What this covers
Walter Russell Mead speaks with Tyler Cowen on the relationship between institutional coherence, cultural grounding, and American foreign-policy effectiveness. The conversation ranges across historical cases—from Israel's founding to Pakistan's stability, from German economic vulnerability to China's incremental expansion—while maintaining a consistent argument: that the professionalization and credentialization of the foreign-policy apparatus has coincided with its decline, and that the American academy in particular has become a self-referential bubble unsuited to understanding how the world actually works. Mead identifies bureaucratization and the loss of religious or historical grounding as the central problems facing both decision-makers and the institutions that train them.
The conversation turns on several distinct claims. Mead argues that non-democratic forms of government—particularly monarchical systems like Saudi Arabia's, organized around the monarch as power broker—have demonstrated stability that Western political science refuses to acknowledge. He contends that effective foreign policy requires distinguishing between vital hard power vs soft power goals and focusing resources on the former rather than pursuing ideological universalism. He traces current geopolitical tensions to material interests: Germany's orientation will be determined by cheap energy and markets, not values; Follow the Material Interest explains Saudi reluctance to increase oil production amid American efforts to phase out fossil fuels. On China, he describes a cabbage-leaf strategy of incremental expansion designed to avoid triggering unified resistance. Throughout, Mead emphasizes that the decline of religiosity has weakened the cultural glue required to sustain democratic governance at scale, and that individuals grounded in religious or historical tradition possess psychological resources—self-criticism, acceptance of limits—unavailable to those trained entirely within secular institutions.
Mead argues that effective foreign policy depends on cultural cohesion, historical and religious grounding, and pragmatic realism about hard-power limits, and that the over-bureaucratized, credentialized American academy and foreign-policy elite have systematically degraded that capacity.
- The bureaucratization and PhD-ification of foreign policy has coincided with declining effectiveness, not improved it
- Many states (Saudi Arabia, UAE) are stable through non-democratic mechanisms, contradicting the American belief that democracy is the only stable form of government
- Religious and historical grounding provides the self-criticism and psychological balance needed to handle existential foreign-policy questions
Professional foreign-policy elites have lost public credibility and institutional influence through repeated ideological failures and bureaucratic groupthink.
- Think tanks lost government influence partly because the government grew its own in-house think tanks—starting with State Department policy planning after WWII (which produced the Marshall Plan)—so you don't need the Council on Foreign Relations when you have your own internal capacity, and the CIA's analyst side is itself a very large think tank with classified access outside groups lack.
“the government has grown. It has its own in-house think tanks. This really starts with the policy planning in the State Department after World War II”
- Foreign-policy think tanks have less influence not because their government influence collapsed but because public trust in the educated professional elite has declined, since the elite was wrong about so many things for so long (e.g., 'free trade will make China democratic and Americans rich') and has never done the public soul-searching needed to explain why it should now be credible.
“the message from the think tank world was, “Free trade will make China democratic and Americans rich.” That was the message. Americans look at that, and they think, “Really?””
- Both the State Department and CIA are hampered by the bureaucratization of knowledge: where small pre-WWII institutions allowed individual geniuses like George Kennan real influence, the ballooned Cold War national-security bureaucracies foster groupthink that obscures their best thinking—since you only need one good China analyst if you can find the right one.
“There’s always the question, how many analysts of China do you need? The answer is one — if you can find the right one. Bureaucratic groupthink, I think, tends to dominate the products of both the State Department and the CIA”
- Over the last 40 years there has been an enormous increase in PhD graduates engaged in forming American foreign policy alongside an extraordinary decline in its effectiveness—a correlation Americans ought to take to heart.
“over the last 40 years, there’s been an enormous increase in the number of PhD grads engaged in the formation of American foreign policy. There’s also been an extraordinary decline in theeffectivenessof American foreign policy.”
- The American academy is a terrible place for understanding how world politics works because disciplines drift from pragmatism toward inward, ideological navel-gazing, and—worse—spending the first 30-35 years of life inside an academic bubble socializes smart people the way prison socializes prisoners, leaving them unable to ask the integrative question of what the overall impact of a policy will be.
“The American academy is actually a terrible place for coming to understand how world politics works.”
Religious faith and spiritual grounding are essential to national coherence and individual capacity to face existential foreign-policy challenges.
- The decline of American religiosity has diminished societal coherence and the psychological strength of individuals, because foreign policy now confronts existential questions (nuclear war, climate, AI) that few people can face with psychological balance absent a religious or faith grounding, and because religious identification provides the cultural glue that holds together a 300-million-person democracy where power is too diffuse to act otherwise.
“the ebbing of religion among some, certainly not all, Americans has tended to dissolve these bonds and leads, in all kinds of ways, both on the left and the right, to some of the sense of suspicion, of paranoia, a lack of trust, and declining support for democracy.”
- In a society of 300-plus million, if power were divided equally no individual would have any influence; democracy therefore functions through citizens' identification with elites and social-political groups, making cultural and spiritual bonds the essential glue.
“if political power was divided equally among all 300 million Americans, it would mean that no one had any power.”
- A religious faith connected to one of the great historical traditions—whether Christian, Muslim, or Jewish—gives a person a degree of insight and potential for self-criticism that are crucial to understanding foreign affairs, which is why Mead looks for grounding in a faith (or possibly a secular ideology) when spotting promising young foreign-policy talent.
“a religious faith, connected to one of the great historical traditions, gives you a degree of insight and potential for self-criticism that are absolutely crucial to foreign affairs.”
- American Mormons and evangelicals support the state of Israel not for traditional foreign-policy reasons but because its rise is seen as confirming their core religious theology—a sign of God working in history—which reassures them that a benign deity governs a dangerous world.
“people supporting the state, not necessarily for traditional foreign policy reasons, but because they think it’s a sign of God working in the world.”
Great-power rivals pursue incremental expansion, irrational escalation, and material interest unconstrained by ideological principles.
- The existence of nuclear weapons does not mean great-power conflict and international politics can be ignored, because actors are not always rational—Hitler with nuclear weapons in spring 1945 would have used them.
“if Adolf Hitler had had a couple of nuclear weapons in the spring of 1945, would he have used them? He absolutely would.”
- The Saudis won't pump more oil partly because fracking made the US a price competitor and because the Biden administration's climate-change agenda explicitly aims to drive fossil fuels out of the market—so if American policy is to make Saudi Arabia's one valuable income source worthless as fast as possible, the Saudis have little reason to bail the US out.
“If American policy is to make Saudi Arabia’s one valuable source of income worthless as quickly as possible, what are the reasons for them to help bail us out?”
- Germany's basic economic model—built on cheap Russian energy and large Chinese markets—is now under question because the energy supply is cut and China's development strategy aims to end dependency on imported capital goods by becoming a high-tech exporter, making China's industrial plans a gun pointed at the head of German business; Germany's foreign policy orientation will be driven not by ideology but by how it makes a living.
“The German model — and it’s very important in understanding that country — is based on the availability of cheap energy from Russia and large markets in China.”
- China prefers a 'cabbage-leaf' strategy of incremental expansion—growing one leaf at a time so no single move triggers an overwhelming response—as seen in its progression from 'peaceful' South China Sea islands to militarized bases to influence in the Solomon Islands, and Chinese policy toward Taiwan will likely reflect the same logic: nibbling and nibbling before taking the big bite.
“China prefers what people have called the cabbage-leaf strategy. The idea is that a cabbage starts very small, and it keeps growing one leaf after another, getting incrementally larger, but none of its expansionist moves quite trigger an overwhelming response.”
- Stalin had more to do with Israel's independence than Truman or the US, because the Soviets saw the British Empire as the weak point of Western containment and used the question of a Jewish state to drive a wedge between the US and Britain, destroy British power in the Middle East, and radicalize Arab opinion against the pro-British order—all of which Stalin gained from.
“Stalin had a lot more to do with the independence of Israel than Harry Truman or the United States.”
Successful US statecraft focuses on vital, achievable hard-power interests rather than unachievable idealistic transformation goals.
- The best US presidents in the Middle East (Bush Sr. and Nixon) understood that America has both vital, achievable hard-power goals and important but largely unachievable soft-power idealistic goals there, and succeeded by focusing on what was essential and achievable.
“our hard-power goals are vital, and they are achievable. Our soft-power goals are important but largely unachievable. What they did was, they set about dealing with what was essential”
- US Africa policy should de-fetishize democracy promotion, because spending resources flying ballots by helicopter to remote DRC villages while people die of medical problems simple treatment could fix is an insane misuse of resources—a murderous fetishization of ideology over reality; the real key to sub-Saharan development is economic success giving people opportunity to improve their own lives.
“we probably need to de-fetishize democracy promotion... this seems to me, frankly, an insane misuse of resources, a murderous fetishization of ideology over reality.”
- The American political-science belief since WWII that democracy is the only stable form of government and is inexorably rising bears very little relationship to facts outside Western Europe, NATO, Japan, and Australia—as demonstrated by Saudi Arabia's decades of stability.
“The American political-studies belief since World War II has essentially been, democracy is the only stable form of government... This bears very, very little relationship to the facts outside of Western Europe”
- Mead was never enchanted by neoconservatism because he was never persuaded that promotion of democracy is a solution to America's great-power problems and never believed the end-of-history thesis—so unlike disillusioned neoconservatives who flipped to Democratic positions, he had nothing to become disenchanted from.
“I never believed in theend of history thesis. In that sense, I was never enchanted, so I was never disenchanted.”
Historical experience, especially of defeat and moral complexity, tempers American illusions about transforming foreign societies.
- The biggest worldview difference between the parties on foreign policy is historical: Vietnam permanently wounded a class of liberal Democrats' faith in American ideology and made them favor soft power over hard power, whereas leading Republican figures like Baker and Shultz did not absorb the same cultural impact.
“A class of liberal Democrats saw their faith in American ideology permanently wounded by Vietnam. I don’t think that was as true among Republicans.”
- Growing up in the White South gives a person the rare American experience of both being defeated and being wrong, which—unlike the hubris of WASP Yankee patricians who feel they've never been wrong or beaten—instills an inherent sense of the limits of America's ability to transform societies, reinforced by the lesson of Reconstruction's failure.
“the South and the White South — which, of course, is where I come from — has had the experience of both being defeated and being wrong. That’s something that a lot of American political culture doesn’t have”
- To understand the world, history matters enormously and you can't know too much of it (though you must digest it), travel and getting into the field matter, and personal psychological self-understanding is mixed with political understanding because character matters.
“That history matters a lot, and that you can’t know too much history. Now, you have to digest it, but you can’t know too much history.”
Geopolitical stability rests on institutional coherence, national survival pressure, and traditional power-balancing rather than regime type.
- Despite massive governance failure—broken schools, failed flood control, a collapsing economy, and waning US and Chinese support—the strongest single institution in Pakistan is its nuclear-armed military, which has a strong institutional sense of coherence and loyalty to the Pakistani state, a factor essential to predicting Pakistan's future.
“the strongest single institution in Pakistan is its nuclear-armed military. This military has a strong institutional sense of coherence and a strong loyalty to the Pakistani state.”
- From 1850 to 1950 large multinational states crumbled into more coherent ethnic units at the cost of enormous wars, and this re-sorting continues today—visible in Syria, Libya, Ethiopia, Sudan, and Nigeria—because as societies develop, groups become less content to live in large multiethnic units and want to be ruled by people who understand them.
“from 1850 to 1950, you see theselarge, multinational states crumbling away into individual ethnic, almost monocultures, and at the cost of enormous wars”
- Before the Ukraine invasion the US sent Putin a self-defeating combined message: revealing excellent intelligence to signal 'we understand you better than you think,' while simultaneously offering Zelenskyy a plane out of Kyiv and pulling diplomats—communicating 'you are going to win if you do this' and undercutting any internal Russian voices warning the invasion would be hard.
“The message, actually the totality of the message that we sent to Putin is, “You are going to win if you do this.””
- Being a small, insecure country is good for political intelligence because feeling your survival is on a knife edge makes you think hard and ruthlessly weed out incompetent people from your national security structure—a margin of error breeds complacency, while existential worry gives states like the UAE an edge.
“being a small, insecure country is very good for your political intelligence because when you feel you have an immense margin of error, then you don’t really care that much, but when you feel that your survival is on a knife edge, you think hard about what you’re doing”
- Saudi stability comes from the monarchical tradition of the king acting as a feudal-style power broker who balances tribes and clans, sensing where discontent arises and rebalancing, combined with large oil income that provides the resources to respond to grievances.
“the king acting as a power broker among different tribes and clans, maintaining a balance of power more like a feudal leader in medieval Europe than a modern dictator”
Regional security threats from major powers and state dissolution continue despite liberal assumptions about inevitable democratic stability.
- A new Balkan war would most likely arise from Russia, perhaps with quiet Chinese support, stirring the pot around a Serbia-Kosovo flashpoint to divert NATO's attention and resources from Ukraine to its southern flank.
“if the war in Ukraine continues to drag on for Putin, diverting NATO’s attention and resources to the southern flank, to the western Balkans makes a lot of sense.”
- America turned away Jewish refugees in the 1920s-30s because the technological shift to large, fast steam-powered ships and European railroad networks created cheap mass immigration just as the Industrial Revolution and decline of the family farm produced economic anxiety, shifting labor unions against immigration and culminating in draconian 1923-24 restrictions—after which 25% Depression unemployment left zero support for immigration and even less for prioritizing Jews.
“Once you had these steam-powered ships that were much, much larger and could travel much more quickly, it became much cheaper for immigrants. Plus, you started having railroad networks across Europe”
- Northeast India is unlikely to break away because secession would immediately lead to its annexation by China, which few there want; the Indian interest in preventing Chinese encroachment plus the argument that Beijing would treat residents worse than New Delhi keeps the region in the fold.
“it would immediately lead to its annexation by China, which is something that I think very few people in northeastern India want.”
International institutions persist not from their effectiveness but from convenience in managing problems no one wants to address.
- If the UN disappeared we would need to reinvent it—not because it accomplishes much as a central political body, but because there are many problems no one wants to deal with yet still wants dealt with, and it's convenient to have the UN to work on them.
“there are all kinds of problems that no one else really wants to deal with, but still wants to have them dealt with, that it’s very convenient to have the UN to work on them.”
- The WikiLeaks cables revealed that many State Department observers are quite good, sending home perceptive analyses, contrary to assumptions about institutional quality.
“One of the interesting consequences for me of theWikiLeaks cableswas you see, actually, just howgooda lot of the State Department observers are.”
- Israel's promotion of technology like Pegasus spyware is not fundamentally different from what the US, Russia, and India do in selling weapons worldwide without effectively controlling their use; it is 'in the ballpark' with everyone else.
“is Israeli’s promotion of technology like Pegasus fundamentally that different from what everybody else is doing? I would say the answer there is no.”