digit of of world Supply...Kaza prom is obviously...the stocks moved up 7 eight n% But the spot price didn't move”
ISM Manufacturing data came in weak on Thursday, sparking S&P sell-off; JOLTS and ADP jobs numbers also weak; Friday jobs report (non-farm payroll) is the key catalyst—negative print could trigger 5400 SPX test; however, broad floodgates unlikely to open before FOMC meeting.
“the reaction down was uh on the ISM Manufacturing numbers that came out on Thursday and uh we continued to see things like the uh jolts and ADP jobs numbers coming in week...this is going to be all decided on Friday when we get that jobs numbers because if it comes out negative because bad news is bad news uh we could spill down to 5,400 on the S&P futures”
Townsen points out that multi-billion dollar hedge funds betting against utilities with hundreds of millions of dollars of leverage are likely to 'know something' that fuel buyers are missing, suggesting that professional capital is pricing in supply deficits that utilities are ignoring
“when those guys those stinking slimy sleazy money grubbing Wall Street guys are running a fund with a few hundred million dollar levered up betting against you it's usually because they know something little tip”
Gold: New all-time highs, healthy accumulation pattern with dips bought immediately, trend intact; technical measured move to ~$2700 zone appears realistic; likely push toward $3000 in near term; outperforming commodities complex including silver (deeper pullbacks).
“we're going to see it perhaps pushed near 3,000 in the near term...it has been behaving very well...the pull bags have been deeper...gold even during these pullbacks uh seems to be bought on dip almost instantaneously...trend has been primarily up...there's a technical measured moves that are measuring up to the 2700 area”
Uranium (SRUUF): Trading 23-25 range for ~1 month, rejected moving averages, failed to break downtrend; price action finally showing divergence (not making lower lows); watch for decisive break above $25 to signal potential accumulation cycle and bull breakout.
“uranium has been hovering between that 23 and 25 area for the past month or so...has rejected its moving averages...we are seeing finally the price action uh behave in a Divergent manner...would be looking for on the spra physical uranium trust chart would be a decisive breakout above the $25 level uh breaking that uh descending Channel and potentially demonstrating that some sort of new accumulation cycle may have begun”
US 10-year Treasury yield: Down ~7 bps week to ~3.76%, near year lows; key technical level being approached; if weak jobs numbers Friday hold and yield remains below 3.80%, downside window opens to 3.50% ('basis points' precision).
“the December gold contract down 43 basis points to 2526...the US 10-year treasury yield down seven basis points trading at 376 it's trading right at the year lows...the big question of course is that is this a level that will be broken on the downside...if...the jobs numbers come in Weak and this remains below 380 the downside windows open to 350 basis points”
US Dollar Index: Actively distributed (lower highs, lower lows), below all key moving averages, but testing major support near 2023 lows; critical to examine individual currency crosses (USD/JPY near 142 vs. Dec 2023 low 140; EUR/USD near 111-112.5) to assess whether DXY support will hold.
“when we're taking a look at that US dollar Index it has been actively distributed lower highs lower lows persistently uh below all of its key key moving averages but it's at that major support line...we have to dissect this by looking at some of the individual currency crosses uh particularly the one uh currency that's been driving this has been the Yen...December 2023 low was near 140 and so we're a stone throw away from some key support lines being tested”
VIX trading at 20 handle; intraday SPX top-to-bottom volatility ranges ~1.25%; election volatility elevated; options protection (calls) roughly 25% more expensive week-over-week; for equity portfolios correlating to SPX, collars into election event provide meaningful tail hedge.
“right now with the vix at a 20 handle we can expect to see intraday top to bottom ranges on SPX of approximately 1.25% and important to note that with the election coming up soon it's probable we see elevated volatility into that time period so insurance is more expensive now than it was last we for example by a factor of about 25% or so”
S&P 500 September 2024: Spot ~5520, implied move 160 pts (5680 up, 5360 down), resistance at 5670 ATH, support at 5500; week started down 2% YTD, average September decline 2.3%; likely range 5400-5600 with bounce expected rather than capitulation.
“right now on SPX we have a spot price of approximately 5520 and we have an implied move that actually increased from last week from 140 points to 160 points for the September 20th monthly Opex so we have an upper implied move therefore of 5680 and a lower implied move of 5360”
Crude oil: Spot ~$69-70, rejected 50-day MA, broke to fresh 2023 lows, currently oversold in short-term; typical reaction support at $68-69; upside resistance $72-74; extended bearish structure suggests prolonged basing formation into elections rather than imminent breakout.
“we once again had a negative spill on the downside um it rejected the 50-day moving average and uh just uh broke to a fresh new low not holding the $72 level and we find ourselves here in quite a short-term oversold State Trading right into the 2023 lows...typically when you approach a major support line it offers a reaction along there...one of the things from that I'm looking for here in the $ 6869 level is whether a very typical rea ction AR bounce happens sending us back towards 72 to $74”