What this covers

Tyler Cowen uses three great economists—Hayek, Keynes, and Adam Smith—as lenses to examine AI, economic growth, and institutional risk. Rather than treating these thinkers as oracles, Cowen judges each by both their insights and blind spots, then applies their frameworks to contemporary questions: How should we think about AI scaling and safety? What drives sustained growth? Why do some economies stall while others compound for centuries? The conversation ranges across whether the universe itself might be fundamentally illegible—resistant to more intelligence applied to certain frontier problems—and whether current anxieties about AI reflect sound economics or what Cowen characterizes as overly rationalist thinking divorced from how decentralized systems actually work.

Cowen argues that Hayek's insight about markets—that they work not by solving for general equilibrium but by building structures that survive to the next day—is more useful than rationalist framings, especially for AI policy. He contends that because the world is already decentralized and that choice is irreversible, safety comes from benevolent hegemons establishing dominance rather than from legislation. He challenges AI doomers for misunderstanding legibility and decentralization, citing examples like failed predictions about China's AI competitiveness. On growth, Cowen revisits why Smith's inference from local observation to global progress was rationalist inference, not induction, reframes the Soviet collapse as a story of creeping decentralization rather than pure central planning failure, and argues that Mill's refusal to over-aggregate contingent structures—his claim that oppression of women was not inevitable—exemplifies the best social science. He also covers why evolutionary selection of firms matters more than individual ingenuity, the puzzle of ancient firms that still improve, and why passive investing's real risk lies in implicit collusion among large asset owners rather than absence of monitoring.

Sharpest takeaway

Cowen argues that the great economists are best judged by both their triumphs and failures across breadth of work, and that a properly Hayekian, decentralization-first understanding of markets and human institutions is more useful for thinking about AI, growth, and risk than the rationalist 'big monster vs. little people' framing favored by AI doomers.

  • Markets work not by solving for general equilibrium but by building sustainable structures that survive to the next day
  • We chose a decentralized world long ago, so intelligence will have advantages and cannot be turned back; safety comes from benevolent hegemons, not legislation
  • The universe may not be fully legible, so simply applying more intelligence may hit hard frontiers

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0.82

On the technical side it would be weird if AI scaling just stopped working, so scaling will likely continue; the more underrated barrier is on the knowledge side, where the universe may be fundamentally illegible, meaning there may be no fruitful way to apply more intelligence to certain frontier problems like unifying general relativity and quantum mechanics.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“It does seem to me intuitively it would be weird on the technical side if scaling just stopped working. But on the knowledge side, I think people underestimate possible barriers.”

0.78

Mill's argument on women is anti-Hayekian rationalism: even though every society Mill knew oppressed women, he was right to refuse to over-aggregate information from that universal observation, insisting the structure behind it was contingent and that unpacking the contingency reveals women can achieve far more, making it one of the greatest pieces of social science.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“Mill's chief argument is to say you're making a big mistake if you overly aggregate information from this one observation, that behind it is a lot of structure, and a lot of the structure is contingent”

0.78

The market is not solving for a general equilibrium but merely for something that gets us into the next day with wealth not falling and people not quitting; one of Hayek's great insights is that framing the economy as computing a general equilibrium is the wrong way to think about the problem, so computational intractability of equilibrium worries neither markets nor planning.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“the market's not solving for a general equilibrium. It's just solving for something that gets us into the next day. And that's a big part of the triumph, just living to fight another day”

0.78

At high sustained growth rates over decades, GDP growth numbers cease to have meaning because they only make sense when the economy's basket stays broadly similar; as the basket changes the numbers become meaningless, so cross-era comparisons like 'we are 50% richer than an average Roman' don't make sense, illustrated by whether you'd rather spend $50,000 from a 1905 or modern Sears catalog.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“the numbers cease to have meaning because the numbers make the most sense when the economy is broadly similar... As the basket changes, the numbers become meaningless.”

0.78

Economic principles depend less on human nature than we tend to suggest and are fairly universal, since ant and animal societies often obey human-like principles (or humans obey animal-like principles); the automatic principles of profit, loss, and selection at the firm-wide level operate regardless of the agents involved, which is responsible for much of economics being true.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“Gordon Tullock wrote a very interesting book on the economics of ant societies and animal societies and very often they obey human-like principles... So I suspect it's fairly universal and depends less on quote unquote human nature than we sometimes like to suggest.”

0.75

The rate of return on private investment, including small businesses, is highly skewed: only a few percent of people doing it make anything at all, with a bifurcated distribution between foolish optimists who should just take stable jobs and a smaller group who are genuinely innovating with very high social returns.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the rate of return on private investment, if you include small businesses, it's highly skewed. And just a few percent of the people doing this make anything at all.”

0.75

Much of Soviet and Chinese high growth, even before WWII, was driven by urbanization: moving a worker from a farm producing almost nothing into a city makes them far more productive even under a bad system, but this growth source eventually exhausts itself, as is now happening in China.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“You take someone working on a farm producing almost nothing, put them in a city, even under a bad system, they're going to be a lot more productive. And that drove so much of Soviet growth”

0.73

Smith's genius was, like Mill's rationalism, to observe the local information of very small growth in a world barely better than the Roman Empire and infer from increasing returns to division of labor how much progress was possible, making him more of a rationalist than Hayek's interpretation allows.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“Smith is seeing the local information of very small growth and the world barely being better than the Roman Empire, and inferring from that, with increasing returns to division of labor, how much is possible.”

0.73

The later Soviet Union was actually highly decentralized, with managers optimizing their own rents and setting prices too low to extract bribes; true central planning was attempted only briefly after the revolution and was abandoned even by Lenin, so the USSR is not a clean example of central planning at all.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“I view the later Soviet Union as being highly decentralized managers optimizing their own rents and setting prices too low to take bribes.”

0.73

Contrary to the US tech-centric view, many firms around the world appear to get better as they age, including 17th-century Japanese firms and the leading Danish firms (none younger than the 1920s) like Maersk and Novo Nordisk; how this continuous multi-century improvement is possible is a genuine puzzle, while outliers like the US and Israel rely heavily on young firms.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“there are Japanese firms that date back to the 17th century. They must be better today or even in 1970 than they were way back when. Like the leading four or five Danish firms, none of them are younger than the 1920s.”

0.73

At some point having billions of AI copies won't matter; what matters far more is how good the best system is and how well it integrates into our other systems, which have their own bottlenecks (behavioral, legal, regulatory), and the principles governing that integration imply much slower growth than just scaling up training compute.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“At some point, having billions of copies probably won't matter. What will matter much more is how good the best thing we have is, and how well integrated it is into our other systems, which have bottlenecks of their own.”

0.73

The financial sector should be measured as a percentage of wealth rather than GDP, and on that basis it has been a roughly constant 2% of US wealth for decades; this makes its apparent growth far less sinister, since the sector grows relative to GDP simply because the wealth-to-GDP ratio rises with durable capital and no major wars.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the financial sector has been a pretty constant 2% of wealth for a few decades in the United States, with bumps. Obviously, 2008 matters, but it's more or less 2%, and that makes it sound a lot less sinister.”

0.73

The real worry about the rise of passive investing is not that no one monitors company value (research is more abundant than ever and informed actors can always trade), but that a handful of large funds owning big chunks of competing firms like Coke and Pepsi could produce implicit collusion by selecting lazier managers who don't compete aggressively.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“those passive investors have economies of scale, and they'll end up colluding with each other... say the same few mutual funds own Coke and Pepsi. Should Coke and Pepsi compete, or should they collude? Well, they might just pick lazier managers who in some way give you implicit collusion.”

0.73

Markets work well because participants solve a complex multidimensional problem using quantities, reaction speeds, and advertising terms, not just price, so the price is not a sufficient statistic the way it is in an Arrow-Debreu model; Hayek sometimes understood this and sometimes wrote as if he didn't.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“markets work so well because people are solving this complex multidimensional problem and the price really is not a sufficient statistic the way it is in an Arrow-Debreu.”

0.73

A shockingly high percentage of productivity gains from freer trade come not from human ingenuity but from your worst firms being bankrupted, suggesting the Alchian-Becker evolutionary-selection mechanisms operating at the firm or sector level are far more important to economics being true than smart humans figuring out better methods, which is a deeply Hayekian point.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“when you have freer trade, a shockingly high percentage of the productivity gains come from your worst firms being bankrupted by the free trade.”

0.73

The real risk of network-based collusion among protection agencies operates through banking systems with clearinghouses and payment networks: in the absence of legal constraint, the clearinghouse can help everyone collude, and if you don't go along you're kicked out of the payment system; this is a genuine issue, unlike social media deplatforming which was mostly competition for attention with only weak quasi-collusion.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the real risk protection agencies' side of network-based collusion is through banking systems, where you have clearinghouses and payments networks... the clearinghouse, in the absence of legal constraint, can indeed help everyone collude.”

0.73

Historically, relative safety has come from relatively benevolent nations becoming hegemons and establishing dominance, so the strategy is to want the US, UK, and a subset of allied nations to establish dominance in AI; you can't wake up and legislate safety, and even though hegemons may not stay good forever, in a decentralized world it beats the alternative of China or Russia leading.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“The strategy that's worked best so far is to have relatively benevolent nations become hegemons and establish dominance... I want the US, UK, some other subset of nations to establish dominance in AI.”

0.72

Scaling intelligence may hit hard limits because some problems may have no answer if the universe is not legible; you cannot necessarily just turn up the dial on smarts to integrate general relativity and quantum mechanics, which is a Hayekian point about the limits of applying more intelligence to fundamentally illegible problems.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“maybe the universe isn't that legible, and if it's not that legible, GPT Eleven doesn't really make sense as a creature or whatever.”

0.72

AI doomers are too rationalist and fundamentally misunderstand the properties of decentralized worlds, evidenced by smart people who thought China's edict requiring safe non-CCP-criticizing AIs meant China wouldn't compete and AI could be shut down, and by the failure to see that AI threats like reading all legal code would manifest as social problems (70-year courtroom waits) rather than existential ones.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“They just seem to have zero understanding of some properties of decentralized worlds.”

0.71

Flat-out risk aversion or risk-loving behavior does not really exist; almost everyone is context-dependent, as Friedman and Savage showed, with the same people typically buying insurance and gambling, possibly as a form of mood management.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“his famous piece with Savage makes the point that risk aversion is essentially context dependent. So he was a behavioral economist before we knew of such things. So the same people typically will buy insurance and gamble.”

0.69

The frequently cited figure that innovators capture only about 2% of the social value they create is not based on firm data; it could be 1%, 2%, or 6%, as shown by the difficulty of estimating Picasso's income relative to the spin-offs his style generated.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“that 2% figure that's cited a lot, I don't think it's really based in much real. It's maybe not a crazy seat of the pants estimate, but people think like, oh, we know it's 2% and we really don't.”

0.69

In early 20th-century Europe and Britain there was, very selectively, more tolerance of so-called outrageous or deviant behavior than people today realize; Keynes's homosexuality was broadly known yet he was politically powerful and never in evident danger, even while figures like Turing were severely punished, and what determines who is selected for this tolerance is poorly understood.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“there was in the past, very selectively, and I do mean very selectively, more tolerance of deviance than people today sometimes realize.”

0.69

The declining-researcher-productivity argument is less convincing than it appears because the best measure of researcher productivity is wages, which have risen rather than fallen; the worry instead is that we have far more researchers with rising wages yet this has not boosted aggregate productivity growth, which is itself a worrisome sign.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“the best way to measure productivity for an economist is wages. And wages of researchers haven't gone down, period. In fact, they've gone up.”

0.68

NIMBYism, which Hayek effectively predicted, exists across both democratic and most autocratic systems because interest groups always matter, public opinion always matters, and it's easy to do nothing on any given day; China is currently an exception but will likely slide into NIMBYism even while autocratic, especially given its shrinking, overbuilt population.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“most autocratic countries have this too. Now, China is an exception. They will probably slide into some kind of NIMBYism even if they stay autocratic. Just people resist change.”

0.68

On net more intelligence is more likely to be good than bad, including against existential risk, because AI will help with the multitude of other risks we face; if AI were the only risk it would be more worrying, but since there is a whole multitude of risks, additional intelligence that helps with all of them is a favorable bet.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“on net, do you think more intelligence is likely to be good or bad, including against x risk? And I think it's more likely to be good. So if it were the only risk, I'd be more worried about it than if there's a whole multitude of risks.”

0.68

The dollar is stable because US voters hate inflation, mostly for good reasons, and the US has enough wealth to pay its bills without having to inflate much, keeping inflation around a stable 2%; by contrast, why some poor countries like Argentina have recurring hyperinflation while many African countries do not is hard to explain, possibly relating to seigniorage capacity and currency holdings.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“US voters hate inflation, mostly for good reasons, and we have enough wealth that we can pay our bills without having to inflate very much.”

0.68

Institutions like the Federal Reserve are well run not merely because they're a step removed from elections (many unelected bodies worldwide are corrupt) but because American civic virtue combines with incentives such that one's reputation for having done a good job aligns private self-interest with morality, and that self-reinforcing loop shows no signs of breaking.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“you want a reputation for having done a good job. So your sense of morality and your private self-interest coincide, and that's pretty strong. And we're still in that loop.”

0.68

The libertarian critique that democracy is a road to serfdom is not validated by evidence: France and Sweden have had very large governments without turning autocratic or totalitarian, and Sweden actually reformed back from a government approaching 70% of GDP, so the real problem is regulation and the administrative state, not a slide into serfdom.

factualhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“France and Sweden have had pretty big governments, way too large, in my opinion. But they haven't threatened to turn autocratic or totalitarian... Sweden moved away from a government approaching 70% of GDP”

0.66

Contrary to Coase's 1937 view that the firm is an island of planning contrasted with the market, the firm IS the market: it is always making contracts within the market and is subject to market checks and balances, so successful logistics-heavy firms like Amazon are evidence of the market working, not of central planning succeeding.

definitionhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“I think the firm is the market. The firm is always making contracts in the market, is subject to market checks and balances. To me, it's not an island of central planning in the broader froth of the market.”

0.66

The Hayekian price argument can fail because the price signal reflects only the current marginal price, not high inframarginal values; when access to a crucial good like vaccines drops from some availability to zero because you're at the bottom of the queue, those inframarginal values matter enormously and the market fails, as happened during Covid.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the signal you have is of the current price. And that's not telling you how high are the inframarginal values if you get, say, cut off from being able to buy vaccines from India, because you're at the bottom of the queue.”

0.65

The fundamental choice for decentralization may have happened hundreds of millions or billions of years ago, even before humans, and once you opt for decentralization, intelligence will have advantages that cannot be reversed; this means we are walking a tightrope and should frame broad human history as an irreversible gamble, which has implications for how to think about x-risk.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 4/4durability 4/4· Tyler Cowen

“The fundamental choice was one of decentralization, and that may have happened hundreds of millions or billions of years ago. And once you opt for decentralization, intelligence is going to have advantages and you're not going to be able to turn the clock back on it.”

0.63

Going from the current regime to 10% growth for decades on end does not seem plausible, both because such numbers become meaningless as bundles change and because human bottlenecks and constraints of law, which Smith emphasized, would check AI growth and its speed.

forecasthigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“That does not seem plausible to me. But I would stress the point that high rates of growth decades on end, the numbers cease to have meaning”

0.61

Anarchy is everywhere, including within government among federal layers where there is no true final adjudicator, and the central insight is that anarchy itself will evolve enough collusion to enable it to persist if it persists at all; therefore one shouldn't press the anarchy button where social-political capital is already invested, though it might be worth pressing for a place like North Korea.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 4/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the point that anarchy itself will evolve enough collusion to enable it to persist, if it persists at all, is my central point.”

0.61

We currently tax savings and should stop, and in principle the government should subsidize savings to approach a zero social discount rate, but workable targeted subsidies are hard to design without handing rich people large unfair benefits, so better approaches lie in deregulating institutions like local credit unions that act as de facto subsidies to the poor.

normativehigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“First, we tax savings right now. So we should stop taxing savings. Absolutely. I think it's hard to come up with workable ways of subsidizing savings that don't give rich people a lot of free stuff”

0.60

The impact of AI will be analogous to the outsized 20th-century contribution of Jews who, as roughly 2% of the population, won around 20% of Nobel Prizes: excellent and transformative, ending the Great Stagnation and returning us to early-20th-century rates of change, but ordinary rather than the stuff of a science fiction novel; what will matter is the quality of the best system and its integration, not having billions of copies.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 4/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“the impact of AI will be like in the 20th century, the impact of Jews... it's not extraordinary. It's not a science fiction novel.”

0.59

The main long-run civilizational worry is that energy becomes too cheap so individuals can destroy things easily at very low cost; if destroying a city with a nuclear weapon cost $50,000 the world might fall apart, and this cheap-WMD risk, with or without AI, makes a retreat to a chaotic low-population medieval-Balkans existence a high-probability default outcome.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“My worry is that energy becomes too cheap and people at very low cost can destroy things rather easily. So, say, if destroying a city with a nuclear weapon cost $50,000, what would the world look like?”

0.57

From a social point of view, you may only be able to have too much trading or too little trading rather than the optimum, because investor temperament is a coarse dial; given that overconfidence is the alternative to under-confidence, too much trading may be the best achievable outcome since human emotions cannot be fine-tuned.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“if temperament is some inclination in you, and you can just be overconfident or not confident enough, and overconfidence gives you too much trading, that might be the best we can do.”

0.57

The concept of tacit knowledge breaks down with AI: because how GPT-4 works is not legible even to its creators, it's unclear whether that illegibility means it possesses tacit knowledge or whether it is knowledge at all, so the whole discourse about tacit knowledge needs to be restructured in a new way.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“What tacit knowledge means with AIs, I don't think we understand yet... Does that mean it's possessing tacit knowledge, or is it not knowledge? None of those categories are well thought out”

0.57

A useful concrete test for any major civilizational worry, like Fukuyama's last-man Nietzschean critique, is to ask where it would show up in asset prices and whether the worrier is short the market; when people lack a clear answer to where a worsening risk would manifest in prices, that is itself a reason for skepticism.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“even if you're not short the market, if that were the main relevant worry, where would that show up in asset prices as it got worse? It's a very concrete question.”

0.57

Economics has fragmented because, as Adam Smith warned, the division of labor makes people feeble-minded and incurious; current economic researchers have probably never been smarter but are far less broad and curious, a shift catalyzed by Jevons showing that rigorous statistical work and economics could be the same thing, which led too many to crowd into specialization.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“It's division of labor. Adam Smith, who said it would make people a bit feeble-minded and infurious, was completely correct... Current economic researchers probably have never been smarter, but they're way less broad and less curious.”

0.57

Pacifists never seem to rise in status for more than brief moments because subsequent wars sweep away their gains, so over the long run pacifists lose status no matter what while hawks gain status; if future decades bring more war, the hawks and those worried about fertility decline will rise in relative status while secular intellectuals fall.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“the pacifists seemed to lose long-term status no matter what. And that means the Hawks would gain in status.”

0.57

There is no philosophically grounded consistent view on honoring the wishes of the dead: the Burkean view of taking ancestors' preferences seriously is time-inconsistent because new ancestors with different views keep arriving, forcing you to keep changing course, so what survives will be whatever is practically sustainable and then rationalized after the fact.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“it's time inconsistent to take those preferences seriously... as time passes, other ancestors come along, they have somewhat different views. You have to keep on changing course.”

0.57

There is a Hayekian solution to academic over-specialization: as specialists proliferate, a small number of generalists can be parasitic on them, taking their narrow outputs and turning them into interesting larger bundles the specialists never dreamt of, and making a living doing so.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“as specialists proliferate, we can be, quote-unquote, parasitic on them and take what they do and turn it into interesting larger bundles that they haven't dreamt of and make some kind of living doing that.”

0.53

AI agents will replicate markets on their own and evolve their own currencies, starting perhaps with Bitcoin and an entire property-rights system based on what we now call NFTs; this will start small as a share of GDP but grow over time and vindicate Hayek's account of how decentralized systems evolve.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“They're going to replicate markets on their own, has been my prediction, and I think they're going to evolve their own currencies. Maybe at first, they'll use Bitcoin, but there'll be an entire property rights system based, at least at first, on what we now call NFTs.”

0.53

Really good Internet writing is multidisciplinary and constitutes a new field defined by its method of thinking and writing rather than by subject; this is why there likely won't be a new GOAT economist contender ever, and practitioners across computer science, psychiatry, and economics have far more in common with each other than with typical specialized researchers in their own fields.

factualhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“That really good Internet writing is multidisciplinary. When I meet someone like a Scott Aronson... I have way more in common with him than with a typical research economist”

0.53

The challenge facing literary economists and synthesizers won't necessarily be that AI does the work better, but that people will simply prefer to read what AIs generate because playing with AIs is fun, making it harder to get a human audience; the literary-economist mode won't disappear but will take new AI-related forms.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“it doesn't have to be that AI does it better than you or I do, though it might, but simply that people prefer to read what the AIs generate for ten or 20 years. And it's harder to get an audience because playing with the AIs is a lot of fun.”

0.52

The US government, despite smart well-intentioned national security people, won't do much about AI until there is an SBF-like headline incident, after which it will overreact; this pattern of inaction followed by overreaction to a salient incident is a very common and durable feature of American history that AI's high stakes won't change.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“until there's that, we won't do much of anything, and then we'll have an SBF like incident, and we'll overreact. That seems a very common pattern in American history.”

0.52

Transaction costs for dealing with humans will fall because you'll deal with their AI assistants, and effective people will segregate tasks according to comparative advantage while ineffective people will be poor at delegation, producing a bifurcation of personal productivity based on how well one knows what to delegate to AI.

forecasthigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“people who are very effective will segregate their tasks in a way that reflects their comparative advantage. And people who are not effective will be very poor at that, and that will lead to some kind of bifurcation of personal productivity.”

0.52

An intellectual's failures are not unrelated to their best work; the same characteristics show up in both, as with Hayek's inability to produce a rigorous normative standard in The Constitution of Liberty reflecting a Germanic tendency toward profound-sounding complexity that also appears in his best work, and Keynes's annual mind-changing being both strength and weakness.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“it's not as if the failures and the best work for all these people are unrelated.”

0.47

For the best intellectuals, a large quantity of work is necessary rather than a distraction, because the ability to see things from multiple perspectives stems partly from writing extensively across many different topics, as with John Stuart Mill's vast output on French history, ancient Greece, and more giving him real depth and breadth.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Tyler Cowen

“For the best people, it's necessary. So John Stuart Mill wrote an enormous amount... his ability to see things from multiple perspectives, I think, was in part stemming from the fact that he wrote a lot about many different topics”

0.40

Henry George's status is way up because of YIMBY/NIMBY debates and this is correct; he was undervalued, belongs in the top 25 economists, and his book on protectionism remains one of the best books on free trade, though he is somewhat circumscribed compared to Smith and Mill.

factualcontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“Status is way up for this reason because of YIMBY NIMBY. And I think that's correct. He was undervalued. He's worth reading very carefully.”

0.40

Hayek was not as right as he thought at the time of writing The Road to Serfdom and became too grumpy in his later years, believing collectivism would still engulf the world due to biologically built-in atavistic instincts toward envy and collectivism, a pessimism that was unjustified given the West's good run since then.

factualcontestednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“He thought there were atavistic instincts in the human spirit which were biologically built in, that led us to be collectivists and too envious... I wouldn't say he's been proven wrong, but a lot of the west has had a pretty good run since then”

0.35

Robert Nozick was sensitive to a broad form of AI risk very early, worrying about how beings much smarter than us, or morally and intellectually superior aliens, would treat us; by analogy to how we treat animals, this concern led him to conclude he should be a vegetarian.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“the notion of aliens coming down who are like in some way, morally, intellectually way beyond us. He did write about that and he was worried about how they would treat us. So he was sensitive to what you would call AI risk”

0.35

Wokeness has peaked and is falling and is not our biggest problem; excessive bureaucracy, sclerotic institutions, and kludgeocracy are bigger and more fundamental problems that are harder to fix, even though they are not unrelated to wokeness.

factualcontestednovelty 2/4durability 1/4· Tyler Cowen

“I don't see wokeness as our biggest problem. I see excessive bureaucracy, sclerotic institutions, kludocracy as bigger problems.”

0.34

We should treat children much better, applying Mill's logic that the current treatment of a group reflects contingent power rather than natural wisdom; current schooling keeps children coerced for 8 hours a day with most of the time wasted, and Mill favored inducing children to learn the classics while also giving free play to the imagination.

normativecontestednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“Yes, I think we should treat children much better. We've made quite a few steps in that direction.”

0.26

All propositions about real interest rates are wrong; while lower risk, better information, and higher buffers of wealth are intuitive explanations for the centuries-long decline in interest rates, how much of that trend they actually explain as a share of variance is unknown.

factualspeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Tyler Cowen

“You may know Cowen's third law: All propositions about real interest rates are wrong.”