What this covers

Eberstadt, a political economist and demographer at the American Enterprise Institute, presents the findings of Men Without Work in a Wheatley Institute talk, followed by audience questions, including one from a documentary photographer identified as Mark. He begins with measurement. Unemployment statistics, he argues, miss the fastest-growing group of working-age men, those neither working nor looking for work. He relies instead on the employment-to-population ratio and the labor force participation rate for prime age men). He dates the decline's acceleration to 1965, which he ties to the War on Poverty, the Immigration Reform Act, and the start of the postwar crime surge. He shows the decline continuing through booms and recessions, running across successive birth cohorts, and varying widely between neighboring states such as West Virginia and Maryland. It is also sharper in the United States than in other rich countries.

The middle of the talk works through candidate causes and what idle men actually do. Marriage is presented as a powerful equalizer: married black men work more than unmarried white men. Eberstadt also contrasts native-born and immigrant high school dropouts, a 25-point gap he partly attributes to felony convictions, which he estimates affect 20 million American men. He notes that the government tracks almost nothing about their employment. Disability benefits, received by about 60 percent of non-working men, function as de facto unemployment insurance. He says Medicaid made opioids available for a $3 co-pay. Time-use data show roughly 2,100 hours a year spent on screens.

Some claims are contested. These include his counterfactual that 1965 marriage rates would produce much higher work rates today, his emphasis on human agency over education or nativity, and his list of fiscal and civic consequences. He closes by contrasting Sweden's post-1990s "work-first" welfare reconstruction with the American approach.

Sharpest takeaway

Easterbrook argues that male labor force participation in the United States has collapsed to depression-era levels due to a combination of structural factors—family breakdown, incarceration, disability programs, and cultural shifts—rather than economic demand alone, and this crisis has been systematically ignored by policymakers despite its catastrophic social consequences.

  • Male prime-age (25-54) workforce participation has declined from ~95% in 1965 to ~83% by 2015, worse than 1940 Great Depression levels when unemployment was 15%
  • The decline is structural and voluntary (labor force exit), not cyclical—it persists across booms and recessions, and varies dramatically by state despite a national labor market
  • Family structure collapse, incarceration (20 million American men have felony convictions, 1 in 8 adult males), disability program substitution, and generational cohort effects are interdependent causes that policy has failed to address

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0.86

The work rate for prime-age men (25-54 years) in 2015 was approximately 2 percentage points lower than in 1940 at the tail end of the Great Depression, making today's male labor force participation a depression-scale disaster.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 3/4durability 4/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“for guys uh 20 to 64 years of age the work rate was actually almost 3 percentage points lower in 2015 than in 1940 at the tail end of the depression and the work rate for prime age guys was 2 percentage points lower than in 1940 at the tail end of the depression the unemployment rate in 1940 for the country as a whole by the way was almost 15%”

0.79

Over the last two generations, there has been a quiet calamity of collapse in work for men, demonstrated by a sustained decline in employment-to-population ratios over the past half-century, with the rate of decline accelerating since the mid-1960s.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“over the last two generations over the last half century there's a quiet Calamity that has befallen our country and that Calamity is the collapse of work for men what we have seen over this long period of time uh quietly but relentlessly is a decline in the work rates in the employment to population ratio for men in our society”

0.79

The year 1965 marks a significant departure point for male labor force decline, coinciding with the rollout of the War on Poverty and expansion of means-tested welfare programs, the Immigration Reform Act bringing waves of legal and illegal immigration, and the beginning of the postwar crime explosion.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“1965 was the beginning uh the roll out of the war on poverty and the big expansion of America's uh social welfare and means tested benefit uh programs 1965 was also the year of our uh Immigration Reform Act and set in motion a big uh wave of legal and not so legal immigration that has uh changed uh America's composition in major ways and also 1965 was about the time when the uh when the post-war crime explosion really um took off”

0.79

Geographic differences in male inactivity rates have grown wider over the postwar era and since 1980, with some adjacent states showing vastly different rates (e.g., West Virginia vs. Maryland), suggesting that national labor market equilibration is not occurring despite being expected under market-clearing models.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“we've seen is bigger and bigger and bigger differences between our different states over the post-war era in general and since 1980 in particular and to make the problem even more acute we can see that some of the places which have the very most uh disappointing uh inactivity rates for men are adjacent to some of the places which have the very most hopeful ones so West Virginia for example which has got one of the which has perennially got the uh highest inactivity rate for men borders on Maryland”

0.75

Using unemployment statistics alone to measure labor market health is outdated and misleading because it ignores the fastest-growing group of working-age men: those not in the labor force at all (neither working nor looking for work), a third category that has emerged beyond the traditional binary of employed or unemployed.

definitionhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“if we just use unemployment statistics to measure the health of our labor market we're doing the same sort of thing as counting Cavalry brigades and trying to figure out what our military Readiness is like today it's looking at a bygone era um there was a time when unemployment statistics told you a whole lot about labor market conditions that was in the sort of if you will the dezian era when there were really just two options for working age men either to have a job or to be looking for one U but today things aren't quite as black and white and there's a third option that has emerged for men which is not being in the labor force at all”

0.75

The pattern of male labor force withdrawal shows no sensitivity to business cycles—the decline is relentless regardless of recessions or boom times in the 1960s, 1990s, or other periods—indicating the problem is structural rather than cyclical or demand-driven.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“you can basically draw a straight line up for the proportion of men who are not in the workforce you can't see from this chart here when the recessions were you can't see see from this chart here when the crash of 2008 occurred you can't see from this chart here when we had real boom times in the economy like in the 60s or in the 90s um this just looks like a Relentless Exodus and that's not what you'd expect if things were being influenced or determined by the business cycle”

0.75

Disability programs, originally designed to protect people who could not work, now serve as an alternative form of unemployment insurance and lifestyle choice, with nearly 3 out of 5 (approximately 60%) of men out of the labor force in 2013 receiving at least one disability benefit, up from less than 40% two decades earlier.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“to a great degree now uh the disability program serves the perverse and un intended consequence of a sort of an alternative uh unemployment insurance and I'll show you what I mean by that if we just look at these numbers here um this chart that I've kind of this colum I've highlighted here uh reports the proportion of men of different work categories or statuses who report their receiving one or more disability benefits um and in 2013 almost three out of five of the men who are out of the labor force reported receiving benefits from at least one disability program”

0.75

Among wealthy developed nations (Western Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States), the United States has experienced a uniquely stark decline in male prime-age workforce participation, suggesting the cause is specific to American conditions, not universal to developed economies.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“we've won a race to the bottom here and this is the workforce participation rates for Prime AG men it's not a race we should want to win um all of these countries have seen a little bit of decline in Workforce participation for guys over the postwar era at least a little bit um but ours is much Starker than any other country”

0.75

Marriage acts as a powerful equalizer that overcomes ethnic and educational disadvantages in workforce participation: black married men have higher workforce participation than white unmarried men, and married high school dropouts have similar participation to unmarried college graduates.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“if you look at the work uh Workforce participation rates for black guys who are married they are higher than for white guys who are not married so marriage beats out ethnic disadvantage here in this particular case or if you look at another one we know about educational advantage and disadvantage but one of these charts is married guys who are high school dropouts and the other is for guys who have college degrees or better but are unmarried and the point is you really can't tell the difference here so marriage again counteracts the effect of educational disadvantages”

0.75

High school dropouts show dramatically different labor force participation rates depending on nativity: native-born American dropouts have much lower participation (bottom trajectory) than foreign-born immigrant dropouts (top trajectory), a 25-percentage-point gap that cannot be explained by demand for low-skill labor alone.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“here's another complication remember I told you that the bottom is more less dropped out in labor force participation for guys without high school degrees but it hasn't dropped out for all high school dropouts um this shows you two different trajectories for guys without high school degrees who are between 25 and 54 years of age the top one is high school dropouts who came to America from other countries the bottom one is native born Americans there's a 25 Point Gap there between these two that's not what you would expect if this was a matter of less demand for low skilled labor in the United States per se”

0.75

Medicaid policy directly enabled opioid dependence among non-working men by making expensive opioids like oxycontin available for as little as a $3 co-pay, meaning government welfare programs inadvertently subsidized addiction and withdrawal from work.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“part of the answer uh has to do with uh with Medicaid dependence as well and I'm sure you saw Medicaid dependence while you were uh making doing your great work on your documentary so for for a $3 co-pay uh you can get a month's prescription of uh you could get this is tightened up a little bit you could get a month's prescription of uh oxycoton you could use or sell or whatever um but this means that the government and the Medicaid Program was directly involved also in this change of attitudes and this change of dependence in a kind of a troubling way”

0.75

Between 1948 and 2000, female work rates and labor force participation surged while overall American work rates also rose, meaning women supplemented rather than replaced male workers and there were gains for both (win-win); but since 2000, both male and female work rates have declined in parallel, creating a lose-lose situation.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“between 1948 in the year 2000 the work rate and labor force participation rate for women surged in the United States now at the same time that the work rate was going up for women between 48 and 2000 the overall work rate for America was going up too so that means that women weren't just replacing men they were supplementing men they were augmenting men uh after the year 2000 something happened and is a very not good something uh it's not just what I'm about to mention a lot of other things I think have been moving in a pretty spooky Direction since then in terms of society and economic Trends but around the year 2000 the work rates the employment to population ratios for women peaked they reached what are up to now their all-time high and they've been heading south since then so since the year 2000 the work rates for men and the work rates for women have both been going down kind of in parallel the men and women are sharing the same pain”

0.75

American high school dropouts have higher proportions of felony convictions and prison sentences than foreign high school dropouts in the US, explaining part of the 25-point workforce participation gap between native-born and immigrant dropouts.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“American guys who are high school dropouts have way higher uh proportions of felonies and prison sentencing in their background than foreign uh High School dropouts at least in our country they don't have the same proportion”

0.75

Male labor force participation has been declining across successive birth cohorts, with each younger cohort having lower participation rates at every age than the cohort before it, suggesting a gravitational force pulling down participation independent of age or business cycle.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“at any given age of life depending upon which Birth Cohort you're in it's going down so that older brothers were more likely to be in the workforce than younger brothers and Sons are more likely to be out of the workforce than their fathers”

0.75

American incarceration rates are higher than other rich societies, which is part of the explanation for why the United States performs worse on male labor force participation—incarceration creates employment barriers that other countries don't have to the same degree.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“in in this little book uh I argued that that's one of the keys to the mystery that that helps explain why our performance has been so much poorer than other Rich societies because they don't have the same sort of uh um Crime and Punishment circumstances that we do”

0.74

Family structure change is deeply interwoven with male labor force withdrawal, and if the United States had the same proportions of married vs. unmarried and divorced men in 2015 as in 1965, work rates would be much higher today.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“if we had uh uh if we had the same sort of uh family structure or let's put it this way even kind of um cruder uh measures uh the same proportions of men who were married and never married and uh not divorced or divorced as we had in '65 um we'd have much higher work rates today than we have uh we would have much higher proportions of men uh seeking work than we have uh there's no uh there's no doubt at all that the disintegration of the former family structure in the United States is part and parcel of this uh collapse of work for men”

0.73

Native-born men with college education and foreign-born immigrant men who are high school dropouts have nearly equal workforce participation rates, suggesting that differences in values, motivations, aspirations, and behavior (human agency) matter more than education or nativity in determining work outcomes.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 3/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“that blue line at the top is native born guys who have a college degree or higher and the jaggedy gray line is the foreign born The Immigrant men who are high school dropouts they're not quite equal but they're very close to being equal and if you think about immigrants without a high school diploma and native born American guys with college education or more just about the only thing they have in common is their High labor force participation rates”

0.70

Approximately half of non-working men report taking painkillers daily, according to a Princeton study by Professor Alan Krueger, suggesting that opioid dependence is a major factor in labor force withdrawal alongside television and internet consumption.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“Professor Alan Krueger at Princeton last year uh published a study uh based on some survey of his own where he suggested that almost half of the unworking men uh reported taking painkillers every day um so it's not just the TV and the internet that I'm talking about but it's doing it stoned”

0.70

The U.S. government collects no systematic information on employment rates for men with felony convictions, despite an estimated 20 million American men having at least one felony conviction (approximately 1 in 8 adult males), making it impossible to develop evidence-based re-entry policy.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“I looked a little further and found out actually the Bureau of Labor Statistics has no information on this and the Census Bureau has no information on this and the Department of Justice statistics has no information on this and in fact the US government collects no information on this whatever um now back when the United States had uh if we can put the word only in quotes only a million or two million people who had been sentenced to felony conviction that would be one thing but today in our real existing America uh according some to some estimates of non-government demographers who produced these numbers um we have about 20 million American men and women overwhelmingly men uh who are not behind bars but who have at least one felony conviction in their background”

0.70

Non-working men spend approximately 2,100 hours per year watching television, movies, and internet content on handheld devices—equivalent to a full-time job—and do substantially less childcare, household work, civic participation, and religious activity than both working men and unemployed men.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“what they do is they watch they report looking at movies television other things uh presumably on TVs internet handheld devices other things and they report doing about 2100 hours a year of watching it's like a full-time job um what does this tell us about their prospects for getting back into the workforce uh we do know that we've had a real world a real life experiment where tens of millions of people have gotten back into the workforce after being out of it for years”

0.69

Men with a prison sentence in their background are substantially more likely to be out of the labor force than men with only an arrest record, who in turn are substantially more likely to be out of the labor force than men with no trouble with the law, a pattern consistent across age, ethnicity, and educational attainment levels.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“no matter what the age of men in the post-war era uh no matter what their ethnicity no matter what their educational attainment level might be if they have an arrest in their background excuse me if they have a prison sentence in their background they are way more likely to be out of the labor force than if they only have an arrest say only with quotes and if they only have an arrest and again I put the quotes on only they are way more likely to be out of the labor force than if they've never had trouble with the law at all”

0.69

Crime and punishment spiraled upward starting around 1965, with violent and property crime soaring and then mass incarceration and sentencing following with a delayed response, creating a cohort of 20 million men with felony records whose employment prospects are severely damaged.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“1965 was about the time when the uh when the post-war crime explosion really um took off and I didn't uh I didn't show any charts uh in my presentation today but in my book I show some charts about uh violent and property crime and the post-war era how they started to really soar around 1965 and with a delayed response how punishment of crime followed that and how big increases in incarceration and sentencing followed that”

0.69

The collapse of work for men produces slower economic growth, wider wealth gaps, bigger budget deficits, more welfare dependence and public debt, more pressure on families, less social mobility, less civic participation, and a weaker polity for the nation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“the collapse of work for men as I said at the beginning I think is a social change uh it's a uh it's an ill wind that blows no one good to uh to make a little twist on the aphorism uh it means slower economic growth wider wealth gaps in our society bigger budget deficits more welfare dependence more public debt it means more pressure on fragile families in our society it means less social mobility in our society it means less civil participation in our society it means a weaker polity for our nation”

0.68

The collapse of work for men is largely voluntary, manifested as an exit from the labor force (neither working nor looking for work) rather than as unemployment (looking for work but not finding it), which fundamentally changes how the problem should be measured and understood.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“this uh collapse in work in some important sense has been voluntary and when I say it has been voluntary what I mean is that there has been an exit from the labor force of increasing numbers of men who now are neither working nor looking for work”

0.68

Personal wealth has grown tremendously (per capita over $1 million per person) and is at record levels despite the 2008 crash, yet the American economy has been growing slowly and weakly since 2000, showing that wealth growth does not reflect genuine economic health.

causalhigh valueestablishednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“personal wealth has been uh growing tremendously well the economy has been very weak in fact uh there is no long period in the postwar era where the American economy has been growing as slowly and as weakly as it has since the year 2000”

0.68

The United States has faster economic growth than many other developed nations yet worse male workforce participation than nations with more generous welfare states, indicating that economic growth and welfare generosity alone cannot explain the American male labor force collapse.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“two things which seem mysterious about this to me at least one is that um our economy has been growing a lot faster than many of these other economies especially over the last generation uh and two uh as we we hear often from foreign friends the United States doesn't have a more generous welfare state than a lot of these other countries so why did we perform so much worse”

0.68

Sweden's welfare state went bankrupt when it ran out of other people's money in the 1990s and was then reconstructed with a 'work-first' principle where recipients must show up for job training and job placement to access benefits, creating incentives for work rather than dependence, the opposite of the American disability-focused approach.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“what if we had gone bankrupt the way that Sweden did when the Swedish welfare state ran out of other people's money uh and reconstructed their welfare state in the 1990s um so modern Sweden's welfare state has a work first principle under ginget it's very generous and it intends to be very generous I many I think here in America would say it's overly generous but but they want it to be that way and it's their Nation um the uh the approach uh in the reconfigured uh Swedish welfare state is um if you show up for job training and you show up for job placement and you then show up for work you get the sort of the keys to the welfare state Kingdom uh but that's almost diametrically opposite from the uh disability uh archipelago that we have today in the United States where there's an incentivization for being helpless and dependent”

0.68

Easterbrook agrees that cultural ideology changes are important but emphasizes the difficulty of obtaining empirical data to prove such mechanisms, and stresses that mothers' experience of non-idleness and the habits they develop (reliability, dependability, schedule-keeping) are attractive to employers in ways that idle non-working men may not be.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“I mean it's hard for me to get the sort of empirical data uh that I'd like to have before uh making generalizations like that um on the other hand if you do the thought experiment is it possible to imagine such a large proportion of men uh not looking for work uh being supported by government being supported by family or girlfriends at any previous age in American history I think the answer is pretty clear and question of why would have to do with changes in mores or acceptable Norms”

0.68

Economic change (globalization, manufacturing decline, offshore competition) is part of but not the whole story of male labor force collapse, as evidenced by the fact that other developed nations experiencing similar economic trends have not seen the same dramatic decline in male workforce participation.

causalhigh valuecontestednovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“we know about the decline of manufacturing we know about globalization we know about offshore rank we know about all of that um but a whole lot of other countries around the world that I showed you earlier also are part of a global economy and they haven't had the same results as us they haven't had the same uniquely bad results so um I would say that the that economic change is certainly part of our men without work problem but I'd also qualify it more than maybe some other uh people who have written about this problem”

0.64

By 2016, for every unemployed prime-age man, there were three men who were neither working nor looking for work, meaning unemployment statistics capture only one-quarter of the non-employment story.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“for every unemployed Prim age guy there were three guys who are neither working nor looking for work so if you're just following the unemployment rate you're missing three quarters of the story”

0.64

Men with lower educational attainment, particularly high school dropouts, are overrepresented in the pool of non-working men, as are men who have never been married or don't have children at home, and African-Americans, while Hispanics/Latinos are underrepresented relative to the national average.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“if you look at education men with lower educational attainment are over represented especially High School dropouts if you look at uh family structure men who have never been married or don't have children at home are way over represented in this grouping compared to married men or married men with children at home um if you look at ethnicity African-Americans are over represented but interestingly enough among people of color Latinos or Hispanics are underrepresented”

0.61

If American per capita economic output had continued growing on the trajectory of the half-century before 2000, it would be about 20% higher today, representing a substantial loss from the slower growth since 2000.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“if America's economy had just been growing on the trajectory of the earlier post-war period of the half century before uh per capita output in America would be about 20% higher than it is today that's not a small difference”

0.56

By 2015, one in six prime-age men (25-54 years old) had no paid work at all, a proportion that had ratcheted up from approximately 5% in the mid-1960s to about 14% by 2015.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“since then there's been an almost Relentless ratcheting up over time from about 5% to now I think at the moment about 14% And if you look at the year 2015 which was kind of the um anchor for my study uh at that point in time one in six uh prime age men had no paid work at all”

0.56

There is an invisible army of 7 million men in prime working age (25-54 years old) who are neither working nor looking for work in the United States today.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“there's an invisible Army of 7 million men in the prime of Life between 25 and 54 years ofe age who are neither working nor looking for work”

0.56

If the United States had the same work rates for men in 2015 that it had in 1965, there would be almost 10 million more paid jobs for men overall and approximately 6 million more for prime-age men.

factualhigh valueestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“if if we had the same work rates today that we had back in 1965 there would be almost 10 million more paid jobs for men excuse me for for men as a whole and about 6 million more for Prime AG men”

0.55

The collapse of work for men has been largely silent and unnoticed by policymakers and the media because an enormous influx of women into the workforce supplemented (rather than replaced) men, preventing observable labor shortages and masking the male labor force crisis.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“there's been an enormous and I think a very positive beneficial influx of women into the workforce over the postwar ERA this has improved American Prosperity opened great options great Vistas and uh the influx of women into the workforce uh did not replace men but it meant among other things that we didn't have Labor shortages”

0.55

The collapse of male work, crime explosion, welfare expansion, family structure breakdown, and immigration reform all began around the same time (1965), suggesting they are interconnected phenomena representing a fundamental social transformation rather than isolated trends.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“for all of those reasons uh we might think that 1965 is in addition to being a kind of an arbitrary 50-year uh anchor for a study uh a year with some real significance to it”

0.53

Poststructuralism, scientism, and California spiritualism—ideologies that spread from intellectuals to working-class men—destroyed traditional religion and objective ideas about masculinity, replacing them with a hedonistic goal of maximizing pleasure through entertainment, sex, and consumption, lowering motivation to work.

causalhigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 3/4durability 2/4· Documentary photographer (identified as Mark in Q&A)

“in the 70s there was a Great Awakening with uh poststructuralism uh scientism and uh California spiritualism and these are all things that we discuss extensively in this room but the way those ideologies kind of filter down to the riverbank in Tennessee was just kind of like pleasure it successfully destroyed religion and kind of like uh objective ideas like acting like a man but they kind of picked up on uh the goal in life is to maximize pleasure”

0.47

The solution to male labor force collapse requires ownership from the entire society—people across political viewpoints, journalists, anthropologists, and qualitative researchers, not just economists—coming together to recognize it as a grave social illness and offering diverse solutions.

normativehigh valuespeaker onlynovelty 2/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“My Hope in trying to uh cast a little bit of light on this in this one modest attempt was to encourage others to look at this problem too because I don't really think we can turn this terrible problem around unless our entire Society takes a little bit of ownership of it unless people with all sorts of different viewpoints uh come together in the Public Square recognize what a grave social illness is offer their own suggestions for how to deal with it”

0.43

The gender gap in labor force participation (women decline less than men) partly reflects the fact that women have much lower incarceration rates and criminal records than men, so they are not as damaged by the criminal justice system's effect on employment.

causalestablishednovelty 1/4durability 3/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“it also helps to explain uh some of the Gap that we've seen emerging between men and women because the proportion for women obviously isn't as high as for men”

0.34

The gig economy and sharing economy (Uber, TaskRabbit, etc.) should theoretically be captured in official employment statistics if measured correctly, as workers doing over one hour of work per week should be counted, though moonlighting and under-the-table work may be undercounted despite IRS attention and time-use survey consistency.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“in principle the US Labor Statistics are are supposed to uh track and follow uh paid work for anybody who uh who is paid and does more than an hour's work in uh in a week I think in the month before the uh before the survey takes place so it doesn't matter if you're doing a a j you know doing a run for Uber or if you're uh doing something in the gig economy or anything else it should be covered now that doesn't mean that it actually will be covered”

0.30

If the United States had workforce participation rates at year 2000 levels, there would be about 11 million more paying jobs today, demonstrating the magnitude of job loss since the 2008 crash and weak recovery.

factualestablishednovelty 1/4durability 2/4· Nicholas Easterbrook

“if uh if we just had a work rate that was back up to year 200000 levels we'd have about 11 million more paying jobs in the United States than we have today”