
James Hamilton on Debt, Default, and Oil 12/21/2009
What this covers
This is a conversation between Russ Roberts and James Hamilton, an economist at UC San Diego who also blogs at EconBrowser. It splits into two halves: the first on the federal deficit and the risk of default, the second on oil. Hamilton separates sovereign default from a currency crisis and argues the second is the relevant model for the US, since it owes dollars and can print them. The live question is whether it can do so without the dollar's purchasing power collapsing. He treats breaking Social Security or Medicare promises as a different matter from defaulting on Treasury holders. The former is legally possible and probably unavoidable.
The fiscal half ranges widely. Hamilton notes that federal receipts have stayed below roughly 21% of GDP while medical spending grows faster than the economy. He explains why the US gets better treatment than its numbers would earn another country: its size, its tradition, and its record. He also covers the Fannie and Freddie guarantees and the way FHA and Ginnie Mae still play the same game. Roberts adds a sharp aside on the roughly $1.5 trillion channeled into subprime mortgages. A contested forecast concerns the Fed. Hamilton expects it would be horrified at monetizing the debt yet would do so de facto through emergency measures, as in fall 2008. The two also discuss the debt ceiling votes and why they make little economic sense.
The oil half begins with the 2005-2008 surge: flat world production, rapid growth in China, and price inelastic short-run demand. Consumption in OECD countries had to fall to make room. Hamilton dismisses speculation as an explanation for the decade-long trend, while allowing it some role recently. Roberts raises the ethanol mandate and its effect on crop prices. Hamilton's most contested claim is that the 2007-08 price spike, which cut SUV purchases by about 25%, was the straw that broke the camel's back for a housing-weakened economy. He ends by reflecting on why recessions are so hard to predict.
James Hamilton argues that large near-term US deficits are appropriate, but the long-run fiscal trajectory threatens the credibility that lets the US borrow at near-zero rates, risking a sudden currency-and-financial crisis. Separately, he argues that stagnant oil supply colliding with demand from newly industrialized countries explains the decade-long oil price rise, and that the 2007-08 oil shock was the straw that tipped the US into recession.
- Low US borrowing costs reflect historical credibility in debt management, which can be abused and lost, so long-run structural fiscal commitments are needed now
- World oil production stagnated from 2005 to 2008 while world GDP grew more than 10%, so price-inelastic demand forced large price increases
- The sudden 2007-08 gasoline price spike cut SUV purchases by about 25% and slowed consumption, tipping an economy already weakened by housing into recession
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The 2005-2008 oil price surge resulted from world petroleum production stagnating while world real GDP rose more than 10% in 2006-2007. China added roughly 1 million barrels a day of consumption, which with flat global output was only possible because OECD consumption fell by about 1 million barrels a day, forced by large price increases.
“between 2005 and 2008 world production of petroleum basically stagnated”
Short-run oil demand is highly price inelastic, so it takes a very large price increase to change consumption. It was perhaps even more inelastic in 2005-2006 than historically, because energy expenditure shares had fallen so low that many Americans could afford to ignore the initial price increases.
“it takes a very big increase in the price of oil for people to change consumption it's highly price inelastic over the short-run”
A U.S. sovereign debt or currency crisis would be very bad for Main Street. If you don't trust money lent to the federal government, you can't trust money lent to U.S. banks, firms or consumers. Fall 2008 showed that when credit dries up, the economy goes into a nosedive. A joint currency and banking crisis has been very unpleasant for countries that went through one and would be worse for the U.S. Because the U.S. has been the safe haven, it would also create global confusion about what replaces it.
“if you don't trust your money being went to the US federal government how do you trust your money lent to the US bank or the US firm or the US consumer”
Off-balance-sheet guarantees are seductive because they seem to give something for nothing. Fannie and Freddie collected small fees for guaranteeing securitized loans without anywhere near enough capital, implicitly relying on the government. The government still plays this game through the FHA and Ginnie Mae, and these promises may bite on real cash flows later.
“that's what the real seductive aspect of these Ledger's he was totally off budget you know because I could get something for nothing”
In fall 2008, money surprisingly fled into dollars even though the US was ground zero of the financial crisis. The link between the short run and the long run is credibility, a power that can be abused to the point that it is lost, which would be very frightening.
“there is a link between the short run and the long run and that link has to do with credibility”
Near-zero US borrowing rates reflect the historical fact that the US has managed its debt relatively responsibly. Responsible debt management lets a country borrow very favorably in crises, but this credibility is a power that can be abused to the point that it is lost. The short run and the long run are therefore linked through credibility.
“those low rates are you know frankly zero rates at the moment or a reflection of the historical fact that the US has been relatively responsible with our debt management”
Knowledge of what causes business cycles is not what we'd like, partly because recessions inherently involve missed expectations. If a recession were foreseen six months out, the Fed and businesses would act differently, so recessions may be as inherently unpredictable as stock prices. Recessions also differ in their propagation details, yet share a critical-mass dynamic: once enough sectors struggle at once, the system goes into reverse.
“an element of recessions in in my understanding is missed expectations so if you knew a recession was coming in six months the Federal Reserve would have acted differently”
Speculation is irrelevant to the decade-long oil price trend, since above-ground inventories can't matter much over 10 years. Day-to-day price moves are entirely speculation, in the sense of guesses about the future, and errors show up in inventories. Above-trend US inventories in 2009 suggest speculation played some role recently, but it is a mistake to attribute the rise from $50 a barrel entirely to speculation.
“on a daily basis movements in the price of oil are entirely speculation in the sense of people making guesses about where the future is going to be”
Gradual oil price increases early in the decade did little economic damage. Consumers spent a few more cents a month while incomes rose, and the energy expenditure share had fallen dramatically since 1980. The sudden, dramatic price spike from fall 2007 through summer 2008, by contrast, made energy spending significant enough that people had to cut spending.
“they were coming kind of gradually and so okay you spend a few more cents each month on gas but your income is rising at the same time”
Sovereign defaults and currency crises are different and shouldn't be lumped together; the currency crisis is the relevant model for the US because it borrows in its own currency. Often, though, crisis countries looked good beforehand, with real growth and a run-up in public debt. If the US name were replaced by a small developing country's, the current numbers would look like a pre-crisis situation.
“if you took the name u.s. off of the current numbers and replaced them with some small developing country you'd certainly say yeah this is the kind of situation that could could go that that route”
Separate congressional votes on spending and taxes versus the debt ceiling make little economic sense, because a bigger deficit necessarily increases the debt. The separation lets politicians grandstand by voting against debt-ceiling increases while having voted for the taxes and spending that created the borrowing need.
“from an economic perspective it's very strange to separate those two questions because there's no way you can run a bigger deficit without increasing the debt”
Breaking entitlement promises is fundamentally different from defaulting to bondholders. Changing Social Security or Medicare law (e.g., a later retirement age or means-testing) is legally permissible and likely unavoidable given projected trends. Defaulting on Treasury holders would damage the ability to borrow again and the world financial system.
“I think they're totally different insurance the US has a legal obligation to be having exactly the same retirement age”
The US gets better treatment than its numbers would earn another country for three reasons: its sheer size as consumer, producer and financial center (a US crisis would hit the whole world), its tradition, and its history of responsible debt management. As Hamilton put it, 'if you don't trust the United States who else don't you trust'.
“if you don't trust the United States who else don't you trust”
Contrary to Lloyd Blankfein's claim that investment banks do 'God's work' by channeling capital to its highest-valued use, about $1.5 trillion was channeled into subprime mortgages between 2004 and 2006. Much of it went to homes people couldn't afford, often second, third or bigger homes. The incentives drove capital there, and unless they change, long-run prosperity is threatened.
“between 2004 and 2006 we channeled about 1.5 trillion into subprime mortgages people buying homes they couldn't afford”
In fall 2008 there was a surprising flight into dollars, even though the US was ground zero of the world's financial problems. Even now, despite fiscal solvency concerns, US short-term borrowing rates are practically zero (the 'tallest pygmy' dynamic).
“one of the very interesting things in the fall of 2008 was this flight into dollars and it was kind of surprising because the u.s. was ground zero”
The US ethanol mandate pushed land into corn, including land less suited to it, raising corn prices and pulling land from soybeans and other crops, raising their prices too. Roberts notes this doesn't explain the broad commodity rise, though. Fifty years of past growth usually saw commodities get cheaper as technology improved, not secular price increases.
“we had a ethanol mandate in the United States that put pressure on corn”
Oil demand may have been even more price-inelastic in 2005-2006 than historically. Energy expenditures had become a modest enough share of budgets that many Americans could afford to ignore initial price increases.
“partly because the energy expenditures had become modest enough for a lot of Americans that we could just afford to ignore those those initial price increases”
In summer 2008, purchases of SUVs and light trucks fell about 25% while purchases of fuel-efficient imported cars rose. This is strong evidence that the energy price shock hurt the US auto sector, causing job and income losses. The slowdown in overall consumption matched historical correlations between consumer spending and energy prices.
“what you saw in the summer of o8 was maybe a 25% drop in purchases of the suvs and light trucks”
Energy price increases were the straw that broke the camel's back for the 2007-09 recession. Housing was subtracting about 1% from annual real GDP growth (slightly more the year before the recession), and once housing, autos, overall consumption and consumer sentiment tanked together, the economy tipped into recession. The fall 2008 Lehman financial crisis was a new phase not caused by oil, but the economy faced it already three-quarters into a recession.
“my own view is that the energy price increases were the the straw that broke the camel's back”
People within the Fed would be horrified at the presumption that they would bail out the government by monetizing the debt, and they would not knowingly go down that road. Hamilton nevertheless expects a crisis to play out as in fall 2008: the Fed would take a series of emergency measures to get past each auction, just as it doubled its balance sheet as a 'short-run' crisis response. The effect would be similar to monetization.
“I could see them taking a series of emergency measures to get past this week's auction or that week's development which has a similar kind of effect”
In a dollar crisis, the Fed faces a dilemma: defend the dollar by raising rates and letting the Treasury default, or step in. The Fed would be horrified at deliberately monetizing the debt, but it would likely monetize de facto, as in fall 2008. It would take a series of emergency measures to get past this week's auction, which has a similar effect; in 2008 that approach doubled its balance sheet without a long-run plan.
“I could see them taking a series of emergency measures to get past this week's auction or that week's development which has a similar kind of effect”
The US can never literally default because it owes dollars and can create them. The real question is whether it can do so without a dramatic collapse in the dollar's purchasing power, so the US doomsday scenario is a currency crisis rather than a default.
“it's true by definition that the what the government owes is dollars and the government could create as many dollars as it needs”
The key policy to prevent a run on rolling over near-term debt is for the US to take credible, responsible action now on long-run issues. It must demonstrate a believable path that makes sense going forward.
“I think the key policy for addressing that is for the u.s. to to take a more responsible stand on these longer run issues”
US federal tax receipts have historically stayed below about 21% of GDP with remarkable long-term stability, while medical expenditures grow much faster than GDP, so something has to give. The options are lenders refusing to lend to the US, or a large increase in the federal tax share, which would potentially sacrifice long-run growth.
“federal tax receipts as a percentage of GDP that's historically in the u.s. always been below about 21%”
A US sovereign debt or currency crisis would be very bad for Main Street. If lenders don't trust the federal government, they won't trust US banks, firms or consumers either, and fall 2008 showed that when credit dries up the economy nosedives. A joint currency and banking crisis would be especially severe for the US, with a global dimension since nothing obviously replaces the US as safe haven.
“if you don't trust your money being went to the US federal government how do you trust your money lent to the US bank or the US firm or the US consumer”
Hamilton answers that the character of growth has changed. Global real GDP grew about 5% a year from 2003 to 2007, which he calls a pretty big deal and possibly without historical precedent.
“we went for years there from oh three two oh seven with with five percent real real GDP growth globally”
Contingent liabilities matter for federal solvency even though they are not part of the deficit-debt accounting identity and don't require issuing Treasuries this year. These include Fannie, Freddie, Ginnie Mae, the FHA and the FDIC, plus projected health care, Social Security and Medicare costs.
“they aren't part of that direct debt calculation ... but they are part of what constitutes the the potential solvency of the federal government”
Roberts worries that Treasury financing with very short-term debt, such as a $31 billion four-week bill at near-zero interest, mirrors what failed investment banks did. They borrowed short because it was cheap, and when lenders worried, financing suddenly stopped.
“gee that's what the investment banks did that went broke they burrowed under very short-term rates”
Over the last decade the US hasn't created jobs and invested in housing rather than productive capacity. At the government level it has not invested in infrastructure but increased transfer payments, which raises the worry that problems are being passed to the next generation.
“we've invested in in housing rather than than productive capacity and you know at the government level not not investing in infrastructure but but basically increasing transfer payments”
Roberts describes himself as a former deficit dove following Milton Friedman's insight. On that view, what government spends on matters more than whether it is financed by taxes today or taxes tomorrow (debt). Debt adds an interest cost, so spending should be especially worthwhile, but in the 1980s and 1990s it carried no real default risk.
“Milton Friedman's insight which I think is still basically true ... it's not so much how you finance government spending whether it's taxes today or taxes tomorrow what's important is what you spend it on”
Energy price increases have been a contributing factor to a number of previous historical US recessions, not just the most recent one.
“just as I believe they are a contributing factor to a number of previous historical recessions”
Much of the gross federal debt is owed by one branch of government to another, with the Social Security trust fund the biggest single holder and the Fed also holding a significant chunk. Debt held by the public would be about 60% of GDP at the end of next year, versus about 100% for gross debt.
“at the end of next year would be 60% of GDP instead of the hundred percent ... the Social Security trust fund is by far the biggest single holder”
A run on US short-term debt could be triggered within a medium-term horizon of perhaps two years, though not in two months. Possible triggers are a recurrence of financial problems such as the 'other shoe' of commercial real estate, a sputtering economy, or politics that heighten concern about unresolved long-run medical costs. Short rates and expectations could then shift very quickly.
“I don't think it's going to happen in two months but I could imagine it happening in two years”
The broader driver of oil prices is a dramatic rise in living standards within a generation in newly industrialized countries, led by China, whose people now want cars. This coincides with a world struggling to increase oil production, so Hamilton expects continued upward pressure on oil prices over the next decade, since most of those people don't yet have cars.
“it's an incredible challenge to try to keep up with with the growing demand from the newly industrialized countries so I think this is something that that's also going to be the trend for the next decade”
Saudi Arabia historically acted as the world's swing producer, raising output when prices were high and cutting it when low, thereby smoothing prices. Its production stagnated and began declining after about 2005, contradicting forecasters who assumed Saudi output would meet Chinese demand growth.
“for years the Saudis were the world's swing producer in oil markets”
China buys US Treasuries to keep the yuan from appreciating and maintain its export market, which conventional theory says shouldn't enrich a country but has worked so far. China is also stockpiling physical commodities (gold, copper, oil), which would gain if the dollar collapsed. This partly hedges its dollar exposure, so it is less exposed than financial numbers suggest.
“they're keeping the wand from appreciating and they're thereby maintaining an export market”
It is an open question why Saudi Arabia failed to raise output: either it perceived no interest in stabilizing prices at a lower level, or it lacks the claimed capacity. Even if it could reach 15 million barrels per day, a few years of Chinese (and Indian) demand growth would eat that up.
“do the do the Saudis have as much oil and as much capacity as they're claiming that's an open question”
The character of global growth changed: 2003-2007 saw about 5% real global GDP growth, possibly without historical precedent. That may explain why this growth episode, unlike earlier ones, produced broad commodity price increases.
“we went for years there from oh three two oh seven with with five percent real real GDP growth globally that's a pretty big deal”
The comovement of oil with other commodities has two sources. On a daily basis, financial factors may move commodities together. Fundamentally, there is common demand: China buys copper as well as oil, and rising meat consumption pressures grain. Agriculture has a margin to expand supply, unlike oil in traditional producing areas.
“China's not just buying oil they're buying copper they're buying well okay increasing meat consumption putting pressure on green”
Many traditional oil supplies are in geologic decline. US production has declined for 40 years, with an increasing fraction coming offshore; the North Sea and Mexico are declining; and Indonesia, an original OPEC member, is now an importer. Brazil and Africa are promising, but much new production is needed just to offset natural decline rates and meet emerging-market demand growth.
“Indonesia was one of the original members of OPEC now they're an oil importer because of the declining production rates”
Even if Saudi Arabia could reach 15 million barrels a day, as many assumed (though the Saudis never said they would), a few years of Chinese demand growth would eat up that increase, and India's billion people and oil producers' own demand add more.
“even if you you thought they could it doesn't take too many years of growth of China for that to get eaten up”
Hamilton expects some movement in US short-term interest rates in advance of any crisis. No historical case shows a country going from borrowing costs as extremely low as current US rates to a crisis within a space of months.
“I don't think you'd find an analogous situation in all the other experiences of a country that went from that time advantage to suddenly the sort of graces we're talking about within a space of mugs”
Running a large federal deficit in 2009 and 2010 is desirable and necessary. Trying to balance the budget immediately would be counterproductive to the point of being infeasible; the real concern is the trajectory a couple of years down the road.
“a large deficit in 2009 and 2010 is quite desirable and the necessary and I think if we tried to balance the budget right now it would be counterproductive to the point of being infeasible”
Apart from World War II, nothing in US history resembles current deficits, which run on the order of 10% of GDP in 2009-2010. That makes this an unusual peacetime development.
“there isn't anything apart from World War two that's that's like what we're getting into right now ... deficits this year next on the order of 10 percent of GDP”
Roberts frames the oil market as a supply-and-demand picture with a relatively vertical short-run supply curve and an inelastic demand curve shifting out, so the shift shows up mainly as higher prices. Responses vary by nation and individual flexibility and are greater in the long run. Saudi Arabia, with very low extraction costs, complicates the picture.
“you've got a relatively relatively vertical supply curve in a short run you have an inelastic demand curve shifting out and that's going to mainly be reflected in higher prices”
Roberts' doomsday scenario combines several stresses: about $3 trillion of borrowing needs in the coming year, a new wave of foreclosures (Fannie and Freddie bought about 600,000 mortgages in 2007 with under 5% down, and 25-33% of US mortgages are underwater with some ARMs resetting in 2010), and commercial real estate. Together these could make the Chinese and others view Treasuries as less safe, signaled first by rising interest rates.
“something between 25 and 33 percent of US mortgages today are underwater some of those are going to reset in 2010”
Currency crises put a country in a situation with no good options, threatening real economic activity along with inflation and currency value. The only real defense is running policy so you never get there in the first place.
“it's a standard problem with these currency crises that it it puts the country in a very unfortunate situation and there isn't a good option”
The debt-to-GDP ratio is still a natural burden measure despite the unit mismatch. The key quantity is the debt service cost, an annual flow: at a given interest rate (e.g., 5% on $50,000 is $2,500 a year), comparing debt to income effectively compares service cost to income. Deviations far from peacetime historical norms raise the question of what will stabilize the debt.
“the key question about the debt is the service cost which is a flow an annual flow”
Debt is a stock and GDP is a flow, so a 100% debt-to-GDP ratio does not imply bankruptcy. It is like owing $50,000 on a $50,000 annual income, which is payable over time if your income grows.
“debt is a stock I think and GDP is a flow that is one is at a point in time and one is describing something that occurs over time”
To a first approximation, the change in debt equals the deficit. Outstanding debt that matures is simply rolled over rather than paid down, and the current year's deficit is added on top.
“to a first approximation the change in the debt is equal to the deficit because you basically have to roll over that outstanding debt”
The U.S. has no legal obligation to keep the same retirement age and health benefits 20 years from now. Keeping them is not feasible, because projecting current entitlement trends shows 'nothing but trouble ahead.'
“I think it's not really going to be feasible as I say you project these trends and there's nothing but trouble ahead”
The view that the current recession was entirely a result of financial issues is hard to sustain. The recession officially began in December 2007, well before the fall 2008 financial crisis, so it must have had a real-side component.
“it's hard to argue the ladder because it started in December of oh 7 at least that's the official measure so it would have to have some real side part to it”
Beyond autos, the energy price increases drained consumer budgets. The slowdown in overall consumption spending that followed was in line with historical correlations between consumption spending and energy prices.
“the slowdown in overall consumption spending following the energy price increases was quite in line with the historical correlations”
Economic growth is the key variable for fiscal sustainability. It raises tax revenue, reduces the likelihood of payouts on implicit guarantees, and stabilizes the financial system. With continued growth, interest rates would rise normally and manageably in an expansion.
“the thing that's going to help all of this this mathematics is economic growth”
Paul Krugman's position is that the US can grow its way out of its debt. He points to the US after World War II, when debt-to-GDP exceeded 100% and was reduced through economic growth, and to other countries that worked out of similar debt levels the same way.
“Paul's position is that we can grow our way out of whatever we dig ourselves into just as at the end of World War two we had a debt to GDP ratio in the u.s. that God above a hundred percent”
Many competing theories explain business cycles: Edward Leamer's housing-driven recessions, monetarist views that monetary policy explains most cycles, and Keynesian 'animal spirits' or loss of confidence.
“we've had Lemur on the program who's written a provocative and interesting paper about housing prices being a driver of recessions”
The recession cannot be purely financial, Roberts argues, since it officially started in December 2007, before the fall 2008 financial crisis. It must therefore have a real-side component.
“it's hard to argue the ladder because it started in December of oh 7 at least that's the official measure so it would have to have some real side part to it”
A U.S. debt doomsday cannot be ruled out 100% and is not the most likely scenario. It is likely enough, though, that the U.S. should implement long-term structural moves now to make its current borrowing credible.
“I think it's not the most likely scenario from here ... but I think it's sufficiently likely that my position is we ought to be implementing longer-term structural moves”
Hamilton is not worried about a rollover crisis in the next two months. The near-zero short rate, a gradually upward-sloping yield curve and surprisingly low long-term rates all signal that markets are not currently worried about US default.
“I think that two-month rate is is sending a signal ... that we're not going to have that problem by January 2010”
Hamilton finds the decade-long trend of rising oil prices, going back to 1997, sustained and easy to miss because pump prices bounce around a lot.
“there has been in the past decade a long run up in oil prices that I think is easy to miss it the prices at the pump bounce around a lot”
Under the conservatorship, the government's guarantee of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac obligations became explicit rather than implicit. The government is therefore on the line for the mortgage-backed securities the Fed is buying (about $1 trillion).
“because of the conservatorship that Fannie and Freddie are operating under they their obligations have been assumed by the government explicitly”
Oil price rises over the past decade were a long, sustained trend going back to 1997 that is easy to miss because pump prices bounce around.
“there has been in the past decade a long run up in oil prices that I think is easy to miss”
The gross federal debt ceiling of about $14 trillion is roughly equal to GDP, which is in the $13 trillion range. Because past debt was issued at many different rates, there isn't a single interest rate for computing service cost. The Treasury's current marginal rate for short-term borrowing is close to zero.
“14 trillion is a really big number and and that alarms people and that is close to our GDP probably a little bit above it right now”
The CBO baseline projects a total federal deficit of under $1.4 trillion for 2010 and under $1 trillion for 2011, smaller than Roberts' $3 trillion borrowing figure. Unemployment is a key factor driving defaults and fiscal outcomes.
“the current baseline projection from the CBO is for a total deficit for 2010 of under 1.4 trillion and then for 2011 it's under 1 trillion”
To its credit, the administration has not proposed a second stimulus of the same kind as the $787 billion package. It has instead talked about different measures, such as business tax cuts, to improve employment, despite double-digit unemployment.
“to the credit of the administration they've not proposed a second stimulus package of the same kind”
The Senate voted to raise the debt ceiling from $12.1 trillion to roughly $14 trillion, which is close to and probably above US GDP (in the $13 trillions).
“this Senate voted to lift the debt ceiling from twelve point one trillion to something closer to fourteen”
2010 is only about two weeks away from the taping date, even though it sounds far off.
“2010 is about two weeks from now it sounds very far away”
Treasury short-term borrowing is practically free, close to zero, for very short-term debt.
“is practically free if you're looking at the very short term debt it's close to zero”