
China's Financial Doom Loop | Leland Miller on Massive Chinese Stimulus
What this covers
This is a conversation recorded on September 27, 2024, a week after the People's Bank of China set off the biggest weekly rally in Chinese stocks since 2008. Leland Miller, co-founder and CEO of China Beige Book, talks with the host of Monetary Matters about what the package can and cannot do. His view is that the equity support works as a short-term put, good for perhaps one to two months, but that its effect on the real economy is to stabilize rather than stimulate. He backs this with Beige Book survey data on firm borrowing costs and with the point that Chinese stocks have long moved independently of GDP.
The middle of the discussion covers the mechanics of Chinese finance. Miller describes a non-commercial financial system, which he calls the Blob, in which the state backstops every liability and so prevented a Lehman moment. He argues the cost is a steady drift of capital into zombie firms and bad debt. He also treats the property collapse as intended controlled demolition, with Evergrande and Country Garden allowed to fail, while Beijing tries to slow price declines to avoid a doom-confidence loop) among households. Rate cuts and RRR) cuts get a pointed critique: borrowing sits at record lows despite record-low rates, because confidence, not the cost of capital, is the constraint. Miller is also skeptical of handouts, which he calls pulled-forward consumption, and of announced stimulus that never materializes.
The later sections turn outward. Miller argues that Xi Jinping prioritizes national security goals such as chips, technology and supply-chain resilience over GDP targets, and that credit now follows those priorities. He discusses the electric vehicle industry, built behind subsidies and then liberalized, and solar overcapacity as examples of China exporting deflation. The talk also covers US–China trade tensions, chip export controls, China's misreading of American politics, and why Miller avoids developer bonds. It closes with his predictions for the first week of October.
China's recent policy interventions represent emergency stabilization of asset markets and sentiment, not a 'Draghi moment' of structural economic transformation—the stock market put is real but temporary, while the underlying macroeconomy faces structural slowdown from non-productive capital allocation that no stimulus can reverse.
- Chinese stock market is historically uncorrelated to real economy; 2007 peak coincided with 500% GDP growth since, so equity support cannot fix macro problems
- Monetary easing (rate cuts, RRR cuts) has failed for 2+ years—firms won't borrow at lower rates due to confidence crisis, not capital cost; sentiment, not rates, is the binding constraint
- China's non-commercial financial system ('the Blob') backstops all liabilities but forces chronic reallocation to non-productive uses, structurally condemning the economy to multi-year slowdown regardless of stimulus
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China's non-commercial financial system—where the state controls all counterparties and can order lenders to lend and borrowers to borrow—prevented a Lehman moment during the real estate crisis because the government can redirect capital across the system and plug holes, whereas a commercial financial system cannot.
“because China has a non-commercial Financial system you know all the people who were predicting a Leman moment in China were wrong before they even uttered it out of their mouth because China doesn't work the same way that the Western economies do it's a non-commercial Financial system which means when you get into a pickle you know liquidity are you don't let liquidity freeze out because the the state controls all the counterparties you can order lenders to lend you can order borrowers to borrow”
The Chinese stock market has been historically uncorrelated with the real economy; since peaking in 2007, GDP has grown over 500% while the stock market has gone down, moving in opposite directions.
“the first thing you learn when you're doing the Chinese economy is that the stock market is historically uncorrelated to the real economy you know the stock market Peak in 2007 since it's gone down GDP has gone up by over 500%”
The 'Blob'—effectively the Chinese government acting as backstop to all liabilities in the economy—must absorb growing bad debt and non-productive uses of capital; this cannot happen all at once or it creates a crash, so Beijing stages bailouts across time, but ultimately all economic liabilities are backed by the government, and the Blob gobbles up problem areas sequentially.
“to understand the banking system you have to understand the concept of The Blob now all the stimulus stuff that's we tweet about this a lot... all these stimulus measures cutting rates stuff you have losers in this who's losing well the profitability at Banks is the loser... the concept of The Blob is in China everything ultimately has to be backed up by the government implicitly explicitly something”
Consumption stimulus handouts are actually pulls forward of future consumption rather than true stimulus; they boost short-term growth at the cost of medium-term weakness unless continued at higher levels
“they're not structurally changing you know the the way they they manage consumption in China they're simply they're simply creating a they're P they're pulling growth forward that's what they're doing so if you give people money you haven't spent earlier they're pulling growth forward which means this will help in the short term it'll probably be medium-term negative unless they do more of it”
Xi Jinping's strategic priorities are not GDP growth targets but national security objectives: building a domestic chip ecosystem, achieving advanced technology competitiveness, minimizing reliance on US dollar payment systems due to sanctions concerns, and achieving supply chain resiliency; weak GDP data is a symptom of non-priority status, not the thing Beijing is worried about.
“if you got into XI jinping's mind to the extent it's possible you know he's much more worried about National Security priorities right now he wants to build a domestic chip ecosystem he wants China to be competitive on advanced technology he wants to minimize Reliance to the extent as possible on US dollar payment systems because he's worried about sanctions they want more supply chain resiliency”
Despite continuous interest rate cuts since early 2023—including precipitous drops in Q1 2023, sustained low rates through 2023, further cuts in Q4 2023, and again in 2024, reaching the lowest levels ever recorded in China Beige Book's nearly 15-year survey—corporate borrowing has remained at all-time lows and dropped further in September, showing zero correlation between lower rates and increased lending demand.
“since the beginning of 2023 you have seen a collapse in interest rates despite the fact that you've had high interest rates around the world and inflation around the world you know in China interest rates have been going down down down first quarter they went they dropped precipitously they in of of 2023 uh they they kept they stayed low throughout 2023 they dropped again in in the fourth quarter of 2023 when in 2024 they dropped again then it dropped again uh we just saw the lowest level of interest rates we've ever seen in the history of our survey recently in this past month”
The downside of China's non-commercial financial system is that while it prevents acute crises, more and more capital ends up going to non-productive uses (bad debt, zombie firms) instead of productive ones; as growth slows (8% → 6% → 5% → 3%), non-productive uses accumulate, dragging growth down dramatically and structurally over time.
“but the reason the downside to this of course is that you slow down precipitously over time more and more of your capital is going to end up going to non-productive uses so you know you have you know you're you're growing at 8% then you're growing at 6% then you're growing at 5% you're going for 3% you can continue to keep things alive you keep the zombies alive you can continue to plug up holes make sure people don't default or don't go bankrupt but you're essentially doing is throwing Capital at these things that should be used for productive uses instead you're using them for nonproductive uses like bad debt”
The stated 'government debt to GDP ratio' in China is artificially low because it excludes local government debt, corporate debt, and all government-backstopped liabilities; true total debt (including Blob-backed liabilities) is far higher than official figures suggest.
“I love people who who can constantly you know quote the idea that the debt to GDP in China is very low you know and then they're like what about local governments what about what about the corporate sector because those are all backstopped by The Blob you know what's what's real debt to GDP”
China's property deleveraging was intentional policy, not accidental failure; Beijing wanted property to shrink from 25% of economy to something much lower (e.g., 10%) to minimize vulnerabilities, and this required prices to fall for years—the Evergrande and Country Garden collapses were allowed to happen as part of controlled demolition.
“the reason we started this that we started this that Chien ping started you know the property deleveraging was that property was this black hole where credit just disappeared into for years and years and years and years and years and property come 25% uh of the economy it was a major growth driver and there was a decision at the very top which was made very clear with the three red lines back in 2020 and then the everg grand implosion evergr was allowed to implode and then Country Garden Etc is it C is it property needed to be deleveraged”
Reserve requirement ratio (RRR) cuts work by freeing up liquidity for banks to lend, but if firms don't want to borrow, the liquidity released has no stimulative effect; RRR cuts are an invitation to lend, not a stimulus to demand.
“if you take an RR cut does this talk about oh we're gonna have a 50 basis point RR cut here and you have another one there you're freeing up liquidity to lend that's what an rcut is you're telling a bank that you're freeing up liquidity to lend if firms don't want to borrow an RR cut doesn't do anything”
China Beige Book tracks interest rates paid by firms from a sample of thousands of companies over approximately 15 years, providing direct visibility into actual borrowing costs rather than relying on official benchmark rates that may not reflect reality.
“China beige book has tracked interest rates paid in China from thousands and thousands and thousands and thousands of firms for almost 15 years now so we know when when interest rates are going up and down and we know what the reaction is”
Cutting interest rates will not stimulate the Chinese economy because the problem is not cost of capital but confidence and sentiment; firms are not waiting for lower rates to borrow—they don't want to borrow at all because they lack confidence in future conditions.
“so the takeaway from this is that cutting rates is not going to cut it you know firms are not looking for cheaper cost of capital they're not waiting out to see if there's another few bips off their off their borrowing rat so that they they could finally jump in there's a problem is a is confidence the problem is is sentiment corporate sentiment investor sentiment”
Property prices will continue to decline long-term, but the government is trying to slow the decline to prevent a 'doom confidence loop' where households see their 70% of household assets falling and rush to sell before values drop further, creating a self-reinforcing collapse in confidence.
“if prices just go straight down people look at their Investments and they say wait a second I got to get out before they're lower they see they they see this race to zero and it can create this Doom confidence Loop so what they're saying basically is no we're here we're not going to let that happen”
The Chinese stock market and asset markets are not important to Beijing in the grand scheme of things; they did not fail to support it earlier because of indifference. The stock market performed poorly and crushed sentiment, which was already low for consumers and corporates, so Beijing stepped in with bigger intervention to show they mean business and prevent entering a doom loop—not because stocks matter, but because loss of wealth and confidence ripple into the real economy.
“I don't think xping cares about the stock market but they they went overboard intentionally this time because the previous measures didn't work I mean this isn't like this isn't like the first time that that Beijing decided to to jump in and you know try to have a market intervention”
If you are classified as an advanced technology company contributing to national security priorities in China, you get credit; if you are not a national security priority, you do not get credit—this is a fundamental change from previous periods where credit was distributed broadly to achieve growth targets.
“if you're an advanced technology then you're a national security priority which means you get the credit if you're not a national security priority you don't get the credit anymore I think that's the difference between China today and China you know five 10 years ago”
China Beige Book is modeled on the US Federal Reserve's Beige Book but focused on quantitative data rather than qualitative flavor, because China lacks the billion data points available for the US; CBB collects quantitative metrics across ~100,000 dimensions including labor market, inflation, credit, shadow credit, and capital usage to build a ground-up composite of China.
“China beige book the name came from the Federal Reserve which does their own beige book and you know we figured when you know we were we were challenging the idea that inquiries in China data collection in China wasn't being done very well we could do something better we looked at a bunch of models say maybe we should look at the the beige book model”
Chinese government stimulus announcements often don't materialize; there was a Bloomberg article about five trillion Yuan of stimulus supposedly coming in 2022, but actual stimulus was the opposite—government actually tightened. Chinese policy rhetoric regularly announces programs, then doesn't execute them, then re-announces the same program and incorporates old numbers into new announcements, creating illusion of larger stimulus than actually happens.
“I remember that there was a Bloomberg article you know we used to joke about this that talked about five trillion Juan of stimulus that was about to go in the economy in 2022 Google I think you could probably get it by just Googling five trillion Yuan China Bloomberg or something and there was like you know about to be Unleashed did we see big stimulus in 2022 no we saw the exact opposite”
China's electric vehicle industry was developed under protectionist subsidies for a decade (2008-2018), with subsidies to producers, consumers, battery firms, and a protective wall against foreign entrants, creating a domestic industry; around 2018, it was liberalized, creating competitive pressure among Chinese firms and producing a world-class industry at costs far below Western competitors.
“for for for 10 years China spent enormous sums with subsidizing producers subsidizing consumers subsidizing battery firms keeping a protectionist wall around other firms going in there they couldn't go in at all then they had to go in with the joint venture uh and so having this really protective cocoon which I call it uh to develop a a robust EV industry around 2018 they start liberalizing it”
China misread the Biden administration, expecting him to reverse Trump's policies and offer a 'much more warmer welcome,' but this showed Beijing's disconnect from American politics; China is similarly uncertain about future US policy regardless of who wins the 2024 election and can't accurately game out scenarios.
“there was still a belief it seemed in Beijing when PR when President Biden got elected that he was going to rip back everything president Trump did and give them much you know much more warmer welcome that just shows that they don't spend enough time in in in America anymore uh because you know there was a terrible terrible misreading it was going to happen”
Chip makers lobby heavily against export controls on semiconductor sales to China because they fear market loss and inability to fund R&D and retain workers if they lose Chinese revenue; this political pressure has prevented export controls from being watertight.
“chip makers spend you know a lot of their time at the White House telling them like you can't do this you're going to hurt our Market we're not going to be able to have money for R&D we're gonna have to fire workers”
Consumption in China is structurally disincentivized by policies that empower the state and savings (not spending); everything—interest rates, fiscal policy—historically favors the state and penalizes the consumer, and this structural bias is unlikely to change despite one-off cash handouts, because the government's heart remains focused on national security priorities, not consumer empowerment.
“consumption in China is is structurally dis incentivized everything is is is you know empowers the state interest rates empower the State Savings but historically the loser has always been the consumer been the household been the private the private firm”
China's economic model is now doubling down on its old export-focused approach but with higher-quality, world-class products developed in protected domestic markets then released internationally; this creates greater global trade friction and competition problems than before because Chinese goods are now genuinely superior, not inferior.
“the Chinese economic model as we see it now is now doubling down on its old model which was already doubling down on exports and it's really competitive really high technology really top-notch stuff”
China is overproducing solar panels; more solar capacity is currently being produced in China annually than the entire world needs, creating massive oversupply and deflationary pressure that makes survival of non-Chinese solar companies extremely difficult.
“they produce so much solar that's they overproducing ch's more more more in China there more produced in China than than the entire world needs right now”
Stock market support measures (swap facilities, stabilization funds, national team buying) do constitute a put on short-term equity performance and may drive a strong rally for 1-2 months, but this does not fix underlying macroeconomic problems; short-term historically means under two months in Chinese market contexts.
“what is shortterm historically it's been under two months so a lot of people think that this is the the return of the Chinese stock market you know I think that you know if we if we talk in uh you know early next year I think we may be in a very different position”
Chinese economic data is not as bad as mainstream media and commentary suggest, but it is genuinely weak; the economy is not in crisis, recession, or collapse, but also not doing well—the reality is somewhere in the middle between 'China is doomed' and 'China is fine', with weak but stable conditions.
“I've got a surprise for the economy is not as bad as as as as the as the newspapers are telling you as as as the the blogs and the Twitter telling you China's economy is not that bad it's not doing well it's it's actually been very weak and the last few few results we've got September data in particular was very very weak so they the the economy is not in great shape but it's also not collapsing”
Current 'support' measures for property are not reversing the deleveraging campaign but are tactical stabilization to prevent sentiment collapse; Beijing will step in, stabilize the sector, but then continue deleveraging—this is the pattern: 'deleveraging, deleveraging, tighten, tighten, exhale, tighten, tighten, exhale.'
“we can actually track in our data when we see firms you know deleveraging deleveraging deleveraging you know tighter credit tighter credit less borrowing Etc uh which which essentially was calling the herd... deleveraging deleveraging deleveraging you know tighten tighten tight Titan exhale Titan Titan Titan exhale”
The macroeconomy message from Beijing is stabilization and floor-setting, not stimulus for growth or recovery; the government wants to prevent a doom loop of collapsing confidence but not reach for higher growth—this is very different from a Draghi moment, which would signal transformation.
“what we're seeing there is a message that we're going to step in we're going to set a floor but we're not reaching for a higher ceiling what we want to make sure is we're stabilizing things and we're making sure we don't allow this Doom Loop of confidence to take down down sentiment”
Chinese government stimulus announcements may be trial balloons, but Miller interprets them as evidence of uncertainty—the government doesn't know what it wants to do and is announcing powerful measures while still developing the plan, suggesting some measure of panic or urgency about needing to signal strength.
“I think it's a very charitable way of describing it I mean I don't think that they're sifting around they've got these ideas and they're sniffing around for for for for for you know popular sentiment on it I think that they don't know what they want to do yet and they want to make sure they're conveying the idea that this is going to be powerful but they don't really know how they're going to do it”
M1 growth in China has slowed dramatically in recent months and years, a sign that consumer and investor sentiment has become gloomy, which is a key reason the government felt compelled to announce stimulus
“look it's it's it's a problem if you look at what M what's happening with M1 um you know it's M1 is is falling off a cliff in China... the consumer look forward and was gloomy the investor looked forward it was gloomy uh you know the the the household looked forward it was gloomy and so because of all these things three things happening at once this is why you saw the latest stimulus package”
BYD Seagull EV model is priced under $10,000 in China with impressive technology and has been marketed in Europe at around $20,000, demonstrating how Chinese cars can outcompete European models on both price and technology
“you have the one of the one of the models byd models the seagull is is is under $10,000 in China and it's been marketed in Europe at around 20,000 and this is technology is way better than what what Europe's doing at at nearly double the price”
Since 2012, Miller and China Beige Book have been predicting China would slow dramatically from 8% growth, but this forecast has required repeated tempering because CEOs in boardrooms dismissed it and believed China would grow 8-7.5% forever; growth has since fallen to 6%, 5%, 4%, and is moving toward very low levels, validating the long-term slowdown thesis.
“this is something we were talking about back in 12 2012 when we were just getting off the hill of the the you know the the loan binge of the fin great financial crisis we say look China is going to slow down dramatically and you know we actually had to temper our message for about five years because we would go into corporate boardrooms and explain what's going to happen and and the CEO is like I don't believe you all my you know all my uh my my guys in China say that they're going to grow at 8% forever”
The chart showing Chinese startup foundings collapsing from 51,000 in 2018 to 260 in 2020 (from Preqin) is wrong if interpreted as general company registrations; it likely reflects only venture capital-backed startups, which are a tiny fraction of actual new company formation in China, and misrepresents broader entrepreneurship trends.
“the reason the chart's wrong is because the chart's wrong I mean it you know it there maybe if you're talking about the small uh nucleus of VC startups very specifically then you then some of those numbers make sense but in terms of I think people were interpreting that to be uh you know company startups at large registrations and that's off by a factor of like 20,000 or something so I mean that that chart's a chart could be useful if if it reflects only like very specific VC firms type thing and and then may maybe it's correct if it's in the broader Universe of compan companies it's it's massively wrong”
China's property sector will face more large-scale bankruptcies of major developers as deleveraging continues; distressed property bonds trading at low valuations are a risky 'dumpster dive' opportunity only for sophisticated investors who can timing trades (buy at 13 cents, sell at 18 cents), not a long-term investment.
“I would go I wouldn't go anywhere near it but look I mean I'm not saying that that distress distress debt investors can't go in there buy setting for 13 cents see it go up to 18 cents sell and make a nice nice chunk of change I mean we've worked with distress debt investors and but but we're not telling them to you know to buy here and not to buy there”
A trade war is coming between the US and China in 2025 regardless of which US president is elected, because China's policy (New Quality Productive Forces, doubling down on exports) is now set and will create greater trade friction with the entire planet, including long-time Chinese allies like India and EU members.
“I think we're gonna have a trade War next year no matter who is president no matter what their policies are simply because of what the policies coming out of Beijing are”
What has been impressive about China's property deleveraging is that the government has not backed off under pressure once pain emerged; they have continued with occasional ventilation but not reversal, unlike previous reform efforts
“what has been impressive about what they've done in property is that they haven't stopped so they didn't feel pain this is what you used to see all all the time in in Chinese you know quote unquote reform efforts they do something it cause a little pain and then they'd back off then maybe a couple years later they'd do something cause pay they back off they haven't backed off this property stuff”
Chinese banks are being squeezed by profitability losses from repeated government-ordered rate cuts and lower lending rates; the government then has to inject capital to recapitalize them, creating a cycle where banks are the losers in stimulus schemes
“all the stimulus stuff that's we tweet about this a lot so I think you know what I'm talking about but um all these stimulus measures cutting rates stuff you have losers in this who's losing well the profitability at Banks is the loser so so these banks are getting taken out the dry by the fact that the government keeps ordering to lower rates”
Of the measures announced, only the monetary measures (three interest rate cuts and the 50 basis point RRR cut freeing up ~one trillion Yuan in liquidity) have actually happened; most other measures (stock stabilization funds, consumer cash transfers, property support programs) are either rumors or haven't been executed yet and are in 'trial balloon' phase.
“in your excellent report from the China beige book you talked about the three interest rates that were cut as well as the rever uh uh Reserve requirement ratio and that has actually happened a lot of the other stuff is either a rumor or it's going to happen but hasn't happened yet and uh that is in definitely in the trial balloon phase”
Retail sales growth of 2.1% year-over-year with 0% inflation equals real retail sales growth of 2.1%, which is low compared to historical 8-10% growth in mid-2000s but does not constitute recession; this is a period of significantly reduced growth, not economic collapse.
“reported data is retail sales year-over-year for for August or up 2.1% over the same time period they've had almost no inflation let's call it 0% inflation so real reala sales are are at 2.1% that doesn't sound horrible it's definitely a a period of of lower growth than China has been used to so if you compare it to the 8% 10% growth of the mid-2000s of of course it's bad but it's just it's it's it's not a recession”
Recent stimulus is intentionally larger and broader than previous measures to show credibility and signal serious commitment to preventing doom loop, not to indicate bazooka-level economic stimulus
“I don't think xping cares about the stock market but they they went overboard intentionally this time because the previous measures didn't work... they needed to show they're bringing out bigger guns so I think when you're talking about the stock market This Is Bigger Bang um than they've been doing and it's intentional so that they show their meaning they mean it”
The stock market rally in China has been the best week since 2008; the 52-week low was hit two weeks ago and the 52-week high is today (as of September 27, 2024), showing how rapidly Chinese market sentiment has shifted on the policy announcements.
“the uh Chinese stock market is up I think the best week for the Chinese stock market since 2008 and I I read online that the the 52- we low in the chines stock market was two weeks ago and the 52- we High uh is is today”
Even though VC-funded startups may have declined, there are still pressures on starting companies in China, particularly in the VC world, but broad entrepreneurship through bank credit, personal savings, and restaurant startups continues
“I don't doubt the trend I just don't I don't think the chart's right... there are pressures in starting a company and if you're in the VC world you got particular problems... people are still starting restaurants with Chinese Bank credit money or or savings and that is not captured in that chart”
The three-part stimulus strategy (rate cuts, RRR cuts, asset purchases) does not add up to a 'bazooka' because outside of asset markets (stocks), the measures are insufficient; on assets markets they might qualify as a bazooka depending on duration and intensity, but they are not a bazooka for the macroeconomy or credit growth.
“you can you can argue terminology around what's happening at the stock market um if they do everything they're saying they're doing then then then we won't quibble with with bazooka on on on asset markets I me it's how long the put exists and how intense it is um so let's leave stocks out of here outside of stocks know this is not a bazooka you know this is this is you know there's they're throwing some numbers around”
Rumors that China will inject $42 billion of capital into top banks are insignificant relative to the size of the banking system and would represent only a tiny fraction of Chinese banking assets.
“China quote unquote weighing injecting $42 billion of capital into the top banks that sounds like a lot of money and it is but it's pales comp to the size of the bank so it's a you know tiny fraction of the Chinese banking system”
Miller has never invested in Chinese equities and will never do so to avoid conflicts of interest in his analysis; he wants to maintain absolute objectivity and not have personal financial positions bias his public commentary (unlike 'most of Wall Street' which talks books based on holdings).
“I have never invested in Chinese equities and I never will invest in Chinese equities because I one for a lot of reasons um but also because I don't want to be conf I I don't want to be conflicted out of anything that I'm talking about I want to be able to talk about this stuff and have absolutely no no skin in the game”
Tepper was invested in Chinese equities throughout last year (visible in 13-F filings) with Alibaba as his largest position, so his current bullish commentary is not a 'jump in yesterday' moment; he's been holding for a long time and is now seeing conditions turn favorable.
“Tepper was invested in Chinese equities all last year I mean go look at the 13f you know he didn't just jump in Alibaba yesterday I think it was his biggest position so uh you know during during the worst periods last year”
Miller expects further policy announcements and specificity in coming weeks, particularly on consumer support via bond issuance and possible bank recapitalization, but does not expect complete transparency about what portions of programs will go where.
“I think they have to keep trickling out some specificity particularly on the consumer side they announc this stuff they're not going to just not do it um some of the stuff they may not do but I I think they have to start trickling some stuff out next week you're going to see some big Bond issuance numbers”