Sarah Paine — How Mao conquered China (lecture & interview)
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Historian Sarah Paine examines how Mao Zedong seized power in China through a systematic mastery of triangle building—constructing a shadow government from within Chinese society by mobilizing peasants, building a military apparatus, and deploying propaganda, rather than fighting the Nationalist state through conventional warfare. The lecture and interview trace how Mao's real theories of people's war applied not to resistance against Japan but to the civil war against Chiang Kai-shek, supported by evidence that the Communists conducted virtually no major operations against the Japanese and abandoned such efforts after the Japanese response devastated their base areas. Paine emphasizes that Mao's innovations—adapting Marxism to peasant, agrarian conditions; conducting data-driven surveys to identify exploitative landholding patterns; deploying propaganda teams as a first-priority function of every military unit—proved far more applicable than Soviet models to the decolonizing world after 1945.
The conversation shifts sharply from Mao's tactical and operational genius to the catastrophic gap between how he wielded power during wartime and peacetime. The same dictatorial concentration that won the civil war removed all counterarguments through purges, leaving no one able to check his blunders like the Great Leap Forward or the subsequent famine—history's only nationwide Chinese famine. Paine contrasts Mao's binary Yin-Yang Dualities (defend to attack, retreat to advance) with the graduated choices and evolutionary approaches required for economic development. The discussion also examines how Edgar Snow, Mao's cultivated Western propagandist, progressively sanitized the historical record; how competent U.S. foreign service officers correctly assessed the outcome but were destroyed in McCarthy purges; and how Taiwan's post-war land reform became a permanent rebuttal to claims that Chinese culture and democracy are incompatible, even as the Han Chinese revere Mao for ending national humiliation.
Paine argues that Mao's genius was as an insurgent triangle-builder who mastered propaganda, data-driven peasant mobilization, and protracted people's war to seize a shattered China, but that the same psychopathic, dictatorial concentration of power that won the civil war made him catastrophic in peacetime — culminating in history's only nationwide Chinese famine.
- Mao succeeded by building a shadow government from the ground up (Clausewitz's triangle: people, military, government) rather than fighting state-to-state war.
- The commissar/party system that made communism brilliant at seizing and holding power also delivered compounding poverty, not prosperity.
- Dictatorship removed counterarguments through purges, so no one could check Mao's peacetime blunders like the Great Leap Forward.
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Although Mao claimed his theory of people's war applied to the war against Japan, it actually applied to the civil war against the Nationalists, because Mao did virtually none of the conventional fighting against Japan — the Nationalists did — and his one attempt, the Hundred Regiments campaign of 1940, provoked the Japanese 'three alls' (kill all, burn all, loot all) campaign that wiped out Communist base areas, so he never tried it again or wrote about it.
“Mao didn't actually fight the regional war against Japan. The Nationalists did. The Nationalists did every bit of the conventional fighting, except one, and that's the Hundred Regiments campaign that Mao fought in North China in 1940, and he was smeared.”
Mao's three stages of people's war are cumulative not merely sequential, and reaching phase three (conventional positional warfare with the war-winning battle) requires a big friend like the Soviet Union, because conventional warfare demands infinite supplies of armaments that need an industrial base China lacked — which is why Mao chose Yan'an near the Soviet border as his terminal point of retreat.
“in order to get to phase three, you need a big friend. Why? Because phase three is conventional warfare, which requires infinite supplies of conventional armaments that requires an industrial base to produce it, and somewhere like China lacks this industrial base.”
Edgar Snow's naivety is explained by his being a bored young Depression-era Midwesterner seeking adventure whom Mao deliberately cultivated as his own 'Jack Reed'; Snow let Mao correct his interview drafts, progressively edited out purged figures across editions of Red Star Over China, and denied the famine and purges to the end because the book was the only thing that made him important.
“Mao probably needed his own Jack Reed, and Edgar Snow seemed the perfect guy because he's a very good writer. You want someone who could write well, and he's young and naive.”
Because the Communists were weak, Mao argued they had to follow a strategy of annihilation — destroying one small enemy unit at a time so cumulative effects eventually change the balance of power — whereas only someone who is really strong can tough out an attrition strategy.
“if you're weak the way the Communists were, you had to follow a strategy of annihilation. What you do is you annihilate one small enemy unit at a time, and the cumulative effects will eventually change the balance of power. Only someone who is really strong can tough out an attrition strategy.”
Unlike Clausewitz, Sun Tzu, Mahan and Corbett who all theorize warfare between states, Mao is a different phenomenon: he engaged in 'triangle building' — taking over the host society from within by constructing a shadow government (people, military, government) from the ground up and eventually seizing power.
“an insurgent is going to be building these things from the ground up. So that's what Mao is doing, is he's actually taking over the host from within by building a shadow government and eventually taking power.”
Following Sun Tzu's principle never to put your enemy on death ground (a hopeless position where their only option is to fight with incredible willpower), Mao propagandized captured soldiers, recruited the willing and released the unwilling, making the contrast between Communist leniency and Nationalist brutality stark and disintegrating the enemy army from within.
“Sun Tzu advocates: never put your enemy on death ground. Death ground means that you just have no hope, that you're a dead person if you don't fight. So, your only hope is to fight. If you put someone on death ground, they tend to fight with incredible willpower.”
Mao's thousands of pages are pervaded by Yin-Yang dualities — coexisting opposites constantly changing where each opposite contains a dab of the other (defend in order to attack, retreat in order to advance) — reflecting Sun Tzu's insight, in Samuel Griffith's translation, that the wise general finds advantage in every apparent disadvantage; but in peacetime, choices are graduated not binary, and evolution is far more conducive to economic development than revolution.
“"In every apparent disadvantage, some advantage is to be found. The yin is not wholly yin, and the yang is not wholly yang. It is only the wise general," said Sun Tzu, "who is able to recognize this fact and turn it to good account."”
Mao understood he was operating within nested wars — a civil war against the Nationalists inside a regional war against Japan, which after Pearl Harbor became a global war that would morph into a global Cold War — and most of his writings focus on the first two layers because they predate Pearl Harbor.
“Mao understood that he was dealing with three layers of warfare, nested wars, that he was fighting a civil war against the Nationalists within a regional war against Japan.”
Mao offered minorities self-determination, but what they failed to grasp is that a promise made in a desperate civil war becomes unenforceable once the war is won and the regime can turn its guns on those trying to secede — as the Tibetans and Uyghurs discovered.
“What the minority people didn't get is that a promise made in a really desperate civil war, with a regional war overlaid, once you win those things and you can turn your guns on those trying to secede, that promise may be unenforceable. You can ask the Tibetans and Uyghurs how it all worked out.”
Mao's sinification of Marxism — adapting Marxist theory to peasant, agrarian, underdeveloped conditions — made his version much more applicable to the newly independent countries after WWII and positioned him to replace Stalin as the leader of world communism after Stalin's death in 1953.
“Mao is famous for all these reasons, but also for his sinification of Marxism, where he makes all the things that I’ve told you about, makes his version of Marxism much more applicable to these countries, the newly independent countries after World War II”
Mao repeatedly won by luring enemies deep into unfavorable terrain and springing a trap — the early encirclement campaigns, the Nationalists in Manchuria, and MacArthur to the Yalu where 350,000 Chinese troops were infiltrated around him — which is a lesson for the modern US Navy about not being lured into the South and East China Seas where the Chinese could pull the trap.
“Mao also lured good old General MacArthur, who fancied himself a great Asianist in the Korean War. MacArthur goes all the way up to the Yalu River, right on the Chinese border in the Korean War, and Mao springs a trap. MacArthur didn't realize that 350,000 Chinese troops had been infiltrated around him.”
Mao's purging of generals like Peng Dehuai during and after the Korean War left fewer and fewer counterarguments, which is a real case against dictatorship — because for all the chaos of party politics, you are at least forced to confront the counterargument, making it a healthier situation; Mao's victories also relied on many people's ideas (On Guerrilla Warfare was actually written by Peng Dehuai and others), not Mao alone.
“It's a real case against dictatorship. For all the chaos of party politics, you're at least forced to confront the counterargument. It is a healthier situation to be in.”
The recurring tallies of millions of deaths in modern China are mostly famine rather than direct combat — when warfare disrupts agriculture and distribution, starvation, not bullets, kills the most people, as also happened when the North Vietnamese won and promptly got famine despite having three harvests a year.
“It's famine. If you have warfare, you have famine. It's not mostly bang, bang, you're dead. That goes on too, but it's starvation when you disrupt things in this way.”
Contrary to the popular image of Mao as a guerrilla, Mao himself held that regular conventional forces are of primary importance because they alone can produce the decision (win the war), and that there is no such thing as a war-winning battle in guerrilla warfare — guerrillas operate in combination with conventional forces to weaken and disperse the enemy.
“here's what Mao really says: "Regular forces are of primary importance because it is they who alone are capable of producing the decision," like winning the war. “There is in guerilla warfare no such thing as a war-winning battle”.”
Mao put the vast peasant population on communes because it lined up with communism but also with party control — by controlling whether hundreds of millions of peasants eat or don't, you truly control them, which was a way to extend central control from Beijing over a country shattered by warlord rule.
“if you put all this vast population—because most people are peasants—on communes, then you control whether they eat or don't. You truly control them.”
Every Communist military unit had about a 20-member propaganda team, and Mao declared the propaganda work of the Red Army to be its first-priority work — fundamentally different from Western soldiering, with messengers doubling as medics, propagandizing POWs, building troop morale, and reporting intelligence back to Communist Central.
“Every single military unit had about a 20-member propaganda team. That's a lot of people. According to Mao, the propaganda work of the Red Army is therefore first-priority work of the Red Army.”
Mao's theories appealed to the decolonizing world after WWII more than the Soviet model because those regions were agricultural and underdeveloped like China, not industrialized like Russia, making Mao's peasant-based revolution seem more relevant to taking over failing states from within.
“the decolonizing parts of the world were also agricultural and underdeveloped, unlike Russia, which had quite a military—excuse me, an industrial base. They thought Mao was the more relevant guy.”
Through data-driven surveys between 1926 and 1933 inventorying who owned, worked, and tilled what down to the last pitchfork and chicken, Mao concluded that 6% of the rural population owned 80% of the land while 80% owned only 20% — with 70% poor peasants, 20% middle peasants, and an exploitative 10% — and his solution was to mobilize the bottom 80% to crush the top of the social pyramid through revolution.
“What he concludes is that 6% of the rural population owns 80% of the land, and 80% of the population owns only 20% and his solution is going to be revolution.”
After Peng Dehuai and Liu Shaoqi pulled the plug on Mao following the Great Leap Forward and demoted him, Mao launched the Cultural Revolution to regain power by leaving Beijing, rallying indoctrinated teenage Red Guards who started by killing their teachers and worked up the system, then using Lin Biao's military to restore order once he had ousted his rivals — ruinous for production and education but, from Mao's perspective, it worked.
“he and Liu Shaoqi pulled the plug on Mao, and then Mao is demoted from one of his positions, and that's when you get the Cultural Revolution because Mao is on his way out of power from these guys.”
Competent China-expert foreign service officers (children of missionaries who spoke fluent Chinese) accurately assessed that Chiang Kai-shek could not win because he was hated by the peasantry he dragooned into his armies while the Communists gave peasants land and education — and these officers were later ruined in the McCarthy purges only to be exonerated decades later after their careers were destroyed.
“they were saying it's hopeless, that there is no way Chiang Kai-shek's going to win this thing because he's hated by the peasantry, which he was... whereas the Communists are giving them land and educating them, you better believe who the peasants are supporting.”
After losing the civil war, the Nationalists in Taiwan did an after-action analysis identifying corruption and lack of land reform as their failures, then carried out bloody but effective land reform (compensating Taiwanese with bonds that became valuable) to become one of the Four Asian Tigers with a very equal income distribution — making Taiwan a permanent rebuke that disproves the racist notion that Han Chinese and democracy are incompatible.
“after they lost the civil war and they are on the island of Taiwan, they did a big after-action analysis of what went wrong and they decided it was corruption and that it was land reform that they needed to fix those things.”
Horrible wars and Great Depressions provide hothouse conditions for dictators to rise, so the key lesson is that the last thing you want to do is fight a world war — but when an aggressor like Hitler or Putin is insistent, you can be stuck having to respond, as Britain discovered in WWII and Ukraine faces today.
“for dictators, yeah, they can have personal successes... it's in these horrible wars that dictators can rise. Also, Great Depressions provide hothouse conditions for dictators.”
Many Han Chinese revere Mao as a national hero because reunifying China under communism and fighting the capitalist coalition to a stalemate (perceived victory) in the Korean War ended what they consider the era of humiliations that began in the mid-19th century, satisfying the deep cultural belief that China must be a great power.
“by reunifying China under the banner of communism and then fighting the coalition of all the major capitalist powers to a stalemate in the Korean War, or in their mind a victory, that constitutes ending what they consider the era of humiliations that started in the mid-19th century”
The Great Famine was the only nationwide famine in Chinese history precisely because it was not caused by weather but by policies set in Beijing: putting peasants on communes gave the party control of the food supply, decentralizing industry collapsed production, yet Mao kept exporting food as government income, killing roughly 40 million people, disproportionately peasant girls.
“most of them died during the Great Famine, which was the only nationwide famine in Chinese history. Why? Because it's not caused by the weather. It's caused by policies set in Beijing.”
For someone with no power, words are the initial route into gaining power; Mao said the Communist Party can overthrow the enemy only by holding propaganda pamphlets in one hand and bullets in the other, which is why propaganda was one of only six original departments of the shadow Communist government.
“the Communist Party can overthrow the enemy only by holding propaganda pamphlets in one hand and bullets in the other”
Mao believed messages must be kept simple and epigrammatic — matching slogans equivalent to newspaper headlines (and analogous to modern tweets) that provide a lens for people to interpret events, such as 'Arm the peasants' during the White Terror or 'Down with imperialism and the Nationalist Party too' after the 1931 Manchuria invasion.
“You want to make it epigrammatic so that people can understand it rapidly. In his day, this meant having matching slogans, the equivalent of newspaper headlines, to provide a lens for people to understand events, rather like tweets in our own day.”
Chinese reverence for Mao reflects a universal human need to be proud of leaders and nation, combined with the difficulty all peoples have confronting the dark side of their own country — illustrated by how the US still struggles with slavery as its original sin, especially in the regions where it was most embedded, so it is unsurprising that the Chinese cannot easily reckon with Mao.
“it's also really hard to look at the dark side of your own country. This country has slavery; it is our original sin. We have not gotten over it.”
Because no one knew anything about Mao, Edgar Snow's Red Star Over China became the original footnote in Chinese history — everyone cited Snow and then cited each other, so the entire chain of knowledge about Mao traces back to one naive young journalist whom Mao deliberately cultivated and whose drafts Mao corrected.
“it's the original footnote in Chinese history because no one knew anything about Mao. And so then everybody starts citing Edgar Snow, and then we cite everybody and everybody and everybody. But actually, it only goes back to Edgar Snow.”
The Great Leap Forward's idiocy is explicable once you recognize Mao's primary objective was to stay in power and keep the Communist Party in power and pursue revolution, not the welfare of people — and communist ideology fails because labor theories of value ignore that services are also valuable, so the basic theory he was implementing was simply incorrect.
“you need to think about what his objective is, which number one is to stay in power, right? And number two is probably Communist Party in power and pursue his visions of revolution... Then you're worried about the welfare of people as if that's the primary objective. It most certainly is not.”
There is a crucial difference between nation-rebuilding (Japan and Germany, which already had full-up modern institutions, economies, parliaments, courts, police, and high literacy, so cash quickly recreated modern institutions) and nation-building (China, Iraq, Afghanistan, which lacked indigenous expertise), which is why a Marshall Plan would have worked in Europe but not in China.
“it's really important to distinguish between nation-building and nation rebuilding. If you're rebuilding, which is what happens in Japan and Germany, they already had full-up institutions, modern economies before the war.”
Americans often fail by not examining whether warring parties are primary adversaries; if two sides want to exterminate each other (Pakistanis and Indians, or the parties in Iraq and Afghanistan, or the Chinese Communists and Nationalists), aiding one infuriates the other and pushing them into a coalition government is impossible — so don't try it.
“Americans often don't look at warring parties to understand if they are primary adversaries there is no way you're going to make them make nice... As long as they're primary adversaries, you aid one, it infuriates the other, and they're never going to cooperate the two of them.”
The disintegration of long-fighting armies — the Nationalists collapsing after one 1948 Manchurian defeat, South Vietnam wrapping up suddenly, and Japan quitting in 1945 without an invasion of the home islands while the Germans fought for every street to Berlin — shares the common feature that warfare had gone on for an incredibly long time and ruined the places in question, so such collapse should not be expected to happen quickly.
“what you can say in all those three cases is the warfare had been going on for an incredibly long time, and it was ruinous. The places in question were ruined, so don't expect that to happen too fast.”
Global prosperity rests on a maritime order in which people obey rules because it is far cheaper to obey rules and hire a lawyer when disputes arise than to pay protection money or blow up each other's buildings and destroy wealth at an incredible clip, as is happening in Ukraine.
“The reason you all are prosperous is there's a global maritime order in which people obey rules because it is so much cheaper to obey rules. Because what do you do when people break the rules? You hire a lawyer.”
Mao's land reform was a duplicitous bait-and-switch: he propagandized first then distributed land later to win peasant allegiance, deliberately kept rich peasants around because 'rich peasant production is indispensable' (a line deleted from the collected works), and planned ultimately to collectivize all land and turn the guns on landlords and middle peasants after winning the civil war.
“It's a big bait and switch. It looks like you're going to get -- see, you got the land? Well, now you do, and now you don't, because at the end, they're all going to lose their land.”
Because the Nationalists' conventional armies had to fight the Japanese and dropped their education programs and dragooned peasants into service, while the guerrilla Communists operating behind enemy lines offered social services, education, and land reform during the winter slack season, supporting the Communists became a no-brainer for peasants.
“as the Nationalists are dragooning people into their armies, the Communists are busy offering social services, and I'll get to land reform. And so for the peasants, before too long, it becomes a no-brainer whom they're going to support.”
Mao's critic Li Lisan, following Moscow's directive to take the cities, attempted decisive war-winning battles too early with the failed 1927 Nanchang and 1930 Changsha uprisings; Mao argued Li did not understand the protracted nature of the Chinese Civil War, and trying to force a decisive battle prematurely can ruin you.
“according to Mao, Comrade Li Lisan did not understand the protracted nature of the Chinese Civil War. Li Lisan is trying to fight a decisive, war-winning battle far too early. You try to do that, and you can get yourself ruined.”
Stalin had many more tools at his disposal than the Chinese Communists because Russia was a developed country industrializing since the late 19th century with institutions China lacked, and China was uniquely devastated by overlapping catastrophes — the Taiping Rebellion (20-30 million dead) and other 19th-century peasant rebellions, warlordism, the communist-nationalist conflict, and the Japanese invasion.
“Russia is quite a developed country compared to China. And if you think about it, Russia had been industrializing since the late 19th century, and China's a much later event. Russia also has all sorts of institutions and things that China was lacking.”
The 'brilliance' of communism is the commissar and party system that makes it incredibly effective at seizing power during warfare and maintaining it thereafter — which is why there was never a successful insurgency or coup against Mao despite tens of millions of deaths — but it does not deliver prosperity; it delivers compounding poverty, as North Korea demonstrates.
“This is the “brilliance” of communism is this commissar system and the party system... it's incredibly effective about maintaining power. It's very effective about seizing power during warfare, maintaining it thereafter, but it does not deliver prosperity, it delivers compounding poverty”
Mao cultivated an unprecedented coalition never before assembled in Chinese history — peasants, women, minorities, youth, intellectuals, and most creatively the enemy army — by offering women absolute equality and the vote, offering minorities self-determination, and disintegrating the enemy army through leniency toward POWs.
“Mao also cultivated an unprecedented group of allies, never before assembled in Chinese history: not only peasants, but women, minorities, youth, intellectuals, and the enemy army, most creatively.”
Syngman Rhee's immediate land reform in South Korea glued the loyalty of soldiers to their leadership and helped defeat North Korea's attempt to mobilize the southern peasantry — an important factor (though not the only one) in why the Korean War turned out differently from China, where the Communists used land reform to win peasant loyalty.
“Syngman Rhee, the leader of South Korea, immediately did land reform, and this glues loyalty of soldiers to the leadership doing this. Maybe that is not the only factor, but an important factor for why the Korean War turns out differently.”
The claim that the Chinese are uniformly great long-term strategists is refuted by the fact that they killed so many of their own people during the Maoist period — more Chinese civilian deaths than all deaths in WWII — because killing vast numbers of your own population is generally not a mark of good strategy.
“for those of you who think the Chinese are all great long-term strategists, you need to ponder these numbers. How is it possible to kill so many of your own? That's generally not a mark of good strategy.”
The US Hawley-Smoot tariff raised tariffs to historic highs, triggering global retaliatory tariffs that devastated trade-dependent Japan, whose solution was autarky requiring an empire large enough to be self-sufficient — leading directly to the 1931 invasion of Manchuria.
“here's trade dependent Japan, that's always cooperated with everybody and suddenly they're toast. And so their solution is autarky and they need an empire large enough to be autarchic. And so then that's when they invade Manchuria in 1931.”
Communist China's demand that victims participate in their own victimization by confessing guilt reflects China's long Confucian tradition of education and re-education — putting people like Deng Xiaoping in prison to re-educate them and later releasing them — in contrast to Stalin's Russia, which simply killed all the old Bolsheviks with no chance to return.
“China has a long tradition of education... there's also a tradition of re-educating people. You could shoot everybody, you could, but that's not the Chinese tradition.”
Chiang Kai-shek, after studying communism and fascism and sending his son to Russia, accurately understood that 'the Japanese are a disease of the flesh, but the Communists are a disease of the soul,' and following the one-enemy-at-a-time principle wanted to defeat the Communists first — but popular pressure and the Xi'an Incident forced him into the Second United Front against Japan, depriving him of his preferred strategy.
“But Chiang Kai-shek knew you only take on one enemy at a time. You'll become overwhelmed if you do, and he believed that really he needed to kind of accommodate or put the Japanese aside, fight the Communists, get rid of them”
Strategic communication is terribly important because for the powerless, words are their only weapon; the Communists and especially the Russians understand how to feed information to both sides of a conflict so they are at each other's throats and increasingly dysfunctional, which is visible in modern struggles over fake news, disinformation, and elections.
“the Russians absolutely understand how to do this, this is their- they're really good at understanding both sides fighting, and then you feed information both ways so that they're just at each other's throats, and being more and more dysfunctional.”
Rather than openly supporting corrupt autocratic regimes, any country must worry about overextension given finite resources and the cost of sending citizens to die; the great insurance policy is allies and institutions like the UN and EU — the gift of the Greatest Generation that has saved millions of lives — and China's weakness is revealed by its allies being only North Korea and theocratic Iran.
“What's key on this maritime order, the big insurance policy of it all, is our allies and institutions. This is the great gift of the Greatest Generation, of having created the UN”
China is not unique in mass atrocity; the West has butchered itself and others, and it was the West that industrialized warfare — before, you had to go at it with spears, which slowed people down, but industrial equipment removed that constraint, reflecting humanity's dual capacity for great creativity and great awfulness.
“it's the West that industrializes warfare. So instead of- before you had to go at it with spears, and that slowed people down. With industrial equipment...”
Mao is one of the most consequential political and military figures of the 20th century and of Chinese history, and is probably the most brilliant and famous psychopath in human history — a description, not an endorsement.
“He is also probably the most brilliant and most famous psychopath in human history, and that is saying a lot.”
To transmit complicated material, you need a simple framework — a 'coat rack to hang all the hangers' — with only three to five items, because that is all anyone can handle on short notice.
“Simple framework should have three to five things because that's all about any of us could really handle on short notice.”
China had been a broken state since 1911 when the last dynasty fell and the country shattered into multilateral civil war among warlords, which Mao eventually won.
“China had been a broken state basically since 1911, when the last dynasty had fallen and the country had broken out into a multilateral civil war that he eventually wins.”
It is possible that Mao being so terrible — the Cultural Revolution and Great Leap Forward as visceral counterexamples — is precisely what the reformers needed to viscerally justify abandoning communism and pursuing pro-growth policies in the post-Mao era.
“Possible. Definitely possible, because of all the people who were ruined by it.”