What this covers
Velina Tchakarova sits down with Tyler Cowen to map the shape of great-power competition over the next decade. She argues that the world is not drifting toward multipolarity but hardening into a rigid bipolarity—a US pole and a China pole, with Russia effectively subordinated to China through what she calls the Dragonbear, a coordination mechanism that emerged after 2014. The conversation ranges across flashpoints (Taiwan, Ukraine, North Korea) and treats them not as isolated crises but as moves within this larger structural competition. Throughout, Tchakarova emphasizes the distinction between daily prediction and long-term foresight—a methodological claim that shapes how she frames each conflict.
The substance branches into three territories. First: the evidence for bipolarity. She walks through how her global system analysis, tracking finance, energy, trade, and agriculture, identified only two genuine centers of power since 2014, leaving middle powers like India to oscillate between them. Second: specific geopolitical moves. On Taiwan, she forecasts death by a thousand cuts rather than invasion. On Ukraine, she explains how she predicted conflict but expected a limited operation, and attributes Putin's all-in decision to assured Chinese support and a permissive global environment in late 2021. On the Balkans, she describes how external competition among the EU, Russia, Turkey, the US, and China creates space for smaller states to play interests off each other. Third: the methodology itself. She articulates what foresight requires—freedom from bias, a working model, off-the-record networks of on-the-ground experts—and notes the structural problem that long-term assessments cannot be validated until years pass and reality confirms them. She also addresses how trend projection informs practical decisions, drawing on her own investment moves in semiconductors.
Tchakarova argues the world is not sliding into multipolarity but into a bipolar order organized around a US pole and a China pole (with Russia subordinated to China via the 'Dragonbear'), and that long-term geopolitical foresight—not daily prediction—is the right tool for navigating it.
- Since 2014 her 'global system' analysis showed only two real centers of power, with middle powers like India oscillating between them
- Russia took China's side in 2014 and was economically saved by China, formalizing the Dragonbear coordination
- Conflicts (Taiwan, Ukraine, North Korea) are best understood as moves within this great-power competition rather than isolated events
The global system has solidified into a true bipolarity between US and China with all others in a gray zone oscillating between them.
- Contrary to the 20-year consensus that the world is sliding into multipolarity, since 2014 a 'global system' macro analysis of intertwined socioeconomic networks (finance, energy, trade, agriculture) reveals only two true centers of power—the US and China—with everything in between occupying a gray zone oscillating between them.
“The biggest cliche that we've been hearing is that we are sliding into a multipolarity order... I've never bought into this. Since 2014... I saw that, practically, we have only two centers of power.”
- The China-Russia relationship is best understood as the 'Dragonbear'—a modus vivendi and modus operandi enabling the two to coordinate without entering any formal strategic alliance—a concept that drew no interest when introduced in 2014 but is now validated by daily commentary on a China-Russia axis and decoupling.
“the Dragonbear being this modus vivendi of China and Russia, as modus operandi to coordinate without the necessity to enter any strategic alliance”
- Most middle powers avoid taking sides in the US-China bipolarity in order to capitalize on both worlds, with India the classic example, acting as a geopolitical bridge between the two antagonists to extract the best of both.
“most of these middle powers are still avoiding taking sides. They want to capitalize from both worlds. A classic example right now is the case of India. India is acting as a geopolitical bridge between the two antagonists”
Russia's strategy is systematic long-term territorial subjugation through cycles of military action, ceasefire, and negotiation that legitimize gains.
- Putin's calculus is to take all of Ukraine, not just a third, and if necessary to pursue a 10- to 15-year plan of slow subjugation using a 'rinse-and-repeat' pattern of military action, ceasefire, and negotiations—as practiced since 2014—because each ceasefire and negotiation legitimizes Russian territorial gains and is subsequently violated, which plays into Russia's hands.
“Putin wants the whole of Ukraine, not just one-third of Ukraine or 20 percent. Right now, Russia controls around 18 percent. No, they want all of it”
- Tchakarova predicted in December 2021 a war but expected a limited operation in Ukraine's east and south rather than an all-in five-direction full-scale invasion; she attributes Putin's actual all-in decision to a permissive regional/global environment (US withdrawal from Afghanistan, European political vacuums, the 2021 energy crisis, food prices hitting 2011 levels on the FAO index) and crucially to assured comprehensive support from China built with Xi since 2013.
“I was absolutely sure that there will be a war, but I actually called this war a limited military operation. I thought that this was my mistake, that the war will start in the east and south of Ukraine.”
Foresight is a disciplined qualitative methodology for trend categorization and projection distinct from prediction, requiring bias freedom and rigorous modeling.
- Foresight is fundamentally different from prediction or forecasting: rather than predicting discrete outcomes like elections, it categorizes daily events into trends to assess possible trend projections and anticipate possible futures, a qualitative methodology requiring one to free oneself from personal biases and to operate with a model.
“Contrary to predictions, I anticipate possible futures. I do foresight, not predictions, not forecast, so I cannot forecast anything.”
- Effective geopolitical analysis comes not from public posting but from off-the-record networks of on-the-ground experts with proven track records, combined with reading across five languages and many chat-room platforms, which allows quick discrimination of credible from non-credible sources in a way ordinary social-media users cannot replicate.
“what I post on Twitter is not what I actually discuss with my clients off the record... I have networks of people who have a proven track record of analysis and assessment, and they are very often also on the ground.”
- Long-term trend projection enables actionable investment decisions: anticipating the bifurcation of the global system with semiconductors as a critical area, she invested in semiconductors six to seven years ago, demonstrating that macro foresight (not tactical daily analysis) supports patient long-game investing.
“I invested in semiconductors six, seven years ago, knowing that there will be actually a bifurcation of the global system, and one of the critical areas of it will be semiconductors.”
- Large consultancies such as Goldman Sachs are now trying to enter the business of geopolitical foresight with big teams, but the methodology is not easily conducted because it requires freeing oneself from personal biases and operating with a model.
“a lot of consultancies, like the big consultancy Goldman Sachs, are trying to enter this business of geopolitical foresight with big teams and trying to foresee the future. But in the end, I would argue it's a methodology that is not so easily conducted.”
- A structural problem of long-term foresight is that it is impossible to convince anyone of an assessment's correctness until reality kicks in and proves it right, as happened with her bipolarity and Dragonbear assessments which were ignored for a decade before becoming mainstream.
“it is absolutely not possible to convince anybody else of the correctness of this assessment so long as the reality doesn't kick in and prove you right.”
International law and global order are crumbling into a gray interregnum where the powerful act unchecked and conflict proliferates without effective enforcement.
- Many Serbians believe Russia is one of the biggest investors in Serbia, which is not factually true—the European Union is in fact the biggest institutional investor—revealing that perception of Russian influence diverges sharply from economic reality.
“ask who is one of the biggest investors in Serbia, a lot of people will tell you that this is Russia, which is actually not the case. It's not factual because still, the European Union is, in fact, the biggest institutional investor in the country.”
- Balkanization—splitting a country into smaller parts so external powers can interfere and play political actors against each other—remains a relevant and actively applied tactic in other regions of the world today.
“the term Balkanization means splitting a country into smaller parts in order for external powers to interfere, to play different political actors off against each other. That kind of thing is still very much relevant, and it's being used and applied to other regions”
- If forced to speculate, the most likely region to see further nuclearization is the Middle East, because Iran has never been closer to obtaining a nuclear weapon, and one scenario is Israel (which already has nuclear weapons) considering their use to prevent Iran from acquiring them—though she considers it improbable.
“one region that would probably see nuclearization, will witness more nuclearization, is actually the Middle East because Iran has never been closer to getting the nuclear weapon.”
- The number of international military conflicts and wars is now the highest since the end of the Cold War, and 2024 is forecast to be extremely volatile with even more tensions and conflicts in the coming years.
“the number of international military conflicts and wars hasn't been that high since the end of the Cold War. It's the highest number of military conflicts and wars.”
- International law still exists but in the world of realpolitik the strong do what they want and the weak suffer what they must; we are in a gray interregnum where the old international system is crumbling and a new one is being born, so bodies like the UN Security Council are bifurcated between China-Russia and the US-France-UK and are both used and misused, leaving no global police power to end conflicts.
“we have international law, but in the world of realpolitik and geopolitics, the strong do what they want, and the weak suffer what they must.”
- Bulgaria is one of the fastest demographically shrinking countries in the world (not just Europe), a structural problem driven by 30 years of political mismanagement and corruption, low birth rates, skyrocketing death rates, and the emigration of roughly 3 to 3.5 million people.
“Bulgaria is probably one of the fastest demographically shrinking countries in the world, not just in Europe.”
- The Israel-Hamas war will likely find its resolution by the end of 2024, with the US/EU backing Israel and China/Russia backing the Palestinian question, and this balancing act may positively push toward a two-state solution despite devastating humanitarian consequences—whereas the war in Ukraine will continue for several more years.
“the war between Israel and Hamas probably will find its way by the end of this year, as compared to some other tensions that will still be ongoing, like the war in Ukraine, which will still be ongoing in the next several years.”
- North Korea will not use nuclear weapons because a small player using them would be annihilated, and because there is a 'scalability' in international relations—smaller players are only allowed to create regional havoc within a scope tolerated by their patrons (China and Russia), who benefit from North Korea overstretching US attention in the Indo-Pacific.
“Neither China nor Russia will actually allow a small player in international relations to use the nuclear weapon because there is a scalability in the international relations.”
- The helicopter crash killing the Iranian president and foreign minister is being referenced by some analysts as a potential 'next Sarajevo moment'—a black-swan, unanticipated event of the kind that triggered World War I—which could lead to a major military conflict.
“it could be the next Sarajevo moment... A Sarajevo moment is something that is defined as a black swan and that could lead to a major military conflict”
Middle and regional powers maintain stability and extract advantage by balancing competition among external powers rather than submitting to hegemons.
- The Balkans achieve stability not through a single hegemon but through a balancing act among several external powers (EU, Russia, Turkey, US, China), and this competition of empires allowing small states to capitalize on their own interests is a geopolitical continuum that has persisted across history.
“There is a stability outside the influence exercised by a hegemon, for instance, to the balance of several external powers. This is the case right now.”
- While nationalist sentiment will persist and be politicized in Bulgaria, the dream of a 'San Stefano' greater Bulgaria including parts of neighboring countries is over and will not return so long as these states remain in or candidates for the EU, because EU institutions provide a solution mechanism and incentives for parties to find common ground.
“The dream of, let's say, San Stefano Bulgaria or, if you like, big Bulgaria including parts of other countries, neighbors, is over.”
- Russian influence over neighbors follows a 'golden rule' that the closer a state is to the core, the greater the influence, penetration, and subversion—illustrated by Cold War Bulgaria being the most controlled satellite while more distant Poland and Czechoslovakia had more room to act and more internal turmoil.
“I use this golden rule of the closer, the better. In terms of influence and in terms of penetration and subversion, the closer to the core, the bigger the influence.”
Russia's near-term risks involve probing NATO after Ukraine while nuclear escalation risk remains low despite rhetoric and China's patient Taiwan strategy eschews invasion.
- If Russia succeeds in Ukraine, in the 2025-2026 timeframe it could plausibly grab territories near existing military presence (Transnistria as a cordon sanitaire near Odessa, South Ossetia, Abkhazia in Georgia) and then probe the Baltics to test whether NATO's Article 5 would actually be activated—a scenario currently possible and somewhat probable but not yet plausible—while Poland is a less likely target, especially if Poland goes nuclear.
“provocation like this would mean to test the article 5, to use the opportunity to show that article 5 of NATO is not really going to be activated.”
- Despite Russia's nuclear blackmail and a precedent of a great power using nuclear threats to legitimize territorial gains, the realistic risk of nuclear weapons actually being used has not grown; Russia does not need tactical nukes against Ukraine given its conventional arsenal.
“With all the nuclear blackmail, with all the threats that nuclear weapons will be used coming from Russia... the risk of the realistic use of nuclear weapons hasn't grown bigger.”
- China is unlikely to launch a military attack on Taiwan because it can achieve subjugation more efficiently through a slow, steady 'death by a thousand cuts'—political, social, economic, and societal penetration using agents provocateurs and plausible deniability—since time is on China's side and a military invasion offers less than a 50-50 chance of success given Taiwan's difficult terrain and a narrow attack window limited to April and October.
“I call this approach "death by a thousand cuts." That would mean that China could spend a little bit longer in a slow but steady political, social, economic, and societal penetration of Taiwan.”