How Hitler almost starved Britain – Sarah Paine
What this covers
Sarah Paine traces how Britain defeated Nazi Germany through the structural advantages of maritime power—sea control, blockade, and peripheral strategy—and uses that history to argue that Russia and China face the inverse predicament today. The conversation centers on the Maritime vs Continental Power Framework, which holds that countries hemmed in by narrow seas cannot project force reliably or blockade in return, while island and peninsula nations can impose starvation without reciprocal threat. Paine walks through how Britain's combination of Peripheral Strategy campaigns, Additive Alliances with Russia and America, and superior access to oceanic trade defeated a continental power that could not blockade back. The discussion moves across military history, geopolitics, economics, and the logic of strategic choice.
The range widens considerably beyond the Second World War. Paine compares Limited vs Unlimited Objectives—Bismarck's restrained territorial ambitions versus Hitler's exterminatory aims—to explain why outcomes depend on how much each side values victory, not merely industrial capacity. She introduces Julian Corbett's design for a workable peripheral strategy and Alfred Thayer Mahan's prerequisites for a functioning maritime power, neither of which Russia or China fully satisfies. The conversation turns contentious on several points: whether Putin's real adversary is China rather than NATO; whether Germany's surface fleet strategy was catastrophic; and whether China's geographic encirclement makes it as strategically vulnerable as the thesis proposes. Paine also addresses how to reason about war—the dangers of hindsight bias when labeling decisions blunders, why dictators cannot reassess as democracies can through elections, and the value of listening to disagreement to expose one's own blind spots.
Paine argues that Britain defeated Nazi Germany by exploiting the structural advantages of a maritime power—sea control, blockade, peripheral campaigns, and alliances—against a geographically imprisoned continental power, and that this same geographic logic makes Russia and China inherently vulnerable to blockade today.
- Maritime powers can blockade continental powers on narrow seas while continental powers cannot blockade back
- Britain's peripheral strategy and big continental ally (Russia) plus American industrial output combined to defeat Germany
- Russia and China are hemmed in by narrow seas that become kill zones in wartime, lacking reliable sea egress
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A small subset of countries can defend themselves primarily at sea, which opens certain strategic possibilities (mobility, access, sanctuary) that are closed to continental powers, and these geographic positions fundamentally shape what military strategies are feasible.
“It turns out that the possibilities for maritime and continental powers are a little different. Basically, a small subset of countries can defend themselves primarily at sea. That opens certain possibilities. Others can't.”
The difference between Bismarck and Hitler is limited versus unlimited objectives: Bismarck fought three wars (Danish, Austro-Prussian, Franco-Prussian) for limited territorial gains while leaving opposing governments intact and offering generous peace, transforming Prussia into the second power of Europe, whereas Hitler pursued the most unlimited variant—eliminating states and exterminating populations.
“This is the difference between limited and unlimited objectives... An unlimited objective means the state in question is not going to exist at the end of the war. If it's really unlimited, and Hitler does the most unlimited variant, he's going to kill all the people.”
Alliances are additive when partners pool complementary capabilities and share them optimally; the Allies did this voluntarily, whereas the Axis was additive only through conquest, which incurred heavy occupation overhead, damaged the conquered territories, and absorbed petroleum-deficit zones, undermining the supposed GDP gains.
“Alliances are additive, right? You should ideally add up all the complementary capabilities of you and your friends and then share them... the Axis alliance was also additive in the sense that the Germans added to their GDP the GDPs of all the places they occupied... that whole way of doing things involves big occupation forces which are big overhead.”
The opening move of a maritime power in a high-stakes war is blockade—cutting the enemy off from the oceans to force it to cannibalize its own resources—and because a continental power on narrow seas cannot blockade back, it responds with commerce raiding, which the maritime power counters by convoying merchant ships.
“The opening move of a maritime power in a really high-stakes war like this is typically blockade... if you blockade, a continental power can't blockade you back. Why? They're on the narrow seas, so they can't deploy a surface fleet.”
Single-cause explanations of why wars turn out as they do are misleading; one should play the 'game of takeaway,' removing each factor (cryptography, radar, alliances, industrial output, ship design) to test whether the outcome changes—and the Battle of the Atlantic shows the result was a package of many necessary factors, so listening to those who disagree helps reveal your blind spots.
“There's another game to play which I think is worth playing. It's the game of takeaway... If I took away cryptography, would it have turned out the same way? Negative... The story is, it's probably a package of many things.”
A useful analytical exercise is to write down each power's primary, secondary, and tertiary adversaries; doing this for WWI reveals nothing aligns—the powers were fighting parallel wars with conflicting objectives—which is why no one could exit the war without someone's primary objective being violated.
“To the best of your abilities, write down primary adversary, secondary adversary, tertiary adversary. Take all the powers in World War I on both sides and do their primary enemy, secondary, third. You find out it is a mess. Nothing aligns.”
Per Julian Corbett, a good peripheral theater must be overseas (so the enemy can't wreck your productive base), require local sea control where your sea access is better than the enemy's land access (favoring your attrition rates), use a disposal force sized so its loss won't ruin the homeland, and be conducted as joint and combined operations with friendly locals and self-command.
“according to Corbett, here are the prerequisites for a theater that makes a really good one for a peripheral operation. One, it has to be overseas so the enemy can't invade you or wreck your productive base. Secondly, you need local sea control to get in there.”
Peripheral operations work by starting where you can win, which opens a menu of more promising locations while attriting the enemy and relieving the main front; strategically this controls resources for yourself, denies them to the enemy, strengthens alliances through mutual dependence, divides enemy attention, and progresses from containment to rollback to regime change.
“You start with one where you can. If you win there, it'll open up a menu of more promising locations. All the while, you're attriting your enemy's forces... You start by trying to contain the problem, and as things go on, you try to roll it back, and then you go for regime change.”
Per Alfred Thayer Mahan, playing the maritime game requires a moat for insulation from attack, a dense internal transportation grid, reliable sea egress in wartime, a dense coastal population running trade, a commerce-driven economy, and a stable government that funds a navy and supports commerce—prerequisites that neither Russia nor China fully meets.
“Here are his prerequisites for playing the maritime game. One, you need a moat... You need a dense internal transportation grid... reliable egress by sea to get the navy out in wartime, a dense coastal population... a commerce-driven economy. Then you need a government that's stable.”
The value of a fleet is best understood by asking what it forecloses for neighbors and what it opens for you; the Austro-Hungarian submarine fleet in WWI, though it didn't win the war, forced Britain to convoy the entire Mediterranean and prevented invasion across its seas—a very cheap investment with large strategic effect.
“If you have a fleet, what does that foreclose for whoever's around you? What does it open for you?... Just by having that submarine fleet in there, it forced Britain to convoy the whole Mediterranean.”
Labeling Hitler's decisions as blunders is hindsight bias: at the time the outcome was unknown, and many people get away with very risky moves and are called brilliant while those who fail are called idiots, so the same risky decision is judged differently depending only on whether it worked.
“you call it a blunder now because it didn't work out. At the time, you don't know. A lot of people get away with really risky things and then you say they're brilliant. The ones who don't get away with the risky things, you say they're idiots.”
The 'value of the object'—how much victory is worth to each side—shapes outcomes: Denmark and Austria valued ceding small territories far less than Prussia valued unifying Germany, so they accepted generous peace, while the asymmetry in how much each side cared determined how hard each would fight.
“This is another concept, value of the object. How much is victory worth to you versus the other guy? For Denmark, just making Bismarck go away for this little state, the value of the object's lower to them.”
Dictators never surrender even when losing—they just double down—whereas elections provide a structural moment of reassessment when the party in power has screwed things up; since most humans dislike changing their minds, only elections force the reassessment that dictatorships cannot generate, which is why Putin will not back down in Ukraine.
“Dictators don't. They just double down. This is the beauty of elections... elections are a moment to reassess when the party in power sufficiently screws things up... If you have a dictator, you're guaranteed. Putin is not going to back down in Ukraine.”
Whether industrial superiority determines the outcome depends on whether the war is for limited or unlimited objectives; the Russo-Japanese War shows Japan, with a fraction of Russia's resources, trounced Russia because Japan had a very limited objective and Russia had domestic problems and was willing to bail.
“It depends whether the war is a war for limited or unlimited objectives. You can play that game with the Russo-Japanese War. All the data you talk about, Japan's is a fraction of Russia's but Russia gets trounced... Japan has a very limited objective.”
The US wrongly believes Putin's main concern is NATO, but Putin's real problem is China: NATO does not want Russian territory, while China might covet the resource-rich Siberian lands (energy, water, Lake Baikal's 20% of world fresh water) that Tsarist Russia took from China, especially given Putin's own doctrine that you can take a place you feel deeply about.
“The United States thinks that Putin is just worried about us and NATO. Actually, Putin's problem is China. NATO doesn't want Russian territory. Who would want it?... But China might want it.”
China received essentially no effective Lend-Lease aid because aid requires ports and railways, and Japan had blockaded China—a proof of concept that blockade works—forcing the US into the unworkable expedient of flying supplies over the Himalayas (the Hump), which consumed nearly as much fuel as it delivered.
“China, nothing. What's going on there? You can only get aid in if there are ports and railways. Japan blockaded China. Proof of concept, it can be done.”
US entry into the war initially benefited Germany by producing a 'Second Happy Time,' because Admiral King opposed convoying and Americans failed to black out coastal lighting, silhouetting merchant ships—especially around the Cape Hatteras shoals—and making them easy U-boat targets until convoys were adopted by May 1942.
“The United States enters the war, which you think would be good for Britain, except it produces Hitler's Second Happy Time. Why? Because Admiral King... doesn't think convoying is the manly thing for naval officers to be up to.”
Germany should have minimized its surface fleet and bought far more U-boats, because its geography on the narrow seas meant a surface fleet could never be deployed without being sunk; Hitler eventually recognized this, scrapping his surface fleet—a lesson countries like China surrounded by narrow seas ought to consider.
“He scrapped his surface fleet, because it was useless to him in this war. You cannot deploy it in this kind of high-stakes war. It's something countries like China, surrounded by narrow seas, ought to think about.”
Eurasia's geography naturally contains both Russia and China because they are surrounded by narrow seas that become kill zones in wartime, leaving them without reliable sea egress—unlike the US and the European peninsula whose unencumbered coastlines face the open ocean.
“Eurasia is a completely different story. This is where China and Russia live. No one's done this to them. This is just the way it is. It's all of these narrow seas that become kill zones in wartime... Nature naturally contains both Russia and China.”
Germany's fundamental error was going to war at all in either world war, because with its strong growth rate it could have dominated Europe economically by simply continuing to grow and building business relationships, rather than incurring millions of losses in conflict.
“The first one is, why even go to war? If you want to dominate Europe and you have a really great growth rate, which in World War I they did, they would have taken over Europe years ago by just growing. Don't do either world war.”
Despite the difficulty of coordinating high-stakes decisions among allies, the only thing worse than fighting with allies is fighting without them, because you need complementary capabilities and multiple locations to gang up on a continental problem, and sticking with alliances also establishes precedents and institutions that hold the peace afterward.
“his idea is that there's only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and that's fighting without them, because you'll be toast.”
No matter how rational one's preferred course, peace and good outcomes cannot be unilaterally chosen because the enemy gets a vote—adversaries may make dangerous, seemingly idiotic decisions that must nonetheless be countered.
“Of course, peace would be the better thing... But sadly, the enemy gets a vote.”
A key reason to listen to people who disagree with you is that they may see factors you cannot, since everyone has blind spots and relies on others to find them—but this only works if you are receptive to listening.
“A reason why you should listen to people who disagree with you is that they may see some of these other factors. We all have blind spots and we rely on other people to find them. But you have to be receptive to listening.”
Because humans dislike changing their minds and doubling down on bad decisions is a common mistake, structuring discourse as argument and counterargument helps reduce the psychological sting of revising one's views.
“Most human beings don't like to change their mind. It's a terrible mistake... That's why I like the argument/counterargument structure, to try to take some of the sting out of changing our minds.”
Lend-Lease aid was decisive for Russia not in quantity (it got less than Britain) but in supplying critical complementary inputs Russia couldn't produce—high-octane aviation fuel, rolling stock and locomotives for transport, and Spam that prevented a Soviet famine in winter 1942-1943—delivered over railways that had not been completed in WWI.
“The United States prevented Russia from going into a famine in the winter of 1942-1943. We fed them with this Spam in a can.”
Per Clausewitz, the culminating point of attack is the point beyond which an attacking force weakens itself, because the enemy will counterattack and push it back further than its starting position; WWI's trench offensives ignored this and produced massive casualties for little territory.
“Lesson number one is don't go beyond the culminating point of attack... It means if you're attacking in a battle, if you go too far you'll weaken yourself because the enemy will counterattack and send you further backwards than you would have otherwise been.”
Good foreign policy is rarely about finding a great option—there usually are none—but about identifying the least bad option among feasible alternatives, which requires many experts gaming out courses of action, so gutting the State Department is profoundly dangerous.
“What is your least bad option? That's usually what foreign policy is. It's not what the great option is, there are none of those. It's what the least bad one is. It takes a lot of thought and gutting the State Department will not get you there.”
Ukraine has demonstrated that you don't need a navy to stop a navy in narrow seas—using drones, shore ordnance, and planes, smaller powers can wreck a larger navy, which should be a wake-up call to anyone operating on a narrow sea and forced Russia to relocate its Black Sea base from Sevastopol to Novorossiysk.
“The Ukrainians have shown that you don't even need a navy to stop a navy in narrow seas. It should be a real wake-up call to anyone on a narrow sea. Just by using drones and shore ordnance and planes and things that you can wreck navies.”
Sanctions need not be leakproof to be devastating: knocking even one or two percentage points off Chinese growth annually—as the difference between North and South Korea illustrates—compounds over generations, dramatically extending an economy's doubling time and proving highly consequential.
“If you can knock off one or two percentage points of Chinese growth just because some people are sanctioning like war materiel, that would be a very likely thing... The cumulative effects of doing that to a country over generations is the difference between North and South Korea.”
The strategic trick today, mirroring how German invasion glued the Anglo-Soviet alliance by making Germany the primary enemy of both, is to avoid doing things that make the United States the primary enemy of both Xi Jinping and Putin—currently their primary problems are each other and their neighbors, and keeping them divided is essential.
“That's the trick in our own day. You do not want to do things that make the United States the primary enemy of those two, of Xi Jinping and Putin. Currently we're not.”
The leaders of WWII were the conscripts of WWI who learned concrete lessons—avoiding the culminating point of attack, running coordinated multi-front diplomacy, providing Lend-Lease aid, and convoying merchant shipping—and applied them to fight a fundamentally different and less costly war.
“the generation that led World War II in Britain—not just Britain but elsewhere—were the conscripts of World War I... They learned a whole series of lessons. I'm going to do a comparison of what was done in World War I versus World War II.”
China can only realistically blockade neighbors lacking alternate coastlines (Vietnam, Brunei, Cambodia must transit the South China Sea), while Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Taiwan have coastlines facing the high seas that are extremely difficult to shut down, and the legal ambiguity of the South China Sea means neutrals could switch sides in any conflict.
“Better bets are in the South China Sea, because Vietnam, Brunei and Cambodia don't have alternate coastlines... However, Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Taiwan, all have other coastlines that face the high seas.”
Putin and Russia are far more vulnerable to blockade than they can impose, because the Baltic has become a NATO lake after Sweden and Finland joined, the Black Sea can be closed with mines, and Russia's two big naval bases on the Bering and Barents Seas require deploying past NATO territory while being far from any industrial base.
“It turns out that Putin and Russia are much more vulnerable to blockade than the other way around. It's very easy to close up the Baltic and Black Seas.”
Barbarossa was largely motivated by Hitler's need for oil to escape Germany's petroleum-deficit position, so the real blunder was not invading Russia per se but going for Moscow rather than driving straight for the oil fields and taking only those.
“he needed it because he had this big petroleum deficit zone. When you say 'stupid to invade Russia', probably it's that once you've done this number, you have to go into Russia because you've got to take those oil fields. Then you can go, 'Buddy, don't go for Moscow... Just go straight for the oil fields.'”
The Battle of the Atlantic was won partly through reduced merchant losses and increased U-boat kills, but arguably more important was the US ability to overwhelm Germany through sheer construction—merchant hull construction rising fourfold and naval hulls tripling then doubling—so that by mid-1943 construction diverged decisively from losses and Germany could not keep up.
“one could argue even more important was the civilian side of it: the United States' ability to just overwhelm Germany with the construction of US naval and merchantmen.”
The Gallipoli campaign, an attempt to break the blockade of Russia by reaching the Black Sea, failed because it was not a joint operation: the British Navy ran the Dardanelles alone for two months, alerting the Ottomans, who reinforced before the land troops arrived, stalemating the invasion in three days and producing 190,000 casualties.
“First of all, it wasn't a joint operation... The British Navy tries to run the Dardanelles for two months. That does not work well. Do you suppose the Ottomans might think something was up?”
British capture and decryption of German Enigma machines from 1940-1941 allowed convoys to perform evasive routing around U-boat wolfpacks within 36 hours of intercepting messages, potentially saving up to 2 million tons of Allied shipping until the Germans added a fourth rotor and blinded the British again.
“By the summer of 1941 through February 1942, they can actually read the codes and decrypt them so that within 36 hours they can get the information out. This allows convoys to go, 'Oh, wolfpack there. We're going to do evasive routing.' That may have saved up to 2 million tons of Allied shipping.”
Aleksandr Dugin, who expresses ideas resembling Putin's, advocates a world divided into spheres of influence where each is a world unto itself, rejecting a universal rules-based order of mutual trade.
“Here's his view of how the world should be. It's not a universal rules-based order where we all trade with each other. Rather we're going to divide it up into these spheres of influence where each is a world unto itself.”
Britain was dangerously dependent on sea imports not only for oil and resources but for about half its food supply, which is why German commerce raiding came close to sinking a terminal quantity of British trade.
“Britain is dependent not only on oil imports and resources, but about half of its food supply. The Germans tried and came close.”
The main theater of WWII was Russia, not the western fronts, because between two-thirds and three-quarters of German ground forces were always fighting Russia, which is what made all other theaters peripheral and what ultimately made the Normandy landing possible.
“The main theater is Russia in this war, not what you think. Why? Because between two-thirds and three-quarters of German ground forces were always fighting Russia.”
Ever since the Industrial Revolution introduced compounded economic growth, the continental solution of invading territory is a mistake; it is far better to forgo conquest and allow free traffic of people, trade, goods, and ideas so that everyone grows together in a positive-sum manner.
“Ever since the Industrial Revolution introduced compounded economic growth, this continental solution is a mistake. It is much better to forget about invading territory, allow the free traffic of people, trade, goods, ideas, and then we'll all grow together.”
The Soviet Union's logic in dividing Poland with Germany was 'pounce and absorb'—letting Germany and Britain weaken each other to open opportunities for Russia—because the British, who saw communists as the real long-term threat, did not grasp how lethal and genocidal the fascists were until blitzkrieg forced a realignment.
“It's the pounce and absorb. They will weaken each other that will open opportunities for Russia. That would be the plan.”
The air campaign over Germany functioned as another peripheral campaign that helped Russia, because once the British began bombing Berlin, Hitler recalled air squadrons and anti-aircraft guns from the Eastern Front, ending German air dominance over Russia and stopping the capture of hundreds of thousands of POWs.
“once the British start bombing Berlin, Hitler calls off air squadrons from the Eastern front. These anti-aircraft guns can be used against tanks or aircraft. He pulls those back and that means the Germans no longer own the skies of Russia.”
If the US blows its alliance system it will face China alone, which won't go well, and attempting to corner a great power like China is especially dangerous because cornering a great power does not end well for the one doing the cornering.
“If we blow our alliance system, we're going to be dealing with China alone. That won't go well. Particularly if we think we're going to corner them in some way, corner a great power like China and think that'll go well for us. It won't.”
Being the biggest trading partner of many countries creates strong vested interests that function as a de facto alliance; America has many alliances because it has a lot of trade, but China's trade ties come with the baggage of telling smaller neighbors to 'shut up and color' because China is big, which the neighbors resent.
“these international institutions, for those who actually are serious about them, it's a de facto alliance. NATO is most certainly an alliance.”
WWI was an absolutely mismanaged war in which militaries ran the show with civilians deferring, and this disaster set up communism and fascism and put them on steroids; the people who lived through it built the institutions that held the peace until the present day, when reckless leaders again endanger it.
“That war sets communism and fascism up, it puts them on steroids. You can argue we've been dealing with that mismanagement in one way or another ever since.”
The munitions mathematics doomed Germany: Russia on its own produced more munitions than Germany did, and once the US entered, American munitions output (around $100 billion) dwarfed Germany's (under $40 billion), while Russia mobilized twice the army the US did despite its conquered-reduced population.
“If you look at the mathematics of munitions, the Russians on their lonesome produce more munitions than did Germany. Once the United States gets in the war, we produce, I think like $100 billion in munitions. In that period the Germans produced less than $40 billion.”
New technologies—radar, hedgehogs, auxiliary aircraft carriers, and destroyer escorts equipped with sonar and depth charges—transformed commerce raiding into a low-life-expectancy profession, causing Germany to lose 41 U-boats in May 1943, an unsustainable rate that forced Dönitz to withdraw from the North Atlantic.
“These little ships have all sorts of fun things on board: sonar, radar, depth charges, hedgehogs. They transform commerce raiding into a low-life expectancy profession so that in May of 1943 the Germans lose 41 U-boats. That's unsustainable.”
Britain's continental problem has been a recurring structural feature: it was always fighting France, and once Germany unified in 1871 the problem became Germany—the same maritime power facing whichever continental power dominated the European peninsula.
“Britain was always fighting France. In 1871, Germany unifies and then the problem's Germany.”
If China invaded Taiwan, the chip foundry everyone cares about would be the first casualty—blown and gone—because there is no way to capture it intact, and the act would terrify everyone else and trigger sanctions that give trade-reliant China a massive timeout from the global order.
“That lovely chip foundry that everyone cares about, I imagine would be the first casualty of that war. That will be blown and be gone. There's no way you'll capture that intact.”
It is a serious error to have royalty or hereditary leaders running states, because they get their jobs based on lineage rather than merit; Bismarck succeeded partly because he dealt with kings who were clueless about what they were doing, and merit-based leadership produces better strategic decisions.
“It's a real reason why you don't want royalty running stuff. You want people who get their jobs based on merit rather than who their dad was. The world that Bismarck's dealing with is kings who are just clueless what they're up to.”
Trade patterns do not change overnight but gradually over roughly a ten-year period, and supply chains are already moving out of China, meaning a coalition's economic pressure would have slow but cumulative effect.
“you're right that trade patterns don't go overnight. They go gradually over like a 10 year period in which China will find it's already happening, as supply chains are moving out of China. It's slow.”
By adopting a peripheral strategy in WWII rather than committing a large army to the main continental front (as in WWI), Britain chalked up roughly half the deaths it suffered in WWI, when it deployed its multi-million-man army on the main front from start to finish.
“In World War I, the British army gets the multi-million man army that they had coveted. They deploy it on the main front from start to finish and chalk up twice as many deaths as they did in World War II when they have a peripheral strategy.”
Although the Allies won WWI and wrecked the continental powers, it was a Pyrrhic victory for France and Britain that severely weakened them—a lesson that drove the determination to fight WWII differently.
“Even so, the Allies win this thing and they wreck the continental powers. But they almost wreck themselves in the process. It's a Pyrrhic victory for France and Britain. It really weakens them.”